JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. - The applicant has been convicted under sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to 1 year's R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000/- by the Judicial Magistrate Muzaffarnagar. His conviction has been maintained by the V Addl. Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar. The sentence of fine imposed upon him has also been maintained, but the sentence of imprisonment has been reduced from 1 year's R.I. to 6 months' R.I. vide aforesaid order of the Sessions Judge dated 1st September, 80. Hence this revision. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned orders. A sample of Saunf (aniseed) was purchased by the Food Inspector from the shop of the applicant on 31st August, 78, at 9.30 A. M. in Mohallah Shekhomadan, Qasba Jhinjhana, Muzaffarnagar. The sample was divided in three parts, and the packets were sealed. One of the samples which was sent for report to the Public Analyst which revealed that it contained insect damaged Saunf (fennel whole) which exceeded the maximum prescribed limit of 5 per cent and the aniseed contained living and dead insects. After obtaining sanction for prosecution, the applicant has been prosecuted and convicted as above. 3. The main point which has been argued by the applicant's counsel is that even though the report of the Public Analyst disclosed that the insect infested aniseed exceeded the permissible limit of 5 per cent, yet there was nothing on the record to disclose that dead or living insects contained therein, were injurious to health, and made the same unfit for human consumption. He, therefore, submits that no offence has been committed. Reliance for this purpose is placed upon a Supreme Court case Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Khacheru Mal, reported in 1975 (II) FAC 223, In that case their Lordship of the Supreme Court has observed that apart from the sample being insect infested, it is also necessary for the prosecution to prove that it was unfit for human consumption. Relying upon that case I had also given a decision reported in 1979 Allahabad Criminal Report page 34 : 1979 (II) FAC 91, Radhey Lal Gupta v. State and another. Applicant's counsel has now argued that in view of decision of the Supreme Court and my own decision, the applicant is entitled to get relief. 4. Relying upon that case I had also given a decision reported in 1979 Allahabad Criminal Report page 34 : 1979 (II) FAC 91, Radhey Lal Gupta v. State and another. Applicant's counsel has now argued that in view of decision of the Supreme Court and my own decision, the applicant is entitled to get relief. 4. On behalf of the State, however, it is submitted that the latest view of the Supreme Court is expressed in the decision of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia, 1979 (II) FAC 218. On the basis of this decision, learned State-Counsel argued that it is not now necessary for the prosecution to prove in the case of insect infested food that the same was unfit for human consumption, He, therefore, submits that the offence against the applicant is complete. 5. I have carefully considered both these decisions of the Supreme Court and I have also read my own decision. In the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1979 (II) FAC 218, a Division Bench of that court had doubted the correctness of the earlier decision of its own court, reported in 1975 (II) FAC 223, referred to above. But the Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench in view of the circumstances existing in that case. I find from a close study of the latest decision of the Supreme Court that they have distinguished Khacheru Mai's case on two grounds : first ground is that at the time when the offence was committed by the accused in Khacheru Mai's case, there was no standard prescribed with regard to the permissible limit of insects living or dead in cashew nuts; the second ground is that since there was no standard prescribed, the court proceeded to consider the question whether the existence of insects dead or alive made the article of food unfit for human consumption. It was further observed that there was no evidence to that effect also in Khacheru Mai's case. Therefore, in the latest decision of the Supreme Court, their lordships have observed that the decision in Kacheru Mai's case was applicable only to the special circumstances in that particular case. They therefore, thought it futile to refer the case to a larger bench on the question of law, involved. 6. Therefore, in the latest decision of the Supreme Court, their lordships have observed that the decision in Kacheru Mai's case was applicable only to the special circumstances in that particular case. They therefore, thought it futile to refer the case to a larger bench on the question of law, involved. 6. As I have observed above, my decision in 1979 Allahabad Criminal report page 33 (1979 (II) FAC 91) followed the earlier case of Khacheru Mai On that basis, I had come to the conclusion that apart from the article of food being insect infested, it was necessary for the prosecution also to prove that the insect infestation was deleterious to health and made the article of Food unfit for human consumption. The principle of law' is that the later decision of the court prevails over the earlier decision. Since the Supreme Court appears to have taken a different view in the latest decision, reported in 1979 (II) FAC 2i8, I am now bound by this latest decision. It has, therefore, become necessary for me to hold on the basis of the observations in this latest decision that when an article of food is insect infested, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the same is also unfit for human consumption under Section 2(f) of the P.F.A. Act. I am aware of rath or embarrassing circumstance that two cases of the Supreme Court appear to have differed on a principle of law and on the interpretation of Section 2(f) of the P.F.A. Act, but it is not within my powers to explain or to clarify this difference. It is that court alone which can reconcile the different views if any which have been expressed them. Being bound by the latest decision, I have no other alternative but to accept that the aniseed in question was adulterated. In the instant case it contained insect infestation in excess of 5 per cent, therefore, the Article of Food was adulterated under Section 2(f) of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant has also argued two other questions which are purely questions of fact. The first question argued by him was that the packet was not properly sealed and the second question was that the witnesses of the locality were not called. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant has also argued two other questions which are purely questions of fact. The first question argued by him was that the packet was not properly sealed and the second question was that the witnesses of the locality were not called. Both these questions have been considered by the courts below, who were satisfied that there has been due compliance of law on the facts found by them. Sitting in revision, I am not inclined to reverse pure findings of fact arrived at concurrently by the subordinate courts. Therefore, I do not find any merit 011 these two factual questions, raised by the applicant's counsel. 8. In the result, therefore, this revision application is dismissed. The conviction of the applicant and the sentence imposed upon him is maintained. The applicant is on bail. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the unexpired portion of the sentence of imprisonment. The interim order passed by this court on 18th September, 80 is hereby vacated. 9. Learned counsel for the applicant has prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India, in view of the divergent opinions which have been expressed by that court on question of interpretation of Section 2(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 1 am satisfied that this is a fit case in which a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India be granted. I hereby grant It applicant certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution.