JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs appellants. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 1st October, 1973 on the ground that it was barred by time. Against the judgment dated 1st October, 1973 an appeal was filed before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal on 12th March, 1975. The judgment dated 12th March, 1975 has been impugned in the present second appeal. 2. The only question involved in the resent appeal is as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs appellants was barred by time or not. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, did not apply to the facts of the present case and as such the view taken by the courts below is erroneous in law. The further argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit falls either under Articles 65, 109 or 110 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the only article applicable to the suit in question is Article 59 and as such the suit is barred by time. 3. In order to decide the controversy, between the parties in the present appeal it is necessary to examine all the four articles mentioned above. Articles 59, 65, 109 and 110 are quoted below :- "59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of contract Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first becomes known to him. "65, For possession of immoveable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Explanation.- For the purposes of this article. (a) where the suit is by a remainderman a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devi see, as the case may be, falls into possession. Explanation.- For the purposes of this article. (a) where the suit is by a remainderman a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devi see, as the case may be, falls into possession. (b) where the suit is by Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant, shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; (c) where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the Judgment - debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the Judgment - debtor who was out of possession. "109. By a Hindu governed by Mitakshara Law of set aside of ancestral property. Twelve years. When the alienee takes possession of the property." "110. By a person excluded from a joint family property to enforce a right to share therein." Twelve years When the exclusion become known to the plaintiff." 4. In the instant case on a reading of the plaint it is clear that the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs appellants on the ground that Mantoo Lal, father of the appellants, had no right to transfer the share of the plaintiffs appellants to respondents Nos. 2 to 4. The allegation was that after the coming into force of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition, and Land Reforms Act, (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951), the plaintiffs appellants being members of the joint Hindu family and the property in dispute being ancestral property, they had share in such ancestral property and as such Mantoo Lal respondent No. 1 their father, could not transfer their share by the impugned sale deed to respondents Nos. 2 to 4. The relief, therefore, claimed in the plaint was that the sale deed which had been executed by respondent No. 1 in favour of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 was void ab initio to the extent of the th share of the plaintiffs appellants. Accordingly, a further relief was sought that respondents Nos. 2 to 4. The relief, therefore, claimed in the plaint was that the sale deed which had been executed by respondent No. 1 in favour of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 was void ab initio to the extent of the th share of the plaintiffs appellants. Accordingly, a further relief was sought that respondents Nos. 2 to 4 who had come in possession by virtue of the sale deed, should be ejected from the plots in dispute and thereafter the suit be decreed in favour of the appellants for joint possession. The admitted case of the parties was that the plaintiffs appellants were not parties to the said sale deed. 5. In Prakash Narain v. Raja Birendra, AIR 1931 Oudh 333, this Court has laid down that while interpreting Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which is in similar terms to the present Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, that this article does not apply when the plaintiff is not party to the instrument sought to be avoided. The decision in Prakash Narain's case (supra) fully applies to the facts of the present case. In the circumstances so far as Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned it does not apply to the instant case. The first submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded. 6. The question now remains to be considered is if Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply which other article would govern the present suit. Article 109 applies to a suit when a Hindu governed by Mitakshara Law files a suit to set aside his father's alienation of ancestral property. After the coming into force of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the question arose as to whether the property still remains ancestral or the property ceased to be ancestral property. In Ram Awalamb v. Tata Shanker, AIR 1969 All 526 ; (1968 All LJ 1108), a Full Bench of this Court took the view that when members of a joint Hindu family holds Bhumidhari right in any holding they hold the same as tenants in common and not as joint tenants and that the notions of Hindu law cannot be invoked to determine that status. This view was taken by the Full Bench in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1790 : (1961 All LJ 716) in which the Supreme Court took the view that Section 18 of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act conferred new rights on person on whom they had been conferred and they held such rights subject to the provisions of that Act. In view of this decision it cannot be said that the plaintiff's suit is based on the basis that the property was ancestral property. Article 109 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would, therefore, not apply. 7. Article 110 is applicable to suits where a person is excluded from a joint family property to enforce a right to share therein. Thus, as I have already stated above, after the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 the rights of the plaintiffs cannot be said to be those of joint family property and as such this article would not apply. This article would further not apply because it is well settled that when the rights of strangers intervene Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply. For both the reasons mentioned above Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. 8. The only article left for consideration is Article 65. Article 65 applies to suits for possession of immovable property or any interest therein base of on title and the limitation starts when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In the instant case admittedly the plaintiffs appellants were members of a joint Hindu family. The property was ancestral property. After the coming into force of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 the appellants became co-bhumidhars of the property in dispute. In view of this the possession of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 obtained by virtue of the sale deed executed by respondent No. 1 in respect of the entire property would clearly become adverse to that of the plaintiffs appellants. The present suit is a suit for avoiding the said sale deed on the ground that th share could not be transferred to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 by respondent No. 1. In the circumstances the present suit filed for joint possession of the property after ejecting respondents Nos. The present suit is a suit for avoiding the said sale deed on the ground that th share could not be transferred to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 by respondent No. 1. In the circumstances the present suit filed for joint possession of the property after ejecting respondents Nos. 2 to 4 from their exclusive possession is clearly a suit which would come under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 9. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the suit is not barred by time as the 12 year's period of limitation is applicable as provided by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 10. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the trial court as well as of the lower appellate court are set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial court for decision on merits. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.