Judgment :- 1. As a common question regarding the interpretation and scope of Explanation II-A to S.2(25) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended upto date arises for consideration in these cases, these cases have been referred for decision by a Division Bench. The facts in CRP. 360 of 1977 may be stated first. The respondent claiming to be a kudikidappukaran applied for purchase of the kudikidappu of a dwelling house in his occupation. The petitioner resisted that claim. According to him one Thuloora took the building under a registered cooly-chit in the year 1945. On his death his son, Parayan, was in occupation and" he filed an application for registration as a kudikidappukaran. That application K A. 999 of 1964 was dismissed in 1967 as he was found to be in possession of other properties. After that the respondent who is the son of Parayan, set up kudikidappu right and filed an application for purchase. According to the petitioner it is to defeat or to get over the order passed in application K. A. 999 of 1964 that this application has been filed by the respondent in collusion with his father and his claim cannot be allowed. The respondent's case is that he is in occupation of the dwelling house from a date prior to 16th August 1968 and he has no building or land of his own to erect a homestead and hence he is a kudikidappukaran under Explanation II-A to S.2 (25) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended up to date. This claim of the respondent was accepted by the Land Tribunal and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. It is against this, this Civil Revision Petition has been filed. 2. The facts in C. R. P. 2711 of 1978 are the following: The petitioner claiming to be a kudikidappukaran applied before the Land Tribunal to purchase the kudikidappu under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The respondent disputed the status of the petitioner as a kudikidappukaran by contending that the hut in question was entrusted to one Govindan Master with a liability to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-and the cost of construction of the building will exceed Rs. 2,000/- and the rent will also be more than Rs. 15/- per month. The respondent disputed the status of the petitioner as a kudikidappukaran by contending that the hut in question was entrusted to one Govindan Master with a liability to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-and the cost of construction of the building will exceed Rs. 2,000/- and the rent will also be more than Rs. 15/- per month. The Land Tribunal went into the matter and held that the petitioner and his family have been residing in the house from 1962 onwards, that the building is a hut and so Explanation.11-A to S.2 (25) of the Act gives the petitioner the status of a kudikidappukaran. The Land Tribunal also found that this Govindan Master was only a mediator for fixing the house on rent for the petitioner and the petitioner alone was in possession throughout. On appeal by the respondent the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and dismissed the purchase application holding that though the petition schedule building was in the occupation of the petitioner from 1962 onwards, he has come into possession of the building only under the said Govindan Master. Consequently the petitioner is not a kudikidappukaran. The petitioner came up in revision before this Court and this Court by order dated 13th June, 1977 set aside the decision of the Appellate Authority and remanded the case to that Authority for fresh disposal. This Court in the order of remand found that the building is a hut as defined in the Act and that the petitioner was in occupation from 1962. It was further observed that the question whether a tenancy arrangement was entered into by Govindan Master or Govindan Master acted only as a mediator should be decided in the light of all the circumstances and evidence, in the case. After remand the court has again allowed the appeal and dismissed the purchase application. According to the Appellate Authority, Explanation II-A to S.2 (25) raises only a presumption in favour of the petitioner But this is not an absolute presumption which will preclude the land holder from proving that the initial occupation was without permission and as it has been proved in this case that the petitioner has entered possession without the permission of the respondent he is not entitled to the benefit of Explanation IIA. This is challenged in this revision petition. 3. This is challenged in this revision petition. 3. To appreciate the rival contention in both cases it is first necessary to read S.2 (25) and Explanation II-A. They read as follows: "25. "kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any Panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and (a) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a hut belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and "kudikidappu" means the land and the homestead or the hut so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto: Explanation I. xx xx Explanation II. xx xx Explanation II-A. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, a person, who, on the 16th day of August, 1968 was in occupation of any land and the dwelling bouse thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessor-in-interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970, shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran: Provided that no such person shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran (a) in cases where the dwelling house has not been constructed by such person or by any of his predecessors in interest, if (i) such dwelling house was constructed at a cost, at the time of construction, exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) such dwelling house could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent exceeding five rupees; or (b) if he has a building or is in possession of any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any Panchayat area or township, either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a building;" The main part of S.2(25) emphasises the aspect of permission with or without an obligation to pay rent for the purpose of erecting a homestead, or to occupy a hut belonging to a person in lawful possession of the land. This permission if denied, has to be proved by the person claiming the benefit. A person in occupation on 16-8-1968 of a dwelling house, whether constructed by him or by any other person and continued to be in such occupation till 1-1-1970 is deemed a kudikidappukaran. A person may commence occupation either legally or illegally. According to the land owner an illegal occupation will not be considered for the purpose of Explanation II-A. In other words if it is proved that the occupant has come into possession illegally he will not be protected under Explanation II-A. The question for consideration is whether or not the expression'in occupation of any land and dwelling house thereon' means lawful occupation with initial permission only or takes in unlawful occupation as well. 4. 4. In determining either the general object of the legislature or the meaning of its language in any particular passage it is obvious that the intention which appears to be the most in accordance with reason, justice and legal principle should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be a true one. If the court is to avoid a statutory result that flouts commonsense and justice it must do so, not by disregarding the statute or overriding it, but by interpreting it in accordance with the judicially presumed legislative concern for commonsense and justice. An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. Any construction will be rejected if it would enable a person by his own act to impair an obligation which he has undertaken or otherwise to profit by his own wrong. Whenever the language of a legislature admits of two constructions and if construed in one way would lead to obvious injustice the courts should act upon the view that such result could not have been intended, unless the intention to bring it about has been manifested in the plainest words. These are some of the fundamentals which have to be kept in view in construing the passage or expression in a statute which is capable of two constructions. This principle has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux (AIR. 1970 SC. 1880). At page 1883 Para.9 the principle is stated thus: "The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words, as observed by Crawford in his book in Statutory Constructions that the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intend in every piece of legislation. Consequently, where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute was not the one intended by the law-markers. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intend in every piece of legislation. Consequently, where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute was not the one intended by the law-markers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the Legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent." In that case S.9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (the expression 'held') was the subject of consideration. After stating the principle quoted above their Lordships took the view that the expression 'held' can be understood only in the limited sense as distinct from physical possession that will be had to a trespasser. This approach is called for in interpreting Explanation II-A. 5. To appreciate its scope better it will be useful to keep in mind the successive legislations relating to kudikidappukars passed by the Travancore-Cochin and Kerala Legislatures Under the Cochin Proclamation XVIII of 1122 certain rights had been conferred on persons, who had no homestead or land to erect a homestead and who had been permitted by the owner of the land to have the use and occupation of a portion of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead. A similar legislation called the Travancore Prevention of Eviction Act-Act 22 of 1124-had been enacted by the Travancore Legislature in 1124. With the formation of the Travancore-Cochin State these two legislations were replaced by the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act-Act 15 of 1955. Under this Act a kudikidappukaran is defined as a person who has no homestead or land of his own to erect a homestead and has been permitted by the owner of the land to have the use and occupation of a portion of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead and a 'kudiyiruppu' is defined as the site so given together with the structure which is used as the place of residence by the Kudikidappukaran with the permission of the land holder. The expression 'has been permitted' means under ordinary rules of grammar 'an action that has just been complete or a past action continuing to the present'. The expression 'has been permitted' means under ordinary rules of grammar 'an action that has just been complete or a past action continuing to the present'. In other words it means 'was permitted and continues to be permitted'. The present perfect tense of the passive voice of the verb 'permit' is used to denote two things, an initial permission and a continuity of that till the date of the enactment. The expression 'Kudiyiruppu' is defined to mean the site permitted to be used for erecting a homestead together with the residential structure of the occupant. So to constitute a 'kudiyiruppu' initial permission to put up the structure and occupation of it as residence of it is alone sufficient. To make a person kudikidappukaran that permission must continue to exist till the commencement of the Act. There may be cases where the initial permission given by the land owner or land holder would have been withdrawn. In such a case S.3 (2) provided that every person who at the commencement of the Act in occupation of the kudiyiruppu shall be deemed to be in occupation of such kudiyiruppu with the permission of the owner. So by legal fiction the original permission given is extended and made continuous to satisfy the requirement of 'has been permitted'. With the formation of the Kerala State on 11th April 1957 the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance I of 1957 was passed which extended the meaning of the word Kudikidappukaran to include any person in occupation of a hut, whether constructed by him or not, in any portion of a land in the possession of another and who has been permitted by the latter to occupy that hut. The Ordinance was replaced by Act 1 of 1957 as amended by Act 30 of 1958. Here also the definition of the word 'kudikidappukaran' is extended to include a person in occupation of a hut with permission. This Act was replaced by Act 4 of 1961. There is a definition of the word kudikidappukaran in this Act also. A person who has been permitted to put up a homestead and a person who is allowed to occupy a hut by the person permitting him to occupy are both kudikidappukars and instead of the expression 'kudiyiruppu', 'kudikidappu' is used to denote the land and the homestead or the hut so permitted to be erected or occupied. A person who has been permitted to put up a homestead and a person who is allowed to occupy a hut by the person permitting him to occupy are both kudikidappukars and instead of the expression 'kudiyiruppu', 'kudikidappu' is used to denote the land and the homestead or the hut so permitted to be erected or occupied. This also emphasises the initial permission and the continuity of that permission till the date of the Act. A case where a permission initially given is withdrawn is covered by Explanation II to S.2 (20) which reads thus: "Explanation II. Any person who was in occupation of a kudikidappu on the 11th day of April, 1957, and who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be in occupation of such kudikidappu with permission as required under this clause." When Act 4 of 1961 was repealed by Act 1 of 1964 the same fiction was continued up to the date of that Act, 141964. Explanation II to S.2 (25) which is in similar terms is clear on this point; Permission given subsequent to 1141957 also required continuity for protection. So Acts 9 of 1967and 5 of 1969 were enacted to cover them as well. The latter Act extended the continuity of the possession till the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Bill 1968, namely 16th August 1968. Then came Act 35 of 1969. The definition of the word 'kudikidappukaran' was re-drafted and the proviso to S.2(25) extended the continuity from-16th August 1968 to 111970. There it will be seen that this legal fiction is made use of only to cover a stage subsequent to the initial permission to satisfy the requirement 'has been permitted' mentioned in the main clause. 6. Has the scope of this legal fiction, which right from 1955 been only to cover a stage subsequent to the initial permission be altered or widened to cover a case of initial permission also by Act 17 of 1972 as is sought to be contended by the counsel for the occupant? That may be considered now. This Act deletes the proviso to the main clause which continued the legal fiction and introduces the fiction by adding Explanation IIA. As part of a correct draftsmanship the legal fiction has now been set forth only subsequent to Explanations I and II. That may be considered now. This Act deletes the proviso to the main clause which continued the legal fiction and introduces the fiction by adding Explanation IIA. As part of a correct draftsmanship the legal fiction has now been set forth only subsequent to Explanations I and II. Explanations I and II to the main clause relate to qualifications of the person claiming to be a kudikidappukaran and the structure occupied. Explanation I relates to the extent of land and Explanation II defines what a 'hut' and a 'homestead' mean. The idea contained in the main clause is complete only with Explanations I and II. The main clause uses the same expression "has been permitted" which means a past permission continuing to the present. A case may arise where permission initially granted could have been withdrawn before the coming into force of the Act. Up till 16th of August 1968 the enactments referred to earlier provided for the continuity by a legal fiction. From 16th August 1968 till the commencement of the Act that continuity must be made good and that is done by Explanation IIA. In the context in which the Explanation IIA has been added one cannot ignore the scope of occupation referred to in the main clause. In the main clause mention is made of a person permitted to occupy a portion of the land to erect a homestead or permitted to occupy a hut. It is in that sense 'a person in occupation of any land and a dwelling house thereon' is used in Explanation II-A. Though the expression 'in occupation' de hors from the context may suggest an occupation even without initial permission the context of the main clause and the purpose to which the fiction is added indicates that there must be an initial permission for occupation. This alone will harmonise with the main clause. As a matter of statutory construction the Explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section see Bihta Co-op. Development & Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar (AIR. 1967 SC. 389 Para.8). Otherwise this will nullify the main clause itself and limit the scope of the main clause to cases of permission subsequent to 16th of August 1968. It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section see Bihta Co-op. Development & Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar (AIR. 1967 SC. 389 Para.8). Otherwise this will nullify the main clause itself and limit the scope of the main clause to cases of permission subsequent to 16th of August 1968. It will be adopting a dangerous or unusual course to import a legislation from an explanation wholly inconsistent with and repugnant to the main clause. The court cannot infer such an intention of the legislature unless the expression is clear to that effect. There is no such expression in Explanation II-A. 7. In this connection it has to be stated that the substitution of the proviso by the Explanation is only a different form of legal drafting to incorporate in the Statute book the idea which has been judicially stated in Mariam v. Xavier (1971 KLT. 729) to which we will come to later. The proviso made good the continuity of the permission to occupy. That is the scope of the Explanation also can be seen if we analyse the main part of the Explanation and its proviso. The proviso to the Explanation became necessary because the latter deemed the occupier a kudikidappukaran without specifying the qualification of the occupied. The proviso to the Explanation borrows these requisites from the main clause of S.2 (25) to make the person in occupation a kudikidappukaran. So in substance the main clause of the Explanation serves only the purpose of the proviso substituted by the Explanation. 8. There is one more change of expression in the Explanation. Homestead and hut used in the proviso are substituted in the Explanation by the words dwelling house whether constructed by the occupier or his predecessor or belonging to any other person. This conveys the same idea of homestead and hut, because homestead and hut are defined as dwelling houses of the same specifications as mentioned in the proviso. That is why we stated that the substitution made in Act 17 of 1972 is only a redrafting of the same idea with no change of legislative intent. 9. Now let us look into the decided cases on this matter. The earliest case where the scope of the legal fiction came up for consideration is the decision of Justice Velu Pillai in S. A. 558 of 1961. 9. Now let us look into the decided cases on this matter. The earliest case where the scope of the legal fiction came up for consideration is the decision of Justice Velu Pillai in S. A. 558 of 1961. Therein the learned judge observed: "It was also argued by learned counsel, that under the definition of 'kudikidappukaran' in S.2, Clause.25 of Act 1 of 1964, unless the permission originally granted, to the defendants or their predecessors, to have the use and occupation of the portion of the land for erecting the homestead, was renewed or was in force, these rights cannot be recognised. This definition follows the definition in previous enactments. Learned counsel is wrong in his submission, that the permission admittedly granted at the inception' required to be renewed from time to time or at the time Act 1 of 1964 came into force. The permission granted originally was for the use and occupation of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead, and once such permission was granted, rights of kudikidappu accrued. These rights cannot be taken away subsequently. Permission once granted is irrevocable. It is not open to the plaintiff, as contended for them, to revoke or withdraw the permission, by the institution of the suit or by other means. The kudikidappu rights have therefore to be upheld." This undertaking of the clause was not fully accepted by Madhavan Nair, J. in Gopalan v. Chellamma (1966 KLT. 673). According to him the permission initially granted is revocable and that it has not been done on 11-4-1957 has to be proved. This decision reduced the efficacy of the protection and so by Act 35 of 1969 the proviso was amended by substituting the word 'hut' for kudikidappu in the provision relating to legal friction. The next decision to be noticed is Mariam v. Xavier (1971 KLT. 709). Krishna Iyer, J., as he then was, construed the legal fiction contained in the provision to the main clause thus: "The proviso is not always limited to carving a category out of what the substantive enactment embraces. It is not as if what comes within the main provision as kudikipappu is excluded by the proviso. Nor does it create an independent category altogether. It is not as if what comes within the main provision as kudikipappu is excluded by the proviso. Nor does it create an independent category altogether. The proviso here, if read harmoniously with what has gone before, really clarifies the meaning of the definition as Velu Pillai J. has ruled and removes the difficulty high-lighted in the judgment of Madhavan Nair J. May be, it is explanatory in one sense and extends the scope in another. The whole clause, read together, at once accepts the need for permission at the inception and nullifies the potency of the landlord's later recantation. In short, the initial leave to occupy is obligatory to make the dweller a kudikidappukaran. The provision operates only at the next stage. If as the reported ruling (1966 KLT. 673) insists, a continued existence of permission up to 11th April 1957 or other later date specified in the statute should be read into the substantive clause, the proviso steps in to dispense with it in cases where the occupant has been in the hut between 16th August, 1968 and 1st January 1970. If Madhavan Nair, J. is right, the proviso is otiose; if Madhavan Nair J. is wrong, the proviso salvages the legislative intent. Viewed; against the history and the constitutional backdrop of the kudikidappu provision in the tenancy legislation of the land, calculated to stabilise agrarian labour settled on the land, to start with by the owner's consent, the legislative project only sanctions their continuance against the owner's will rather than freeze all occupation even such as is secured by criminal trespass. The law loves neither him who grabs land or buildings, for that would be humanism gone haywire nor him who bulldose humble dwellers out of their shacks, for that would be a negation of the wholesome humanism behind the statute." This observation and statement of the concept of a kudikidappukaran is only incorporated in the statute book by Act 17 of 1972. To the same effect is the decision in George v. Sadasivan (1972 KLT. 107) and in Thankappan Asari v. Ammukutty Bai (1973 KLT. 443 (FB.)j. This Explanation II-A also came up for consideration in subsequent decisions. In Chinnan v. Gopinathan (1975 KLT. 50) this fiction was understood to cover only a case of occupation with initial permission. To the same effect is the decision in George v. Sadasivan (1972 KLT. 107) and in Thankappan Asari v. Ammukutty Bai (1973 KLT. 443 (FB.)j. This Explanation II-A also came up for consideration in subsequent decisions. In Chinnan v. Gopinathan (1975 KLT. 50) this fiction was understood to cover only a case of occupation with initial permission. If the initial occupation is proved to be illegal or wrong Explanation II-A was held not to apply. In this case the submission of the learned Advocate General that it can never be presumed that the legislature intended to create rights in favour of persons committing illegal acts for getting into property unlawfully was noticed. He urged that the explanation must be understood to mean only, those who are in lawful occupation. No doubt the decision of that case rested mainly on another reason namely that the wider interpretation will make the provision constitutionally invalid. That reason may not hold good now in view of the constitutional protection given to Act 17 of 1972. As easy way of disposing of an argument is not available now. That is all. But it does not follow that the court did not attach any weight to the submissions of the Advocate General for a harmonious construction. A harmonious construction as mentioned above indicates the legislative intent in accordance with justice and reason. Again in Sankaran v. Kumaran (1977 KLT 275) this Explanation II-A came up for consideration. The Division Bench construing this explanation observed thus at page 278: "A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (Eradi, J.) was a member had occasion to consider the scope of the said explanation in Chinnan v. Gopinathan (1975 KLT. 50). In that case the constitutional validity of the said Explanation was challenged on the ground of contravention of Art.19(1)(f) and Art.31 A of the Constitution. In defence to the said contention it was urged on behalf of the State that it could never be presumed that in enacting the impugned explanation the legislature intended to create rights in favour of persons committing illegal acts such as getting into possession of property unlawfully and that hence the impugned Explanation should be understood as conferring rights only to persons who were in lawful occupation. This contention was accepted by the Division Bench and it was held that despite the wide language used in Explanation IIA the said provision has to be read and understood as conferring benefits only on persons who are in lawful occupation and as being inapplicable to cases of trespassers. We are in respectful agreement with the said view expressed by the Division Bench." This construction given to Explanation II-A is in accordance with the Full Bench decision in Thankappan Asari v. Ammukutty Bai (1973 KLT. 443) wherein the expression 'in occupation' has been construed to mean legal occupation under that section. We are bound by and in respectful agreement with those decisions. 10. There are instances where this court has not accepted the wider interpretation put on the word 'occupation'. In the Full Bench case Mohamed Mytheen v. Sreedharan (1976 KLT. 919) this provision in Explanation II-A was sought to be made use of by the transferee pendente lite. Govindan Nair, C. J., speaking for the Full Bench in Para.10 observed as follows: "I am therefore unable to accept the first contention that by the wording of Explanation IIA read with S.127, if the occupation of the land and the dwelling house between the dates mentioned in the explanation is satisfied, the occupant must be held to be a kudikidappukaran if the transfer which gave rise to such occupation was pendente lite." Similarly in Sankarankutty Menon v. Chacko (1958 KLT. 543) and in Srinivasan Embrandiri v. Krishnan Namboodiri (1975 KLT. 28) the expression 'occupation' was not construed in a wider manner. Therefore, with respect, the wide construction sought to be pur on the expression'in occupation' by one of the judges who decided Achuthan v. Narayani Amma (1980 KLT. 160) does not appeal to us. We hold that to apply Explanation.11-A it must be proved that there was initial permission for occupation of the dwelling house. If that is not proved the benefit of Explanation II-A is not available. 11. In the first case in the light of the sequence of facts a clear case of collusion is established. A father who has five children first applied to get the benefit of a kudikidappukaran. After he failed in that attempt his eldest son on the basis of a separate ration card in his name has come forward claiming that he is in occupation on his own account. A father who has five children first applied to get the benefit of a kudikidappukaran. After he failed in that attempt his eldest son on the basis of a separate ration card in his name has come forward claiming that he is in occupation on his own account. The fact that a separate ration card is issued to him before 16th August 1968 by itself will not establish that he is. in independent possession. He is in occupation if at all only under his father and has collusively put forward a claim of kudikidappu in this case. He has not been permitted by the land holder to occupy at any time. The permission given by the land holder to his grand-father may possibly enure to bis father and during the latter's life time his son the present occupant will not be entitled to claim a kudikidappu. The lower Tribunals have failed to look into this aspect. They have wrongly construed the meaning of the expression 'in occupation' contained in Explanation II-A and overlooked all other aspects in this case. Therefore the respondent is not entitled to any kudikidappu right. His application has been wrongly allowed by the lower Tribunals. Therefore the C. R. P. is allowed and the application for purchase of kudikidappu is dismissed. 12. In the second case it has come out that in 1962 one Govindan Master took the building on rent from the land holder. The lower courts have found that the petitioner was in actual occupation all along. His initial occupation being not with permission of the land holder he is only a trespasser or a person in occupation without the consent of the landlord. In other words be is in unlawful occupation. He also therefore is not entitled to the benefit of Explanation II-A. His application was rightly dismissed by the Appellate Authority. No interference is called for in this revision. C. R. P. 2711 of 1978 is therefore dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs in both the Revision Petitions.