ORDER Murlidhar, J. - This is a tenant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the, order, dated 29-9-1977 of the appellate authority (1st Addl. District Judge). Meerut rejecting the Petitioner's application under Section 24 of the Act XIII of 1972. 2. The brief relevant facts are that the petitioner was tenant of shop No. 440 in the town of Baraut at Rs. 41 /- per month and was running an eating place popularly described as a hotel therein. The landlord Ranjit Singh filed an application under Section 21 against the petitioner in the year 1972 claiming release of the shop in order to start a new business for his son who had lost his job with a private concern Silvania and Laxman Ltd. of Delhi on 9-11-1972. This was allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer per his order dated 27-12-1973. An appeal by the tenant was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 27-10-1975. Possession was obtained by the landlord on 27-4-1976 On 26-7-1976, the tenant applied under Section 24 alleging that the shop had been got released for starting a general merchandise shop for the son Praveen Kumar but bad not been used for any such purpose, that there were no general merchandise goods in the premises, that some of the landlord's own goods like cement pipes etc. Were being stored in the shop and the same remained mostly closed, and that Praveen Kumar had never occupied or sat on it. The petitioner also took out a commission. The commissioner visited the shop on 28.7-1976 and reported that Praveen Kumar had opened the shop at about 10 00 a.m., that there was a board 'Ranjit Singh Praveen Kumar Cement Stockist, asbestos sheets, sanitary pipes etc.' on the shop, that some asbestos pipes and some iron pipe fittings were stored inside the shop, that there was also a newly painted iron safe, there was also a half bag of cement said to be kept for repairs to the shop and that there were cobwebs on the ceiling at one or two places and ceiling fan as well as a tube-light and three bulb points without any bulb. The Commissioner reported that Praveen Kumar had obtained a cement agency on 30th June and had placed an order for cement and asbestos pipes and had also secured sales-tax registration. The Commissioner reported that Praveen Kumar had obtained a cement agency on 30th June and had placed an order for cement and asbestos pipes and had also secured sales-tax registration. Praveen Kumar also showed some receipts relating to asbestos pipe sales to the commissioner. The landlord's case was that Praveen Kumar was the sole owner of the business M/s. Ranjit Singh Praveen Kumar started in the shop and was carrying on the business of stockists of cement and asbestos sheets, Sanitary pipes and Sylvania tubes and bulbs etc. The landlord also filed certain other papers showing grant of cement agency and pipe fittings. The appellate authority nothing the commissioner's report and the other papers filed held that the landlord's son did start business in the disputed shop and therefore, it could not be said that the shop was put to some use other than that for which it had been released. This is the order attacked in this petition. 3. Section 24 applies inter alia (1) where the landlord puts or causes to be put the building in occupation of any person different from the person for whose occupation the building was required, (2) where the landlord permits any such other person to occupy, (3) where the landlord otherwise puts the building to any use other than one for which it was released and (4) where the landlord omits to occupy it within one month or such extended period as the Prescribed Authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession. In such cases the tenant is entitled to apply to the Prescribed Authority where he has been evicted under Section 21 of the Act or the District Judge where he has been evicted on an appeal under Section 22 within three months of the date of such Act or omission and the Prescribed Authority or the District Judge may "order the landlord to place the evicted tenant in occupation of the building on the original terms and conditions." 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the goods found by the commissioner in the shop were the goods of the landlord's own existing business and not of a new business of general merchandise belonging to the son, that it was unlikely that the son should have started a new business competing with that of his father's business and the father being ill it was the same business and that in fact the landlord had from the beginning negotiated the sale of the shop with one Kailash Chand Jain. Later it was brought to the notice of the court by the respondent that due to losses in the business pending this petition the shop was sold on 9-3-1978 to Sri Krishna Jain, It appears that while filing the writ petition the petitioner had on 2-1-1978 obtained an order restraining the landlord from transferring the shop to anyone. Apparently this injunction order was not served on the respondent and the sale deed of the shop was executed. It has been stressed that the sale bears out the case of the petitioner that the landlord had throughout the fraudulent intention of securing the release of the shop for purposes of sale with vacant possession. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent raised the preliminary point that the petitioner's application under Section 24 should have been filed before the Prescribed Authority. According to the learned counsel the application would lie before the District Judge only where the District Judge for the first time in appeal reversing the order of the Prescribed Authority directs release and in a case where he only confirms the order of the Prescribed Authority directing release the application should be made to the Prescribed Authority. It is not possible to accept this contention. Whether the District Judge's appellate order is one of confirmation or reversal, after the decision in appeal the release has to be regarded as a release by the appellate authority under section 22 of the Act because it is a settled principle of law that the decree of the trial court or Tribunal merges in the decree of the appellate court or tribunal. Therefore, wherever an appeal under section 22 has been filed and decided, the application under section 22 lies to the appellate authority namely, the District Judge. Therefore, wherever an appeal under section 22 has been filed and decided, the application under section 22 lies to the appellate authority namely, the District Judge. The intention appears to be that in such cases, the appellate authority should look into the complaint of the tenant. 6. The main plank of the petitioner's grievance is that the sale-deed of 9-3-78 bears out that his objection was all along correct and the shop was not required for the son's business. While there may be substance in this contention, it is not possible to regard this subsequent event of the sale-deed as in any way vitiating the decision of the District Judge or showing the same to be the manifestly erroneous. The sustainability of the District Judge's order on the application tinder Section 24 has to be determined on the material before him when he passed that order. The subsequent sale-deed of 9-3-1978 could at best furnish a cause of action for fresh application under Section 24 but admittedly no application under Section 24 was moved on that basis. The pendency of this writ petition would in no way do away with the requirement under Section 24 of moving an application within three months of the cause of action. In this connection the learned counsel for the respondent also urged that Section 24 can be of no avail against a transferee. In view of the finding, I am about to record it is not necessary to decide the point in the present writ petition. I am, however, of the opinion that the word 'landlord' in Section 14 should include a transferee from the original landlord, because after the transfer it is such transferee alone who can be regarded as the landlord. Not to hold so would render Section 24 wholly ineffective for landlord would be able to avoid the liability of Section 24 by simply transferring the property. 7. The crucial point in the case, therefore, is whether the District Judge's order is manifestly, erroneous on the material before him. I am afraid the petitioner has failed to make out this The main ground now asserted is that the goods found by the Commissioner in the shop were of the landlord's own business. But this point does not appear to have been specifically raised before the District Judge. I am afraid the petitioner has failed to make out this The main ground now asserted is that the goods found by the Commissioner in the shop were of the landlord's own business. But this point does not appear to have been specifically raised before the District Judge. The District Judges record was summoned at the petitioner's instance and the copies of orders under sections 21- and 22 there in only show that the landlord had been running a business in partnership with Amoiakh Rain styled as Ranjit Singh Amolakh Ram. There is nothing to show that this was a cement or pipe business. Therefore, the District Judge's finding cannot be regarded as vitiated for failure to consider this objection. It was also urged that the premises were got, released for purpose of a general merchandise business and opening of a cement business would be use for a different purpose inviting the penalty under Section 24. I find it difficult to agree that where a shop is got released to set up a son in a particular business, it is always an essential part of the purpose of release that the same business be started. Special features of the business being the ground of release apart, the particularisation of business which the son is said to intend to set up would be only incidental. As long as the intention was bonafide it would not be necessary that the son must start the same business. Various factors can affect the choice of business before it is actually started. Therefore, the mere fact that a business different from the one given out in the proceedings under Section 21 was started after release would not in my opinion it office for holding that the premises bad been put to a use other than the one for which it was released within the meaning of Section 24. I do not wish to imply that such a shift may not in appropriate cases affect the credibility of the landlord's stand that a genuine business by the person for whom release had been obtained had been started, In the present case. however, I do not find sufficient justification for finding the District Judge's view that a new business of cement, asbestos sheets and pipes etc. however, I do not find sufficient justification for finding the District Judge's view that a new business of cement, asbestos sheets and pipes etc. in the name of Ranjit Singh Praveen Kumar had been started in the shop by Praveen Kumar to be, on the material before him, perverse or so erroneous as to be regarded as vitiated in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. Lastly it was contended that the petitioner had been alleging the landlord's intention to sell the property to Kailash Chand Jain from the very beginning and the whole release proceeding and the pretence of Praveen Kumar obtaining agency and starting his own cement and pipe business in the disputed shop were steps in the landlord's scheme of securing release through fraud on the authorities so that be may be able to secure a good price by delivering vacant possession to the vendee. It is not necessary to go into this matter in these proceedings. If this position avails, there is nothing to prevent the petitioner from seeking such remedy as may be available to him under law. 9. The petition is dismissed. But the parties are left to bear their own costs.