JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - Union Carpet Industries, Bhadohi is the appellant. It entered into an agreement with the State Woollen Mills, Rajasthan which is owned by the State of Rajasthan for the supply of woollen yarns of various specifications. Certain payments were made by the appellant to the State Woollen Mills, Rajasthan and there was a dispute between the appellant and State Woollen Mills as to the liability of the appellant to pay a further sum of money claimed by the General Manager of the State Woollen Mills, Rajasthan being the interest amount. The General Manager of the State Woollen Mills asked the Collector of Bikaner to issue a recovery certificate for Rs. 8,675-94 Paise. The Collector purporting to act under Section 5 of the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rajasthan Act') after receiving a requisition from the General Manager of the Mills, transmitted a certificate to the Collector of Varanasi within whose jurisdiction the appellant carries on its business, to recover the aforesaid sum of money. At this stage the appellant apprehending coercive proceedings being taken against it, instituted the suit out of which the appeal arose. In the suit the Collector of Varanasi was also impleaded. It was prayed that a permanent injunction be issued restraining the defendants from recovering the said amount of Rs. 8,675-94 Paise. 2. The defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the General Manager, State Woollen Mills, the State of Rajasthan and the Collector of Bikaner filed a written statement while the Collector of Varanasi did not file a written statement. They contested the suit of the plaintiff. It was inter alia pleaded that the suit was not maintainable. 3. The trial court framed various issues and it came to the conclusion that while the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Varanasi, the suit was not maintainable in the view of the law it had taken. It also decided other issues involved in the suit. 4. Aggrieved by the decision of the court below the appellant has filed the appeal. 5. The first question that arose at the hearing of this appeal, was as to whether the view of the court below that the suit was not maintainable was correct or not. It also decided other issues involved in the suit. 4. Aggrieved by the decision of the court below the appellant has filed the appeal. 5. The first question that arose at the hearing of this appeal, was as to whether the view of the court below that the suit was not maintainable was correct or not. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the provisions of the Rajasthan Act and the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 are not in pari materia with the Central Revenue Recovery Act and the proceedings having been taken under the Rajasthan Act, are invalid and void. In this connection he has relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Ram Ranjan Rakshit v. Chief Administrator, Rahabilitation Finance Administration, New Delhi, AIR 1960 Cal 416 wherein Mr. Justice Mukherji had in a case where certificate had been issued by the Collector, Delhi to a Collector in Bengal as to consider whether the amount could be recovered under the Public Demands Recovery Act which was a State Legislation, held that as there was a considerable difference in the provisions of the two Acts, the amount could not be realised under the Public Demands Recovery Act. It was observed in para 14 of the judgment as under: "It is true that the Collector of Nadia had to proceed under the Public Demands Recovery Act but that is only "as if it were an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his own district" under Section 3 (3) of the Revenue Recovery Act of 1980. That means that the local public Demands Recovery Act comes only as a legal fiction "as if it were". It only means this that for purposes of realisation it will be treated "as if it were an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his own district". Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act therefore do not apply in strict terms but are applied only notionally by way of that legal fiction. In other words, the machinery of realisation under the Public Demands Recovery Act could be invoked but without derogating from special provisions contained in the Revenue Recovery Act of 1890. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act therefore do not apply in strict terms but are applied only notionally by way of that legal fiction. In other words, the machinery of realisation under the Public Demands Recovery Act could be invoked but without derogating from special provisions contained in the Revenue Recovery Act of 1890. The primary Act that governs realisation of this demand as a land revenue is the Revenue Recovery Act of 1890 and what the Public Demands Recovery Act does is to provide only the auxiliary machinery and not the substantive rights such as reopening a conclusive certificate by objections. I shall make here a reference to Section 7 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, which makes it clear that: "Nothing in the foregoing section shall be construed- (a) to impair any security provided by, or affect the provisions of, any other enactment for the time being in force for the recovery of land revenue or of sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue" etc. It was therefore argued on behalf of the petitioner that Section 7 (a) of the Revenue Recovery Act preserves and protects the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act and hence the petitioner's right to file objections under S. 9 of the latter Act. The language of Section 7 (a) of the Revenue Recovery Act no doubt says that it does not "affect the provisions for the recovery of land revenue contained in any other enactment" but from this provision the conclusion for which the applicant contends does not follow. This statutory provision in Section 7 (a) of the Revenue Recovery Act means that it does not affect the other Acts for the recovery of land revenue or sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue. That means where other Acts apply by their own force the Revenue Recovery Act will not supersede them but will continue to be applicable as before. But here the Public Demands Recovery Act does not apply on its own force and on its own terms. It is only being resorted to "as if it were an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his own district" by a legal fiction introduced in Section 3 (3) of the Revenue Recovery Act. But here the Public Demands Recovery Act does not apply on its own force and on its own terms. It is only being resorted to "as if it were an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his own district" by a legal fiction introduced in Section 3 (3) of the Revenue Recovery Act. In other words where a certificate is initiated and originates under the Public Demands Recovery Act then the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act will apply and will not be affected by the Revenue Recovery Act. But where, as here the certificate originates and is initiated under the Revenue Recovery Act. it is that Act which will apply. One principle of construction is that a Statute should be so construed, wherever possible, as to avoid repugnancy or conflict with another Statute. Here there is no question of the proceedings being initiated under the Public Demands Recovery Act at all. The proceedings were and are under the Revenue Recovery Act of 1890." 6. The aforesaid decision has been followed in another decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Bulu Rani v. The Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal, ( AIR 1962 Cal 499 ). 7. Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 provides that where an arrear of land revenue or a sum recoverable as an arrear of land revenue is payable to the Collector by the defaulter being or having property in a district other than that in which the arrear accrued or the sum is payable, the Collector may send to the Collector of that other district a certificate in the form as nearly as may be of the Schedule stating the name of the defaulter and such other particulars as may be necessary for his identification and the amount payable by him and the account on which it is due. Sub-section (2) of that Section has been amended by the State of Uttar Pradesh and amended sub-section (2) of that section runs as follows : "The certificate shall be signed by the Collector making it or by any officer to whom such Collector may by order in writing delegate this duty and save as otherwise provided by this Act shall be conclusive proof of the matters therein stated." 8. Sub-section (3) of that Section provides that the Collector of other district shall on receiving the certificate proceed to recover the amount stated therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his district. It is, thus, clear that provided the amount in question was recoverable by the State Woollen Mills the proceedings for the recovery of the amount could only be taken under the Revenue Recovery Act at Bhadohi within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Varanasi. The argument of the learned counsel is that certificate itself having been issued under Section 5 of the Rajasthan Act, it cannot be treated as a certificate under Section 3 of the Revenue Recovery Act. The difficulty in accepting this argument is that it is well known that a wrong recital of power in an order does not vitiate the order provided the authority making the order had the power to make it. The certificate, therefore, issued by the Collector, Bikaner, can be treated as a valid certificate in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Revenue Recovery Act. 9. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is only a public demand which can be recovered under the Rajasthan Act. Public Demand has in that Act been defined as 'any arrear of money' mentioned or referred to in the schedule to this Act and includes any interest which may by law be chargeable thereon up to the date of signing of a certificate in respect thereof under Section 4. The Schedule referred to in Section 2 (5) of the Rajasthan Act has Clause VI which provides that any money payable to the State Government or to a Department or an Officer of the Government". (i) under or in pursuance of written instrument, or (ii) under or in pursuance of an agreement, evidenced by a writing or in view of any service rendered or supply made by the Government. Clause VII of the Schedule runs as follows : Any money payable to any local authority, in respect of which the person liable to pay the same has agreed by a written instrument or agreement duly registered that it shall be recoverable as a demand or a public demand or as arrear of revenue or land revenue. 10. Clause VII of the Schedule runs as follows : Any money payable to any local authority, in respect of which the person liable to pay the same has agreed by a written instrument or agreement duly registered that it shall be recoverable as a demand or a public demand or as arrear of revenue or land revenue. 10. The learned counsel urges that the demand of type which was sought to be recovered, could only be recovered by Clause VII of the Schedule and he argues that Clause VII cannot be applicable because there is no written agreement duly registered between the appellant and the State of Rajasthan or State Woollen Mills wherein it was agreed that the dues under the agreement could be recovered as arrears of land revenue. In my opinion. Clause VII has clearly been made applicable in the cases where a local authority is a party. The demand in the instant case clearly falls in Clause VI which has been quoted above. The amount is payable to the State Woollen Mills which is a State Government Undertaking. Thus, the argument that there was no public demand in respect of which a recovery certificate could be issued by the Collector of Bikaner, cannot also be accepted. 11. The third argument of the learned counsel is that Rajasthan Act's territorial limitation is defined in the Act itself and it is within the territory of Rajasthan. It is on this basis urged that the Act cannot operate outside Rajasthan and, therefore, the Collector of Bikaner had no authority to transmit the certificate to the Collector of Varanasi under Section 5 of the Act. I have already observed that the certificate issued by the Collector of Bikaner to the Collector of Varansi is, in effect, a certificate also under Section 3 of the Revenue Recovery Act and as such the argument against the validity of the issue of certificate by the Collector of Bikaner to the Collector of Varanasi, cannot be accepted. 12. Section 4 of the Revenue Recovery Act deals with the remedy available to a person denying liability to pay the amount being recovered under Section 3 of the Act. 12. Section 4 of the Revenue Recovery Act deals with the remedy available to a person denying liability to pay the amount being recovered under Section 3 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides that when proceedings are taken against a person under Section 3 for recovery of an amount stated in a certificate that person may if he denies his liability to pay the amount or any part thereof and pays the same under protest made in writing at the time of payment and signed by him or his agent, institute a suit for repayment of the amount or the part thereof so paid. Sub-section (2) provides that a suit must be instituted in a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the local area in which the office of the Collector who made the certificate is situate, and the suit shall be determined in accordance with the law in force at the place where the arrear accrued or the liability for the payment of the sum arose. In view of the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act the suit of the nature that the plaintiff has instituted without paying the amount covered by the certificate under protest in writing, is not maintainable in a Civil Court. In the second place, the Civil Court at Varanasi or Gyanpur would have no jurisdiction as the certificate under Section 3 had been issued by the Collector of Bikaner and it is the Courts at Bikaner alone that would have jurisdiction. 13. In the circumstances, I hold that the trial court rightly determined that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 14. Before parting with this case, I will place on record the fact that Sri A.S. Srivastava has argued on behalf of the appellant with great ability. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.