JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Ram Nayan Shukla (hereinafter called the petitioner) praying that the orders dated 28th May, 1979 and 24th July, 1979 be quashed and a direction be issued to the respondents to treat the petitioner in service and to pay him his salary. 2. The petitioner's case, briefly stated, is as follows : - "The petitioner was inutility appointed as Assistant teacher temporarily for six months on 1-1-1974 in Mewa Lal Gupta Gurakul Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Grokhpur (hereinafter called the Institution). Thereafter on 1st July, 1974 the petitioner was again appointed as assistant teacher for one year. The petitioner claims that in July, 19 4 he was appointed on probation for one year and. on the expiry of the period of probation, became a confirmed teacher. Since the petitioner, it is alleged, was being paid a salary of Rs. 156 per mensem only, he made a demand in May, 19 8 that he should be paid his full salary at the rate of Rs. 330 per month. This annoyed the management of the institution with the result that the petitioner was not permitted to discharge his duties and sign the attendance register with effect from 1st July, 1978. 1 he petitioner sent some letters in that connection to the District Basic Education Officer but that also proved abortive. On 13th July, 1980 the respondent No. 2 passed a resolution that the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from 31st May, 1978. This was approved by the District Basic Education Officer. Feeling aggrieved against it the petitioner has come up to this Court". 3. The case has been opposed on behalf of the respondents. The defence set up by them is that the petitioner was a temporary employee, that his appointment was approved by the District Basic Education Officer only till 30th June, 1977 and thereafter the committee of management granted extension to the petitioner for the period till 30th June, 1978. According to the respondents the appointment of the petitioner for the period after 30th June, 1977 did not have the approval of the District Basic Education Officer and, therefore, conferred no status on the petitioner. According to the respondents the appointment of the petitioner for the period after 30th June, 1977 did not have the approval of the District Basic Education Officer and, therefore, conferred no status on the petitioner. The respondent No. 2 has further pleaded that since the petitioner did not furnish necessary documents, which be was directed to do earlier, and since he also did not attend the college at any time after 1st July, 1978, his appointment was terminated with effect from 31.6.1978. The respondents contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 4. A preliminary objection was also raised on behalf of the respondents that the petition is not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy. 5. Elaborating their objection in regard to the alternative remedy, learned counsel for the respondents urged that, in the year 1978 the U. P. Government promulgated U.P. recognised Basic Schools `Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules 1978 (hereinafter called 1978 Rules). These rules apply to the petitioner. Learned counsel pointed out that, according to rule 16 of these rules in matters of disciplinary proceedings, the rules applicable to the teachers of a Basic School established or maintained by the Board will apply. Learned counsel next invited our attention to the U.P. Recognised basic School (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter called 1975 Rules) and pointed out that Rule 12 of 1975 Rules provides for an appeal being filed Rule 12 of 1975 Rules provides for an appeal being filed against an order passed by the District Basic Education Officer. Rule 16 of 1978 Rules reads as follows:- "16. Disciplinary proceeding - In respect of disciplinary proceedings and the punishment to be inflicted in such proceedings a Head-master or assistant teacher, as the case may be, of a recognised school shall be governed by the rules applicable to Headmaster and assistant teacher of a Basic School established or maintained by the Board' 6. A perusal of the above would show that Rule 16 makes applicable to the teachers of a "recognised school", as defined in Rule 2 (g), the Rules applicable to the teachers of a Basic School established or maintained by the 1 Board. So far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned. 7. Rule 12 of 1975 Rules reads as follows : - "12. So far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned. 7. Rule 12 of 1975 Rules reads as follows : - "12. Appeal against the orders of the District Basic Education Officer - A teacher or the management feeling aggrieved from an order under Rule 11 passed by the District Basic Education Officer may, within thirty days from the date of communication of such older, f appeal to the Board and the order passed in such appeal by the Board or person authorised by the Board shall be final". 8. Rule 11 refers to an order dismissing, removing or terminating the f services of a teacher of a recognised the school The expression `recognised ; school is defined in Rule 2 (6) of 1975 Rules as follows : - "2. (a) "Recognised School" means any junior Basic School, not being an institution belonging to or wholly maintained by the Board or any local body, recognised by the Board before the commencement of these rules imparting education from Classes I to V" 9. Now since Rule 12 of 1975 Rules does not apply to Schools establish-1 ed or maintained by the Board and Rule 16 of 1978 Rules speaks of rule relating to schools established or maintained by the Board, it cannot be successfully urged that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal f under Rule 16 of 1978 Rules read with Rule 12 of 1975 Rules. 10. Further, now after the deletion of clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution, alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. In the instant case as have heard counsel for both the parties at length with regard to the merits of the case. It would, therefore, not be expedient to throw out the case on the ground of alternative remedy even if the petitioner has an alternative remedy under some rules or regulations not referred to us. 11. Coming to the merits of the case the first question that falls for consideration is whether the petitioner was appointed on probation in July, 1975, and, on the expiry of the period of probation, he became a confirmed ,teacher. 12. Annexure II to the rejoinder affidavit is the appointment latter issued to the petitioner for his appointment on 1-7-1975. This appointment letter has specified the period of appointment as session 1975-76. 12. Annexure II to the rejoinder affidavit is the appointment latter issued to the petitioner for his appointment on 1-7-1975. This appointment letter has specified the period of appointment as session 1975-76. Annexure C-2/2 to the counter-affidavit of Sri Ganesh Prashad Sbukla (filed on behalf of the respondent No: 2) in the letter issued by the District Basic Education Officer approving the aforesaid appointment. This also states that the appointment was approved for the sessions 1/75-76 on temporary basis. Annexure C-2/3 to the same affidavit is a copy of the application submitted by the petitioner for appointment as assistant teacher in June, 1976. If it is true that the petitioner had been appointed on probation on 1st July, 1975 and became permanent on the expiry of period of one year, he would not have applied afresh for the same post. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 compelled the petitioner to make this application in order to obtain the grant in and from the Government. We are, however, not prepared to Accept that even though it was not necessary for the petitioner to apply for appointment afresh yet made this application only because he was asked to do so by the management of the institution. Annexure C-2/4 of the counter-affidavit of Sri Ganesh Prasad Shukla is the letter issued by the District Basic Education Officer approving the appointment of the petitioner for the session 1976-77. Obviously, there could be no occasion for the District Basic Education Officer to issue this letter if the petitioner had become a permanent teacher on 1st July, 1977. 13. Some strees was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the fact that in the appointment letter (Annexure II to the petition). It is, inter alia, said that the petitioner was appointed on probation (Paryavekshan Kal). Learned counsel urged that in view of the aforesaid words occurring in the appointment letter, it would be accepted that the petitioner was appointed on probation in 1975 and became permanent after the expiry of period of probation. The argument fails to impress us. It is significant that even the initial letter of appointment issued by the District Basic Education Officer, which admittedly was for a temporary appointment, the words Paryavekshan Kal' find mention. The argument fails to impress us. It is significant that even the initial letter of appointment issued by the District Basic Education Officer, which admittedly was for a temporary appointment, the words Paryavekshan Kal' find mention. In the circumstances the mere fact that the appointment letter `Annexure II' mentions the word `Paryavekshan Kal' cannot lead to the conclusion that the petitioner was appointed substantively and was put on probation. It cannot be ignored that while the appointment letter Annexure II mentions the word `Paryavekshan Kal' it also mentioned that the appointment was for the session 1975-76. Further, as already stated earlier, if the petitioner was appointed on probation and had become permanent, there was no question of his making an application for appointment afresh for the session 1976-77. The explanation given by the petitioner shat he was compelled to-make that application, cannot be accepted for any moment. It may not be out of place to add here that in the counter-affidavit of Sri Ganesh Prasad Shukla as well as that of Sri C. B Dube (of two Office of District Basic Education Officer) it has been consistently stated that the petitioner was appointed temporarily for one year viz 1975-76 session. We have no reason to reject these affidavits as untrue. 14. We accordingly hold that the petitioner was appointed only on temporary basis on 1st of July, 1975 for the session 1975-76. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that he was appointed on probation on 1st July, 1975 and that be became confirmed on the expiry of one year from that date, is rejected. 15. So far as the appointment during the session 1976-77 is concerned, it is the common case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that the petitioner had been appointed on temporary basis for that session and it was such appointment that was approved by the respondent No. 1. This is also apparent from the letter Annexure C-2/4 of the counter-affidavit of Sri Ganesh Prasad Shukla and the counter-affidavits of Sri Shukla and Sri C.B. Dube. The petitioner no doubt contended that he was a permanent teacher and worked as such during the session 1976-77. We have, however, already rejected that contention. 16. The question that next falls for consideration is what was the nature of the petitioner's appointment after 30th June, 1977. The petitioner no doubt contended that he was a permanent teacher and worked as such during the session 1976-77. We have, however, already rejected that contention. 16. The question that next falls for consideration is what was the nature of the petitioner's appointment after 30th June, 1977. Sri Ganesh Prasad Shukla in para 5 of his counter-affidavit stated that, although the appointment of the petitioner was approved only fore session 1976-77 ending on 30th June, 1977, the opposite party No. 2 extended the same for the next session i. e. up to 30-6-1978 and the terms of other teachers was also similarly extended. The respondent No. 2 thus conceded that the petition also worked as temporary teacher during the session 1977-78 though that appointment had not been approved by the District Basic Education Officer. The fact that the petitioner functioned as assistant teacher during the session 1977-78 also stands conceded in the counter-affidavit filed by Sri C.B. Dube (on behalf of respondent No. 2), though it is further pleaded therein too that the approval of the respondent No. 1 was not obtained to that appointment. The fact that the petitioner was permitted to function as a teacher during the session 1977-78 without any approval from the District Basic Education Officer also finds support from the letter dated 1st June, 1977 (Annexure C-A/2 to the counter-affidavit of C. B. Dubey) which was sent by the District Basic Education Officer to the Institution. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 argued that since the appointment for the session 1977-76 was made without obtaining the approval of the District Basic Education Officer, it was void. Reliance for this argument was placed on Arya Kanya Pathashala v. Smt. Manorma Devi Agnohotri, (1971 ALJ 983). As opposed to this learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there was no statutory provision under which the approval ( of the District Basic Education Officer was mandatory and hence, even if it be accepted that the petitioner was not a permanent Employee but was reappointed in June, 1977 for the session 1977-78, the appointment cannot be held to be null and void. 18. 18. While it is ture that, in connect ion with the appointments of the petitioner as assistant teacher for each of the sessions 1974 75, 1975-76, 1976-1 77, the approval of the Basic Education Officer was consistently obtained, of Learned counsel for any of the respondents could not refer to any provision in. the Act or the Rules framed thereunder under which such approval may be necessary. It is quite likely that the appointment was referred to and got approved from the respondent No. 1 in view of the fact that the institution was getting grant in aid from the Government. Learned counsel for the respondents could not, however, refer us even to any circular issued by the Government to show that in the case of an aided recognised basic school, appointment can not be made except with the approval of the District Basic Education Officer. So far as the case of Arya Kanya Pathashala v. Smt. Manorama Devi Agnibolri ' (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the respondents is concerned it was a case under Intermediate Education Act and there is an express provision in that Act requiring approval of the District Inspector of Schools to the appointment of a teacher. It was on account of that provision that this Court held that a teacher appointed ^without the approval of the District Inspector of schools, could have no right whatsoever. 19. Since the respondents have not been able to refer us to any provision of law to show that the petitioner could not be appointed even temporarily for the session 1977-78 without obtaining prior approval of the District Basis Education Officer, we shall, for the purposes of this case, assume that no such approval was necessary. Consequently, the argument raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner's appointment is illegal being without approval of the District Basic Education Officer and the petitioner has do locus standi to file the writ petition is rejected. Rule 15 of the 1978 Rules reads as follows:- "15. No Headmaster or assistant teacher of a recognised school may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer". 20. No Headmaster or assistant teacher of a recognised school may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer". 20. We have already said earlier that the petitioner was lastly appointed for the session 1977-78 ending on 30th June, 1978. By a resolution passed on 13-7-1978 the petitioner's services were terminated w.e.f. 31-5-1978 A copy of the decision was even sent to the petitioner. No approval of the respondent No. 1 was obtained before doing so. The termination having taken place subsequent to the date on which 1978 Rules were enforced, it could not be made without prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer. 21. It was urged before us that since the petitioner had been appointed on a temporary basis and without approval of the District Basic Education Officer for the session 1977-78, the approval of the District Basic Education Officer was not necessary for terminating his services. We do not find it possible to accept this argument. Rule 15 does not make any distinction between a temporary and permanent teacher. It puts a blanket bin on the termination of service of any teacher without prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer. The rule appears to have been framed for the protection of the teachers and should be strictly interpreted. We, accordingly, rejected the contention made on behalf of the petitioner that the approval of the District Basic Education Officer was not necessary in the instant case. 22. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in any case the District Basic Education Officer did accord his approval through his letter dated 28-5-1979 (Annexure C-./9 of the counter-affidavit of Sti Ganesh Prasad Shukla). There is more than one reason for which this argument cannot be accepted. In the first instant, what is mentioned in the letter dated 28-5-1979 is that order terminating the petitioner's services was approved because the appointment of the petitioner for the session 1977-78 did not carry the approval of the District Basic Education Officer. From this it is obvious that the District Basic Education Officer did not examine the merits of the impugned order. In any case this approval having been accorded on 28th May. From this it is obvious that the District Basic Education Officer did not examine the merits of the impugned order. In any case this approval having been accorded on 28th May. 1979, cannot render valid the decision that had been taken earlier on 30th July, 1978 terminating the petitioner's services retrospectively v/z with effect from 31st May, 1978. We may mention at the cost of repetition that the requirement of rule 15 is that the approval of the District Basic Education Officer should be prior and not subsequent to the date of the resolution. 23. We accordingly held that the respondent No. 2 acted in breach of Rule 15 of 1978 Rules while passing the resolution dated 30th July, 1978 .terminating the petitioner's service. We further held that the letter of approval of the District Basic Education Officer dated 28th May, 1979 is also not in conformity with the aforesaid rule and is invalid. 24. Once we accept that the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 13th July, 1978 and the letter dated 28th May, 1978 issued by the respondent No. 1 are invalid. It will follow that they did not bring into effect termination of petitioner's service on 31st May, 1978. 25. The question that still remains to be considered is up to what date the petitioner continued as a teacher beyond 31st May, 1978. 26. As already stated earlier, it is contained in the counter-affidavit of Sri Ganesh Prasad Shukla that on the expiry of Session 1976-77 the petitioner and the other teachers were permitted to continue for the Session 1977-78 ending on 30th June, 1978. It is not the petitioner's case that he was appointed afresh for the Session 1978- 9. The petitioner's case all along has been that he became a permanent teacher on the expiry of period of probation subsequent to his appointment in 1975, which case had not been accepted by us. It would, therefore, mean that even though the order of the Committee of Management terminating the petitioner's services with effect from 31st May, 1978 was ineffective the petitioner ceased to be a teacher in the institution after 30th June, 1978, viz. the date on which 1977-78 session came to an end. It would, therefore, mean that even though the order of the Committee of Management terminating the petitioner's services with effect from 31st May, 1978 was ineffective the petitioner ceased to be a teacher in the institution after 30th June, 1978, viz. the date on which 1977-78 session came to an end. The petitioner could not continue as a teacher beyond that date because it is not shown that he was either reappointed as a teacher or was permitted to continue to function as a teacher. 27. In the result, the writ petition is allowed to this extent that the order dated 24th July. 1978 passed by the respondent No. 2 terminating the service of the petitioner with effect from 31st May, 1978 and the letter dated 28th May, 1978 issued by the District Basic Education Officer approving the same are quashed, but with this consequence only that the petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in the service of the institution upto 30th June, 1978 and shall be entitled to claim from respondent No. 2, his salary for that period. The petitioner in so far as the other reliefs are concerned, fails and is dismissed. No order is made as to cost. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner made oral request for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion, however, no substantial question of law of general importance requiring to be decided by the Supreme Court is at all involved. The request is, therefore, refused.