JUDGMENT V. K. Mahrotra , J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal who has lost in both the Courts below, 2. The plaintiff was posted as Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Northern Railway, at Varanasi, when a charge sheet, dated 29 June 1968 (Paper No. 17A), was served upon him. In the statement of allegations accompanying this charge sheet were enumerated the facts on the basis whereof it was alleged that the plaintiff had violated the Railway Servants' Conduct Rules. The plaintiff was required to submit a representation to the accusations made against him within seven days of the service upon him of the charge sheet or, in case he desired to inspect the documents upon which the accusations were founded or some other relevant documents, within seven days of such Inspection having been made by him. The plaintiff addressed a letter (Paper No. 15A) on 4July 1968, demanding inspection of a number of documents to enable him to submit his reply to the charge sheet. On 26 August 1968, the plaintiff was informed by a letter of the same date (Paper No. 13 A) that some of the documents mentioned by him In his letter, dated 4 July 1968, may be inspected by him the same day at Delhi. It was also mentioned in that letter that since it, would not be possible for the plaintiff to proceed to Delhi and make the Inspection there that very day, a request was being made to the authorities concerned to fix a date In future on which the plaintiff may make Inspection at Delhi. The case of the plaintiff is that no such future date was ever intimated and that on 4 January 1969, an order was passed inflicting upon him a minor punishment of temporary stoppage of his Increments for two years. This order is Paper No. 12A on the record. The case set up by the defendant, however, is that by a communication, dated 28 August 1968, the date of inspection of the documents by the plaintiff was fixed as S September 1968. The plaintiff, according to the defendant, did not avail of the opportunity of inspection offered to him nor did he file any reply to the charge sheet. The case set up by the defendant, however, is that by a communication, dated 28 August 1968, the date of inspection of the documents by the plaintiff was fixed as S September 1968. The plaintiff, according to the defendant, did not avail of the opportunity of inspection offered to him nor did he file any reply to the charge sheet. The order of punishment, therefore, had to be passed ex page on the basis of the material on record which was duly examined by the punishing authority, namely, the General Manager of the Northern Railway. 3. After giving a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises. on 22 May 1965. After narrating the facts leading to the impugned order of punishment the plaintiff prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased- " to cancel and set aside the order of punishment, dated 4 January 1969, passed by the General Manager, Northern Railway, withholding the increment of the plaintiff temporarily for two years, and to pass an order of permanent prohibitory Injunction restraining the defendant from giving effect to and/or acting upon themselves or through any of their employees, agents or servants, the order of punishment, dated 4 January 1969, mentioned above." 4. The claim for the relief aforesaid, which essentially was one for a declaration that the order of punishment, dated 4 January 1969, was void and Inoperative was founded upon two main grounds, namely ; (1) that the order had been passed without affording an opportunity of defence to which the plaintiff was entitled under the relevant rules and on principles of natural justice ; and (2) that It was bad for want of recital of any reasons for the order. 5. The principal defence of the Union of India in the case was that the plaintiff had been afforded all opportunity to which he was entitled, but, inasmuch as he failed to make use thereof or to make any representation about the charges levelled against him, he could not canvass the invalidity of the order of punishment on that score. It was also pleaded that the order passed on 4 January 1969, was in accordance with law and that no infirmity attached to it on the supposed ground that it did not contain any reasons, or was not a speaking order. Other defences were also taken. It was also pleaded that the order passed on 4 January 1969, was in accordance with law and that no infirmity attached to it on the supposed ground that it did not contain any reasons, or was not a speaking order. Other defences were also taken. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court have taken the view that opportunity, envisaged by law, was afforded to the plaintiff to meet the charges levelled against him but he failed to avail of it. They have also taken the view that the order, dated 4 January 1969, does not suffer from any infirmity on the ground that it is a non- speaking order. The plaintiff was held by both the Courts below as not entitled to any relief. 6. Appearing for the plaintiff-appellant Sri K. N. Tripathi, his learned counsel, has made two submissions in this Court The first of these submissions is that the plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity to which he was entitled under rule 1716 of the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules for Railway Servants in force from 1 August 1961, and rule I 1 of the Railway Servants (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968, which came into force on 1 October 1968. The second submission is that the order of punishment is bad in law for it is not a speaking order and does not contain the reasons for the order. 7. In Debi Din v. Divisional Operating Superintendent, Northern Railway, Moradabad, and others, A.I.R. 1968 All. 355, a Division Bench of this Court held that an order of punishment passed under rule 1716 should contain reasons and that in case It did not contain reasons, it would stand vitiated In law. Speaking for the Division Bench, Laxmi Prasad, J., observed that 3 "As already indicated the procedure prescribed by rule 1716 which the punishing authority had to follow in the instant case itself requires that the authority has not only to pass the order on the case but also to give reasons for the order. That the punishing authority in the instant case failed to comply with this requirement is amply clear from the order, annexure 4. That the petitioner attacked the order, annexure 4, in appeal on that score is amply clear from the memo of appeal, annexure 5. That the punishing authority in the instant case failed to comply with this requirement is amply clear from the order, annexure 4. That the petitioner attacked the order, annexure 4, in appeal on that score is amply clear from the memo of appeal, annexure 5. In these circumstances, it was the bounden duty of the appellate authority having regard to the requirement of rule 1731 which the appellate authority had to observe in the instant case, to quash the order of punishment for the simple reasons that it came to be passed without reasons being mentioned for the same and to direct the punishing authority to dispose of the matter afresh In accordance with rule 1716, in case the appellate authority thought, having regard to all the facts of the case, that it was necessary to pursue the matter any further. The very fact that the appellate authority did nothing of the sort but only passed a cryptic order: " I have gone through his appeal. The appeal is rejected," shows that the appellate authority failed to consider the points enumerated in Cis. (a) to (c) of sub-rule (2) of rule 1731. On that score itself the petition must succeed, apart from the fact as to whether or not on the very language of rule 1731, the appellate authority is bound to give reasons for its decision. We are of opinion that even though role 1731 does not provide in express terms for the reasons being given just as rule 1716 (2) provides in express terms, the same appears to be necessarily implied In the language of rule 1731, The very requirement that the appellate authority Is to consider whether the finding recorded by the punishing authority is justified shows that the appellate authority has to appraize the evidence for Itself in order to confirm or reverse the findings recorded by the punishing authority. That necessarily implies the giving of reasons. In our view, there can be no sufficient compliance with the requirements of rule 1731 (2) unless reasons have been given. So in any view of the matter the inevitable is that on the facts of the present case the order passed in appeal stands vitiated." 8. That necessarily implies the giving of reasons. In our view, there can be no sufficient compliance with the requirements of rule 1731 (2) unless reasons have been given. So in any view of the matter the inevitable is that on the facts of the present case the order passed in appeal stands vitiated." 8. The decision aforesaid, which is binding upon me, clearly lays down that where an order of punishment passed under the aforesaid rule 1716 does not contain reasons, as required by that rule, it shall have to be held to be bad in law. The order of punishment, as noticed by the Division Bench, is made subject to an appeal in rule 1731. Where the order of punishment is subject to an appeal, the necessity to record the reasons is greater for without record of reasons, the appellate authority has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the decision was just. See Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1320 . 9. Reasons, as held by the Supreme Court In Union of India and others v. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, 1974 (I) L.L.N. 74 (in Para. 28, at page 86) "...are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just, and reasonable. . ." 10. The relevant portion of the order, dated 4 January 1969, challenged in this case Is as follows : " The memorandum of charge sheet No. -9 Vig/197, dated 29 June 1968, was acknowledged by you on 29 June 1968. You were directed by the Senior Commercial Officer (6), Northern Railway, Varanasi, vide letter No. SC OB/CON/Officers/ 63, dated 26 August 1968, to attend head quarters office on 26 August 1968, for Inspection of the chaiges framed against you, as also organisation order of the catering department, requisitioned by you. You were directed by the Senior Commercial Officer (6), Northern Railway, Varanasi, vide letter No. SC OB/CON/Officers/ 63, dated 26 August 1968, to attend head quarters office on 26 August 1968, for Inspection of the chaiges framed against you, as also organisation order of the catering department, requisitioned by you. You have, however, failed either to inspect these documents or submit your defence to the memorandum of charge sheet, though reasonable opportunities have been afforded to you for this purpose. I have carefully considered the case and have decided to impose upon you penalty of withholding of increments temporarily for a period of two years. Your next increment is, therefore, withheld for a period of two years without affecting and postponing future increments." It is evident that the order aforesaid cannot be said to contain any reasons as is required in law. Obviously, therefore, the order is vitiated and cannot be held to be one in conformity with law. It deserves to be declared to be so. 11. In view of my conclusion in regard to the second submission of Sri Tripathi, it is really unnecessary to examine his first sub- mission about there being lack of opportunity of defence to the plaintiff in the matter of the disciplinary enquiry against him, resulting in the imposition of minor penalty contained in the order, dated 4 January 1969. The plaintiff is entitled to relief on the ground that the order is vitiated on account of lack of reasons therein as required by law. 12. Setting aside, therefore, the decree of the two Courts below I allow the appeal and decree the plaintiff's suit for a declaration that the order, dated 4 January 1969, (Paper No. 22A) is Illegal and inoperative and as cannot be held to affect the plaintiff's right in the matter of his emoluments. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.