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Allahabad High Court · body

1980 DIGILAW 1047 (ALL)

Gopi Chand v. State of U. P

1980-11-11

P.N.BAKSHI

body1980
JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. - The applicant has been convicted under sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to 6 months R.I., and a fine of Rs. 1000/-by the Munsif Magistrate, Deoria. His conviction and sentence has been maintained in appeal by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Deoria vide his order dated 18th December, 79. Hence this revision. 2. Very briefly stated the prosecution case is that a sample of linseed oil was purchased by the Food Inspector Jagat Pal Singh from the applicant on 11th December, 76, on suspicion it was adulterated. The sample was filled in three separate phials and duly sealed in accordance with law. One phial was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst and two phials were deposited in the Health Office. The report of the Public Analyst disclosed that the sample was adulterated. After obtaining sanction the applicant has been prosecuted and convicted, as above. Both the courts below on a consideration of the evidence on the record and the circumstances of the case have held the guilt of the accused fully established. 3. Counsel for the applicant has argued three points. First submission is that the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to him by the Health Officer but by the Food Inspector. This argument does not carry any weight. The statement of the Food Inspector is clearly to the effect that two sample phials were deposited by him in the Health Office. Obviously if the sample was sent by the Food Inspector, it implies that it was sent through the Health Office where they were in deposit. In any case this technicality will not carry the applicant very far, because there is nothing to indicate that any prejudice has been caused to him, as a result of the report being sent by the Food Inspector through the Health Office. 4. Second contention of the applicants counsel is that the Sanctioning Authority has not applied his mind. The order granting sanction is Ex. 8 on the record. The argument advanced by the learned counsel is that this exhibit is cyclostyled and that the number of the Notification which authorised the Mukhya Chikitsa Adhikari to grant sanction has been cyclostyled as "6000/-" instead of 600/-. The order granting sanction is Ex. 8 on the record. The argument advanced by the learned counsel is that this exhibit is cyclostyled and that the number of the Notification which authorised the Mukhya Chikitsa Adhikari to grant sanction has been cyclostyled as "6000/-" instead of 600/-. He points out that the correct number of notification has not been cyclostyled and therefore the Chief Medical Officer had no jurisdiction to grant the sanotton. This argument is again based upon a typing or cyclostyling error. The crux of the matter is whether the sanctioning authority has applied his mind to the facts of the case. I find from a perusal of Ex. Ka 8 that it is mentioned therein that the sanctioning authority is satisfied from the perusal of the case sent to him, that accused has committed the offence. The order of sanction is duly signed and dated by him. Apart from this the report of the Public Analyst Ex. 4 is also signed by the sanctioning authority and the word prosecute has been written thereon. The Food Inspector has deposed that all the papers including the report of the Public Analyst were sent to the sanctioning authority. There is no cross-examination on this aspect of the matter. I have, therefore, every reason to hold that the relevant papers concerning sanction were sent to the Sanctioning Authority and were considered by him before he appended his signatures granting sanction. I, therefore, find no merit in this contention raised by the applicants counsel. 5. Lastly it is argued that the report of the Public Anayst was sent to the applicant on 10th March 1977, whereas the complaint was filed on 14th April, 1977. The argument is that the sending of the report of the Public Analyst more than a month prior to the initiation of proceedings has deprived the applicant of a valuable right to apply to the court within the specified period of 10 days for reanalysis of the sample purchased from him. In this connection, it would be worthy of note that the sample in question which forms the basis of the present offence was taken from the applicant on 11th December, 76. He would be, therefore, guided by the provisions of the P.F. Act, and the rules made therein as they existed on that date. Till then Rule 9(J) had not been deleted and was in existence. He would be, therefore, guided by the provisions of the P.F. Act, and the rules made therein as they existed on that date. Till then Rule 9(J) had not been deleted and was in existence. It is settled view of this court that rule 9(J) was not mandatory therefore the question of a loss of right which has been confined to a period of ten days after the amendment dated 4.1.77 does not arise in the instant case. Prior to amendment and the insertion of rule 9(A) on 4.1.1977, rule 9(J) existed on the statute book. In these rules which applied to the circumstances of the present case, the applicant had a right to apply for sending the sample for reanalysis at any time till the date of final judgment. Therefore, there has been no infringement of his legal right. Moreover, I find from scrutiny of the record that no application has ever been filed by the applicant at any stage of the proceedings for sending the sample for re-analysis. The ground which is now sought to be canvassed was never taken either in the trial court or in the court of appeal. There is no material on the record to indicate that any prejudice has been caused to the accused on this ground. In these circumstances, I find no force in this submission also. 6. In the result, this revision application fails and is hereby dismissed. The applicant is on bail. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the unexpired portion of the sentence of imprisonment. The interim stay order passed by this court is hereby vacated.