SAEHAHTT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the original petitioner is directed against the order dated 29-5-1973 passed by the District Judge, mysore in Insolvency case No. 2 of 1968 on his file, dismissing the petition instituted by the creditor under Sec. 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, to declare respondents 1 and 2 in the petition as insolvents and to take cosequent steps against them. ( 2 ) THE petitioner averred in his petition that he was a creditor of respondents 1 and 2. That respondents 1 and 2 were indebted to him having borrowed Rs. 1,000/- on the foot of a pronote dated 14-4-1976 and that they failed to repay the same on demand and further that they committed an act of insolvency inasmuch as they transferred the properties mentioned in the schedle to the petition in favour of respondent-3, by a registered sale deed dated 18-12-1967. He further averred by an amendment to the petition that in the first week of August 1968, they transferred some of the moveables in favour of respondent-3 which also Amounted to an act of insolvency. Hence, he prayed for declaring respondents 1 and 2 as insolvents and for appointing a receiver with regard to the properties etc. The petition was resisted by respondents 1 and 2. They denied that they were indebted under the pronote to the petitioner. They denied having received any amount under the pronote. They contended that the petition was beyond three months. According to them they had not committed any act of insolvency. ( 3 ) THE learned District Judge who enquired into the petition recorded the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3. P. W. 3 is Puttaswamappa the petitioner. P. W. 2 is Sri Vishakantiah. He has deposed that he attested the pronote. P. W. 3 somaraja Urs has attested the sale deed. He has also spoken with regard to the loan Respondents did not examine themselves before the learned district Judge, Ex-P1, the copy of the sale deed was got marked. The learned! district Judge appreciating the evidence on record held that the debt was not proved, that the pronote was not admissible in evidence, that the act of insolvency was not proved and further the petition was not maintainable as it was beyond three months of the alleged act of insolvency. In that view he dismissed the petition. The learned! district Judge appreciating the evidence on record held that the debt was not proved, that the pronote was not admissible in evidence, that the act of insolvency was not proved and further the petition was not maintainable as it was beyond three months of the alleged act of insolvency. In that view he dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has come up in appeal before this Court. ( 4 ) THE learned advocate appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that the learned District Judge was not justified in holding that the pronote was not admissible as it was on general stamp paper, that he was not not justified in holding that the debt was not proved, that the learned District Judge was not justified in holding that the act of involvency was not proved and further that the petition itself was beyond time. As against that the learned Advocate appearing for the contending respondents argued supporting the order of the learned district Judge. The points therefore that arise for our consideration in this appeal are:1. Whether the learned District judge was justified in holding that the pronote was not admissible as the same was on the general stamp (impressed) paper? 2. Whether the learned District judge was justified in holding that the debt was not proved? 3. Whether the learned District judge was justified in holding that the act of insolvency was not proved? 4. Whether the learned District judge was justified in holding that the petition was beyond three months of the act of insolvency and hence not maintainable? ( 5 ) IT is no doubt true, and there is no dispute about it, that the recovery of stamps on the pronote is governed by the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act. Section 2 (11) of the Indian Stamp act defines 'duly stamped' thus: "duly stamped; as applied to an instrument means that the instrument bears an adhesive or impressed stamp of not less than the proper amount and that such stamp has been affixed or used in accordance with law for the time being in force in India;" section 10 of the Stamp Act speaks of duties how to be paid'. It reads:" (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, all duties with which any instruments are chargeable shall be paid, and such payment shall be indicated on such instruments, by means of stamps- (a) awarding to the provisions herein contained; or (b) when no such provision is applicable, thereto as the State government may by rule direct. (2) The rules made under subsection (1) may, among other masters regulate,- (a) in the case of each kind of instrument-the description of stamps which may be used; (b) in the case of instruments stamped with impressed stamps-the number of stamps which may be used, (c) in the case of bills of exchange or promissory notes the size of the paper on which they are written," ( 6 ) IT is not in dispute that the duty on pronote is governed by Article 49 of the Stamp Act. Rule 5 of the Indian stamp Rules of 1925 states as follows: "promissory notes and bills of exchange.-A promissory not or bill of exchange shall, except as provided by Section 11 or by rule 13 and 17, be written on paper on which a stamp of the proper value, with or without the word "hundi" has been engraved or embossed. " rule 13 of the Indian Stamp Rules which is applicable to the present case states in clause (f) thus: "the following instruments may be stamped with adhesive stamps namely: - (f) Instruments chargeable with duty under Articles 19, 36, 37, 49 (a) (ii) and (iii) and 52 of Schedule i. Article 49 of Schedule I states- "i. Promissory note as (defined by sec. 2 (22) below- (a) when payable on demand (i) When the amount or value does not exceed Rs. 2501-----10 paise; (ii) When the amount or value exceeds Rs. 250 j- and does not exceed rs. 1,000/-----15 paise (iii) In any other case - 25 paise. " ( 7 ) IN the present case the value of the pronote, is Rs. 1,000/ -. Therefore, it is governed by Article 49 (a) (ii ). Hence it becomes clear under Rule 5 read with Rule 13 of the Indian stamp Rules that such a pronote may be written either on impressed stamp paper or adhesive stamps may be used, the pronote having been written on a plain paper. 1,000/ -. Therefore, it is governed by Article 49 (a) (ii ). Hence it becomes clear under Rule 5 read with Rule 13 of the Indian stamp Rules that such a pronote may be written either on impressed stamp paper or adhesive stamps may be used, the pronote having been written on a plain paper. That becomes clear case under Rule 5, quoted above, that normally it is imperative that all the instruments shall be on impressed paper. But an exception is made under rule 13 and this exception is mentioned in Rule 5 itself and in Rule 13 the word used is 'may' thereby providing for an option to the person either to use impressed stamp paper or to use the adhesive stamps. In the instant case, the parties have used impressed stamp paper of the value of 50 paise. Therefore, the learned district Judge was clearly in error in coming to the conclusion that the pronote written on impressed stamp paper is not admissible in evidence. There is no provision of law which supports his view for reasons discussed above. Hence, we are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the view taken by him. We hold that the pronote is written on a, proper stamp paper, that it is admissible in evidence and that the, learned District Judge was not legally justified in not admitting it into evidence. We admit the same into evidence and look into it. ( 8 ) ONCE it is held that a pronote is executed having been, duly proved in evidence of P. Ws 2 and 3 the burden shifts on to the debtors under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments art to prove want of consideration, there is no such proof forthcoming in the mstant case. Hence, it is obvious that consideration did pass and we held accordingly, relying on the presumption provided for in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the absence of evidence of rebuttal adduced by respondents 1 and 2. ( 9 ) THE learned District Judge there- fore was in error in coming to the conclusion that liquidated debt was not proved. We hold that the petitioner has proved the liquidated debt tq the extent of Rs. 1,000/- due to him. ( 9 ) THE learned District Judge there- fore was in error in coming to the conclusion that liquidated debt was not proved. We hold that the petitioner has proved the liquidated debt tq the extent of Rs. 1,000/- due to him. ( 10 ) IT may be noted in this context, however, that Section 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act under which the petition is submitted contemplates three ingredients. It reads as follows:" (1) A creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor unless- (a) the debt owing by the debtor to the creditor, or, if two or more creditors join in the petition, the aggregate amount of debts owing to such creditors, amounts to five hundred rupees, and (b) the debt is a liquidated sum payable either Immediately or at some certain future time, and (c) the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition;" ( 11 ) IT is obvious that the first two clauses contained in (a) and (b) of S. 9 (1) are established by the petitioner in this case viz. , that he is a creditor and the debt exceeds Rs. 500/- and a liquidated sum is payable. We are now to consider whether clause (c) is satisfied on, the facts of this case. An act of insolvency is defined in See. 6 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Sec. 6 (b) on which the petitioner relies upon reads thus: "acts of Insolvency- a debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following cases, namely,- (a) xx xx xx (b) If, in India or elsewhere, he makes a transfer of his property or of any part thereof with intent to defeat or delay his creditors; (c) xx xx the petitioner has averred in the petition that he transferred to responden,t-3 his relative the properties mentioned in the schedule by a, registered sale deed, a copy of which is at ex-Pi dated 18-12-1967. Further, he has averred by an amendment that in about August, 1968, he transferred a cot, a cupboard and other furniture in favour of respondent-3. But on going through the petition we find that he has averred that all these transfers were nominal. Further, he has averred by an amendment that in about August, 1968, he transferred a cot, a cupboard and other furniture in favour of respondent-3. But on going through the petition we find that he has averred that all these transfers were nominal. This is what he has stated; "as such, on 18-12-1967, the 1st and second respondents have nominally transferred the petition schedule properties in the name of the 3rd respondent who is the cousin ol the 1st respondent". Again he has stated in the amendment application that the furnitures were nominally transferred in favour of respondent-3. Thus, on the showing of the petitioner himself, the transfers are nominal. The question that follows for our consideration is whether a nominal transfer amounts to an act of insolvency. It is needless for us to point out that, a nominal transfer is no transfer because it is merely sham. If there is a sham or nominal transfer there cannot be any intention to defeat or delay the creditors. What is contemplated under Section 6 (b) is a real transfer effected with intent to defeat or delay the creditors. On the showing of the petitioner himself in the instant case, the transfers are nominal or sham and in our considered view, such transfer is not what is contemplated under S. 6 (b) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. If an authority is needed on the proposition it is to be found in the case of Secretary of State v. Dadi reddi Nagiah, AIR 1919 Mad. 467. wherein it is observed thus:"a deed of transfer, however, which evidences a sham transaction which the parties have no intention whatever to give effect to and which does not affect the property or any interest in it, is a mere nullity and does not constitute an act of insolvency within the meaning of the section. "moreover, it is necessary to establish that the transfer was with intent to defeat or delay the creditors. The petitioner has to adduce evidence in that behalf. There is no such evidence forthcoming in this case. ( 12 ) MOREOVER, Sec. 9 (c) specifically states that the petition should be grounded on an act of insolvency which has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition. The petitioner has to adduce evidence in that behalf. There is no such evidence forthcoming in this case. ( 12 ) MOREOVER, Sec. 9 (c) specifically states that the petition should be grounded on an act of insolvency which has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition. But in the instant case, it is the case of the petitioner that the schedule properties were transferred by a registered sale deed dated 18-12-1967. The petition is presented on 3-9-1968. Thus, it is obvious that, that condition is not satisfied. It may be mentioned in this context that what is contemplated under section 9 (c) is not a period of limitation but a condition precedent for the presentation of the petition. In the case of Chintaman Laxman v. Ramgopal Raghunathadas, AIR i948 Nagpur 385. it is clearly observed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment that the period of three months prescribed under S. 9 (1) (c) is not a period of limitation but is a condition precedent to the filing of the insolvency petition itself. They have relied upon a decision from the Madras high Court reported in V. R. K. M. Kumarappa Chettiar v. K. M. V. R. Chidambaram. Chettiar, AIR 1938 Mad. 898 . which has followed the case reported in Kaku chenchuramana Reddi v. Palapu arunachalam, AIR 1935 Mad. 857 FB. The High Court of bombay in the case of Mokshamadanlal v. Hariprasad Vishnuprasad, Aim 1956 Bom. 650. has held speaking through Shah J. that S. 9 (1) (c) does not prescribe a period of limitation for presentation of a petition by a creditor for adjudication but sets out a condition precedent and by applying the rule contained in S. 14 of the limitation Act, a petition filed after the expiry of three months cannot be made to conform to the strict requirements of S. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial insolvency Act. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that what is contemplated under 3. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial insolvency Act is only a condition precedent for presentation of the petition by the creditor and not a period of limitation prescribed. The view that we are taking, finds support also in the observations of His Lordship Hegde J. as he then was of this Court in the case of ramasubba Sastry v. The Official receiver, Mysore, 1963 Mys. L. J. Supp. The view that we are taking, finds support also in the observations of His Lordship Hegde J. as he then was of this Court in the case of ramasubba Sastry v. The Official receiver, Mysore, 1963 Mys. L. J. Supp. 266. wherein His lordship has observed: "it has been uniformly held by courts that the condition that a petition for adjudging a person insolvent should be filed within three months; from the date the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred is a condition precedent. " ( 13 ) THAT being so, it is obvious that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to condone the period of limitation. The period of three months in the instant case, when there is a registered sale deed, commenced from the date of registration i. e. on 18-12-1967 and not from the alleged knowledge of the registered sale deed and it shall be strictly considered as what is contained in S. 9 (1) (c) is a condition precedent. In that view, it is obvious that the petition filed is not in conformity with S. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The same observation holds good even with regard to alleged transfer of moveable properties. That being so, we have no hesitation whatsoever to agree with the finding of the learned District Judge that the petition does not satisfy the condition precedent contemplated in S. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency act and hence the same is liable to be dismissed. In that view we hold that the appeal is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. ( 14 ) IN the result, we dismiss this appeal. On the peculiar facts of the case, we make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .