Judgment : The facts are not in dispute. The list of dates has been supplied. One Narendra Nath Das, predecessor in interest of the petitioners, was inducted as a tenant in respect of the property in question. On the 7th September, 1964, one Santi Ranjan Biswas, plaintiff-opposite party, auction purchased that property in a Court sale. On the 10th February, 1965, he took delivery of possession. Then on the 2nd March, 1966, he instituted the suit for ejectment of Narendra Nath Das on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation. Eventually, the suit was decreed. There are some other facts, which are not necessary for the purpose of the present Rule. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, was amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act 1970, Section 17E was inserted providing for making an application by the tenant within sixty days from the date of commencement of the amending Act before the trial Court to set aside the decree, if the same was passed on the ground of reasonable requirement, provided that the interest of the landlord was acquired before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of acquisition of such interest by purchase. On the 2nd May, 1970 the petitioners filed an application under Section 17E of the Act. The application was turned down by the learned Judge of the City-Civil Court. Hence this revislonal application. 2. It has been conteded on behalf of the petitioners that the language as used in sub-sec. ion (1) of section 17E of the Act is very clear. The relevant portion thereof shows that where before the commencement of such amending Act a decree for recovery of possession was in a suit brought by the landlord, who had acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such Interest on the ground of reasonable requirement embodied in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 13 as it was in force before such commencement, but possession of the premises was not recovered by execution of the decree the tenant may within a period of sixty days from the date of commencement of the amending Act, make an application to set aside the decree. Since the language used is absolutely clear, no reference to the objects and reasons can be made. Since the language used is absolutely clear, no reference to the objects and reasons can be made. The case of (1) Central Bank v. Workmen, reported in 1960(1) S.C.A. 454 at page 473 has been cited to show that the statement of objects and reasons is not admissible, for construing the section, far less it can control the actual words used. The section speaks of purchase. No distinction has been made in the section between voluntary and involuntary transfer. Simply because Santi Ranjan Biswas purported to make an auction purchase in the Court sale, he cannot claim higher protection and ask for exemption from the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17E of the Act on such ground. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court made a mistake in the respect. The case of (2) Sarin v. Ajit Kumar, reported in 1966(1) S.C.A. at page 290 has been cited. Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act contains provisions similar to those engrafted in section 17E of the West Bengal Act. It will appear form the page 290 of Sarin’s case (supra) that in regard to cases falling under Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, a person who had no title to the premises and in that sense, was a stranger, becomes a landlord by virtue of the transfer. The case of partition amongst co-owners stands on a completely different footing because they are the co-sharers and the parties to the suit have pre-existing title to the property. But a stranger has no previous title or possession in the property in question. This Court should held that the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17E or the West Bengal Act do not apply to the case of an auction purchaser in a Court sale. 3. The learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, has referred to the case of (3) Krishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, in 63 C.W.N. 29 at page 42 to show that the Rent Control Act was passed for the protection of tenants. The main part of section 12(1) of the Act gives absolute immunity to tenants from eviction. The main part of section 12(1) of the Act gives absolute immunity to tenants from eviction. In this context, when proviso (a) speaks of a transfer by the tenant, it refers to a transfer in substance at least if not in form, also by the tenant and it will not apply where the transfer is by operation of law and the tenant has no hand in it, although technically or in form, it is and appears to be a transfer by him. The case of (4) Omkar Singh v. Saheb Datta, in 1970 All India R.C.J. 15 has been cited to show that the Delhi High Court has taken the view that became of the background of the object of section 14(6) of the Act a transfer must be a voluntary act or the landlord. It has, thus, been contended that section 17E(1) does not apply to an involuntary transfer in a Court sale. 4. It seems that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. Sub-section (1) of section 17E of the Act speaks of a transfer. Transfer generally envisages a voluntary transfer. In the aforesaid case of Sarin (supra) Gajendragadkar, C. J. was dealing with the case of a partition of a Hindu Joint Family. While dealing with that question, the provisions of section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was referred to and it was observed that partition was not a transfer. This question did not crop up for consideration in that case. 5. The property in question was put up to sale in execution of a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. A stranger auction purchaser made a purchase and acquired possession of the property. The previous landlord had no hand in the matter because he could not prevent that court sale. Hence, I am of opinion, that the word 'transfer' mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 17E of the Act, envisages a voluntary transfer and it does not apply to the case of a transfer pursuant to a court sale. 6. The Rule is, therefore, discharged. There will be no order as to costs. 7. The learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, asks for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. This case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and this matter needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. 6. The Rule is, therefore, discharged. There will be no order as to costs. 7. The learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, asks for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. This case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and this matter needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court is granted on the oral prayer made on behalf of the petitioner.