JUDGMENT - AGGARWAL R.L., J. : - The petitioner-wife had obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights from this Court on 4th October 1979. At the time of passing of the said decree, she had desired to make a separate application for alimony and for maintenance of the children and hence the present petition. 2. On behalf of the respondent-husband, it is contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the husband is a British subject domiciled in England. The husband has filed petition for divorce in England, which, according to him, is the competent Matrimonial Court. Assuming this Court has jurisdiction, then the petitioner-wife is not entitled to certain reliefs prayed for. It is necessary to set out a brief statement of facts. 3. The petitioner-wife and the respondent-husband are Parsi Zoroa-strians. On 29th May 1961, the parties married in Bombay and solemnized their marriage according to the Parsi form of marriage under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. Two children are born from the wedlock:- one female and the other male. The daughter Tinaz is now aged 16, and the son Naval is now aged about 14. According to the wife, the marriage was happy until the year 1976. In that year, the husbands mother died. The husband is employed in Air India for the past several years. From January 1975 to about September 1978, the husband had a posting in Geneva as a Manager. The wife was not keeping good health and underwent operations in Bombay at the Parsi General Hospital during 1975 and 1976. Her prolonged absence from Geneva during 1975 and 1976 gave the husband a chance to have an affair with a woman in Geneva:-a millionairess but with a notorious reputation for breaking up the marriage of happily married per-sons. In December 1976, the wife accompanied by her two children came to Bombay for a short visit during the school Christmas Vacation. The husband followed in a few days thereafter from Geneva. After coming to Bombay, the husband told the wife that he did not want her and the children to return to Geneva. The husband had brought the childrens school leaving certificates from the school in Geneva and he got the children admitted to a school in Bombay. The husband followed in a few days thereafter from Geneva. After coming to Bombay, the husband told the wife that he did not want her and the children to return to Geneva. The husband had brought the childrens school leaving certificates from the school in Geneva and he got the children admitted to a school in Bombay. The husband prevented the wife and the children from returning to Geneva by refusing to arrange the necessary free Air India air passages. Since the end of December 1976 or early January 1977 the husband deserted the wife against her will and without lawful cause. The husband voluntarily remitted money from Geneva to Bombay for the housekeeping, living and schooling expenses. 4. In September 1978, the husband was transferred from Geneva to London for a period of about 3 years. 5. In January 1978, the husband came to Bombay and filed a suit against the wife in this Court for divorce or in the alternative for judicial separation. The wife, filed her written-statement and counter-claim on 20th September 1978 praying for restitution of conjugal rights. The husband made and filed his reply to the counter claim. In January 1979, the husband unconditionally withdrew his suit for divorce or for judicial separation. 6. In February 1979, the husband filed a petition for Divorce in the High Court of London being Petition No. 1845 of 1979 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 7. The session of this Court was held from 1st August 1979 onwards. The husband had come to Bombay in August 1979 on a short visit. The husband made applications for postponement of the hearing of the wifes counter-claim and, according to the wife, the adjournments were applied for on false excuses in order to delay the hearing of her counter-claim for restitution of conjugal rights. This, according to her, was done in an attempt to defeat her just and lawful rights under the Parsi Law by wresting a decree of divorce from the English Court first. Ultimately, as stated above, the wife was granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights on 4th October 1979. 8. It appears that in the meantime the husband continue to pursue his Divorce Petition in the London High Court. In order to defend herself, the wife was obliged to engage a Solicitor and Barrister as per the requirements of English Law. 8. It appears that in the meantime the husband continue to pursue his Divorce Petition in the London High Court. In order to defend herself, the wife was obliged to engage a Solicitor and Barrister as per the requirements of English Law. It is not necessary to refer to what transpired in London High Court. Suffice it to say that the President of the Family Division High Court, London, held, as appears from the petition, that in the face of the provisions of the English statute, since the husband was domiciled in England since 1936, the High Court had jurisdiction in England under English Law provisions to hear the husbands divorce petition. It was pointed out to the President of the Family Division, High Court, that Parsi law was applicable to the parties as their personal law and since the wife had been granted a decree of restitution of conjugal rights by the Parsi Court in Bombay and that it would be contrary to public policy and comity of nations between friendly Commonwealth countries for the English Court to go directly contrary to the Parsi Court decree by granting a decree of divorce to the husband on grounds not available to him under Parsi Law, the President of the Family Court directed that in the interests of justice, the husband should give an undertaking to the English Court that he would arrange for the Air Passage for the wife to come to England and provide for her expenses whilst in England in order to enable her to defend herself properly as and when the divorce petition came up for hearing on merits in due course. 9. Several other facts are mentioned and statements are made in the petition. But it is not necessary to refer to them in detail. An idea can be had of other facts and the reliefs asked for from the reply filed by the husband. 10. In his reply, the husband, in the first place, submits that the petitioner-wife should be called upon to amend the title of the petition as he has withdrawn Suit No. 1 of 1978 and that he is not a plaintiff in any matrimonial suit in this Court. Secondly, he has filed the reply under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court. Secondly, he has filed the reply under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court. His submission is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present petition as he is a British subject domiciled in England where his said petition for divorce is pending. It is further stated that in the said petition pending in the English Court, the wife raised preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction, personal law of the Parsis and applied for stay, and all her objections were negative by the President of the Family Division of the High Court and that Court has been pleased to hold that the husband is domiciled in England and that English Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try his petition for divorce. As regards costs of the hearing, the same have been reserved to the Judge of trial. 11. It is further submitted that the wifes petition is utterly false, frivolous and vexatious and is not maintainable and there is no provision in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act under which her prayers(a),(g),(h).,(i),(j),(k) and(I) can be granted by this Court, The husband further states that the English Court is seized of the matter and that Court has decided that it has jurisdiction to entertain and. try the matrimonial petition-filed by him and any order as prayed by the wife-from this Court would-amount to interference with the jurisdiction of a competent Court and would be against Private International Law governing, comity of nations. The husband further submits that the wifes prayer(a) for costs(£5125=Rs. 95,000 and a further amount of £800=Rs. 15,000 to Ronald Nathan Co.,. Solicitors, London) of the proceedings in England has been reserved by the English Court to the Judge of trial and, therefore, it is for the English Court to decide whether the wife is entitled to receive any costs from the husband. The wife has also applied for legal aid in England and if ultimately the wife-is awaided any costs, the Legal Aid Fund will recover the same from him. In these circumstances, according to the husband, the wifes-claim for costs of English proceedings is in any event premature and is not maintainable and that this Court has no jurisdiction to make any order for costs of proceedings in England. 12. Regarding prayer(b) far costs of matrimonial proceedings in this Court, the husband contends that this Court has already awarded the wife-Rs. 12. Regarding prayer(b) far costs of matrimonial proceedings in this Court, the husband contends that this Court has already awarded the wife-Rs. 1,500 for her costs, and, therefore, her claim for Rs. 10,000 is untenable. Regarding alimony and maintenance relating to prayers(c) and(e), the husband submits that he is voluntarily making monthly payments to the wife in the sum of £100(sterling) equivalent to Rs. 1,800 or more depending upon the rate of exchange and in addition he is giving pocket money to the children and providing them with clothing and shoes and on his visits to-India he takes for them various things required by them from England. During the long holidays, the children come and stay with him in England when he spends substantial amount on their maintenance and entertainment in England and provide them with clothes and other things required by them. The husband further states that he has also given an undertaking to the English Court to pay £100 per month to the wife. He submits that he is voluntarily giving much more than what the wife is entitled to receive in law by way of alimony and maintenance from him even if this Court was seized of the matter. The wifes claim for Rs. 5,000 per month for alimony and maintenance is utterly fantastic and beyond his means. He describes her claim for lump sum payment of Rs. 6-½ lacs in lieu of alimony as ridiculous and in any case beyond his resources. 13. As regards prayer(d), according to the husband, the wife is not entitled to have the flat transferred to her name. He apprehends that if the flat is transferred in her sole name, she will deal with and dispose of the said Sat and his children will be deprived of the flat which, he desires, should go to his children after his death. 14. Regarding prayer(f) for custody of the children, the husband says that both the children are already in custody of the wife and he has not made any attempt to disturb the wifes custody and, therefore, there is no justification for her said prayer. The husband further contends that his daughter Tinaz has completed 16 years of age and under section 49 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order regarding her custody or maintenance. 15. The husband further contends that his daughter Tinaz has completed 16 years of age and under section 49 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order regarding her custody or maintenance. 15. The wife has filed a rejoinder to the affidavit in reply. I feel it unnecessary to refer to it as the relevant facts for the decision of this case are sufficiently borne out from the said resume of the petition and the reply thereto. 16. Shri Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the husband, confined his arguments to the question of jurisdiction alone and he did not address me on the merits of the prayers as such. He contended that English Court alone has jurisdiction to decide this petition as the husband is domiciled in England. Assuming this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present petition, then there is no jurisdiction to grant any prayer except the prayer for alimony and for maintenance of the son and the custody of the son. 17. On behalf of the wife, learned counsel Smt. Master contended, firstly, that the husband has already submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court and as such the husband is not entitled to challenge the same. Secondly, the question of domicile is an after-thought. The concept of domicile is not permitted in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, and the same is made irrelevant. . ; 18. I will first examine the plea of the husband having submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court and next take-up the rival contentions on the point of jurisdiction. 19. it was pointed out by Smt. Master that the respondent-husband considered himself to be governed by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, and as such he had filed a suit for divorce and in the alternative for judicial separation in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court at Bombay. In that suit, the wife had made a counterclaim and the husband had filed a reply to the counterclaim. Both in his suit and in the counterclaim, the husband had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court. In reply to the wifes counter-claim, the husband did not challenge the jurisdiction of this Court. Even thereafter or after the withdrawal of his suit, he did not amend his reply to the counterclaim so as to challenge the jurisdiction of this Court. In reply to the wifes counter-claim, the husband did not challenge the jurisdiction of this Court. Even thereafter or after the withdrawal of his suit, he did not amend his reply to the counterclaim so as to challenge the jurisdiction of this Court. During the pendency of his suit for divorce, the husband had taken out a Notice of Motion No. 431 of 1978 for restraining the wife from removing the children Tinaz and Naval outside the jurisdiction of this Court and for ordering her to deposit the passports of the children in the custody of the Court. Even after the withdrawal of his suit, the husband had continued to contest the wifes counterclaim for restitution of conjugal rights. All this indicates, sub-. mitted Smt. Master, that the husband had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court and now as an after-thought he is challenging the jurisdiction of this Court. I find considerable substance in this submission. There is no doubt that in instituting the suit in this Court for a decree for divorce or for a decree for judicial separation and for custody of the children and in the alternative for access to the children, the husband had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in so far as his suit was concerned. The withdrawal of the said suit did not efface his submission to the jurisdiction of this Court. His conduct before the withdrawal of his suit is relevant for the purpose of considering of his having submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court. As regards the counterclaim which he had to face, he had made his reply thereto. There is nothing in the reply to show that he did not intend to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court even in respect of his-wifes counter-claim. It is well-settled that objection to jurisdiction is to be taken at the-earliest possible opportunity. A party cannot sit pretty and challenge the jurisdiction at any time it pleases. There was no obstacle in the way of the husband in applying for amendment of the reply to the counterclaim to object to the jurisdiction of this Court. On behalf of the husband, a number of adjournments were applied for. On all those occasions before me, the question of challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court was never raised. There was no obstacle in the way of the husband in applying for amendment of the reply to the counterclaim to object to the jurisdiction of this Court. On behalf of the husband, a number of adjournments were applied for. On all those occasions before me, the question of challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court was never raised. Postponements were sought for the convenience of the husband to enable him to come to Bombay to contest the counterclaim. I have passed speaking orders on those applications for postponement. Ultimately, his counsel withdrew appearance on behalf of the husband and the hearing of the counterclaim proceeded ex parte. I am informed that the husband has not filed any appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4th October 1979. In all these circumstances, I am of the view that the husband had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, he is not entitled to raise that objection at this stage. 20. I next go to the rival contention on the point of jurisdiction. Shri Mehta placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Jessie Grant(Khambatta v. Mancherji Cursetji Khambatta)1, 36 Bom. L.R. 11. In that case, a petition for dissolution of marriage was filed. The petitioner Jessie Grant was a Christian, domiciled in Scotland. On December 4, 1906, she was married to one Gulam Mahomed) Ibrahim(who was a Muhammadan domiciled in British Tndia) by civil marriage in Scotland. After the marriage, the parties settled in British India. In 1912, the petitioner embraced the Muhammadan faith. On June 27, 1922, Gulam Mahomed divorced the petitioner according to the talak form under Muhammadan Law. On April 24, 1923, the petitioner contracted a second marriage with Mancherji(a Parsi convert to Christianity) in Bombay under the Special Marriage Act(III of 1872). They lived together, and a child was born on October 7, 1923. In 1932, the parties quarrelled and began to live separately. On May 25, 1933, the petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage with Mancherji(respondent). The respondent contended that his marriage with the petitioner was void on the ground that at the date of the marriage the petitioner was the lawfully married wife of Gulam Mahomed and that that marriage “has never been dissolved or annulled by any Court of competent jurisdiction but is still subsisting”. The respondent contended that his marriage with the petitioner was void on the ground that at the date of the marriage the petitioner was the lawfully married wife of Gulam Mahomed and that that marriage “has never been dissolved or annulled by any Court of competent jurisdiction but is still subsisting”. At the hearing, a preliminary issue was raised: “Whether the first marriage of the wife has been validly dissolved by certain proceedings which took place before the present marriage.” I have mentioned these facts in order to have some idea of the background of that case. Shri Mehta had placed considerable reliance on the following passage at page 14:- “Certain principles of law relevant to the determination of this ques-tion are, in my opinion, firmly established in the realm of private international law :(1) the forms necessary to constitute a valid marriage and the construction of the marriage contract depend on the lex loci contractus, that is, the law of the place where the marriage ceremony is performed;(2) on marriage the wife automatically acquires the domicile of her husband;(3) the status of spouses and their rights and obligations arising under the marriage contract are governed by the lex domicilli, that is, by the law of the country in which for the time being they are domiciled(see Harvey v. Farnie)2,(1882)8 App Cas. 43. and(Nachimson v. Nachimson)3,(1930) P. 217. ;(4) the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the dissolution of the marriage do not form part of the marriage contract, but arise out of, and are incidental to, such contract, and are governed by the lex domicilli(see Nachimson v. Nachimson).” 21. Shri Mehta further relied upon the judgment of Coyajee J. reported in Sarwar(Merwan Yezdiar v. Merwan Rashid Yezdiar)4, 52 Bom.L.R. 876. a Division Bench ruling. In that case, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. One Sarwar(plaintiff) was married to Merwan(defendant) in Bombay on November 11, 1944. Both the parties were Iranians professing the Zoroastrian faith. Sarwar, the wife, had come to Bombay from Persia in 1940 and Merwan had come to Bombay in 1943. A suit for divorce on the ground of cruelty was filed in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court of Bombay. One Sarwar(plaintiff) was married to Merwan(defendant) in Bombay on November 11, 1944. Both the parties were Iranians professing the Zoroastrian faith. Sarwar, the wife, had come to Bombay from Persia in 1940 and Merwan had come to Bombay in 1943. A suit for divorce on the ground of cruelty was filed in the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court of Bombay. The defendant contended that the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, did not apply to him and that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He alleged that he was an Iranian subject and a foreigner in India, that he was registered as a foreigner under the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1939, and that he was allowed to stay in India only under a special permit and was liable to be called upon to leave India at any time. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, it seems, on the basis of the propositions quoted above from the case of Khambatta v. Khambatta. But it may be noted that the Division Bench decided the appeal on the basis that the defendant was not a Parsi and that the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, was not applicable to him and therefore the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court set up under the said Act had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 22. Relying upon these two decisions, Shri Mehta urged that the present respondent-husband is domiciled in England and, therefore, the competent Court to grant the relief for alimony etc. is the English Matrimonial Court and not this Court. The sum and substance of Shri Mehtas submission was that the proceedings for dissolution of the marriage are governed by the law of the domicile of the spouses at the time when they are instituted. There is no manner of doubt that the Court has to remember that rule, but the question is whether that rule governs the present case? 23. The general rule of jurisdiction in divorce in English Court was one of domicile. By the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, the English Court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for divorce if, and only if, either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in England on the date when the proceedings are begun or was habitually resident in England throughout the period of one year ending with that date. By the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, the English Court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for divorce if, and only if, either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in England on the date when the proceedings are begun or was habitually resident in England throughout the period of one year ending with that date. By the said 1973 Act, wifes dependent domicile was abolished. 24. Shri Mehta stated that when the respondent-husband was about 2 years old, his father permanently transferred his residence to United Kingdom in the year 1936. The respondent lived with his father and his mother in England. His father acquired a domicile of choice in England. The respondent remained with his father until his death in 1952. The respondent-husband thus acquired through his father a domicile of dependence. Smt. Master pointed out various facts and circumstances to suggest that the husband, after the death of his father, had voluntarily made a home in Bombay. After his fathers death, he came to Bombay with his mother. In 1960, he took up employment in Bombay with Air India. He married the petitioner in Bombay in 1961. After the marriage, the husband continued to live in his house in Bombay. His postings outside India from time to time have been on account of service conditions and exigencies. At present, the husband is living in England not because he has made England his permanent home. He is there at the moment or for some time because of his posting in-England. From his previous posting in Geneva he is moved to England. Smt. Master pointed out that he has been eating the salt of India for years. He wanted his wife and children to live in Bombay. He wanted his children to be educated in Bombay. All these years Bombay has been his home and that of his family. Smt. Master also pointed out that the husband flew from Geneva to Bombay to file the matrimonial proceedings in this Court by filing Suit No. 1 of 1978 against his wife. At the time of the filing of the suit, he did not claim that he was domiciled in England nor after the filing of the suit. Smt. Master also pointed out that the husband flew from Geneva to Bombay to file the matrimonial proceedings in this Court by filing Suit No. 1 of 1978 against his wife. At the time of the filing of the suit, he did not claim that he was domiciled in England nor after the filing of the suit. It was only when he found that the going of his suit was difficult and the suit was likely to fail that he thought of falsely claiming that he was domiciled in England. By making the said false claim, the husband wanted to take benefit of the easy grounds of divorce available under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. All these circumstances, emphasized Smt. Master, indicate that the claim that the husband is domiciled in England is not true and is an after-thought. These circumstances prima facie make Smt. Masterss submissions tenable. Though Shri Mehta pointed out that the husband had acquired through his father a domicile of dependence, but m view of the circumstances pointed out by Smt. Master, it is not improbable that the husband on independence voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and his family in Bombay with the intention of making it a permanent home. It may be made clear, if necessary, that I am not deciding the question of domicile. What I have considered are the various circumstances suggesting that the husbands plea that he is domiciled in England is an after-thought. 25. In order to appreciate the argument of Smt. Master that the con-cept of domicile is not relevant, a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, is necessary. This Act amends the law relating to marriage and divorce among Parsis. Prior to this Act, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1865, governed the marriage and divorce matters of the Parsis. The 1936 Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. A “marriage” means a marriage between Parsis whether contracted before or after the commencement of the Act. A “Parsi” means a Parsi Zoroastrian. A “husband” means a Parsi husband and a “wife” means a Parsi wife. Chapter II makes provision for marriages between Parsis. The 1936 Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. A “marriage” means a marriage between Parsis whether contracted before or after the commencement of the Act. A “Parsi” means a Parsi Zoroastrian. A “husband” means a Parsi husband and a “wife” means a Parsi wife. Chapter II makes provision for marriages between Parsis. Section 3 enacts requisites to validity of Parsi marriages and section 4(1) makes remarriage unlawful if certain conditions are not fulfilled, and sub-section(2) of section 4 makes a marriage contracted contrary to sub-section(1) of section 4 void. We will revert to section 4(1) as Smt. Master depends on it for reinforcing her argument. Chapter III deals with the Constitution of Parsi Matrimonial Courts. “Court” means a Court constituted under this Act as defined in section 2(2). For the purpose of hearing suits under this Act, a Special Court can be constituted by the State Governments, but in the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, a Special Court is ordained to be constituted by section 18. Under section 19, such a Special Court is to be named the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be. The State Governments are under a duty, under section 24, to appoint persons to be delegates to aid in the adjudication of cases arising under this Act, after giving the local Parsis an opportunity of expressing their opinion in such manner, as the State Government concerned may think fit. All such delegates have to be Parsis. Thus the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court cannot adjudicate upon cases under this Act without the aid of Parsi delegates. The Legislature has made this special provision of the delegates being selected from the Parsi community alone. Section 27 gives each party the right to challenge any three of the delegates without assigning for the same. Thus the delegates who are to aid the Court in the adjudication of cases enjoy the confidence of the parties. The parties by this process know that they can depend upon the honesty, sense of fairness and respect for justice of the delegates chosen with their approval. Thus the delegates who are to aid the Court in the adjudication of cases enjoy the confidence of the parties. The parties by this process know that they can depend upon the honesty, sense of fairness and respect for justice of the delegates chosen with their approval. The intention of the Legislature is that suits under this Act, for example, matrimonial suits under Chapter IV of the Act for nullity of marriage, for dissolution of marriage, for judicial separation, for restitution of conjugal rights, etc., are to be adjudicated upon by the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court with the aid of the Pars; delegates alone. Parsis alone are considered to be fit persons to participate in the adjudication of the cases involving the Parsis. Under section 46, the decision on the facts is made the decision of the majority of the delegates. Thus the presiding Judge has to give effect to the decision of the majority of the delegates when they take a decision on the facts of the case. This is the scheme for the Constitution of the Special Court, its functioning and its competency. A Court must be a Special Court. A Special Court, without the aid of the Parsi delegates, would not be properly qualified to decide suits under the Act. 26. Section 29 speaks of a Court in which suits are to be brought? The defendants residence at the time of the institution of the suit is the main ground conferring jurisdiction. 27. Before examining the provisions of section(52)2 relied upon by Smt. Master, we might address our minds to the meaning of “domicile” and its function. We first turn to the statement of law contained in Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edition, Volume 8, para. 421, page 318 :- “Many questions concerning the personal status of an individual are governed by his personal law. The primary function of domicile is to identify this personal law. Domicile is the legal relationship between an individual and a territory with a distinctive legal system which invokes that system as his personal law.” 28. I find that the actual statement in(Henderson v. Henderson)5,(1965)1 All E R 179. is more effective than the last sentence quoted above from Halsburys Laws of England. Domicile is the legal relationship between an individual and a territory with a distinctive legal system which invokes that system as his personal law.” 28. I find that the actual statement in(Henderson v. Henderson)5,(1965)1 All E R 179. is more effective than the last sentence quoted above from Halsburys Laws of England. In Henderson v. Henderson at page 180 it is stated :- “Domicile is that legal relationship between a person(called the propositus) and a territory subject to a distinctive legal system which invokes the system as the personal law of the propositus and involves the Courts of that territory in having primary jurisdiction to dissolve his marriage.” Rayden on Divorce, 13th edition, Volume 1, page 47, gives the defini-tion and nature of “domicile” in the following words :- “Domicile is the legal and normally also the factual relationship between a person and a territorial area subject to one system of law which arises either from his residence there with the intention of making it his permanent home or from its being, or having been, the domicile of some person on whom he is for this purpose legally dependent. Every person has a domicile at all times, and no one has more than one domicile at once. Every person at birth becomes a member both of a political and of a civil society; the former determines his political status or nationality; the latter determines his civil status. The law which governs the civil society into which he is born, the law of the country of his domicile, is attached to his person, and remains so attached wherever he goes, unless and until he ceases to be a member of that society; and he can only so cease by becoming a member of another civil society, and so acquiring a new domicile(i.e. a domicile of choice), the law of which thereupon becomes attached to him in the same manner.” 29. In Khambatta v. Khambatta, relied upon by Shri Mehta, the learned Chief Justice Sir John Beaumont says at page 16 this : :- “Once it be established that a man and woman have entered into a valid marriage contract, that is, have contracted to become husband and wife, it is for the Courts of the country in which they elect to make their home, and not for the Courts of the country in which they may chance to have been married, to determine the status which attaches to the marriage, and the rights which flow therefrom. ... ... To hold from the mere fact that a marriage has taken place in the country of the wife, and according to the forms required by the law of that country, that an inference arises that the parties intended that the marriage should be of the character recognised by the law of the wifes country, irrespective of the domicile of the husband seems to me to amount to a substitution of the lex loci contractus for the lex domicilli as the law which is to regulate the status and rights of the parties in such a case.” 30. The above decision was confirmed by the Division Bench consist-ing of Blackwell and Broomfield JJ. See Khambatta v. Khambatta. Mr. Justice Blackwell concluded his judgment with the following observations:- “So far, therefore, as the lex loci contractus is concerned, neither of the parties could, in my opinion, be heard to say that he or she intended a marriage of a character other than that which the law of that country permits. So far as the law of the husbands domicile is concerned, that governs the marriage status by operation of law, regardless of the inten-tion of the parties, and the status might be altered by a change of domicile.” 31. We next go to section(52)2 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. So far as the law of the husbands domicile is concerned, that governs the marriage status by operation of law, regardless of the inten-tion of the parties, and the status might be altered by a change of domicile.” 31. We next go to section(52)2 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. It provides that a Parsi who has contracted a marriage under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1865, or under this 1936 Act, even though such Parsi may change his or her religion or domicile, so long as his or her wife or husband is alive and so long as such Parsi has not been law-fully divorced from such wife or husband or such marriage has not lawfully been declared null and void or dissolved under the decree of a competent Court under either of the said Acts, shall remain bound by the provisions of this 1936 Act(emphasis supplied). The intention is to bind a Parsi who has contracted a marriage under the 1865 Act or this Act of 1936 by the provisions of the 1936 Act with regard to his or her divorce or dissolution of the marriage or for nullity of marriage. Such divorce or dissolution or nullity of marriage can become operative if it is decreed by a competent Court under either of the Acts of 1865 or 1936 and not by law of some other country. I think that section(52)2 is to be understood in that manner. The words “lawfully divorced” and the other word “lawfully” used in relation to the marriage contracted under these two Acts being declared null and void or dissolved mean “lawfully divorced or declared null and void or dissolved” under the provisions of the Acts of 1865 and 1936 and not by the law of any other territory. Section(52)2 further lays down that a marriage solemnized under this Act or the Act of 1865 can be brought to an end by the decree of a competent Court under either of the said Acts. A competent Court contemplated under section(52)2 is a Special Court and entitled the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court if at Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, and at any other place it is entitled as the Parsi District Matrimonial Court of such place. Such Special Courts are to be aided by the Parsi delegates chosen in the manner laid down in this Act. A competent Court contemplated under section(52)2 is a Special Court and entitled the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court if at Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, and at any other place it is entitled as the Parsi District Matrimonial Court of such place. Such Special Courts are to be aided by the Parsi delegates chosen in the manner laid down in this Act. The case is to be heard and tried before the delegates. The decision of the delegates on the facts of the case shall be the decision of the majority of the delegates and if they are equally divided in opinion, the decision on the facts shall be the decision of the presiding Judge. A marriage contracted under this Act cannot be dissolved by the decree of any other Court except that of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court or the Parsi District Matrimonial Court, as the case may be, and aided by the Parsi delegates. . In my view, a Court without these trimmings would not be a competent Court. I am not impressed by Shri Mehtas faint suggestion that “lawfully divorced” means a divorce granted by a Court of the country in which a husband is domiciled and that “competent Court” also means the Court of that country. 32. The above approach is justified on a further examination of section(52)2. Amongst the ways in which a contracting party to a marriage can free itself from the marriage tie and change his or her status and rights and obligations relating to divorce and dissolution of the marriage is to change his or her religion or domicile. This course is sought to be blocked: up by section 52(2). A Parsi who has contracted a marriage under this: Act or the 1865 Act cannot, by changing his or her religion, escape from the provisions of this Act. Likewise, by change of domicile, a Parsi cannot escape from the implications of the provisions of this Act. Section.(52)2 does away with the right of a Parsi to create a jurisdiction in the Court of some other country by changing his domicile after marriage. Likewise, by change of domicile, a Parsi cannot escape from the implications of the provisions of this Act. Section.(52)2 does away with the right of a Parsi to create a jurisdiction in the Court of some other country by changing his domicile after marriage. By implication section(52)2 does not permit a Parsi who, before contracting a marriage under this Act, has a domicile of a territory other than India(State of Jammu and Kashmir excluded) to obtain a divorce or to have the marriage dissolved in a Court where he was domiciled before the solemnization of the marriage under this Act. Section(52)2 is meant to keep the parties to the marriage-bound by the provisions of this Act unless he-or she has been lawfully divorced or his or her marriage declared null and void or dissolved in the manner laid down in this Act. A decree for divorce or dissolution of marriage or nullity of marriage can be passed by the Court constituted under this Act and not by the Court having jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage on the basis of the domicile of the party suing. This celebrated Parsi community of India seems to have evolved its own system under this Act, so that the legal systems prevailing in other countries for dissolution of marriage, etc., do not affect their community in India. 33. Smt. Master also relies on section 4(1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, to reinforce her argument. This sub-section says that no Parsi(whether such Parsi has changed his or her religion or domicile or not) shall contract any marriage under this Act or any other law in the lifetime of his or her wife or husband, whether a Parsi or not, except after his or her lawful divorce from such wife or husband or after his or her marriage with such wife or husband has lawfully been declared null and void or dissolved and, if the marriage was contracted with such wife or husband under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1865, or under this Act, except after a divorce, declaration or dissolution as aforesaid under either of the said Acts. This sub-section and section(52)2 have much in. common and are moulded in the same fashion. But in view of the opinion expressed above, it is necessary to interpret the provisions of section 4(1). 34. This sub-section and section(52)2 have much in. common and are moulded in the same fashion. But in view of the opinion expressed above, it is necessary to interpret the provisions of section 4(1). 34. In conclusion, I say that we must interpret section(52)2 on its own terms without any pre-conceived notion on the question of dissolution. of marriage being governed by the lex domicilli. The meaning and function of domicile and its application in cases like Khambatta v. Khambatta and Yezdiar v. Yezdiar as decided by Mr. Justice Coyajee, have been noted. In Yezdiar v. Yezdiar, the provisions of section(52)2 did not come up for interpretation, whereas Khambatta v. Khambatta was decided on 4th December 1933 before this Act went into operation on 22nd June 1936. The intention of the Legislature as manifested in section(52)2 seems to be to separate the Parsis contracting marriage under this Act from the mainstream of private international law relating to dissolution of marriage and to bind them to the provisions of this Act in matters of their divorce, dissolution of marriage and nullity of marriage. Such matters are intended to be decided by the Special Courts with the aid of the members of their community. In my view, this Court has jurisdiction to pass necessary orders on the present petition as this Court alone is competent under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, to pass such orders, and not the English Matrimonial Court on the basis that husband is governed by the law of his English domicile as urged on behalf of the respondent-husband. 35. Coming to the prayers in the petition, prayer(a) is premature. Moreover, the question of costs is to be decided in the proceedings pending in the London High Court. 36. Prayer(b) is refused as the costs are already awarded. 37. As regards prayer(c), the first part relates to fixation a lump-sum amount. But I am not inclined to award a lump-sum amount at this stage. The monthly alimony asked for in the alternative is Rs. 3000. At present, the husband is paying per month £100=Rs. 1800. Ex. A to the petition is a statements of the amounts remitted by the husband since January 1977 to 8th December 1979. In the year 1977, the husband was remitting at an average of Rs. 3000 per month from February 1977 to December 1977. 3000. At present, the husband is paying per month £100=Rs. 1800. Ex. A to the petition is a statements of the amounts remitted by the husband since January 1977 to 8th December 1979. In the year 1977, the husband was remitting at an average of Rs. 3000 per month from February 1977 to December 1977. From 1978 he reduced the amount to less than Rs. 1800 per month. In 1978 he did not pay for the months of January, July and October. In 1979, out of 12 months, he did not pay for four months. Again in 1979, for four months he had paid at the rate of Rs. 3000 per month and for another four months at the rate of Rs. 2000 per month. 38. The daughter Tinaz has reached the age of 16 in November 1979 and, therefore, under section 49 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, no provision for her maintenance and education is contemplated. She, however, continues to stay with the mother and the mother maintains her and educates her. I am also bearing in mind what the husband has stated in paragraph 6 of his affidavit in reply to the present petition that he spends money on the clothes of his children and other things and he looks after them when they are on holidays with him. 39. The wife has claimed a sum of Rs. 3,000 per month for herself. She has separately claimed under prayer(e) a sum of Rs. 2,000 per month for the children. Thus, her claim is for Rs. 5,000. Smt. Master has shown me various documents and statements in connection with the monthly expenditure incurred by the wife on herself and the children and their education. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the documents produced before me. But nevertheless, it is a difficult task to assess the expenditure incurred by her. 1 feel that the best yard-stick for fixing the quantum is the statement of remittances made by the husband from 1977 to 1979. The import of section 49 is also to be borne in mind. Considering all the circumstances, I feel that a sum of Rs. 2,500 per month would meet the ends of justice. This payment will be effective from January 1980 when the present petition was filed. 40. Prayer(d) relating to the flat is refused. 41. The import of section 49 is also to be borne in mind. Considering all the circumstances, I feel that a sum of Rs. 2,500 per month would meet the ends of justice. This payment will be effective from January 1980 when the present petition was filed. 40. Prayer(d) relating to the flat is refused. 41. As regards prayer(f) relating to the custody of the childran, no order in view of the statements made by the husband in paragraph 8 of his affidavit. 42. Prayers(g),(h),(i) and(j) relating to the proceedings pending in England refused. 43. The wife to give credit for the amounts received for the months of January, February, March and April 1980 while claiming at the rate of Rs. 2,500 per month from January 1980 onwards. 44. The respondent-husband to pay the costs of this petition quantified at Rs. 500. Order accordingly. ------