JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against a judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Agra dated 29th October, 1971 dismissing the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. A notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was made by the State Government proposing to acquire land of various villages including Rashidpur Kaneta on January 12,1963. On February 9,1963 a notification under section 6 was issued. Thereupon proceedings for determination of compensation were started under section 9 of the said Act, in which the appellant M/s. Bharat Stores filed a claim asserting that it was the zamindar of the land in suit, and that it was entitled to receive compensation at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per bigha. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the claim on the ground that, as the land acquired had vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh, under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the appellant did not have any zamindari rights left over the land in respect of which any compensation was payable to it. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for making a reference to the Court. Upon the receipt of reference before the Court, the appellant filed his written statement, alleging that the land in dispute had been acquired for the construction of S.T.W. Compound No. 7, Firozabad group, in village Rashidpur Kaneta. It claimed that the Company started development and colonization business in the year 1944 and that it had developed several colonies in Firozabad itself. The allegations made further were that the appellant Company purchased proprietary rights in eight villages between 1944 to 1949 solely for the purpose of developing the land for colonisation for which the claimant used to chalk out after obtaining surrender deeds from tenants. The appellant alleged that it had paid huge amounts of money for acquiring the rights of the tenants as well as the zamindars, and that it was entitled to get compensation at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per bigha. The further assertion relevant in this regard was that as the land was held and occupied by the appellant for housing scheme, the same was exempt under Section 2 (1)(c) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 2. 2500/- per bigha. The further assertion relevant in this regard was that as the land was held and occupied by the appellant for housing scheme, the same was exempt under Section 2 (1)(c) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 2. The written statement filed by the Collector, Agra contested the above claim. The Collector alleged that it was incorrect that the acquired land was outside the pale of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The suggestion of the appellant that the area of land was held and occupied by it for the purpose of housing scheme was denied as false. The Collector alleged that the entire conduct of the claimant as well as the records belied the existence of such a claim. 3. Counsel for the appellant and the respondents made a joint statement that the reference giving rise to the present appeal was connected with reference Nos. 35 to 38 of 1966 and was decided together. They further consented to give oral and documentary evidence in reference No. 34 of 1968 which has given rise to the present appeal. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Additional District Judge framed five issues. Out of these issues the first three issues are material which are as follows:- (1) Is the claimant a person interested and entitled to prefer a claim under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act? (2) Does the claimant possess any zamindari rights as claimed for which compensation can be claimed? (3) What is the fair and reasonable compensation for the Zamindari rights if any? 5. Issue No. 2, was decided against the appellant and the learned Additional District Judge held that the land acquired was not covered by Section 2 (1)(c) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Hence, the appellant did not have right to claim compensation over the same after the abolition of zamindari. Under issue No. 3, the learned Additional District Judge felt that the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was less than the market value of the land and enhance the same to Rs. 2500/- per bigha. Issue No. 1 about the entitlement of the appellant to prefer a claim under Section 18 was decided in its favour. But as issue No. 2 was decided against the appellant, the reference was dismissed. 2500/- per bigha. Issue No. 1 about the entitlement of the appellant to prefer a claim under Section 18 was decided in its favour. But as issue No. 2 was decided against the appellant, the reference was dismissed. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the reference, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 6. I would propose to take up the question whether the appellant had any zamindari rights as claimed for which compensation could be given. 7. Section 1 (2) of Act No. I of 1951 provides that the said Act extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh except the areas specified therein. Sub-section (3) lays down that the Act shall come into force at once excepting the areas mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 2. From the above it would appear that the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act did not apply to areas covered by the aforesaid clauses (a) to (f). The relevant portion of Section 2 which is material for our purpose is quoted below:- "(1) The State Government may by notification in the Gazette apply the whole or any provision of this Act to any of the following areas or estate subject to such exceptions or modifications not affecting the substance as the circumstances of the case may require." (a) & (b).................. (c) areas held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility and declared as such by the State Government or acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ... or any other enactment other than this Act relating to acquisition of land for a public purpose. (d) & (e)............. (2) The declaration of the State Government under clause (e) of sub-section (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is held and occupied for a public purpose, or work of public utility. Explanation;- Any area held on the seventh day of July, 1949 for the purpose of housing scheme by a co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, or a limited liability company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, shall be deemed to be held for a work of a public utility" 8. The argument of the appellant's learned counsel was that since the land acquired was held and occupied by the appellant for housing scheme, the same was exempt and that the State Government had since not invoked any of the provisions of the Act, the right, title and interest of the appellant was not extinguished, and did not vest in the State. For the purpose of applying Section 2 (1)(c) it is necessary that the following requirements must be established :- (1) The area must be held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility. (2) A declaration must have been given by the State Government that the land was held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility. (3) It must have been occupied either by the State Government or a co-operative society or a company registered under the Indian companies Act, 1913. 9. In the instant case, the learned Additional District Judge found that none of the requirements of the above section had been fulfilled. The appellant did not prove either that it was a company incorporated under the Indian companies Act, 1913, nor that the land was held it for a housing scheme, challenging the aforesaid finding the learned counsel for the appellant urged that as the explanation referred to above created a legal fiction the court below erred in not drawing a presumption in favour of the appellant and in holding that the land was not in occupation of the company for the housing scheme. The term used in the explanation is "held" which connotes title, If a person holding the area has no title, it would not be covered by the aforesaid explanation. Leaving aside this question, the other requirement of law was that it must have been held for the purpose of a housing scheme. The appellant did not bring any evidence to prove the same. The evidence relied upon before me by the learned counsel was statement of Sri Chand Daunoliya, and the sale deed under which the land had been purchased. The other statement made on behalf of the appellant was that of Bishambhar Dayal Lekhpal. He could not state the purpose for which the land was held by the appellant. He had been produced only for limited purpose of proving he entries made in he papers. The other statement made on behalf of the appellant was that of Bishambhar Dayal Lekhpal. He could not state the purpose for which the land was held by the appellant. He had been produced only for limited purpose of proving he entries made in he papers. So far as Daunoliya was concerned, his statement does not prove that the appellant company had made any housing scheme for which the land had to be utilised. The company did not produce any paper or documentary evidence which could help in establishing that the land was held for the housing scheme. He admitted that the entire his statement it is established that when the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued, the entire land was under cultivation of tenants, the mere fact, therefor, that the appellant had purchased the land with a view to construct a housing scheme was not sufficient in itself to confer upon it the benefit of the exemption. It was necessary for it to have proved that the land was held by it for a housing scheme. The entire land was in possession of the tenants. The Khasra and Khatauni entries filed also go to establish the same. 10. In Bhagwan Das and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. ( 1980 RD 226 ) : (1980 All LJ 1072) the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the same controversy. In this case the question urged was that the appellant held the land for a housing scheme and, therefore, it did not fall within the ambit of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The Supreme Court found that Section 2 (1)(c) of the said Act read with Explanation (2) justified the contention that the housing scheme was a work of public utility, and any area held for that purpose would be exempt from the operation of the Act. But since there was no trace of any project on the relevant date, namely, 7th July, 1949, or even earlier, that the land was held for a housing scheme, the benefit of exemption could not be given to the appellant by that case. 11. The general scheme of Act No. I of 1951 was to provide for the abolition of zamindari system which involved intermediaries between the tillers of the soil and the State. 11. The general scheme of Act No. I of 1951 was to provide for the abolition of zamindari system which involved intermediaries between the tillers of the soil and the State. A few cases of specific nature had been left out from abolition. Those who sought the benefit of the exemption, had to prove strictly the requirements for which the benefit could be extended. As the benefit was being claimed by the appellant, the burden lay heavily on it to prove it. For proving it the evidence ought to have been given that there was a housing scheme for which the land was held on 7th July 1949. No evidence was given to convince me that there was actually a housing scheme. In the absence of evidence to that effect the appellant could not get the benefit of the exemption. 12. Another thing worthy of being mentioned is that the benefit has been given only to the bodies mentioned in the explanation. In the instant case, the appellant claimed itself to be a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. For proving incorporation, the appellant relied upon the statement of Daunoliya (P.W. 1) who stated that the appellant was a limited concern. Under Section 2 (2) of the Companies Act. 1913, the expression "Company" defined is:- " 'Company means a company within the meaning of the word registered under this Act or an existing company." Daunoliya stated that the company was incorporated in the year 1934. He, however, did not file any documentary evidence to prove the same. If the company had been incorporated, the appellant must have got documentary evidence in its possession. The failure to file the same leads to an irresistible conclusion that it was against the appellant and that it was deliberately withheld from the court. The appellant's counsel produced before the court a register prepared by the Government of India in which the name of the appellant was mentioned. From this register an attempt was made to prove that the appellant was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. I cannot place any reliance on this register. The register is not a primary evidence. It was difficult from the register to know all the facts necessary to decide the controversy in favour of the appellant. From this register an attempt was made to prove that the appellant was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. I cannot place any reliance on this register. The register is not a primary evidence. It was difficult from the register to know all the facts necessary to decide the controversy in favour of the appellant. Furthermore, this court is sitting in appeal and therefore is not entitled to see the register to decide the controversy in favour of the appellant on its basis. The procedure to take additional evidence is regulated by the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil P.C. The appellant did not adopt the procedure and wanted to get away from the requirement of filing the application for producing the book which to my mind does not clinch the issue. 13. I have already pointed out above that the statement of Sri S.C. Daunoliya (P.W. 1) is not reliable. He was a highly interested witness and to me it appears that it was not safe to rely upon him. 14. From what I have said above, I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge. In First Appeal No. 162 of 1960, State of U.P. v. M/s. Bhagwan Das and Co. D/d. 12-8-1970, a Division Bench of this Court had repelled the benefit of Section 2 (1)(c) to the respondent of that case by holding that since the respondent did not have any housing scheme, it cannot be given the benefit of Section 2 (1)(c). It was this judgment which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Das and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of U.P. (1980 All LJ 1072) (supra) 15. Since I have found that the appellant was not entitled to get compensation I must decide point No. 1 relating to its right as well against it. The learned Additional District Judge relied upon a decision of the High Court given in the case of State of U.P. v. Abdul Karim ( AIR 1963 All 556 ): (1963 All LJ 368) (FB) in support of its view. This decision of the High Court has been overruled in Mohammad Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1979 SC 404 ). This decision of the High Court has been overruled in Mohammad Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1979 SC 404 ). The Supreme Court held:- "From these considerations, it follows that the court functioning under the Act being a tribunal of special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under Section 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the court jurisdiction to hear the reference. In view of these principles, we would be extremely reluctant to accept the statement of law laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Karim's case." 16. In the instant case, however, to me it appears that the decision on issues Nos. 1 and 2 are inextricably connected and that for deciding the question as to whether the appellant was a person interested to file the reference application, the decision of issue No. 2 was a condition precedent Issue No. 1 could be decided against the appellant only when issue No. 2 was also held against him. 17. Since I have upheld the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge on issue No. 2, and reversed the same on issue No. 1, it is not necessary for me to give any finding on issue No. 3. The result of the decisions on issues Nos. 1 and 2 would be that the appeal merits dismissal. 18. The argument of the appellant's counsel that since a legal fiction has been created by the statute in favour of a company, that the land held by it is for a work of public utility, the court below committed an error in not giving the benefit of the fiction and in dismissing its claim on considerations irrelevant to the controversy. This submission is not correct. The legal fiction created utility, but for applying the legal fiction there are two conditions precedent which have to be satisfied. These are that the land was held by a company and secondly for a housing scheme. Since these two conditions had not been satisfied the legal fiction could not be applied. A legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality, but which the law requires the court to accept as a reality. It is created for some definite purpose. Since these two conditions had not been satisfied the legal fiction could not be applied. A legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality, but which the law requires the court to accept as a reality. It is created for some definite purpose. Here the avowed object was to give the benefit to the persons mentioned in the explanation if the land is held for housing scheme. In making these provisions the legislature thought that the provision of housing scheme was to serve a public interest. Hence the land held for that purpose had to be left out from vesting. By necessity, therefore, it was essential to establish that the land was held for a housing scheme. To extend the benefit to a company which does not have a housing scheme is to defeat the purpose for which the zamindari was abolished. In that event, the benefit of exemption could be obtained by bodies which did not hold the land for housing scheme. Hence, the submission is liable to be repelled. 19. I would have awarded costs to the respondents of this appeal, but since nobody has appeared on their behalf I consider it proper to deprive them of the costs.