ORDER K.N. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 15-7-76, setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 2. The dispute involved in the present case relates to old plot No. 401, new plot No. 160 having an area of .24 acre situate in village Chandpur Khurd, Tehsil Mat, District Mathura. Initially Dongar Chhajan and Rati Ram, sons of Nem Singh, were bhumidhars of this plot. In Mar. 1964 Smt. Onkar Kuer petitioner entered into an agreement with the erstwhile owner of the said plot as a result of which they exchanged the said plot with plot No. 477/4 having an area of .47 acre of the petitioner. The exchange was made with the permission of the Assistant Collector (Sub Divisional Officer) in accordance with S. 111 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950. After the exchange the petitioner continued in possession over plot No. 401 and S/Sri Dongar, Chhajan and Rati Ram continued to be in possession over plot No. 477/1. The names of the parties were recorded in the revenue papers in accordance with exchange as a result of which the petitioner's name was recorded over plot No. 401. The petitioner got plot No. 401 in exchange for the purpose of using the same as Sahan and later on as abadi site as the plot was quite adjacent to the petitioner's house which was on plot No. 401/2. It appears that the plot No. 401 had special utility to the petitioner and as such she gave larger area in exchange. 3. Subsequently the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Land Holdings Act 1953 were taken in the village. On 21-3-1964 the petitioner made an application before the Consolidation Officer, raising objection on the proposed valuetion of the plot. She asserted that the plot was adjacent to her residential house and she had been using the plot for keepting her cattle and for using the same for non-agricultural purposes. She further asserted that the plot had special value to her and for that reason she had got the same in exchange by giving an area double in size to previous owner. She requested that the plot No. 401 be earmarked as abadi and a proportionate land on valuation may be adjusted from her chaks. She further asserted that the plot had special value to her and for that reason she had got the same in exchange by giving an area double in size to previous owner. She requested that the plot No. 401 be earmarked as abadi and a proportionate land on valuation may be adjusted from her chaks. Her application was allowed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation by his order dated 15-5- 1964. In pursuance of that order, the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 9-3- 1966 modified the statement of proposals and directed that the plot No. 401 be left to the petitioner as the land was appurtenant to her building. One Chhetrapal filed appeal against the order of the Consolidation Officer. The Settlement Officer Consolidation by his order dated 12-4-1966 rejected the appeal firstly on the ground that the petitioner had been in continuous possession over the plot No. 401 and that she had been using the same for her domestic purpose : if the said plot was allotted to anyone else, there will be constant trouble and dispute. Secondly the appeal was dismissed on the ground that Chhetrapal was not at all affected by the order of the Consolidation Officer and as such he had no locus standi to maintain the appeal. Chhetrapal thereupon preferred a revision under section 48 of the Act against the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 13-9-1966 modified the order of the subordinate authorities and directed that the plot No. 401 shall be deemed to be Bachat land and the allotment of the same in favour of the petitioner shall stand modified. 4. The effect of the order of the Deputy Director was that the plot No. 401 was earmarked for Gaon Samaj. The petitioner did not challenge the order of the Deputy Director : instead she initiated exchange of plot No. 401 with Gaon Samaj. The Gaon Samaj agreed to exchange the plot No. 401 with petitioner's plots Nos. 587, 288, 289 and 294 having an area of .32 acre. Under the agreement the petitioner agreed to offer a larger area of agricultural land to the Gaon Samaj in exchange for plot No. 401 which was of special utility to her. The petitioner made an application under S. 53 of the Act before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for giving effect to the said exchange. Under the agreement the petitioner agreed to offer a larger area of agricultural land to the Gaon Samaj in exchange for plot No. 401 which was of special utility to her. The petitioner made an application under S. 53 of the Act before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for giving effect to the said exchange. The Settlement Officer by his order dated 21-1-1977 allowed the exchange. In pursuance of the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, the petitioner took possession of the plot in dispute and handed over the possession of plots Nos. 288, 289, 294 and 587 to the Gaon Samaj. On completion of the consolidation operation the State Government issued notification on 20-2-1967 under S. 52 of the Act de-notifying the village in question. Much later thereafter i.e. on 12-7-67 Chhetrapal made an application before the Deputy Director for setting aside the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 21-1-67 permitting the exchange. The Deputy Director by his order dated 29-11-67 set aside the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 21-1-67. 5. The petitioner thereupon filed a suit before the revenue court under S. 229-B of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act 1950 for declaration that she continued to be the Bhumidhar of plot No. 160 (old No. 401). The suit was contested by the State of U. P. and the Gaon Samaj. The trial court decreed the suit by its order dated 22-9-69. No appeal was filed against that order although an appeal lay against that order. At the instance of the unsuccessful party, Chhetrapal who had been making persistent efforts, to deprive the petitioner of the plot in dispute and who was not even a party to the suit made an application in revision before the Commissioner for setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The State of Uttar Pradesh also filed an application in revision. The additional Commissioner made a recommendation to the Board of Revenue for allowing the revision and setting aside the order of the trial Court. The Board of Revenue accepted the reference, by its order dated 15-7-66 and it set aside the order of the trial Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 6. The Board of Revenue accepted the reference, by its order dated 15-7-66 and it set aside the order of the trial Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 6. The Board of Revenue held that the petitioner's suit was not maintainable in view of S. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Land Holdings Act 1953. It further held that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to set aside orders of the consolidation authorities. `Learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the findings of the Board of Revenue. He urged that orders passed by the consolidation authorities in excess of their jurisdiction are not final and binding on the parties and it is always open to an aggrieved person to challenge the same before the appropriate Court and in that event bar of S. 49 will not be applicable. He further assailed the observation made by the Board of Revenue that the suit could not be filed before the Revenue Court, instead it could be filed before the Court. 7. Section 49 lays down that declaration of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land shall not tie questioned by means of any suit or proceeding in any Court of law. The section imposes bar against the filing of a suit challenging or questioning the decision of the consolidation authorities given during the proceedings taken under the Act. No suit or proceeding is, therefore, maintainable against the order of consolidation authorities. The bar, however, would come into play only when the order is with jurisdiction. If consolidation authorities passed orders without jurisdiction, in that event the bar as contained in S. 49 will not be applicable. The petitioner filed the suit for declaration on the ground that the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 21-1- 1967 had become final and the Deputy Director had no jurisdiction to set aside that order after the village was de-notified. This premise was well founded as the Settlement Officer, Consolidation had passed the order on 21-1-67 whereas the Deputy Director interfered with that order in July 1967 although the village had already been de- notified on 22-2-1967. There is no dispute that no proceedings were pending between the parties on the date of issue of the notification under section 52 of the Act. There is no dispute that no proceedings were pending between the parties on the date of issue of the notification under section 52 of the Act. The Deputy Director set aside the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation at a time when he had ceased to have jurisdiction. Counsel for the respondents have failed to point out any provision of the Act under which the Deputy Director could assume jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, after the village was de-notified. It is thus evident that the Deputy Director did not act with jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. In this view of the matter the bar of S. 49 was not applicable and the petitioner's suit was maintainable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice the averments contained in the petition to the effect that the Deputy Director had failed to give any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the order dated 29-11-1967. The averments contained in the petition to this effect are not denied. On perusal of the order of the Deputy Director itself, it is clear that on the application of Chhetrapal a reference was made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation to the Deputy Director for setting aside his earlier order dated 21-1-67. It appears that even though the Settlement Officer, Consolidation had given opportunity to the petitioner but no notice or opportunity was given by the Deputy Director to the petitioner before passing the order dated 27th Nov., 1967. While making a reference u /s. 48 (3) the Settlement Officer is required to give opportunity to the parties. The Deputy Director decides the same in accordance with the provisions of S. 48 (1) of the Act which clearly lays down that no order shall be passed unless parties are given opportunity of hearing. On the admitted facts of the case, it is evident that the Deputy Director had not given any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the order dated 27-11- 67. The order was thus passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and for that reason also the order of the Deputy Director is null and void. In this view, the order of the Deputy Director could not operate as a bar to the filing of the suit. 9. The order was thus passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and for that reason also the order of the Deputy Director is null and void. In this view, the order of the Deputy Director could not operate as a bar to the filing of the suit. 9. The Board of Revenue's observation that the petitioner's remedy lies before the Civil Court and not before the Revenue Court is wholly misconceived. The petitioner was claiming declaration of Bhumidhari rights in respect of the plots in dispute, obviously such a suit could not be filed before the Civil Court under section 331 of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. A suit for declaration of rights in respect of agricultural land is cognizable by the Revenue Court and not by Civil Court. The Board of Revenue committed patent error in making observation that the order of the Deputy Director, Consolidation could not be set aside by the Revenue Court. The petitioner had not filed her suit for setting aside the order of the Deputy Director, Consolidation instead she had claimed relief for declaration of her right on the basis of the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation which had been set aside by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in an unauthorized manner. 10. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the petitioner's suit was maintainable and the Board of Revenue committed patent error in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground that the petitioner's suit was barred by S. 48 of the Act. The matter, however, requires further consideration by the Board of Revenue on other grounds raised by the respondents. In the result I allow the petition and quash order of the Board of Revenue dated 15-7-1976 and direct it to dispose of the case in accordance with law, and in the light of the observation made in this judgment. Parties shall bear their own costs.