BHAMY PAMDURANGA SHENOY v. B. H. RAVINDRA — 1980 DIGILAW 11 (KAR)

( 1 ) THE petitioner Bhamy Panduranga shenoy has filed this Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of india to quash the order dated 21-11-77, a true copy of which is at Ex-A, parsed by the 2nd respondent-First Land tribunal, Mangalore, granting occupancy under S. 48a of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short the 'act'), in favour of the 1st respondent b. H. Ravindra Pai, in respect of Sy. Nos. 36j6, 3618, 36)9 and 36/ 10, the total extent of which is 3 acres 69 cents (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit lands') classified as Bagayat situate in Bolur 'b' village of Manga- lore City in the District of Dakshing kannada. ( 2 ) THE suit lands belonged to late d. Manjayya Heggade of Dharmasthala who granted them on permanent lease with effect from 1-11-1934 to the grand-father of the petitioner of the same name, in the year 1937 under ext-C on an annual rent of Rs. 250. The lease was for residential, industrial, and manufacturing purposes. After the, death of the grand-father of the petitioner, the suit lands came to be owned and enjoyed, by the members of his family. In the year 1973, the suit lands were leased to the 1st respondent by the father of the petitioner Bhamy upendra Shenoy, his grand-mother bhamy Sulochana Bai and himself, under a registered term lease deed dated 5-12-1973 Ext-B for a period of 25 years for the purpose of industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residential, cinema theatres etc. on a monthly rent of Rs. 1500 for the first five years and then at Rs. 2000 per month for the remaining period with an option to the 1st respondent to renew the lease at the end of the period fixed for a further period as required by him for the same purposes. The 1st respondent became the tenant qf the suit lands under the terms stipulated in the lease deed and continued to be in possession of them as a tenant under the petitioner. ( 3 ) THE 1st respondent filed an application in Form-7 as required under s. 48a (1) of the Act on 16-9-1974 for registration of occupancy in respect of the suit lands. The petitioner filed his objection statement on 18-8-1977 as per Ext-D. The 4th respondent who is the successor of the Mulgar, also filed a statement on 10-8-1977. ( 3 ) THE 1st respondent filed an application in Form-7 as required under s. 48a (1) of the Act on 16-9-1974 for registration of occupancy in respect of the suit lands. The petitioner filed his objection statement on 18-8-1977 as per Ext-D. The 4th respondent who is the successor of the Mulgar, also filed a statement on 10-8-1977. Both the petitioner and the 4th respondent contended that the suit lands are not 'agricultural holding' as they were leased out purely for residential, industrial and commercial purposes and as such the provisions of the Act would not apply. ( 4 ) THE 2nd respondent-tribunal, after holding an enquiry as per its order dated 21-11-1977 at Ext-A held that the term lease Ex-B under which the 1st respondent took the suit lands on lease was for non-agricultural purposes. However, it granted occupancy in favour of the 1st respondent, on the ground that in some portion of the suit lands, coconut trees were planted and vegetables were grown and as such, the 1st respondent was cultivating the suit lands as a tenant. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition to set aside the order Ext-A. ( 5 ) THE 1st respondent filed his statement of objections opposing the petition and supporting fully the validity of the order Ex-A passed by the 2nd respondent-tribunal. ( 6 ) SHRI K. Shivashankar Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner contended as follows: the scope and purpose of the Act is to make a uniform law in the State of Karnataka relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holding and certain other matters appearing therein. If the relationship of the landlord and tenant does not rest on agrarian relations, the provisions of the Act would not apply. In the district of Dakshina Kannada from which this case comes, there was no classification of lands as 'agricultural' and 'non-agricultural' and therefore, the nature of the "holding" whether it is agricultural or non-agricultural and the demised land is used for agricultural or non-agricultural purpose would depend upon the purpose for which the land is leased out and the dispute between the landlord and the tenant arising under the provisions of the Act shall have to be decided on. the basis of the relationship that exists between them. the basis of the relationship that exists between them. If the relationship of landlord and tenant is brought about by a written document, the terms of that document shall be the decisive factor to decide the question if agrarian relationship exists between them. In the instant case, if the document ext-B which has brought about the relationship of landlord and tenant between, the petitioner and the 1st respondent is read and understood from the plain language employed therein, it would clearly show that the only purpose for which the suit lands were demised in favour of the 1st respondent was for non-agricultural purposes. In fact, the 'suit lands' are being used by the 1st respondent for the said purpose. The mere fact that the 1st respondent has planted a few fruit-bearing trees such as coconut trees -or grown vegetables, in the suit lands, the lease in in question would not become one for agricultural purposes or that the suit lands are being used for agricultural purposes and the 1st respondent would become a 'tenant' within the meaning the Act. Per contra, Shri U. L. Narayana rao, learned counsel for the 1st respondent argued that the suit lands were leased in the beginning of the year 1965 by the father oi the petitioner late bhamy Upendra Shenoy to the 1st respondent mainly for agricultural purposes. As it was an. oral lease, the lessor insisted thai a registered lease deed should be erecuted. Hence the 1st respondent executed the registered, term lease deed as per Ext.-B in respect of the suit lands for a period of 25 years for the purpose of agriculture and other- incidental purposes viz. , industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residential, cinema theatres etc. He further contended that the 2nd respondent tribunal, during its local inspection found that the 1st respondent was using a greater part of the suit lands for coconut cultivation and for growing vegetables which would clearly go to show that the suit lands are being used for agricultural purposes. He further- submitted that the relevant factor- to be taken into account to find out whether a certain holding of land is 'land' and the person in possesion of it is a 'tenant' within the meaning of the act, is the nature of the use to which the demised land is actually put on or, before 1-3-1974 and not the purpose for which it was leased. ( 7 ) ON the rival contentions advanceby the parties, the points that arise for decision in the case will be: "whether the 1st respondent is a 'tenant' and the ' suit lands' are land within the meaning of the Act? these two questions being closely related, have to be dealt with and disposed of together. ( 8 ) INDIA is primarily an agriculturalcountry. The economy of the country is largely depending upon the development of agriculture. The reconstruction of the agricultural section of the society is one of the objects, aimed at in the process of develpment of agriculture. The Central as well as state Governments are keen in taking suitable measures in the advancement and improvement of agriculture. The act is one such legislation, enacted, by, the State of Karnataka in that diretion. The preamble of the Act states the, scope and the purpose, of. the Act. It states that it is an enactment for making a uniform law in the State of Karnataka relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land-holdings and for other matters appearing therein. The Act deals with agrarian relations and eiling on land holdings besides conferring ownership on tenants and other incidental matters. The Act does not apply to all kinds of lands in the state of Karnataka and to all categories of tenants- if the relationship) of the landlord and tenant does not rest on agrarian relations, the tenant, who is in possession of the land, even if the land is an agricultural land within the meaning of the act, cannot avail himself of any benefit under the Act. The governing factor to bring the case within the fold of the Act will be the relationship of the landlord and tenant based on agrarian relations, This is clear from the scope and purpose of the Act as reflected from its preamble. ( 9 ) CHAPTER III of the Act deals with the conferment of ownership on tenants. The governing factor to bring the case within the fold of the Act will be the relationship of the landlord and tenant based on agrarian relations, This is clear from the scope and purpose of the Act as reflected from its preamble. ( 9 ) CHAPTER III of the Act deals with the conferment of ownership on tenants. Vesting of the land in the state Government is provided under s. 44 which states that all lands held by or in the possession of the tenants immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act (which came into force with 'effect from 1-3-1974) other than the lands held by them under leases permitted undsr S. 5, shall stand transferred to and vest in, the State Government with effect on and from the said date. S. 45 lays down the conditions for entitlement of the tenants to be registered as occupants of the lands they hold as tenants before the date of vesting and which they have been cultivating personally. S. 4anda provides for making applications by persons entitled to be registered a^ occupants under S. 45 and enquiry by the Tribunals of such applications and conferment of occupancy rights. ( 10 ) S, 2 of the Act furnishes the definition of certain expressions used in the Act. 'landlord' is defined under s. 2 (A) (20) as follows: "landlord" means a person who has leased land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant: explanation; An intermediary such as a permanent tenant or mulgenidar, mirasitenant or khata kul who having taken land on lease from the land-owner has le,ased it to another person shall be deemed to be the landlord with reference to the person to whom the land is leased. " "tenant" is defined under S. 21 (A) (34) thus:"tenant'' means an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lea,se from a landlord and includes: - (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4; (ii) a person who was protected from eviction from any land by the mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961; (iia) a, person who cultivates personally any land on lease under a lease created contrary to the provisions of S. 5 and before the date of commencement of the Amendment Act; (iii) a person who is a permanent tenant; and (iv) a person who is a protected tenant; explanation: A person who takes a contract to cut grass, or to gather the fruits or other produce of any land, shall not on that account only be deemed to be a tenant. "agriculturist' is defined under S. 2a (3) thus. "agriculturist" means a person who cultivates land personally-" "tenancy" is denned under Sec. 2 (A) (33) as follows: "tenancy means the relationship of landlord and tenant". "land" is defined under sub- clause (18) of sub-section (A) of S. 2 thus: "land" means agricultural land, that is to say, land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes horticultural land, forest land, garden, land, pasture land, plantation and tope but does not include House-site or land used exclusively for non- agricultural purposes. " ( 11 ) THE tenancy of the 1st respondent in respect of the suit lands is not disputed. It is also not disputed that the 4th respondent is the land owner and the petitioner is Mulgenidar from whom the 1st respondent took the suit lands on term lease under Ex-B. It is also not disputed" that the' petitioner is the landlord with reference to the 1st respondent within the meaning of the Act. The point at issue between the contesting parties is whether the 1st respondent is a 'tenant' and the suit lands are 'land within the meaning of the Act. ( 12 ) IT is common knowledge that in the District of Dakshina Kannada from which this case arises formed part of the state of Madras where there was no classification of lands as 'agricultural' and non-agricultural'. ( 12 ) IT is common knowledge that in the District of Dakshina Kannada from which this case arises formed part of the state of Madras where there was no classification of lands as 'agricultural' and non-agricultural'. There was no provision in tha,t State requiring the owners of the land to obtain conversion of land for non-agricultural purposes after payment of what is called "conversion fine". The lands in Dakshina kannada are classified as nanja, Punja, and Bagayat under the Revenue Laws. Even the cultivable dry lands are classified as III class nanja, Garden lands are classified as bagayat. The lands which are not ordinarily cultivable, hills and hillocks are classified as Punja lands. The classification of the lands in the revenue records by itself would not afford any guidance to decide the question whether a particular piece of land is 'agricultural land' and the person holding it under a lease is 'tenant' within the meaning of the act. When, a lease is evidenced by a written document in which the object or purpose of the lease is stated, then the purpose of the lease as stated in the lease deed concludes the question whether the land demised is 'agricultural land' and the lessee is a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act not with standing the fact that the land demised is a Nanja or Bagayat land because the purpose so stated indicates the nature of the land and controls the enjoyment and further decides the question of relationship created thereby between the landlord and tenant whether it rests on agrarian relations or not. ( 13 ) SUPPOSE a lessee takes a land on lease for a specified purpose and later alters the enjoyment of the land by using it for a different purpose, he commits a wrong as it would contravene the provisions of S. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which stipulates among others that the lessee must not use or permit another to use the property he obtained on lease for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. S. 3 (2) of the Act provides that the provisions of Chapter V of the transfer of Property Act shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, apply to the tenancies and leases of lands to which the Act applies. S. 3 (2) of the Act provides that the provisions of Chapter V of the transfer of Property Act shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, apply to the tenancies and leases of lands to which the Act applies. S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act is one of the sections that finds a place in Chapter V. No provision of the Act which is inconsistent with S. 108 (o) was brought to my notice. Therefore, it follows that tenancies and leases of lands to which the act applies are also subject to the prohibitions and limitations prescribed tinder S. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property act. In that view of the matter, a lessee cannot take advantage of a wrong committed by him by using the land leased for a different purpose than for which it was leased out, to claim any benefit under the Act, even if he had altered the enjoyment of the land (for a different purpose) contrary to the terms of the lease. The relationship of landlord and tenant created under the lease deed in respect of the demised holding will be the deciding factor to the applicability of the Act, because it is a, legislation for making a uniform law "in, the State of Karnataka relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings and for certain other matters appearing therein. If the relationship between the landlord and tenant created under a lease, relates to agrarian relations between them or in, other words, it relates to agriculture, then the provisions of the Act would be attracted. If, on the other hand, the relationship between the landlord and tenant created under a lease, is for a purpose other than agriculture, then such a case falls clearly outside, the ambit of the Act. The primary test to be applied to decide the question, whether the relationship of landlord and tenant created under the tenancy agreement, whether oral or written, rests on agrarian relationship, is the dominant purpose of the lease which creates the relationship of landlord and tenant. The test of dominant purpose of the lease has been consistently applied by this court in P. N. Krishnaraj v. Gulabi Bai (1964 Mys. L. J. Supp. 201.), Piadade D'cunha v. Manakke hengsue ( (1972) 1 Mys. The test of dominant purpose of the lease has been consistently applied by this court in P. N. Krishnaraj v. Gulabi Bai (1964 Mys. L. J. Supp. 201.), Piadade D'cunha v. Manakke hengsue ( (1972) 1 Mys. L. J. 290.), and Noorjehan v. Radhakrishna shenoy (1979 ILR Kaf. 192.) and the Supreme court in Uttamchand v. S. M. Lajioani ( AIR 1965 SC. 716 ,) and- Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das ( AIR 1975 SC. 1758 . ). ( 14 ) THE purpose of the lease controls the applicability of the Act is also, clear from the definition of 'tenancy', ' landlord' and 'tenant' under the Act. 'tenancy' is the relationship of landlord and tenant as denned under the act. 'landlord' is defined as one who has leased the land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from the tenant. Under the Explanation an intermediary such as a permanent tenant or mulgenidar, mirasi-tenant or khata kul who, having taken land on, lease from the land-owner, has leased, it to another shall be deemed to' be the landlord with reference to the person to whom the land is leased. 'tenant' as defined under the Act is an agriculturist who cultivates the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes a person enumerated in items (i) to (iv) of clause (34) of sub-sec. (A) of s. 2 of the Act. ( 15 ) INDISPUTABLY, the Act primarily deals with matters relating to agrarian, relations, conferment of ownership on tenants and ceiling on land-holding etc. The matter relating to agrarian relations is one essentially between the landlord and the tenant relating to agriculture. In other words the tenancy must relate to agriculture in order to bring the relationship of landlord and tenant within the ambit of agrarian relations. The relationship of landlord and tenant is essentially one arising out of a contract between the lessor and the lessee; in other words, under a, tenancy agreement, oral or written this is clear from the definition of 'tenancy' and ' landlord' as defined under the Act. The relationship of landlord and tenant is essentially one arising out of a contract between the lessor and the lessee; in other words, under a, tenancy agreement, oral or written this is clear from the definition of 'tenancy' and ' landlord' as defined under the Act. ( 16 ) NOW coming to the expression, 'tenant' as defined under the Act, the dominant feature it embraces is that he must be an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord, and includes the persons enumerated in items (i) to (iv) of clause (34) of S. 2 (A) of the Act. 'agriculturist' means a person who cultivates land personally whereas a 'tenant' is an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease ). The words "who cultivates personally the land He holds on lease" are the key-words toi find out whether a, person claiming himself to be in possession of the demised land is a 'tenant' or not witein the meaning of the Act. It is clear from the definition that the lessee should cultivate the land he holds on lease. This shows that what was leased should be land' as defined under the Act when it was leased. Further, the phrase 'on lease' governs the entire earlier part of the definition i. e. , "cultivates personally the land he holds". "cultivation" is to be traced to the lease because, it is the lease that gives him the right to cultivate. In order to ascertain these factors, one has to look into the dominant purpose of the lea. se and if the purpose of the lease is one for agricultural purpose, then only he could cultivate the land personally and if the object of the lease is non- agricultural or in other words, it is for the purpose of carrying on business, industry, manufacture, residence, cinema theatre etc. , the tenant who holds such a land on lease could not cultivate personally within the meaning of S. 2 (A) (34) of the Act. , the tenant who holds such a land on lease could not cultivate personally within the meaning of S. 2 (A) (34) of the Act. If the land demised falls under the latter category, it would not be, in my view, open for a lessee to contend that he is a 'tenant' within the meaning of S. 2 (A) (34) and that the land demised is 'land' within the meaning of S. 2 (A) (18) of the Act merely because he has planted a few fruit bearing trees or that he has grown vegetables in a portion of the land demised and if this is not the proper interpretation to be put, then the result would be disastrous. ( 17 ) BY way of illustration, let us consider a case of leasing out a land of one acre or more classified as Nanja or bagayat land for the purpose of erecting a saw-mill and a timber yard for that purpose or erecting a tile factory and storing clay and fire-wood required for that purpose. The tenant who obtains such a lease plants some fruit-bearing trees including coconut trees on the boundaries of the land he obtained on lease and also grows vegetables in a portion of the land. Would it be open for such a tenant to contend that the premises he obtained on lease is 'land' and that he is a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act entitled to be registered as an occupant under S. 45 of the act? The answer would necessarily be in the negative. Thus it is obvious that the purpose of the lease would govern the rights of the parties thereto. ( 18 ) THE expression 'land' has an enlarged and a restricted meaning. In vacuum 'land' means many things but out of these varieties of meanings, what is the most appropriate meaning in the given, set of facts has to be applied. The interpretation should aim at avoiding absurdity, hardship and anomalies. Undoubtedly, the definition of land' under s. 2 (A) (18) is very wide and the term "capable of being used for agricultural purposes" used in the definition, construed liberally, one could reach the conclusion that practically all the lands, even that covered by buildings, factories, mills etc. The interpretation should aim at avoiding absurdity, hardship and anomalies. Undoubtedly, the definition of land' under s. 2 (A) (18) is very wide and the term "capable of being used for agricultural purposes" used in the definition, construed liberally, one could reach the conclusion that practically all the lands, even that covered by buildings, factories, mills etc. , be brought under the definition of 'land' as defined under clause (18) of S. 2 (A) of the Act inasmuch as its potential or possible use could be agricultural and every person who obtains the premises for a purpose other than agriculture and. plants a, few fruit-bearing trees or grows a kitchen- garden or rears a few milching cows or she-buffaloes in the demised land could very well contend that he is a 'tenant' within the meaning of clause (34) of s. 2 (A) of the Act. It was not the intention of the legislature that the various terms defined in the Act should be read and understood in such wide amplitude, is clear from the opening words of sub-sec. (A) of S. 2 "in this act unless the context otherwise requires". These words would give us the clue to hold that the terms and expressions denned in the Act under S. 2 (A) shall have to be read and understood keeping in view the object and purpose of the Act and the context in which they are used. ( 19 ) IN the light of the above discussion of the, various provisions of the act, let me now consider the evidence in the case. ( 20 ) ADMITTEDLY, the 4th - respondent is the owner of the suit lands. His predecessor demised the suit lands in favour of the petitioner's grand father wider Ext-C in the year 1936 for the specific non-agricultural purposes such as residential, industrial and manufacturing on a permanent basic on an annual rent of Rs. 250. The properties demised under Ext-C were the four items of land measuring a, total extent of 3 acres 69 cents classified as Bagayat situated in Bolur village of Mangalore 'taluk within the Mangalore City Municipal limits consisting of one tiled old main house, one small tiled old outhouse, thatched cow-shed and bathshed, two wells, 40 mango trees, 6 jack-trees, 75 coconut trees and 50 cashew trees. The lessee under Ext.-C Bhamy Pandu- ranga Shenoy, the grand-father of the petitioner was a merchant by profession residing in Mangalore town. The lessee under Ext.-C and his successors continued to be in possession of the demised land as such till the suit lands wore once again demised in favour of the 1st respondent under Ext,-B on term lease for a period of 25 years with a condition to extend the term of the lease for a further period at the option -of the 1st respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 1500 for the first five years and thereafter on a monthly rent of Rs. 2000 till the expiry of the term of the lease and also the extended period, if any. The purpose of the lease was nonr agricultural such as industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residiential, cinema theatres and any other purposes. The lease deed Ext-B opens with the recital that it is a term lease in respect of non-agricultural property for a period of 25 years with an option to the lessee to extend the term at the end of the lease period for a further period required by the lessee. The tenancy month shall be English Calendar month. The lessee shall pay the stipulated rent to the lessor on or before 5th of every calendar month in respect of the preceding calendar month. In default, arrears of rent shall carry interest at 10% per annum from the date of default till the date of payment. The lessee shall pay the Municipal Taxes, building taxes, cesses, enhanced taxes etc. and any assessments or cesses or taxes that were then imposed or that might be imposed on the properties described in the lease deed for and on behalf of the lessors and the amounts thus paid by the lessee shall be deducted by him from out of the rent payable by him to the lessors if the lessee desires so. Further, the lessee shall be at liberty to erect such machinery and or effect such improvements, repairs and to do new constructions or re-constructions of buildings, sheds etc. , as required by the lessee for the purpose of carrying on the business, industries, manufacturing, residence, cinema theatres etc. Further, the lessee shall be at liberty to erect such machinery and or effect such improvements, repairs and to do new constructions or re-constructions of buildings, sheds etc. , as required by the lessee for the purpose of carrying on the business, industries, manufacturing, residence, cinema theatres etc. or any other purposes and the expenses or the amounts spent by the lessee for the aforesaid purposes shall be at his cost and at the time when the lessee surrenders his lease holding or he is evicted from it or the term lease period is not extended further or otherwise, the lessee shall have the absolute right to remove and take away at his cost all the improvements, construction, reconstruction etc. , done by him or machinery installed by him in the lease property. At the end of the lease, the description, of the demised property is given. They are four items of Bagayat land consisting of one tiled old main house, shed, latrine, well, mango trees, jack trees, coconut -trees, cashew trees and other trees bearing Sy. No. 36 situated in Boliir village, Mangalore City, dakshina Kannada District. On a perusal of the terms of the lease deed Ext-B, i am of the opinion that the purpose of the term lease was for non-agricultural purposes specified therein. ( 21 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, the petitioner is the 'landlord' within the meaning of S. 2 (A) (20) of the Act in respect of the suit lands. The Tribunal, in its impugned order, on the scrutiny of the terms of the lease deed Ext-B also reached the same conclusion that the suit lands were leased for non-agricultural purposes. In these circumstances, the question for consideration will be whether the tribunal was right in conferring occupancy on, the 1st respondent in respect of the suit lands. ( 22 ) THE tribunal, having found that the term lease Ext.-B was for non-agricultural purposes, allowed the claim of the 1st respondent on the ground that the suit lands contained coconut cultivation and vegetable garden. The term leare Ext-B refers to a variety of fruit- bearing trees standing on the suit lands at the time of the lease. The tribunal has observed in its order Ext-A that it found 21 coconut trees, 120 coconut plants and a lew vegetable plants in the suit lands during its local inspection. The term leare Ext-B refers to a variety of fruit- bearing trees standing on the suit lands at the time of the lease. The tribunal has observed in its order Ext-A that it found 21 coconut trees, 120 coconut plants and a lew vegetable plants in the suit lands during its local inspection. The first respondent, in his statement made before the tribunal did not categorically say that the suit lands were agricultural lands when they were leased out under Ext-B. On the other hand, he has stated that there are five buildings in the suit lands and that he has been running a cashew factory in the said buildings. During the local inspection, the 1-st respondent stated before the tribunal that there were 16 workers working in, the cashew factory. ( 23 ) IN determining the dominant character of a premises, i. e. , whether agricultural or non-agricultural, no one factor is decisive. The cumulative effect of all factors should be considered. See vanajakshi v. Land Tribunal ( (1979) 1 Kar LJ 412) Undoubtedly, the suit lands were demised under Ext-B in favour of the 1st respondent for specific non-agricultural purposes, the purposes being industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residential, cinema theatres and any other purposes. The tenancy month shall be english Calendar month. The rent fixed is monthly rent payable on or before 5th of every calendar month in respect of the preceding calendar month. In case of default to pay the rent witnin the due date, provision is made for payment of interest on the arrears till its payment. The lessee is directed to pay all the taxes relating to tiande suit lands with liberty to deduct the same from the rent payable by him to the lessor. Provision is also made to erect such machinery and or effect such Improvements, repairs, and to do new constructions or reconstruction of buildings, sheds etc. , as required by the lessee for the purpose of carrying on business, industries, trade, manufacturing, residence, cinema theatres etc. , or any other purposes. The suit lands are situate within the Mangalore Municipal limits. The 1st respondent runs a factory in the suit lands. The suit lands were originally demised in favour of the grand-father of the petitioner under ext.-C on a permanent tenure for non agricultural purposes. , or any other purposes. The suit lands are situate within the Mangalore Municipal limits. The 1st respondent runs a factory in the suit lands. The suit lands were originally demised in favour of the grand-father of the petitioner under ext.-C on a permanent tenure for non agricultural purposes. The 1st respondent also took the suit lands for non- agricultural purposes under Ext-B. The suit lands contained several fruit- bearing trees including coconut trees when they were leased out under Ext- B. The existence of a few more coconut plants and some vegetable plants are not inconsistent with the suit lands being non-agricultural. It is not unusual to find either residential houses or industrial and commercial units with extensive compound having a number of fruit bearing trees. The number of trees in the suit lands is not so large as to regard the same as agricultural garden lands. In Dakshina Kannada district, it is quite common that residential houses and Industrial and Commercial units in towns are surrounded by coconut trees and other fruit-bearing trees and also have in addition, kitchen-gardens. Having regard to all these factors, I am of the opinion that the suit-holding is not an agricultural holding and the 1st respondent is not carrying on any agricultural operations therein. ( 24 ) FURTHER, the dispute between the parties in the case on hand is not one arising out of agrarian ' relations. The scope of the Act is limited to, questions arising out of agrarian relations. The provisions of the Act as observed earlier, do not apply to all kinds of lands and to all categories of tenants in the State of Karnataka. Although the defination of the 'land' in S. 2 (A) (18) of the Act is very wide, it was not intended by the legislature, that it should be read and understood in its wide amplitude. This is clear from the opening words of sub-section (A) of s. 2 "in this Act unless the context otherwise requires". This expression would give us the clue to hold that the terms and expressions defined in the Act shall have to be read and understood keeping in view the object and purpose of the Act and the context in which they are used. This expression would give us the clue to hold that the terms and expressions defined in the Act shall have to be read and understood keeping in view the object and purpose of the Act and the context in which they are used. From the various provisions contained in the act, it is quite clear that the 'land' to which the provisions of the Act are attracted, is "agricultural land"; in other words, the land which is being used or ha,s been, set apart or prepared for use for agricultural purpose. Even for the purpose of ceiling on holdings, the expression,' 'land' is used not in its wide amplitude as defined under the Act but in the restricted sense of the land, being used for agricultural purposes as defined under clause (1) of sub-S. (A) of S. 2 of the Act. In that view of the matter, the revenue classification of the land whether it is agricultural or non-agricultural; or Nanja, punja or bagayat as in the District of dakshina Kannada, will not be a deciding factor to settle the question whether a particular holding would fall within the purview of the Act. As regards the dispute between the parties relating to registration of occupancy, the dispute must be one arising out of agrarian relations. That is obvious from the scope of the Act which is limited to questions arising out of agrarian relations. A person, whose possession of agricultural lands, does not rest on agrarian relations, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Land tribunal under S. 45 of the Act. In this regard, the dominant purpose of the demise or the lease of the land, whether it is oral or documentary, which creates the land-lord tenant relationship between the lessor and the lessee will decide the question whether the possession of the land by the lessee, rests on agrarian relations so as to attract the provisions of the act. It is so even in the case of a deemed tenant because he is one lawfully cultivating the land belonging to another person. If the dominant purpose of the demise is non-agricultural, then the possession of such land by the lessee would not rest on agrarian relations. But, on the other hand, if the purpose of the lease is agricultural, then the relationship of the lessor and the lessee would rest on agrarian relations. If the dominant purpose of the demise is non-agricultural, then the possession of such land by the lessee would not rest on agrarian relations. But, on the other hand, if the purpose of the lease is agricultural, then the relationship of the lessor and the lessee would rest on agrarian relations. In the former case, the person in possession of the land cannot invoke the provisions of S. 45 of the Karnataka, land Reforms Act, whereas in the latter case, he could. I am fortified in this view by a Bench decision of this court in Muniyallappa v. Krishnamrurthy ( (1977) 1 Kar LJ 389), the relevant observation is at page 402, and reads thus:-"in our opinion, the dispute between the parties is not one arising out of agrarian relations- The scope of the Act is limited to questions arising out of agrarian relations. A person on whose possession of agricultural lands does not rest on agrarian relations, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal under section 45 of the Land Reforms Act. " ( 25 ) IN the instant case, assuming that the suit lands are agricultural lands, since possession of the suit lands by the first respondent under the term-lease Exhibit-B does not rest on agrarian relations as it is clear from he terms of Ex-B that it was for non -agricultural purpose, the 1st respondent, in my opinion, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the land tribunal under S. 45 of the Act and claim occupancy under S. 48a. Since the decision of the tribunal that the suit lands are agricultural lands and the 1st respondent is a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act, being a jurisdictional fact, is open to review by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution by scrutinising the evidence, on the basis of Avhich the adjudication is based, as that adjudication is not conclusive. For he reasons mentioned hereina bove, I am inclined to hold that the decision rendered by the 2nd respondent-tribunal as per Ext-A is clearly illegal and erroneous and without jurisdiction. ( 26 ) I shall now refer to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. For he reasons mentioned hereina bove, I am inclined to hold that the decision rendered by the 2nd respondent-tribunal as per Ext-A is clearly illegal and erroneous and without jurisdiction. ( 26 ) I shall now refer to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. ( 27 ) IT was argued by Shri U. L. Narayana Rao, learned counsel for the first respondent that the dominant purpose of the term lease Exhibit-B was for agricultural purpose, is clear from the expression "any other purposes" used in the lease deed after referring to the purposes of carrying on the business, industries manufacturing, residence cinema theatre etc. , which are only incidental purposes according to him. I find it difficult to accede to this contention. The expression "any other purposes" follows at the end of the enunciation of the purposes of carrying on the business, industries, manufacturing, residence, cinema theatre etc. , which are all non-agricultural purposes. In this situation, it seems to me that the expression "any other purposes" has to be understood ejusdem generis with the preceding words. On the other hand, if the expression "any other purposes" gives a blanket power to the lessee to indulge in any activity as he likes, then the preceding enunciation of the purposes "industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residential, cinema theatre" etc. , will be nugatory. The expression "any other purposes" has to be understood, having regard to the opening sentences of the term lease deed "lease in respect of non-agricultural properties for 25 years. " Further, the lessor himself has no right to permit agricultural operations in the suit lands as he had, obtained them for non-agricultural purposes under Ext-C. ( 28 ) THE next contention urged by him was that it is just and necessary to see to what use the lease-hold land was actually put on 1-3-1974 or immediately prior to it and not look into the lease deed for what purposes the land was demised. This argument essentially overlooks the scope of the act. As observed in the earlier portion of this order, the scope of the Act is limited to questions arising out of agrarian relations. A person whose possession of agricultural lands does not rest on agrarian relations, cannot avail himself of the benefits under the provisions of the Act. This argument essentially overlooks the scope of the act. As observed in the earlier portion of this order, the scope of the Act is limited to questions arising out of agrarian relations. A person whose possession of agricultural lands does not rest on agrarian relations, cannot avail himself of the benefits under the provisions of the Act. To find out whether the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the lease-hold rests on agrarian relations, one has to look into the terms and conditions of the tenancy created and if the tenancy is created by a written lease, then the purpose of the lease set out in the deed will be the deciding factor and not to what use the land demised is actually put either on 1-3-1974 or immediately prior to it. In this context, one has necessarily to look into the lease deed to find out for what purpose the land was demised. The rulings cited by the learned advocate appearing for the 1st respondent in Krishna Ro v- Wealth tax Officer, Bandlesha Ram v. Land tribunal, Chikkodi, Shiddappa v. Land Tribunal Ranebennur do not support his contention. The chara,- cter of a lease-hold whether agricultural or non-agricultural was not considered in any. of those decisions with reference to the "tenancy agreement" governing the holding. In that view of the matter, this contention also fails. ( 29 ) IT was next contended that the first respondent should be held to be a "deemed tenant" within the meaning of S. 4 as he was in lawful possession of the suit lands, cultivating them personally on the relevant date. What is provided under Sec. 4 to hold a person to be a deemed tenant is that that person must 'lawfully cultivate' the land belonging to another person and if such person does not fall under any of the excepted categories referred to in sub-sections (a) to (c ). The emphasis in S. 4 is on ''lawful cultivation " and not 'lawful possession'. If the possession is unlawful it follows that cultivation is also unlawful- On the other hand, if possession is lawful, cultivation need not necessarily be lawful. The emphasis in S. 4 is on ''lawful cultivation " and not 'lawful possession'. If the possession is unlawful it follows that cultivation is also unlawful- On the other hand, if possession is lawful, cultivation need not necessarily be lawful. For example a person taking an agricultural land on lease for the purpose of industries, commerce or residential, uses it for agricultural purposes, his possession of the land will be lawful, but cultivation will not be lawful as it would offend S. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Applying this test, I must hold, rejecting the argument advanced on behalf of the first respondent, that the 1st respondent cannot be held to be a "deemed tenant" within the meaning of S. 4 of the Act. ( 30 ) IN the result, for the reasons aforesaid, the rule is made absolute. The order impugned Ext-A is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .