ORDER A. N. Verma, J. - This petition is directed against an order dated 19-4-1979 passed by the Learned III Additional District Judge, Aligarh allowing a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, setting aside a decree passed by the trial court and dismissing the petitioner's suit for the ejectment of the respondent No. 3 from the premises in suit. The decree for arrears of rent and damages passed by the trial court was, however, affirmed by the revisional court. 2. These are the relevant facts : The petitioner filed a suit No. 356 of 1970 in the court of learned Munsif, Hathras against the respondent No. 3 for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages in respect of an accommodation of which the petitioner is the owner and landlords and the respondent No. 3, the tenant. While the suit was pending U P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XXXVII of 1972) came into force. In pursuance of the said Act and construing some notifications said to have been issued by the High Court between the years 1972 and 1973, the Learned Munsif Magistrate passed an order directing the return of the plaint to be presented to the court having jurisdiction to try the suit on the ground that the suit not having been transferred to that court by the learned District Judge, the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the same. This order was passed on 18-8-1974. The petitioner took the plaint back from that Court on 19-8-1974, and presented it before the Learned District Judge on 20-8-74. There the suit was registered afresh and given a new number namely, suit No. 16 of 1974. Subsequently, the learned District Judge transferred the suit to the court of Munsif, Hathras to be tried as a Small Causes Court suit. Thereafter, the parties produced oral and documentary evidence. 3. There the suit was registered afresh and given a new number namely, suit No. 16 of 1974. Subsequently, the learned District Judge transferred the suit to the court of Munsif, Hathras to be tried as a Small Causes Court suit. Thereafter, the parties produced oral and documentary evidence. 3. After the suit was transferred to the court of the Munsif, Hathras by the learned District Judge and before the first date of hearing fixed in the suit after that transfer, the defendant-tenant, purporting to take advantage of the provisions of section 20(4), of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 moved an application before the court on 10-4-1975 with a prayer that the amount of arrears of rent, interest and costs of the suit be accepted from the petitioner and the suit for ejectment be dismissed under that provision. The tender of the amount offered by the petitioners was passed by the court on 10-4-1975 and in pursuance thereof the petitioner made the deposit of the amounts required to be deposited under that provision on 12.4.1975. This application was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that section 20(4) did not apply to the suit, inasmuch as, the present suit No 16 of 1974 was really a continuation of the previous suit No. 356 of 1970 and that, therefore, section 20(4) of the U P. Act No. XIII of 1972 would not apply to the present case. It was asserted that the Munsif, Hathras returned the plaint under a mistaken view of law. The suit was cognizable by him. The order of the learned Munsif, Hathras dated 18-8-1974 being erroneous in law and the suit having been sent back to that court, it must be presumed that the present suit is a continuation of suit No. 356 of 1970. This plea of the petitioner found favour with the trial court which decreed the suit for ejectment as well as for recovery of the arrears of rent and damages, overruling the claim of the respondent No. 3 under section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 4. The respondent No. 3, thereupon, filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. The learned III Addl. District Judge hearing the revision has allowed the same. The revisional court has held that the present suit could not be regarded as the continuation of the previous suit. 4. The respondent No. 3, thereupon, filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. The learned III Addl. District Judge hearing the revision has allowed the same. The revisional court has held that the present suit could not be regarded as the continuation of the previous suit. The respondent No. 3 was, therefore, entitled to claim the benefit of section 20(4) which was clearly applicable to suits filed after the coming into force of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 On the further finding, that the respondent 3 had made the deposit of all the sums contemplated under section 20 4) on or before the first date of hearing of the present suit, the learned District Judge held that the said respondent was entitled to the protection claimable under section 20(4) and on that ground dismissed the suit of the petitioner for ejectment. Hence this petition. 5. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that the present suit was not a continuation of suit No. 356 of 1970 is manifestly unsustainable in law. He contended that the revisions court is manifestly wrong in taking the view that the order passed by the learned Munsif, Hathras dated 18-8-1974 directing the return of the plaint would operate as res-judicata could not apply. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2355. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the present suit could not be regarded as continuation of the previous suit No. 356 of 1970 for the purpose of the applicability of section 20(4) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 1 may add that in the view which I am taking as regards whether or not, the present suit can be said to be a continuation of the previous suit, it is not necessary to go into the further question whetbcr the order dated 18-8-1974 passed by the learned Munsif, Hathras directing the return of the plaint would not operate as res-judicata against the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Mohd. Sali v. Mary Gonrath Fernando and others, AIR 1974 Madras 286. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Mohd. Sali v. Mary Gonrath Fernando and others, AIR 1974 Madras 286. in support of his contention that the present suit must be regarded as continuation of the previous suit. Having examined that decision, I am of the view that the said decision is of no assistance in resolving the controversy at band. In the Madras case the question was as to what was the proper date of presentation of a plain in a case where a court having jurisdiction to entertain it returns the plaint, upon wrong view of law, for presentation to another court. The problem in that case was whether it is the date of the Presentation of the plaint before the court which was legally empowered to entertain it, even though that court might erroneously have returned the plaint or the date on which the plaint was presented in the other court pursuant to the order passed by the first court. The question bad arisen in context of the law of limitation. The Madras High Court has observed thus : "In this case, as it transpires from the finding of the Nagarcoil Court, the promissory note was executed at Tuticorin. Therefore, the Tuticorin court had jurisdiction, equally with the Nagarcoil Court, to entertain the suit. The Tuticorin Court acted in violation of Order 7, Rule 10, C.P C. when it returned the plaint and although it bad jurisdiction. This order being an illegal order and the I plaint having been presented within time in a court having jurisdiction, we think that the crucial date for purposes of limitation is the date on which the plaint was presented in the Tuticorin court and not the date, on which it was represented in the Nagarcoil court." The aforesaid decision was founded upon a decision of the Lahore High Court reported in AIR 1929 Lahore 248. 8. From a reading of the aforesaid decision of Madras High Court, it appears that the only reason for holding that the suit was a continuation of the plaint which was presented first before the court which had erroneously returned the plaint was that for the purpose of limitation, it must be presumed that the plaint was presented on the date on which it was first presented before the first court. 9. 9. The decision and observation of the Madras High Court must be read in the context of the law of limitation. Considerations which may be relevant for the purposes of computing the period of limitation for filing a suit cannot automatically be applied in every other context. The Madras High Court as well as some other courts may have for the purposes of determining the period of limitation for filing suits evolved a legal fiction to the effect that under the circumstances stated by them, the suit must be deemed to be a continuation of the previous suit 1, however, see no ground for extending that fiction to the present case which is concerned with section 20(4) of the Act which provides for conferring a benefit on tenants against eviction. 10. In the present case undoubtedly there was a break in the continuity. The petitioner took back the plaint without question. The plaint remained with her for a day. Thereafter, it was presented before the learned District Judge. It was then registered as a fresh suit. Evidence was also led by the plaintiff treating the present suit to be a fresh suit A new number was given to the suit. The suit was registered as Suit No. 16 of 1974. 1 can find no principle or provision of law which may warrant the conclusion that the present suit must even for the purpose of the applicability of section 20(4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, he deemed to be a continuation of the previous suit. 1, therefore, agree with the learned District Judge that the present suit cannot be treated as continuation of the previous suit. For this conclusion it is not necessary to go into the further question whether the order dated 18-8-1974 passed by the learned Munsif, Hathras would not operate as res-judicata against the petitioner. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner also made a feeble attempt to argue that the deposit was made on 12-4-1975 and that the fact that tender was got passed by the respondent No. 3 on 10-4-1975 was of no avail. I find no substance in this argument I Le revisional court has rightly held that where a deposit is made in pursuance of a tender passed by a court, it would be deemed to have been made on the date on which the tender was passed. I find no substance in this argument I Le revisional court has rightly held that where a deposit is made in pursuance of a tender passed by a court, it would be deemed to have been made on the date on which the tender was passed. The view taken by the revisional court is supported by a decision of this Court referred to in its judgment. I am in agreement with that view. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any error in that view. 12. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the respondent No. 3 was rightly given the benefit of section 20(4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 13. There are thus no merits in this petition which is consequently dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs,