JUDGMENT K. N. Seth, J. - This petition is directed against the order of the City Magistrate, Mirzapur, dated 6th Mar., 1978 acting as the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred,.to as the Act) holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain and try the application made by respondent No. 2 under S. 15 of the Act. 2. The case set up by respondent No. 2 was that he was employed as a Stenographer by the petitioner Company. He was coerced by Sri H. C. Verma, the Personnel Controller of the petitioner Company to submit his resignation which was accepted by the Company. On protests and representations made by him he was reinstated with effect from 1st May, 1977. He was, however, not allowed to work or sign the Attendance Register.The claimed his wages for the months of May and June, 1977. The claim was contested by the petitioner Company. It was asserted that respondent No. 2 voluntarily submitted his resignation on 23rd Mar., 1977 which was accepted by the Management the next day and since then the relationship of employer and employee ceased to exist 'between the parties. The petitioner Company denied that respondent No. 2 was reinstated. According to the petitioner no letter of reinstatement was issued by the Management. The alleged letter purporting to have been signed by Sri Seger, one of the Directors of the Company, appears to have been :forged by respondent No. 2 on the letter head of the Company on which he might have surreptitiously got the signature of Sri Seger on some occasion long back. It was further pleaded that the application, under S. 15 was incompetent and the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain and try it. 3. The Authority tried the issue of Jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and "held that he had jurisdiction to entertain and try the claim inasmuch as on the pleadings of the parties it was evident that the signature of Sri Seger on the letter of reinstatement was admitted whatever be the circumstances tinder which it was made. 4. Before proceeding to decide the 'basic question raised in the petition, we may point out that the premise on which the Authority decided the question of its jurisdiction to entertain and try the claim appears to be incorrect. 4. Before proceeding to decide the 'basic question raised in the petition, we may point out that the premise on which the Authority decided the question of its jurisdiction to entertain and try the claim appears to be incorrect. The resignation said to have been tendered by respondent No. 2 was accepted by the petitioner Company on 24th Mar, 1977 putting an end to the relationship of employer and employee between the parties. The petitioner Company had clearly asserted in its written statement that no letter of reinstatement purporting to have been signed by Sri Seger, was issued by the Management. It vas further pleaded that the signature of Sri Seger might have been surreptitiously obtained by the employee on the old letter head of the Company which he had in his possession and control. The written statement of the Company has been wrongly interpreted to imply that the signature of Sri Seger was admitted. In fact in the written statement circumstances were set out which indicated that the letter of reinstatement could not have been issued by Sri Seger. After the impugned order was passed the Company made an application for amendment of the written statement which was allowed by order dated 19th Apr., 1978. The stand of the Company that the letter of reinstatement was a forged document was clarified in the written statement. 5. The relevant part of S. 15 of the Act provides :- "(1) The State Government may by notification in the official Gazette, appoint a presiding officer of any Labour Court or II (Industrial Tribunal, constituted under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of Industrial Disputes in force in the State or any Commissioner for Worker's Compensation or other officer with experience as a judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims ........" 6. The expression "including all matters incidental to such claims introduced by the Amending Act 53 of 1964 appear to have been brought in only for the purpose of clarifying what was already the law. The expression "including all matters incidental to such claims introduced by the Amending Act 53 of 1964 appear to have been brought in only for the purpose of clarifying what was already the law. Interpreting the ambit of the power of the Authority under S. 15 (1) of the Act before its amendment the Supreme Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd v. S. B. Bhatt ( AIR 1961 SC 970 ) observed that while dealing with claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the Authority inevitably would have to consider the questions incidental to said matters. Under this provision jurisdiction of the Authority is confined to hear and decide all claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid including all matters incidental to such claims i. e. claims relating to deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages. 7.The question for consideration is whether the dispute regarding; the existence of relationship of employer and employee between the contending parties is a matter incidental to the claim arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages. The word "incidental" has been defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as follows :- "A thing, is "incident" to another when it appertains to, or follows on, that other which is more worthy, or principal." In Webster's Third New International Dictionary it is defined as - "Subordinate, non-essential or attendant in position or significance." 8. It is thus obvious that matters incidental to claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages must he matters which follow these claims or are subordinate or attend- ant in position or significance to such claims. It is only such matters that can be one into by the Authority while trying die claim made by the employee relating to deductions from his wages or delay in payment of his wages. 9. It is only such matters that can be one into by the Authority while trying die claim made by the employee relating to deductions from his wages or delay in payment of his wages. 9. Dealing with the scope of S. 15 as it stood prior to its amendment by Act No. 5:3 of 1964 by which the words "include, all matters incidental to such claims" were introduced, the Supreme Court in Shri Ambica Mill's case ( AIR 1961 SC 970 ) (supra) observed as follows :- "It is tints clear that the only claims which can be entertained by the authority are claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to (lea] with these two categories of claims is exclusive. for S. 22 of the Act provides that matters which lie within the jurisdiction of the authority are excluded from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. Thus in one sense the jurisdiction conferred on the authority is limited by S. 15, and in another sense it is exclusive as prescribed by S. 22." In dealing with the expression `claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages' it was observed :- "The authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In determining the scope of these incidental questions care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care moist also be taken to see that the seol)e of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the authority." While considering the question as to what could be reasonably regarded as incidental question, the Supreme Court pointed out - "If a claim is made by an employee on the ground of alleged illegal deduction or alleged delay in payment of wages several relevant facts would fall to be considered. Is the applicant an employee of the opponent? and that refers to the subsistence of the relation between the employer and the employee. If the said fact is admitted, then the next question would be what are the terms of employment? Is there any contract of employment in writing or is the contract oral? Is the applicant an employee of the opponent? and that refers to the subsistence of the relation between the employer and the employee. If the said fact is admitted, then the next question would be what are the terms of employment? Is there any contract of employment in writing or is the contract oral? If that is not a point of dispute between the parties then it would be necessary to enquire what are the terns of the admitted contract. In some cases a question may arise whether the contract which was subsisting at one time had ceased to subsist and the relationship of employer and employee had come to an end at the relevant period. In regard to an illegal deduction a question may arise whether the lockout declared by the employer is legal or illegal. In regard to contracts of service some- times parties may be at variance and may set up rival contracts, and in such a case it may be necessary to enquire which contract was in existence at the relevant time." The Supreme. Court did not consider these possible questions because in its opinion it would be inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast or general which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which can be legitimately considered by the authority and those which cannot be so considered. 10. In the case of Shri Ambica Mills ( AIR 1961 SC 970 ) (supra) the relationship of employer and employee was not in dispute. The dispute was confined to the constructions of the terms of employment and what the Supreme Court held to be within the ambit of S. 15 of the Act. This case is no authority for the proposition that the dispute relating to the existence of the relationship of employer i id employee is a matter incidental to the claims arising out of deductions of wages, or delay in payment of wages. 1l. In the case Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta ( AIR 1969 SC 590 ) the workman had applied for closure compensation payable under S. 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1l. In the case Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta ( AIR 1969 SC 590 ) the workman had applied for closure compensation payable under S. 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. One of the questions involved was whether it was it sum due to the employee "by reason of the termination of the employment of the person employed." The other question involved was the plea taken by the particular employer who had been proceeded against that he was riot the employer under the Act. because he was merely it transferee of the business and the worker was not working cinder that particular employer. In this case also, the Supreme Court emphasised that time only applications which the Authority can entertain are those where deductions unauthorised under the Act are made from wages or there has been delay his payment beyond the wage period and the time of payment of wages fixed or prescribed tinder Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It is clear from the opening words of sub-sec. (2) of S. 15, namely, "where contrary to the provisions of this Act" any deduction had been made on any payment of wages has been delay- ed. S. 15 (2) postulates that the wages payable by the person responsible for payment under S. 3 are certain and such that they cannot be disputed. The Supreme Court further observed :- "It is true that Authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which are incidental to the claim in question. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to the claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the Authority. The Supreme Court further observed :- "It is true that Authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which are incidental to the claim in question. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to the claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the Authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction under S. 15 is a special jurisdiction." The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that compensation payable under Sections 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act being wages within the meaning of S. 2 (vi) (d) of the Payment of Wages Act a claim for it on the ground that its payment was delayed by an employer cannot be entertained under S. 15 (2) of the Act because the claim is not a simple case of deductions having been delayed beyond the wage periods and the time of payment fixed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and in view of the defence taken the Authority would inevitably have to enter into questions arising tinder the proviso to S. 25-1'F viz. whether there was any interruption in the employment of the workman, whether the conditions of service under the new employer were any the less favourable than those under the old employer and whether the new employer had become liable to pay compensation to the workman if there was retrenchment in the future. Such an enquiry would necessarily be a prolonged inquiry involving questions of fact and of law. Besides the failure to pay compensation on the ground of such a plea cannot be said to be either a deduction which is unauthorised tinder the Act, nor can it fall under the class of delayed wages as envisaged by Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. 12. In A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil ( AIR 1951 Bom 423 ) the question that arose for consideration was whether the Authority had jurisdiction to determine whether the contract was terminated as alleged by the employer or the contract was till subsisting as 'illegal by the employee. 12. In A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil ( AIR 1951 Bom 423 ) the question that arose for consideration was whether the Authority had jurisdiction to determine whether the contract was terminated as alleged by the employer or the contract was till subsisting as 'illegal by the employee. It was said down that the jurisdiction of Authority really is to determine the terms of the contract in so far as they relate to the payment of wages and in so far as he had to decide the liability of the employer to ]gay wages under the terms of the contract, but that jurisdiction (foes not extend to determining the question as to whether the contract has terminated as pleaded by the employer or the contract is still subsisting as claimed by the servant. 13. Again in Anthony Sabastin Almeda v. R. NI. Taylor ( AIR 1956 Bom 737 ) the Bombay High Court held that "the jurisdiction of the Authority is limited to decide what is contract in the sense of construing the contract in order to determine the liability of the employer to pay wages. But when the employer and the employee come before him and rely on different contracts it is not within his jurisdiction to, decide which of the two contracts holds the field, which of them is subsisting and under which of them the employer kit liable to pay wages. It is only when there is no dispute as to the contract that subsists and regulates the rights and liability of the parties that the jurisdiction of the authority arises to determine the quantum of wages. But when the very basis of the relationship is .in dispute and in controversy, the legislature dill not intend that a Court of sum many jurisdiction should decide that important question.' 14. The principles laid down in these cases were affirmed by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Vishwanath Tukaram v. General Manager 'Central Rly. (AIR 1958 Born 111). The principle laid down in the Full Bench case has been followed with approval by a Bench of this Court in Ram Kishore Sharma v. Add]. District Judge Saharanpur ,(1969 All LJ 225) . 15. That matter was again considered 1y the Bombay High Court in D. P. Kelkar, Amalner v. Ambadas Keshav Bajaj (AIR 1971 Born 124 : (1971 Lab 1C 429). District Judge Saharanpur ,(1969 All LJ 225) . 15. That matter was again considered 1y the Bombay High Court in D. P. Kelkar, Amalner v. Ambadas Keshav Bajaj (AIR 1971 Born 124 : (1971 Lab 1C 429). The Court observed that the expression matters incidental" do not include within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the payment of wages authority substantial questions as to the applicability of the Act or as to the applicability of exemptions -created under the Act and similar other -questions specially where complicated questions of law or fact arise. So long as any complicated question of law or fact is likely to arise even though "incidental", the matter cannot he tried by the Payment of Wages Authority. 16. In Manager Codialabail press v. K. Monappa (AIR 1963) Mys 128) it was held that the scheme and purpose of the Payment of Wages Act make it clear that 'claims which may he decided under Section 15 of that Act are only those in which is the foundation of claims is beyond controversy or is indisputable or reasonably clear although there may be a dispute about its measure or magnitude. But if the basis of the claim as distinguished from its amplitude is itself impugned, and the dispute is about the foundational facts constituting such basis which cannot be satisfactorily resolved in a summary en the controversy falls outside the orbit of the enquiry authorised by the Act. It is not permissible for an authority functioning under S. 15 to adjudicate upon the validity o. an order of retirement or dismissal of an employee. 17. In Lakhpatrai v. Om Prakash ( AIR 1966 Raj 99 ) it was held that in an application under Section 15 filed on behalf of the employee alleging unlawful deduction e of wages relating to the period prior to and after the order of his dismissal, the Payment of Wages Authority has no jurisdiction to enter into the question whether the employee's removal or dismissal was lawful or not. 18. In Kannappa v. Hoe and Co. Madras 1961-2 Lab LJ 510 (Mad) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that wider S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. 18. In Kannappa v. Hoe and Co. Madras 1961-2 Lab LJ 510 (Mad) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that wider S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. the authority has no jurisdiction to make an order at the instance of an employee who has been dismissed or retrenched, and that it is not within the province of the Authority to decide the question whether the dismissal or retrenchment of a workman was lawful. To the same effect is the decision in A. C. Arunnrgham v. Manager Jawalier Mills Ltd., Salem Junction (AIR 1956 Mad) wherein it was held that the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act does not extend to determining the question whether the contract has terminated or still subsists. 19. The scope of Sections 15 and 22 of the Act came in for consideration before one of us in Jaggaunath v. Union of India through General Manager, N. E. Railway, New Delhi (1975 All LJ 591). It was observed that when there is a dispute whether the relationship of employer and employee existed during the relevant period for which the wages are claimed, the dispute can be adjudicated upon only in the Civil Court and not in an application under Section 15 of the Act. The Authority, which is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction and whose powers are controlled by the provisions of the Act, is not competent to determine a controversy which does not fall within the ambit of the provisions of the Act. 20. In M/s. Singh Engineering, Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Kandhai, (1975 Lab IC 853) (All) G. C. Mathur, J. took the view that the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority does not extend to decide, the question whether the employer has bona tide or lawfully terminated the relationship of employer or employee. 21. Our attention was invited to the case reported in Union of India v. Babu Ram ( AIR 1962 All 52 ) wherein a learned single Judge of this court observed that the Authority can decide the question whether the relationship of master and servant came into existence or continued to exist even after the order of removal. In deciding this question the Authority can construe the terms of the contract and decide the legality of the order purporting to remove the claimant from service as the case may be. In deciding this question the Authority can construe the terms of the contract and decide the legality of the order purporting to remove the claimant from service as the case may be. This power flows from the jurisdiction to determine if any wages are due to the employee. 22. The observations made in the above case run counter to the decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts referred to earlier and also appear to be obiter. The controversy in that case in revision was whether the learned Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to condone the delay in preferring the claim. This court declined to interfere with the discretion exercised. by the learned Additional District judge in condoning the delay. On the facts of the case it was not at all necessary for the learned single judge to pronounce upon the ambit of the jurisdiction of Authority under the Act. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Rajgopalan ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ). In that case the Supreme Court pronouncing on the scope of S. 33 (c) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act observed "that the claim under S. 33 (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money, may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the labour court by subsection (2)". This decision cannot be pressed into service in interpreting the scope of Section 15 of the Payment of Waves Act where the language employed is entirely different. The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Payment of Wages Act are not pari materia. 24. For the same reason, the decision in M/s. Chief Mining Engineer. East India Coal Co., Ltd., Babaree, Colliery Dhanbad v. Rameshwar (AIR 1968 SC 2 18) : (1968 lab IC 197) and the decision of the Delhi High Court reported in Yad Ram v. Bir Singh (1974 Lab IC 970) arc not relevant for the decision of the question raised in the present petition. 25. The decision of the Kerala High Court (Supreme Court) in Victor Oil Co. 25. The decision of the Kerala High Court (Supreme Court) in Victor Oil Co. Ltd. v. Amarnath Das ((1961) 3 Fac LR 239), Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramcharan Tiwari v. Dist. judge Jabalpur (AIR 1962) adh. Pra.). Mysore High Court in V. K. Govindaswamy v. N. Nanjappa (1972 LIC 1393) and the Gujarat decision reported in New Prajapat Tiles Co. v. Derasari Labhshankar Ilimatlal ((1964) 8 Fac LR 392) : ( AIR 1964 Guj 22 ) do lend support to the stand taken by the respondent, but with respect we feel that these decisions do not correctly interpret the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court and the decisions of the other High Courts, referred to earlier. In these decisions the very foundation and the source of the right for claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in the payment of [lie wages has been denigrated to the position of a matter incidental or ancillary to such claims which in our opinion is not legally justified. 26. A mere denial of existence of the relationship of employer and employee' may not oust the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of wages Act hit where a serious controversy is raised' about the existence, continuance or emergence of a fresh contract of employment, the Authority would have no jurisdiction to entertain and try the claim as the dispute may involve decisions of complicated questions of law and fact. In the present case the employee admittedly tendered his resignation, whatever be circumstances under which this step was taken. The resignation was admittedly accepted but the parties are at variance whether the employee was reinstated. According to the petitioner the letter of reinstatement was a forgery. It is not a case o more denial of the contract of service. The very foundation for the claim of wages is in dispute. Such a question cannot possibly be characterised as incidental to the claim for wage,. The Authority illegally assumed jurisdiction to entertain site it, v the claim of respondent No. 2 under S. 15 of the Act. 27.In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 6th Mar. 1978 is quashed. The Authority is prohibited from proceeding with the adjudication of the claims made by respondent No. 2. Parties shall bear their own costs.