JUDGMENT M. N. Shukla, J. - This revision arises out of proceedings in execution of a compromise decree dated 22-1-1975 passed by this Court and affirmed by its order dated 3-4-1975. 2. The execution proceedings arose out of a suit which was filed for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and winding up of the affairs of the firm known as "Agarwal Ice Factory, Ahmadabad" etc. Aggrieved by some of the orders passed in the suit the parties filed F.A.F.O.'s. in this Court and it was during the pendency of these appeals that the parties arrived at the compromise dated 22-1-1975. The following prayers were made by the parties in the compromise: "A. That it be declared that the firm M/s. Agarwal Ice Factory, Ahmadabad stands dissolved. B. That the suit for accounting shall stand decreed and the court below will appoint a commissioner to determine the amounts due to the respondents. C. That on payment of the amount of Rs. 5,14,800/- and upon compliance of the terms of cl. (8) above the first appeal from order No. 31 of 1971 shall stand allowed and order passed by the court below against which order these appeals arise will stand set aside subject, however, to the terms of the compromise." This Court passed on 22-1-1975 the following order on the compromise application - "The parties have filed compromise application only signed by their counsel. But as all the parties are not present before the Court the compromise application will have to be sent to the Court below for verification and as under the terms of the compromise the amount is to be paid within a month, it is necessary that the compromise application be sent to the Court below through special messenger. It is, therefore, directed that the compromise application be sent through messenger to the III Addl. Civil Judge forthwith who will send the compromise application after verification through a special messenger as early as possible. The matter shall be listed for orders after the receipt of the compromise duly verified." This Court further ordered on 3-4-1975: "The parties have amicably settled their dispute and filed compromise application which was sent to the Court below for verification. It has been received back from there after due verification. All the appeals are disposed of in terms of the compromise application and the compromise application shall form part of the decree. It has been received back from there after due verification. All the appeals are disposed of in terms of the compromise application and the compromise application shall form part of the decree. The case will now go back for actual accounting and it has been agreed between the parties that the accounting shall be done upto the date of the registration of the sale-deed. The draft of the sale-deed has already been signed by the counsel for both the parties and has been filed in this Court today. It has been agreed between the parties that bank draft in the name of Ram Narain Agarwal plaintiff for Rupees 5,14,800/- payable on a Bank at Agra will be handed over to Ram Narain plaintiff at the time of the registration of the sale-deed." 3. The main objection of the defendant judgment debtor is that no executable decree was passed by the High Court and the decree relied upon by the plaintiff is a purely declaratory decree and cannot be executed as such. The plaintiffs want to execute the decree for Rs. 5,14,800/- without first paying the requisite Court fee therein. Since no decree capable of being executed was ever passed against the defendant, the execution application was misconceived. It was argued on behalf of the defendant-judgment-debtor that the alleged decree was based on a compromise arrived at between the parties under which the defendant No. 1 had agreed to purchase the right, title and interest of the plaintiff and other legal representatives of the deceased partner for Rs. 5,14,800/-. Under the decree there was no mandate or direction of the Court to make payment; it simply verified the agreement between the parties. Therefore, if the plaintiffs wanted any relief, they should have filed a suit for specific performance. On the other hand, the argument of the plaintiff was that the decree sought to be executed was plainly a compromise decree and no declaration of any kind was made by the Court. 4. We are of the opinion that the contention of the plaintiffs must be accepted. The order dated 3-4-1975 passed by this Court clearly showed that all the appeals were disposed of in terms of the compromise and the compromise application was made part of the decree. The decree itself was passed in the light of the compromise application which clearly provides that a sum of Rs. The order dated 3-4-1975 passed by this Court clearly showed that all the appeals were disposed of in terms of the compromise and the compromise application was made part of the decree. The decree itself was passed in the light of the compromise application which clearly provides that a sum of Rs. 5,14,800/- was to be paid by the judgment debtor to the decree holders within a month in lieu of their right and interest etc. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that the decree regarding any legal character to a right with regard to any property was passed. The decree was not passed under Sec. 34 of the Specific Relief Act. On the other hand, it was passed under O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C. which is perfectly executable. In fact, the compromise decree fully partakes of the characteristics of the kinds of decrees which can be passed under the Civil P.C., Appendix B. The compromise provided for payment of Rs. 5,14,800/- which is in the nature of a simple money decree. It stipulates the execution of a sale-deed, registration of such sale-deed and for actual accounting which was agreed upon between the parties to be done up to the date of the registration of the sale-deed. These various reliefs conform to the patterns of executable decrees contemplated by the Civil P. C. Where the compromise decree contains a provision for payment of any specified amount, then on a proper construction the decree so passed is not merely a declaratory one but amounts to a money decree and is executable. It is the duty of a Court to avoid such interpretation of the decree as may in future result in multiplicity of suits between the parties in respect of a matter which has been finally settled by a compromise. See AIR 1951 All 817 , Sultanat v. Md. Sadat Ali Khan. Likewise a provision in a compromise decree directing the parties to execute and to get registered a deed exchange has been held to be a directory provision and capable of execution, and even the fact that a reference was made in the decree to the remedy by way of a suit for specific performance has been held not to alter the nature of the decree and make it merely declaratory. See AIR 1947 All 143: (1947 All LJ 31) Nizam Uddin v. Ikramul Haq. See AIR 1947 All 143: (1947 All LJ 31) Nizam Uddin v. Ikramul Haq. In fact, there are also authorities laying down the rule that in case of a compromise decree no suit would lie for its performance. The ratio of those cases is that the agreement of compromise between the parties becomes a rule of the Court as soon as it is embodied in the decree. The agreement passes into the domain of judgment. See 1939 Nag LJ 148, Jamal Usman v. Umar Haji Karim. In (1904) ILR 26 All 299 (PC) Ganesh Baksh v. Harihar Baksh at page 399 their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that "when an agreement of compromise was carried into effect by the subsequent decree the agreement, in fact merged in the decree." It is evident that "as there is left no agreement apart from the decree it is not open to the parties to found a suit on the former. The only course left for the parties is to execute the decree." See AIR 1947 Nag 53, Zakarali v. Israr Husain. 5. It was further contended on behalf of the defendant No. 1 that under O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C. the Court had jurisdiction to pass a decree in accordance with the compromise only with respect to "matters which related to the suit". This is true but the words "matters which relate to the suit" must be broadly construed. Mulla in his commentary on Civil Procedure Code (Thirteenth Edition, p. 1302) dealing with O. 23, R. 3 has summed up the law as follows: "When a compromise comprises matters extraneous to the suit, the operative part of the decree should be confined to matters that relate to the suit and as regards matters which do not relate to the suit, they can be enforced only in a separate suit, and not in execution even though they are set out in the decree." (Emphasis added). But what are matters that "relate to the suit?" These words are of wider import than the word "subject-matter" and would include all matters which form consideration for the adjustment of the suit whether they form its subject-matter or not. In Gobinda Chandra Paul v. Dwarka Nath Paul, (1908) ILR 35 Cal 837 Mitra, J. observed: "The question whether any particular term ...... relates to the suit .............. In Gobinda Chandra Paul v. Dwarka Nath Paul, (1908) ILR 35 Cal 837 Mitra, J. observed: "The question whether any particular term ...... relates to the suit .............. must be decided from the frame of the suit, the relief claimed, and the relief allowed by the decree on adjustment by lawful agreement. The mutual connection of the different parts of the relief granted by a consent decree is an important element for consideration in each case in deciding whether any portion of the relief is within the scope of the suit. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, each case being governed by its own facts." The above case was followed in a later Calcutta High Court decision in Shashi Bhusan Shaw v. Hari Narain Shaw, ILR 48 Cal 1059: (AIR 1921 Cal 202) wherein Rankin, J. ruled that the facts had to be looked at as a whole in order to decide whether matters had been introduced into the suit that did not relate to the suit and that as a general rule, "all terms which form the consideration for the adjustment of the matters in dispute, whether they form the subject-matter of the suit or not become related to the suit and can be embodied in the decree." Thus, it has been held that where A and B are joint tenants of certain land and A, having paid up the entire rent sues B for contribution, and a compromise is arrived at whereby B in consideration of A abandoning his claim gives up his share of the land to A, the term as to B giving up his share is a term which related to the suit: See 24 CWN 328: (AIR 1920 Cal 194) Jachmi Mondal v. Cheninissa Bibi. Still nearer in point is a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kalyandas Anantlal v. Gangabai, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 67 where a suit for dissolution and accounts of partnership was compromised on the terms that the judgment-debter should pay a sum of money as for profits, and another sum for costs, and that the decree-holder should transfer his share to the judgment-debtor. It was held that the terms related to the suit. It was held that the terms related to the suit. On a perusal of the terms of the compromise arrived at in the instant case there remains no doubt that on a broad and liberal construction the decree did not embrace matters not relating to the suit. The original relief claimed in the suit was for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and winding up of the firm etc. and the compromise decree provided for dissolution of the firm, accounting and transfer of the interest of the respondents in the assets of the dissolved partnership in consideration of Rs. 5,14,800/ and for that purpose the execution and registration of a deed. 6. One of the unmistakable signs of an executable decree is a direction about the execution of a deed. It has been consistently held that such direction is capable of execution under the provisions of O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C. Thus, it was held in Saudamini Dasi v. Behary Lal Biswas, AIR 1921 Cal 227 that a consent decree for the execution of a mortgage was capable of being enforced under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. Likewise, in Ashwini Coomar Banerjee v. Ram Gopal Mukherjee AIR 1926 Cal 975 where the compromise decree provided for execution of a Patta it was held that it could be executed according to Order 21, Rule 34 and the words in the compromise were interpreted to mean not "by way of a suit for specific performance of a contract". In Nizam Uddin's case (1947 All LJ 31) (supra) it was held that a provision in a compromise decree directing the parties to execute and to get registered a deed of exchange was directory provision and was capable of execution and the mere fact that a reference was made in the decree to the remedy by way of a suit for specific performance would not alter the nature of the decree and make it merely declaratory. 7. The Courts have also emphasised that where the parties intended to treat a compromise decree as executable, they could not be allowed later to resile from that position. 7. The Courts have also emphasised that where the parties intended to treat a compromise decree as executable, they could not be allowed later to resile from that position. In K.P. Ganapathy Iyer v. K.P. Subramania Iyer, AIR 1933 Mad 516 , Walsh, J. ruled that in a consent decree no preliminary decree was obligatory in a partition suit, and where the parties had compromised and where the parties had by means of execution petition treated it as a final decree, it was not open to either of them to object that it was only a premilinary decree. Similarly in Manindra Nath Biswas v. Radhasyam Biswas, AIR 1953 Cal 676 it was held that when in a pending suit the parties came to a settlement and either party accepted a monetary liability and consented to a decree being passed against him in respect of the same, charging certain properties for the realisation of the decretal dues, it was quite reasonable to hold that the charge, so created, would be enforceable in execution and would not, in the absence of express or specific words or any clear indication to the contrary, be merely declaration, requiring a fresh suit for its enforcement. Consequently, it was held on a construction of the consent decree that it was not merely a decree declaring a charge but the charge created thereby was enforceable in execution of the decree. The compromise decree in the instant case does not even remotely suggest that it intended to relegate the parties to the remedy of a regular suit for enforcing the terms of the compromise. Its plain intention was to execute it. 8. Another objection of the judgment debtor which was mostly factual in nature was that the respondents had not performed their part of the obligation enjoined by the terms of the compromise decree. In our opinion this objection is wholly without substance. Acting upon the compromise the heirs at law entitled to the estate of Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal the deceased partner signed and filed a deed of dissolution and release as desired by Pratap Narain Agarwal (Judgment-debtor) and the same was approved by the High Court. The said deed was postulated to be registered under the compromise at the desire and expense of Pratap Narain Agarwal. The said deed was postulated to be registered under the compromise at the desire and expense of Pratap Narain Agarwal. The latter sought to take undue advantage of the alleged omission in the compromise regarding the time for registration of the deed and avoided registration thereof and payment of the agreed amount up-to-date. He also contended that as per terms of the compromise he produced the Bank Draft of Rs. 5,14,800/- dated 20-2-1975 of the United Commercial Bank, Rawat Para, Agra on the Allahabad Bank payable to the Registrar, High Court before the Bench concerned but the original agreement was modified and it was subsequently agreed between the parties that the said amount would be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. It was that subsequent compromise which represented the true intention of the parties. This argument is entirely untenable. It is incorrect to state that any omission by an over-sight had occurred in the order of the High Court dated 3-4-1975. The defendant has merely trotted out a lame excuse for delaying the payment. The heirs and legal representatives of the estate of the deceased partner Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal had always been willing and were still ready to do all that was possible to be done by them under the compromise. In fact, they had already done what they were required to do and they were entitled to recover Rupees 5,14,800/- with interest in execution of the executable decree dated 22-1-1975 and affirmed by the High Court vide its order dated 23-4-1975. 9. It was further urged on behalf of the judgment-debter that there were difficulties in ascertaining the correct amount of stamp duty which was required to be paid on the deed, that the draft was submitted for adjudication of the proper stamp duty and the same was still pending. It was alleged that the heirs of the late Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal had not done what they were bound to do nor had they been in a position to perform their part of the agreement before the passing of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976, that after the passing of the said Act the implementation and completion of the said compromise had become impossible and the compromise in question was no longer enforceable. Hence, it was contended that the heirs and legal representatives of Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal since deceased were not entitled to claim or get the said amount before the registration of the sale-deed. To us these objections appear to be wholly frivolous and calculated only to avoid payment of the agreed amount to the respondents. It was not open to the judgment-debtor to take shelter under the provisions of Ss. 26 and 27 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act which prohibit transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or the lease etc. or otherwise of any urban land with a building etc. except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. In the present case it seems from a perusal of the compromise that there were four types of properties in respect of which the legal representatives would waive their rights and interest. These properties were lease-hold rights in factory land, machinery, buildings and furniture and motor cycle etc. On that ground that judgment-debor could not successfully plead any impediment to the implementation of the compromise by invoking S. 27 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act. The prohibition enacted by that provision is applicable to a voluntary transfer and not to a transfer being made in pursuance of an order of the Court. S. 47 of the same Act empowers the Central Government to pass suitable orders for removal of difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. In exercise of that power the Central Government issued notification No. 1/132/76 dated 18-11-1976 saying that the provisions contained in Ss. 26 and 27 of the Act would apply to the case of voluntary transfers only. As transfers arising out of Court decrees or Court orders are not in the nature of voluntary transfers, the provisions contained in Ss. 26 and 27 would not apply. This view is supported by a division Bench ruling of the Karnataka High Court in Samuel Thyagaraja Kumar v. Sitarama Achar, AIR 1977 Kant 158 in which it was held (para 10). "A reading of sub-section (1) of S. 27 demonstrates the inappositeness of the contention that an execution sale is a transfer coming within the scope of the said section. "A reading of sub-section (1) of S. 27 demonstrates the inappositeness of the contention that an execution sale is a transfer coming within the scope of the said section. The definition of the word "person" in S. 2 (i) does not include a Court, When the Act says that "no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years or otherwise any urban or urbanisable land", the Parliament imposed a restriction on a transfer by act of parties. The object of the Parliament in making such a provision is quite obvious; apparently it was intended to prevent persons owning urban or urbanisable land in excess of the ceiling limit from contravening the ceiling provision of the Act. There is a difference between a transfer by operation of law and transfer by act of parties. The purchaser at a Court sale, acquires title by operation of law and at such sales title is transferred without a registered deed. The Court merely issues a Sale Certificate. In Dinendronath Sanyal v. Ram Coomar Ghos (1881) 8 Ind App 65 at p. 75 (PC) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said : "There is a great distinction between a private sale in satisfaction of a decree and sale in "execution of a decree. In the former the price is fixed by the vendor and purchaser alone; in the latter the sale must be made by public auction conducted by a public officer, at which the public are entitled to bid. Under the former the purchaser derives title through the vendor, and cannot acquire a better title than that of the vendor. Under the latter the purchaser, notwithstanding he acquires merely the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor, acquires that title by operation of law adversely to the judgment debtor, and freed from all alienations or incumbrances effected by him subsequently to the attachment of the property sold in execution." "Section 27 has, therefore, no application to execution sales and its scope is limited to transfer inter parties." Therefore, there is no force in the appellant's argument that the contract had frustrated on account of the enactment and enforcement of the Urban Ceiling Act. 10. 10. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the respondents that at all events no case for interference by the High Court in revision had been made out by the revisionist and consequently the present revision should be dismissed. It may be noticed that originally it was filed as an execution appeal but later it was converted into a revision. Therefore, it has now to be seen as to whether this was a fit case for giving relief to the revisionist. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor I referred to AIR 1972 SC 1371 Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang and submitted that an erroneous construction placed by the executing court on the decree which it was called upon to execute amounted to a jurisdictional error and hence interference by the High Court under S. 115, C.P.C. in a case like this was amply warranted. In our opinion the case of Bhavan Vaja (supra) does not promote the revisionists contention. In that case a distinction was drawn between a wrong construction of a decree and a refusal to construe the decree at all. So it was held (at p. 1374): "That is the plain duty of the execution Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Evidently the execution Court in this case thought that its jurisdiction began and ended with merely looking at the decree as it was finally drafted. Despite the fact that the pleadings "as well as the earlier judgments rendered by the Board as well as by the appellate Court had been placed before it, the execution Court does not appear to have considered those documents. If one reads the order of that Court, it is clear that it failed to construe the decree though it purported to have construed the decree. In its order there is no reference to the documents to which we have made reference earlier. It appears to have been unduly influenced by the words of the decree under execution. The appellate Court fell into the same error. In its order there is no reference to the documents to which we have made reference earlier. It appears to have been unduly influenced by the words of the decree under execution. The appellate Court fell into the same error. When the matter was taken up in revision to the High Court, the High Court declined to go into the question of the construction of the decree on the ground that, a wrong construction of a decree merely raises a question of law and it involves no question of jurisdiction to bring the case within S. 115, Civil P.C. As seen earlier in this case, the executing Court and the appellate Court had not construed the decree at all. They had not even referred to the relevant documents. They had merely gone by the words used in the decree under execution. It is clear that they had failed to construe the decree. Their omission to construe the decree is really an omission to, exercise the jurisdiction vested in them." In the instant case the executing Court has in a well reasoned order interpreted in detail the decree presented for execution. Apart from the fact that a wrong construction of a decree merely raised a question of law and not a question of jurisdiction to bring the case within Section 115, C.P.C., we are also inclined to agree with the interpretation of the decrees made by the Court below. It is also well settled that even if a jurisdictional error is involved in a case, the High Court is not bound to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless substantial injustice has been occasioned in the case on account of the impugned order. There is a plethora of cases in support of the proposition that if the jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. is invoked the applicant must show not only the jurisdictional error committed by the Court below but also that the interest of justice calls for interference by the High Court. The powers of the Court under S. 115 of the Code are to be exercised in its discretion and discretion should be exercised in the interest of justice. The powers of the Court under S. 115 of the Code are to be exercised in its discretion and discretion should be exercised in the interest of justice. See AIR 1957 All 825 : (1957 All LJ 644) Sita Ram Sahu v. Kedarnath Sahu, AIR 1973 SC 1096 , Brij Gopal Mathur v. Kishan Gopal Mathur, AIR 1973 Him Pra 29, Hari Dass v. Hiroo, AIR 1976 All 355 : (1976 All LJ 659), State of Punjab v. R.P. Kapoor, Having held in the present case that the decree holders had done all that they should have done under the compromise decree and the judgment-debtor having deliberately obstructed the execution of the decree, we feel that our discretionary powers in revision should not be exercised since it was likely to cause injustice to the respondents. The Court is not bound to interfere in a revision under 115, C.P.C. and we are not satisfied that this case is a fit one for interference by this Court. Moreover, the facts of the present case do not attract the sympathy of the Court towards the revisionist. He did set up deliberately false excuses in order to thwart the execution of the decree. One such plea was that the stamp duty on the draft of the sale deed which had to be registered had not been assessed and until that was done, no registration could take place. It was evident from the letter dated 15-4-1956 Exhibit A-2 addressed to the Assistant Superintendent, of Stamp, Ahmedabad, that the Assistant Superintendent; of Stamp, Ahmedabad, in his letter No. S.T. P./ADJ/83-1975/3156 dated 12-5-1975 to Sri C.S. Shah, Advocate for the judgment-debtor, had said that the amount of stamp duty of Rs. 30,800/- was chargeable in respect of the document presented for registration and this fact had been intimated to Sri C.S. Shah by means of the aforesaid letter but the document was withdrawn by the judgment-debtor as he did not desire to proceed further in the matter. So it is manifest that on 12-5-1975 the stamp duty had already been assessed but the document had been withdrawn. It is also to be noted that at that time the Urban Ceiling Act was not in force. However, the document had been intentionally withdrawn and later the law was amended and the revised stamp duty amounted to Rupees 51,300/-. So it is manifest that on 12-5-1975 the stamp duty had already been assessed but the document had been withdrawn. It is also to be noted that at that time the Urban Ceiling Act was not in force. However, the document had been intentionally withdrawn and later the law was amended and the revised stamp duty amounted to Rupees 51,300/-. On 18-11-1976 the defendant's counsel wrongly informed this Court that the adjudication regarding the stamp on the sale-deed under S. 31 of the Stamp Act had not been made by the Collector till that date. In the order dated 18-11-1976 passed in F.A.F.O. No. 31 of 1971 connected with F.A.F.O. Nos. 196 and 197 of 1972 by this Court it was observed : "About one and a half years have elapsed and, in the circumstances of the case, it can safely be said that the reasonable period for the registration of the document and payment of the money had elapsed. But the remedy of the plaintiff respondent does not lie in this Court. He can get the decree executed or can file a regular suit as advised." 11. It has not been explained as to why at this stage no plea was raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor that there was no executable decree. Similarly true copies of the order of the High Court dated 2-9-1976 passed in F.A.F.O. No. 31 of 1971 were filed in the interim matter arising out of the plaintiff's application that the lease be got registered and certified copies of the same were produced before us at the time of hearing. This order shows that the defendant's counsel wanted time to ascertain from his client whether adjudication on stamp duty had taken place or not. But he did not raise the plea of either frustration of the contract or absence of an executable decree. Therefore, such plea must be held to be barred by the principle of constructive res judicata contemplated by Explanation IV to S. 11, C.P.C. It is well established that this rule also applies to two different stages of the same proceedings. See AIR 1953 SC 65 (Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherji) and AIR 1960 SC 941 , (Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi). 12. See AIR 1953 SC 65 (Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherji) and AIR 1960 SC 941 , (Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi). 12. In support of the doctrine of registration which was in vain invoked on behalf of the judgment-debtor great stress was laid on the fact that the amount of money mentioned in the compromise was to be paid only at the time of registration of the sale deed and the defendant could not be compelled to pay the same unless a sale deed was registered. The applicant sought refuge under Section 28 of the Urban Ceiling Act which provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no registering officer appointed under that Act shall register any such document as is required to be registered under the provisions of cls. (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of S. 17 of the Registration Act. It was contended that the property which the agreement of compromise contemplated to transfer consisted of lease-hold rights in the land as also the building standing thereon which was immovable property and which had devolved upon the legal representatives of the deceased partner and these rights could not be transferred under the registered deed. This argument must be repelled because the condition precedent to the applicability of S. 17 of the Registration Act as well as S. 28 of the Urban Ceiling Act is that the transaction must involve 'transfer' of a property. A perusal of the compromise application shows that under its provisions the interest of the plaintiff and other legal representatives of the deceased partner was being relinquished in favour of the defendant No. 1, Can such relinquishment be deemed to be a 'transfer'? It is necessary to examine what are the legal incidents of the rights and interest of a partner in the partnership property. In answer we can only refer to the classical statement of the law on the subject by Lindley on Partnership (Thirteenth Edition, page 366): "What is meant by the share of a partner is his proportionate interest in the partnership assets after they have been all realised and converted into money, and all the partnership debts and liabilities have been paid and discharged. This it is, and this only, which on the death of a partner passes to his representatives, or to a legatee of his share; which under the old law was considered as bona notabilia; and which on his bankruptcy passes to his trustee. The same principle has been embodied in Ss. 14, 15, 29, 30, 31 to 38, 46 and 48 of the Indian Partnership Act. Thus, the real contents of the rights of a partner are merely that he is entitled "to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in cl. (a) and sub-cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of cl. (b) of S. 48." See AIR 1966 SC 1300 (Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa). It is also necessary to mention in this connection, because a contrary argument was advanced on behalf of the defendant No. 1, that the law makes distinction between the rights of a partner and those of his legal representatives etc. So far as the fundamental legal character of their rights is concerned S. 46 of the Indian Partnership Act provides that "on the dissolution of a firm every partner or his representative is entitled, as against all the other partners or their representatives, to have the property of the firm applied in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm, and to have the surplus distributed among the partners or their representatives according to their rights." The same aspects of the rights of a partner or his representatives are manifest from the mode of settlement of accounts between partners on the dissolution of a firm. S. 48 reads: "48. In settling the accounts of a firm after dissolution, the following rules shall, subject to agreement by the partner, be observed:- (a) Losses, including deficiencies of capital, shall be paid first out of profits next out of capital, and, lastly, if necessary, by the partners individually in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits. In settling the accounts of a firm after dissolution, the following rules shall, subject to agreement by the partner, be observed:- (a) Losses, including deficiencies of capital, shall be paid first out of profits next out of capital, and, lastly, if necessary, by the partners individually in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits. (b) The assets of the firm, including any sums contributed by the partners to make up deficiencies of capital, shall be applied in the following manner and order:- (i) in paying the debts of the firm to third parties; (ii) in paying to each partner rateably what is due to him from the firm for advances as distinguished from capital; (iii) in paying to each partner rateably what is due to him on account of capital; and (iv) the residue, if any shall be divided among the partners in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits." 13. The various provisions referred to above particularly Ss. 46 and 47, make it abundantly clear that the representatives of a deceased partner or of a partner on the dissolution of a firm are put on a par with the partners of the firm. On a dissolution of the firm every partner or his representative is entitled as against all other partners or their representatives to have surplus distributed amongst the partners or their representatives according to their rights. It is obvious that the surplus, if any, can only be found out after accounts have been taken from the managing partner or the partner or partners in whose possession the assets of the partnership remain after it has been dissolved for distribution according to their rights. See AIR 1964 All 53 (para 17) Gopi Nath v. Satish Chandra. Thus, there is no substance in the applicant's argument that the representatives of the deceased partner were not competent to relinquish their interest in the partnership assets in favour of the defendant-applicant and the compromise was illegal, inasmuch as this was one of the principal terms of the compromise. 14. Carefully keeping in mind the essential nature of the legal rights of a partner or his representatives in the assets of partnership, the question arises: can the relinquishment of such interest by a partner or his representatives be deemed to be a 'transfer' of his interest. A similar question arose in Commr. 14. Carefully keeping in mind the essential nature of the legal rights of a partner or his representatives in the assets of partnership, the question arises: can the relinquishment of such interest by a partner or his representatives be deemed to be a 'transfer' of his interest. A similar question arose in Commr. of Income-tax, M.P. v. Dewas Cine Corporation, AIR 1968 SC 676 and it was answered in the negative. The Supreme Court ruled that the distribution of surplus of a dissolved partnership as contemplated by Ss. 46 and 48 of the Partnership Act, 1932 was for the purpose of adjustment of the rights of the partners in the assets of the partnership; it did not amount to 'transfer' of assets. See also AIR 1971 SC 2270 (Commr. of Income-tax, U.P. v. Bankey Lal). Therefore, we hold that the condition in the compromise relating to the relinquishment of the plaintiff's interest in the partnership assets did not amount to 'transfer'. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion it is essential that the distinction between the character of the partnership property and that of a partner's interest therein should not be blurred. 15. Even if it is assumed that the above condition amounted to 'transfer' of a partner's interest, surely it was not transfer of 'immovable property' and therefore did not attract the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act or Section 28 of the Urban Ceiling Act. The point is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1966 SC 1300 (Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa). In that case the members of two joint Hindu families A and B had entered into partnership business of hulling rice, etc. Subsequently, a document styled as Karar was executed between the two families. This document was unregistered and recorded the fact that the partnership had come to end and that A family had given up their share in the machines, etc., and in the business and that they had made over the same to B alone completely by way of adjustment. Subsequently, a document styled as Karar was executed between the two families. This document was unregistered and recorded the fact that the partnership had come to end and that A family had given up their share in the machines, etc., and in the business and that they had made over the same to B alone completely by way of adjustment. In a subsequent suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts brought by the members of A family it was contended that since the partnership assets included immovable property and the document recorded relinquishment by the members of the A family of their interest in those assets, this document was compulsorily registrable under S. 17 (1)(c) of the Registration Act and that as it was not registered it was inadmissible in evidence to prove the dissolution of the partnership and the settlement of accounts. It was held that the interest of the partners of A family in the partnership assets was movable property and the document evidencing the relinquishment of that interest was not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 (1) of the Registration Act. The Supreme Court approved of the full bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Ajudhia Pershad Ram Pershad v. Sham Sunder, AIR 1947 Lah 13, which had held that the interest of a partner in a partnership asset was movable and not immovable property, even though it comprised of lands and other buildings etc. The Supreme Court approved of the full bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Ajudhia Pershad Ram Pershad v. Sham Sunder, AIR 1947 Lah 13, which had held that the interest of a partner in a partnership asset was movable and not immovable property, even though it comprised of lands and other buildings etc. The doctrine that the interest of a deceased partner in the partnership assets is not 'real estate' (immovable property) is also implicit in the pregnant observations made by Lindley on Partnership (Thirteen Edition, page 370): "From the principle that a share of a partner is nothing more than his proportionate interest in the partnership assets after they have been turned into money and applied in liquidation of the partnership debts, it necessarily follows that, in equity, a share in a partnership, whether its property consists of land or not must, as between the real and personal representatives of a deceased partner, be deemed to be personal and not real estate, unless indeed such conversion is inconsistent with the agreement between the parties." The entire legal concept of the interest of a partner in a partnership assets and the applicability of S. 17 of the Registration Act to such transaction was, if we may say so with respect, very lucidly summed up in AIR 1959 Andh Pra 380 (A. Narayanappa v. B. Krishnappa) (FB) from which some excerpts may be aptly quoted. It was observed: "The interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of movable and immovable property cannot be regarded as a right or interest in immovable property within the meaning of S. 17 (1)(b) of the Registration Act." (Para 14) 2. In determining whether transfers of shares of partnership which hold immovable property among other assets, require registration, the Court must be influenced by the policy of the Partnership Act. In determining whether transfers of shares of partnership which hold immovable property among other assets, require registration, the Court must be influenced by the policy of the Partnership Act. The legal conception of the share of a partner in a partnership cannot be assessed by reference to the possibility of his getting a share in the immovable property possessed by the partnership, for his getting a share in the immovable property is only an uncertain factor." (Para 12) "Sections 14 and 15 of the Partnership Act of 1932, speak about what would constitute the property of a firm and declare that such property shall be held and utilised for the purpose of the partnership thereby indicating that so long as the partnership continues no part of the assets of a partnership could be regarded as belonging to any individual partner. Further, no part of the partnership assets could be utilised for a purpose other than that of the partnership. A partner, therefore, seeking to get his share could not get his share in specie in the movable and immovable properties but only after the assets have been converted into only money debts and liabilities discharged and it is only in the residue that he could get his proportionate share. The Statute enjoins this process being gone through before a partner gets a share in the assets of the partnership and it is governed by Ss. 46, 48 and 49 of the Partnership Act. It would, therefore, follow that a partner cannot predicate of a definite share in immovable property which he could transfer or give up." (Para 6) "It follows that a document evidencing a relinquishment by a partner of his interest in partnership assets does not require registration." (Para 15) 16. Thus, we are satisfied that the compromise decree impugned in the present case was a perfectly executable decree and the view expressed by the Court below was not erroneous. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. 17. This revision has no force and is dismissed with costs.