JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is an application dated 27-10-1978 Ram Prasad etc v. Samai Singh etc, No. 5(z) of 1978-79 Meerut under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code for recalling the order dated 6-10-1978 in view application no. 170 of 1976-77 against order dated 30-9-1977 in second Appeal No. 65(z) of 1974-75/Meerut. 2. The facts in brief are that Mamraj, plaintiff, instituted the division suit claiming partition of his half share and alleging the share of defendants 1 to 3 to be half being so of his brother Banshi and that the land was ancestral of the parties. 3. The suit was contested by defendants 1 to 3 who claimed separation since more than 50 years between father of the plaintiff and their father and that Banshi their father was in sole possession and that other parties were also co-tenants originally. The second appeal filed by defendants was dismissed. The share of plaintiff was held on the basis of compromise to be ?rd and that of the defendant to be ?rd which was upheld by learned Additional Commissioner and by the Hon'ble Member of the Board. The review application was filed against order of the Board which was decided on 6-10-1978 on the basis of the compromise duly verified by S.D.O. Baghpat Meerut and the share of Mamraj was held th and that of the defendant to be th. 4. The miscellaneous-application has been filed by Ram Prasad etc. who claimed that Mamraj plaintiff had sole his ?rd share to them on 28.1.1978 and the compromise between the parties of the suit was arrived on 19-8-1978 and was filed on 8-9-1978. 5. I have heard the Ld. counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. It was argued on behalf of the applicants that the father of the applicants purchased after dismissal of the second appeal, the share of Mamraj for Rs. 5600/- through registered sale deed that the opposite parties had moved review application on 12-9-1977 on which order was passed for issuing notice regarding question of admission and operation of final decree was stayed and the review was not admitted and was not finally decided, therefore, the order dated 6-10-1978 was without jurisdiction and fraud was played upon the court. 5600/- through registered sale deed that the opposite parties had moved review application on 12-9-1977 on which order was passed for issuing notice regarding question of admission and operation of final decree was stayed and the review was not admitted and was not finally decided, therefore, the order dated 6-10-1978 was without jurisdiction and fraud was played upon the court. Reliance has been placed on Shakal Singh and others v. Smt. Devi and another, 1979 A.W.C. page 418 (F.B.) Baikunth Nath v. Dhuri Mall, A.W.R. (1971) page 823 (H.C.) and copy of Ram Prasad v. Board of Revenue, Allahabad & others, Civil Misc. Writ no. 2207 of 1977, dated 27-3-1978 decided by Hon'ble Mr. R.B. Misra, J was also referred. 7. In reply it was argued on behalf of the opposite parties that this misc. Application is neither maintainable as the review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the C.P.C. or under Section 151 of the C.P.C. as the Misc. Application because the applicants were neither parties to the suit nor to the first appeal nor to the second appeal and nor to the review application; that full Bench case reported in 1979 A.W.C. page 418 (H.C.) is not applicable to the present case. Reliance has been placed on V.S.T. Thamsa Thasin Tharaganar v. Mahamed Haji Ganny and another, A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon page 364, Suresh Chandra Sen v. Jogesh Chandra Sen and another, A.I.R. 1939 Calcutta page 668, Munshi Singh v. Director of Consolidation, 1965 A.W.R. page 581 (High Court), Nethu Lal Appellant v. Raghubir Singh and others, A.I.R. 1926 (Allahabad) page 50 and Bharat Singh v. Firm Sheo Pershad Giani Ram and others, A.I.R. 1978 (Delhi) page 122. 8. The order dated 2-3-1978 passed by Sri. J.S. Gupta, learned Member for issuing notice to opposite party for hearing the parties on admission of the review application has been interpreted by the Ld. counsel for the applicant, that the review application was not admitted when on 6-10-1978 the impugned order was passed, therefore, it was an order without jurisdiction. Reliance has been placed on 1979 A.W.C. page 418. It has been argued in reply that the passing the order dated 9-10-1978 the review was admitted and was also allowed and the appeal was also accordingly decided regarding the share of the parties. 9. No doubt order XLVII of the C.P.C. contemplates three stages in a review petition. Reliance has been placed on 1979 A.W.C. page 418. It has been argued in reply that the passing the order dated 9-10-1978 the review was admitted and was also allowed and the appeal was also accordingly decided regarding the share of the parties. 9. No doubt order XLVII of the C.P.C. contemplates three stages in a review petition. It is open to the court to reject the review application if it finds that no ground for review has been made out. It may issue notice to the other side before passing a final order on the review application and then, after hearing the parties, the court may dismiss the application for review or it may allow. If the application for review is dismissed, the matter ends there. If the application for review is allowed then the order sought to be reviewed may either be modified or set aside. Till the previous order passed in the second appeal is set aside, the proceeding in the second appeal are not revived. They are revived only when the review petition has been allowed. 10. In the present case as the parties were to be heard on admission and they had compromised which was filed and as it was already verified by S.D.O. Baghpat the impugned order was passed in the following terms on 6-10-1978:- "In this review petition, the contesting parties have come to terms and have filed a compromise which has been fully verified by Sub-Division Officer, Baghpat, district Meerut. According to the terms of the compromise the share of the plaintiff Mamraj would be th and that of the defendants Samai Singh, Atar Singh and Surat Singh would be th. This review petition is decided in terms of the compromise, which will form part of the decree. Costs on parties". By the impugned order in my considered opinion the learned Member admitted the review application, allowed it and modified the order passed dated 30-7-1977 and modified the decree regarding the share of the parties, therefore the argument that the review application was not admitted and the order was without jurisdiction has got no force and is rejected. 11. No the main question for determination is whether this present application under section 151 of the C.P.C. with the prayer of setting aside the order dated 6-10-1978 is maintainable or not. 12. 11. No the main question for determination is whether this present application under section 151 of the C.P.C. with the prayer of setting aside the order dated 6-10-1978 is maintainable or not. 12. In Bainkunth Nath v. Dhuri Mal, 1971 A.W.R. page 823 it was held as follows:- "Where an application u/s 9 R 9 was dismissed for default and and application u/s 151 for setting aside for the order and restoration of application u/s 9 R 9 was rejected on the view that since the plaintiff had a remedy provided by C.P.C. by going up in appeal from the order of dismissal for default of an application u/s 151 for setting aside of that order was not competent in law, held that even if the order is appealable u/o 43 an application u/s 151 C.P.C. can be filed in the trial court for setting aside of that order. The trial court was competent to entertain the application u/s 151 of the C.P.C. and it refused to exercised a jurisdiction vesting in it and threw it out on the ground that the application did not lie being an incompetent application as the remedy of appeal was available to the plaintiff". 13. In Union of India v. V.S. Raghubir Saran and others, A.I.R. 1957 (Allahabad) page 120. It was held as follows:- "A contract vitiated by fraud can be set aside by a decree obtained in a regular suit instituted for that purpose. Order 23, R. 3 does not proved for an enquiry into disputed facts collateral to the terms of the compromise. A party alleging fraud cannot be allowed to avoid the compromise admittedly executed by it in miscellaneous proceedings started by an application under O. 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code The court is bound to give effect to it forthwith if it is lawful having regard to its own terms." 14. In Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram, A.I.R. 1957 (Allahabad) page 820. It was held that:- "Where a compromise decree was passed but the defendant was aggrieved by the decree accepting the compromise and making it a part of decree, he should challenge the decree in appeal. If it was his case that the compromise was voidable at his option on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation he has his remedy in a regular suit. If it was his case that the compromise was voidable at his option on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation he has his remedy in a regular suit. In any case he has no right to pray for the quashing of the compromise and the setting aside of the decree on an application made under section 151 Civil Procedure Code It is not open to any party to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court when he had another remedy open to him but did not pursue it." 15. In Bharat Singh v. Firm Sheo Pershad Giani Ram and others, A.I.R. 1978 (Delhi) page 122. It has been held that:- "A review application can be filed only by a party to the lis in which the order sought to be reviewed has been passed. It cannot be preferred by a third party. It could not be contended that the phrase "any person considering himself aggrieved" would include any one who is adversely affected by the impugned order, whether that person is or is not party to the lis in which the impugned order, has been passed. As will be apparent from a reading of the rule any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order may apply for review provided he can establish that he "from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decision was passed or order made". This postulates that the person applying for review has to satisfy two conditions, namely, that he is aggrieved by the order and also that he for the reasons mentioned was not in a position to bring that fact to the order being passed. If these two conditions are necessary before a review application can be moved, it follows that the review application has to be made by a person who was a party to the lis decide by the impugned order or decree. This view is based on the principle that a decree or order adversely affecting a person who is not a party to the lis in which that order or decree is passed is in law not binding on him. This view is based on the principle that a decree or order adversely affecting a person who is not a party to the lis in which that order or decree is passed is in law not binding on him. Such a person, therefore, can ignore the order or decree which adversely affects him and so, cannot apply for a review of that or decree. May take such other steps as may be available to him in law to protect his right as and when the order, or decree adversely affecting him is sought to be enforced so as to jeopardise his rights." 16. In Nethu Lal v. Raghubir Singh and others, A.I.R. 1926 (Allahabad) page 50. It has been held that:- "Fraud or undue influence unaccompanied by any discovery or new matter does not constitute a ground for review and the order granting review is an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. There is no analogy between discovery of new and important matter or error apparent on the face of the record and an assertion that a person had been under undue influence or coercion. Therefore, a Court has no jurisdiction under O. 47, R. 1, to review a compromise-decree on the ground that the compromise had been procured under undue influence or coercion and subsequent to the decree that compromise has been repudiated. A court's power to review its order depends on a ground which existed on the date when the order was made and cannot be exercised on a ground which has come into existence subsequently (case law reviewed). The court does not have an inherent jurisdiction under S. 151 to review its decree where it was perfectly a good one on the date when it was passed". 17. In Munshi Singh v. Director of Consolidation, A.W.R. 1965 page 581. It was held that:- "Where a revision u/s 48 was decided in terms of the compromise but later on the applicant applied for review of the order on the ground of fraud, held that the proper remedy was to sue u/s 42 of the specific Relief Act for the setting aside of the order passed by the Director on the ground of fraud, when this remedy was available the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked. Whether fraud had been committed or not was a highly controversial matter which could not be satisfactorily disposed of on the basis of mere affidavits and a regular suit was the proper remedy." 18. In Suresh Chandra Sen v. Jogesh Chandra Sen and another, A.I.R. 1939 (Calcutta) page 658. It was held that:- "The expression and other sufficient reason' occurring in O. 47, R. 1 is no unlimited and only points to reasons which are sufficient on grounds analogous to those mentioned in the Rule itself. Hence O. 47, R. 1 does not furnish a proper remedy for setting aside a consent decree and vacating it on the ground of fraud. The proper remedy in such case is by way of a regular suit. Section 151 is not also applicable in such cases. In the first place that section being a residuary section should not be applied at all unless there is no other remedy open to the litigation. In the second place the matter for inquiry in such matters is some thing extraneous to the suit itself and the same kind of investigation is necessary a in a contested suit. It would be hard on the losing party if he is convicted of fraud by a summary proceeding like those under Sec. 151 and yet have no remedy by way of appeal against that finding. When there is apparent consent given by party to the suit and he impeaches the decree afterwards on the ground that his consent was obtained by fraud, in such case it cannot be said that any fraud was practised on the court and hence the court has got no inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 151 to set aside previous decree or order. The remedy of the party in such cases would be by way of a suit." 19. In V.S.T. Thamsa Thasin Tharaganar v. Mohamed Haji Canny and another, A.I.R. 1935 (Rangoon) page 364. It has been held that:- "Persons who have never been 'parties in the proper sense of the word' might or might not have to file a suit to set aside the decree, but persons who have never been parties to a suit or to an appeal at all, need neither file a suit to set aside the original decree or the application for review". 20. 20. It is more than clear from the perusal of the aforesaid mentioned rulings that any person or persons who had not been party or parties to the suit, first appeal or second appeal are not entitled to file a review application or an application under section 151 of the C.P.C. for setting aside order passed in review. 21. It is also abundantly clear from the perusal of the aforesaid rulings that a compromise decree cannot be assailed by way of review application or by invoking inherent jurisdiction of the court under section 151. In such case the only remedy available is by way of regular suit for cancellation of such a decree. 22. In Ram Prasad v. Board of Revenue, C.M.W.P. No. 2207 of 1977 (Allahabad) decided on 17th March 1978 by Hon'ble R.B. Misra, J. It was held that:- "On an analysis of the aforesaid case, it is evidently clear that the court is not powerless to investigate into the question on an application under section 151 C.P.C. if a fraud had been perpetrated on the court. Law Courts always abhor the multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, if the matter had already been gone into on an application under section 151 C.P.C, there is no reason why the parties should be driven to file a regular suit and fight out arduous course of prolong litigation". In that case the only question to be enquired into is whether Ram Moorti, who was appointed the guardian, was really the maternal uncle of the petitioner, who could safeguard the interest of the minor, or whether he had the maternal uncle of the respondent no. 2 himself. The other question was whether the petitioner came to know about the decree on 6th October, 1966, as alleged on behalf of respondent no. 2, or on 20th May 1968, as alleged by the petitioner. Therefore, his Lordship held that there is no reason why these questions cannot be enquired into in the proceedings under section 151 C.P.C., if the court is satisfied that a fraud had been perpetrated on the court itself and the matter had already been gone into. 23. In the present case the parties to the second appeal had entered into compromise and on its basis the review application was allowed. There is no allegation that any fraud was played upon any party to the said compromise dated 19/20-9-1978. 23. In the present case the parties to the second appeal had entered into compromise and on its basis the review application was allowed. There is no allegation that any fraud was played upon any party to the said compromise dated 19/20-9-1978. what to say to any fraud having been played upon the court, therefore, the dictum of Ram Prasad & other v. Board of Revenue Allahabad & others, Civil Misc. Writ No. 2207 of 1977 decided on 27th March 1978 is not at all applicable to the present case, because no fraud on the parties to the compromise or on the court is alleged by those parties to the compromise nor any such fraud appears to have been played on the court. The applicants was not a party to the litigation up to the stage of second appeal or review. The father of the present applicants after the alleged sale deed did not apply for mutation for 5 or 6 months and when the applicants applied for mutation, objection was filed by Mamraj and the defendants-respondents that the alleged sale deed was farzi, fictitious and that review application was pending for decision and civil suit has been filed for cancellation of the alleged sale deed in favour of the father of the applicants. Copy of the plaint of the civil suit no. 391 of 1978 in the court of Munsif East Meerut, has been filed by the daughter of Mamraj against applicants, therefore, this is not a case in which inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of C.P.C. can be invoked because the application of the applicant is neither entertainable either as a review application or an application under section 151 of the C.P.C. Hence, it is liable to be dismissed. 24. In view of the above, the application of the applicants u/s 151 of civil procedure code is rejected with costs as being not maintainable.