JUDGMENT K. N. Goyal, J. - This Is a railway servant's second appeal arising out of a suit for declaration in a service matter. The appellant was a fireman posted at Sonepur. His post was comprised in essential staff. The rules lay down that essential staff are entitled to rent-quarters, subject to the proviso that if no quarters be available at the place of posting of such staff, the railway administration is under no liability to provide the same. While posted at Sonepur, he received an order on 19 September 1966, transferring him to Garhara. In Garhara there were no railway quarters available for him. According to the appellant, his wife was in a state of advanced pregnancy and his daughter's marriage bad also been settled and the prospective in-laws of his daughter were reluctant to perform marriage at Garhara because of greater distance involved though they were willing to have it performed at Sonepur. In these circumstances, be represented for cancellation of his transfer and in the alternative for permission to retain the quarters at Sonepur. He also represented that his own house had fallen down in the floods and he had nowhere to move to if he was not allowed to retain his quarters at Sonepur. None of his requests was, however, granted. It appears from Para. 1733 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual that an employee is allowed two months' time to retain the quarters after his transfer. That period had already expired, but he had not vacated the quarters. On 19 January 1967, an order was served on him directing him to vacate the quarters immediately failing which disciplinary action would be taken against him. Despite service upon him of this order, he failed to vacate the quarters. Thereupon he was suspended on 18 February 1967, and a chargesheet, dated 6 March 1967, was served on him charging him with disobedience of the order, dated 19 January 1967. After inquiry, a show. cause notice was issued to him against the proposed penalty of removal. Thereafter, an order of removal was passed on 26 March 1968, side exhibit 17. The appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed on 28 March 1969, vide exhibit A10. After inquiry, a show. cause notice was issued to him against the proposed penalty of removal. Thereafter, an order of removal was passed on 26 March 1968, side exhibit 17. The appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed on 28 March 1969, vide exhibit A10. Thereafter, he filed a review application vide exhibit 20 pleading for mercy and reiterating his earlier plea that the circumstances in which he had failed to comply with the orders of his superiors were extenuating. This review petition in which he pleaded for mercy and for reinstatement in service was allowed in part on 20 March 1970, ride exhibit All. He was ordered to be reinstated, but the minor penalty of with- holding two Increments was imposed on him. It was further ordered that for the period of suspension and the period from his dismissal up to his reinstatement he would not be entitled to any salary, but he would be treated as on extraordinary leave without pay. Thereupon, he brought the present suit within three years of this last order. The trial Court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate Court allowed the railway administration's appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has come to this Court. 2. Although a number of points were raised in the suit, learned counsel for the appellant has confined his arguments to three points. The other points which have been decided against him have not been sought to be reagitated. These three points are as follows : (1) Under the Indian Railway Establishment Manual only such railway servant as occupied railway quarters without any proper or initial allotment Is subject to disciplinary proceedings for his unauthorized occupation. Where, however, the initial occupation is based on a proper allotment and be merely overstays in the quarters beyond the permitted period, he is liable to pay only enhanced rent, but not to disciplinary proceedings. (2) Under Para. 2044 of the Railway Establishment Manual, a railway servant against whom an order is proposed to be passed for withholding payment of full salary for the period prior to reinstatement, is entitled to opportunity of making representation, but in the present case no such opportunity was given and, accordingly, the order to this extent was void. (3) All the orders, namely, the removal order, the appellate order and the order passed on review were non-speaking orders and were as such void. 3. (3) All the orders, namely, the removal order, the appellate order and the order passed on review were non-speaking orders and were as such void. 3. In support of his first contention learned counsel has invited my attention to Paras. 1730 to 1733 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual. Paragraph 1733 lays down that after permanent transfer, a railway servant may stay in his quarters for two months after which he would be liable to pay enhanced rent as laid down in Para. 1727. Paragraph 1730, first sub-paragraph, lays down that if a railway servant overstays in his quarters beyond the period prescribed by Para. 1728 (which applies to cases of suspension, etc.) The would be liable to pay enhanced rent. Paragraph 1731 lays down that in cases of unauthorized occupation without proper and initial allotment the authorities should not realise any rent at all. Second sub-paragraph of Path. 1734 provides for disciplinary action to be taken in cases of unauthorized occupation. On the basis of the provisions in the rules it has been contended that as the rules provide for realisation of enhanced rent, disciplinary proceedings are not contemplated in case of overstaying where Initial occupation was based on proper allotment. In support of his contention he has also relied on B.R. Vekappaya v. State of Mysore, 1972 L.I.C. 451; and Rabindra Nath Bose v. General Manger, Eastern Railway, 1976 L.I.C. 208. The first decision is of the Mysore High Court and the second is that of Calcutta High Court. The Mysore decision is based on some local rules of Mysore State which were held to be exhaustive on the subject. The Calcutta decision was no doubt based on the Railway Establishment Manual Rules. In that case, although the initial occupation was itself unauthorized and not based on any proper allotment, yet the servant was held to have become a tenant because the railway administration had accepted rent from him. Accordingly, it was held that under Para. 1730 only enhanced rent could be charged but disciplinary proceedings could not be taken under second sub-paragraph of Para. 1731. The decision, however, does not take into account the definition of "unauthorized occupation" contained In the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act of 1958, or of 1971, which replaced the former. Accordingly, it was held that under Para. 1730 only enhanced rent could be charged but disciplinary proceedings could not be taken under second sub-paragraph of Para. 1731. The decision, however, does not take into account the definition of "unauthorized occupation" contained In the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act of 1958, or of 1971, which replaced the former. That definition comprises equally an Initial occupation without a proper allotment order and continuance of occupation after the authority for occupation has ceased. There is no distinction between these two types of unauthorized occupations. More- over, the general law of landlord and tenant does not apply to occupation of public premises which are governed by the said special law. The paragraphs of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual referred to above are not in proper sequence, and statutory rules and administrative Instructions are all mixed up. The provisions that no rent should be accepted In the case where initial occupation is In Itself without proper allotment Is apparently made by way of abundant caution, so that no rights may be claimed on the basis of acceptance of rent. This does not imply that In other cases the occupation would become authorised merely because of acceptance of enhanced or so-called penal rent. With due respect, I also find no legal jurisdiction for the view that because enhanced rent is payable for unauthorized occupation beyond the permissible period, therefore, disciplinary proceedings cannot be taken for disobedience of specific order directing a railway servant to vacate the premises. The two provisions should be construed as without prejudice to each other, and it is In my opinion, open to the authorities to have recourse to one or the other or both. 4. So far as the appellant's second contention is concerned, the lower appellate Court has not taken into account the law laid down in Gopal Krishna Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240. Admittedly, no notice was given by the authorities before making the Impugned direction with regard to salary from the date of suspension to the date of reinstatement. Admittedly, no notice was given by the authorities before making the Impugned direction with regard to salary from the date of suspension to the date of reinstatement. Learned counsel for the Union of India tried to justify the order on the ground that the appellant In his own review petition, exhibit 20, had merely prayed for reinstatement and that request of his having been granted, learned counsel contends, it is not open to the appellant to question the authorities' order to the extent it is adverse against him. The appellant substantially succeeded in persuading the authorities and in obtaining the relief of reinstatement. I am not impressed by this argument, no question of waiver or estoppel arises in the circumstances. This part of the order is clearly void. The representation for review made by the appellant ride exhibit 20 did not deal with this question at all and he was never given a chance to say why the order under Para. 2044 denying him full salary for the said period should not be passed against him. 5. Learned counsel for the Union of India, Sri Sldheshwar Prasad had valiantly tried to distinguish Gopal Krishna Naida case, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240 (Ride supra). He has contended by referring to Para. 6 of the report that their Lordships' view was that opportunity of showing cause against an order under Fundamental Rule 31 (corresponding io Para. 2044 of the Railway Establishment Manual) was required only where the order was not a consequential order. In other words, when the employee already had an opportunity of showing cause in a departmental enquiry, had already had his full and no further opportunity was required while granting him relief in the form of reinstatement merely because such a relief was qualified by an order directing that the full pay was not to be given for the period of his forced absence from duty. It appears, however, from Para. I of the report that in that case also a full departmental Inquiry was held and the employee had been given a notice to show cause against the charges and also against the proposed penalty. In spite of it, it was held that a separate notice was required before an order under Fundamental Rule 54 could be passed. Learned counsel further invited my attention to Pars. In spite of it, it was held that a separate notice was required before an order under Fundamental Rule 54 could be passed. Learned counsel further invited my attention to Pars. 5 of the report in which their Lordships took the view that notice under Fundamental Rule 54 was required because the employee could show that he had been fully exonerated or that the suspension was partly or wholly unjustified. In the present ease, the guilt of the appellant was admitted and as such there was no possibility of his being able to show that he had not been fully exonerated or that the suspension was not wholly justified. It is true that their Lordships in that case did not expressly advert to the possibility of an employee showing cause by way of mitigation of proposed penalty. The emphasis In the ruling was on why fresh opportunity has to be given under Fundamental Rule 54 although earlier opportunity has been given in the departmental inquiry. It was In this context that it was mentioned by way of illustration that the employee could in reply to such show-cause notice represent that his exoneration was complete and no justification for suspension existed. Likewise, for emphasising why a separate show cause was required under Fundamental Rule 54 it was also mentioned that in some cases, namely, those covered by the proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, a disciplinary inquiry may not have been held at all. There is, however, nothing in the ruling to suggest that it was only in such cases that notice under Fundamental Rule 54 was required. In Para. 7 of the report It was mentioned that the authority was to pass an order on consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case. Even a guilty employee can show that the gravity of the charge was not such as to warrant an order of suspension. The generality of the expressions found in Paras. 7 and -10 of the report Indicates that in their Lordships' view the employee was not confined to making representations only in cases mentioned in Paras. 5 and 6 of the report. It is true that whenever an order of reinstatement is passed, the employee does get some relief at the hands of the superior authority. 7 and -10 of the report Indicates that in their Lordships' view the employee was not confined to making representations only in cases mentioned in Paras. 5 and 6 of the report. It is true that whenever an order of reinstatement is passed, the employee does get some relief at the hands of the superior authority. But it does not follow that because some relief is granted, the employee should not have any opportunity of showing cause against an adverse order proposed to be made under Fundamental Rule 54. Of course, if an appellate or reviewing authority merely reduces the penalty, say, from dismissal to removal or reduction in rank or even to a minor-penalty, then no fresh opportunity is required to be given before the reduced penalty is imposed. Because Imposition of a reduced penalty is purely in the nature of relief granted to the appellant. But an order under Fundamental Rule 54 stands on a different footing, as explained in Gopal Krishna Naidu case, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240 (ride supra). I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel that the law laid down in that case should be restricted to situations where the guilt of the delinquent employee is In doubt or where no inquiry was held because of the applicability of any of the clauses of the proviso to Art. 3T1(2). 6. As regards the criticism of learned counsel for the appellant that the order In question was not a speaking order, the learned counsel for the Union has pointed out that this plea was not taken In the plaint. It is true that this plea was not specifioally mentioned. In Para. 16 of the plaint it was said that the impugned order, dated 17 June 1977, was " illegal for the following amongst other reasons." There after reasons were mentioned in Sub-paras. (a) to (1). The fact that the order, dated 17 June 1970, or any of the other orders was not a speaking order was not mentioned in any of these sub-paragraphs. The objection of learned counsel for the respondent would have been valid If the plea now canvassed on behalf of the appellant involved any investigation of facts or production of any records. The records are all there. The order was pleaded to be Illegal. The objection of learned counsel for the respondent would have been valid If the plea now canvassed on behalf of the appellant involved any investigation of facts or production of any records. The records are all there. The order was pleaded to be Illegal. The specific ground of illegality was not Indicated, but if that ground Is self- evidence, it can be permitted to be taken even in a second appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the Union hike further contended that no specific form of order is contemplated by law. The review order was passed by way of concession and the reviewing authority did say that on a consideration of the facts it was passing that order. A bald statement that the facts have been considered is, however, not enough. it is true that substantial relief was granted by the reviewing authority. That relief may have been granted on the ground that penalty of removal was held to be too harsh. It does not, however, appear on the face of the order that the extenuating circumstances alleged by the appellant were actually taken into account. The authority has neither said that the allegations of extenuating circumstances were false, nor that, even if true, the appellant should be visited with at least the penalty of withholding of two increments. In the absence of any such indication in the order, it cannot be said that the said allegations of extenuating circumstances were considered. In Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 567 their Lordships have observed that if an original authority gives reasons, then any superior authority con- curring with those reasons need not separately give reasons. In the present case, none of the orders, namely, exhibit 17 (removal), exhibit A 10 (rejection of appeal) and exhibit A 11 (partial acceptance of review petition) is a speaking order. The mere fact that the appellate authority or the reviewing authority has affirmed or partially affirmed the orders of the original authority did not, therefore, absolve the reviewing authority from giving reasons. 8. I, however, agree with the learned counsel for the Union that so far as guilt was concerned, no reasons needed to be given because the facts were self-evident and were sot in dispute. The appellant did overstay in his quarters beyond the permissible period. He thus did disobey the order, dated 19 January 1967. 8. I, however, agree with the learned counsel for the Union that so far as guilt was concerned, no reasons needed to be given because the facts were self-evident and were sot in dispute. The appellant did overstay in his quarters beyond the permissible period. He thus did disobey the order, dated 19 January 1967. That was the only charge against him. The finding of guilt was thus clearly based on evidence and on undisputed facts. That finding cannot, therefore, be questioned on the ground that it was not a speaking finding. 9. The only flaw in the review order is that although some penalty was imposed, albeit, a much less severe penalty than originally imposed, the order did not speak of the extenuating circumstance submitted by the appellant in his memorandum of appeal which were reiterated by him in his review petition. 10. Learned counsel for the Union also contended that the appellant himself had not appeared before the appellate authority for a period of six months although he had earlier desired oral hearing. He may, therefore, be taken to have abandoned his appeal or to have given up the allegations of extenuating circumstances. I am unable to agree with this reasoning. His failure to appear before the appellate authority merely implies that (sic) his right to oral hearing. The question here is different. He never gave up his submissions made in his representations. Accordingly, even though the appellant did not appear before the authorities for making oral submission, his written submissions were required to be considered. 11. It will be technically speaking open to the competent authorities to pass a fresh order in accordance with law as indicated in this judgment, but having regard to the staleness of the matter and the fact that the appellant has had to undergo considerable expense and botheration in this litigation for a period of seven years, it may not be considered by the authorities to be equitable to do so. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the order and decree passed by the lower appellate Court, dated 7 May 1978 is set aside. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the order and decree passed by the lower appellate Court, dated 7 May 1978 is set aside. The suit is decreed for declaration that the part of the Order No. 324, dated 17 June 1970, imposing on the plaintiff-appellant the penalty of withholding two increments and directing that no salary be paid to him for the period Intervening between the date of his suspension and the date of his reinstatement was void. In view of the fact that the plaintiff had not specifically pleaded in the plaint the grounds of illegality on which he has succeeded, the parties shall bear their own costs.