Judgment M.P.VARMA, J. 1. The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust (hereinafter to be referred to as the Board) filed the suit in question for setting aside an alleged transaction of sale by defendant No. 2, the trustee, in favour of defendant No. 1 as well as for restoration of the possession of the demised property, details whereof have been given in the plaint. Learned Subordinate Judge non-suited the plaintiff on the finding that no sale has taken place in the eye of law and the transaction was just an agreement to sell against which no suit is maintainable. 2. It is the case of the plaintiff-Board that considerable landed properties had been dedicated in favour of the deities of Radhakrishnaji Maharaj, installed in the temple of Rajapur. Defendant No. 2 was the trustee, and, in his capacity as a trustee, he entered into an agreement dated 22-2-1964 with defendant No. 1 to sell 12 kathas of land belonging to the deities at the rate of Rs. 2,900.00 per katha and also received an advance of Rs. 10,00.00. Having received the advance, according to the Board, defendant No. 2 put defendant No. 1 in possession of the property aforesaid over which defendant No. 1 was constructing a pucca building. It was asserted on behalf of the Board in the said suit that there was no legal necessity for transferring the land in question, as such it was not in the interest of the Trust. 3. The trustee, defendant No. 2, did not contest the suit, but defendant No. 1 filed a written statement and questioned the maintainability of the suit on the ground that there was no transfer of the land in question. The learned Subordinate Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board submitted that under the provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) transfer of an immovable property is not a condition precedent for institution of a suit; a suit can be filed even for recovery of possession of the Trust property where the persons concerned has come in possession of the property, without there being a valid deed in his favour. 5. 5. The Act in question was framed for better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts and for the protection and preservation of the properties appertaining to such Trusts, which is apparent from the preamble of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Sec.28 provides that the general superintendence of all religious trusts in the State shall be vested in the Board and "the Board shall do all things reasonable sonable and necessary to ensure that such trusts are properly supervised and administered". Sub-section (2) of that section enumerates "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1)", the powers and duties of the Board, clause (c) thereof vests power in the Board, "to direct the trustee of a religious trust to institute in a Court of law, within such time as may be fixed by the Board, any suit or proceeding which he is entitled to institute in accordance with the law for the time being in force in respect of the trust or any matter connected therewith and, on failure of the trustee to do so, institute such suit or proceeding itself". Sec. 44 puts a restriction on the power of the Trustee to transfer any immovable property of the religious trust and says that no transfer made by such trustees of any immovable property of the Trust "by way of sale, mortgage, gift or exchange...... be valid unless made with the previous sanction of the Board." Section 72 lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure where a suit is instituted on behalf of the Board to set aside a sale of immovable property comprised in a religious trust or to recover possession of property, referred to above, a court shall on application of the plaintiff appoint a receiver for such property, and sub-section (2) of that section prescribes a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 on plaint of such suit. Learned Subordinate Judge has referred to this Section 72 for purpose of coming to the finding that unless a transfer within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act takes place, the Board is not authorised to institute a suit. In my view, the learned Subordinate Judge completely misconceived the scope of Section 72. Whether the Board can file a suit to set aside a sale or transfer or for recovery of possession of property, Section 72 is not the provision for the same. In my view, the learned Subordinate Judge completely misconceived the scope of Section 72. Whether the Board can file a suit to set aside a sale or transfer or for recovery of possession of property, Section 72 is not the provision for the same. Section 72 has only two purposes. Firstly, to make provision for appointment of a receiver in such suits and, secondly, to provide for a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 for such suits. In that view of the matter, it has to be held that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding on basis of Section 72 of the Act that unless a transfer takes place, within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, no suit is maintainable on behalf of the Board. 6. Now it has to be examined as to whether in a situation with which we are concerned, the Board could have instituted the suit for the relief claimed for. I have already" pointed out that Sec.28 vests general superintendence of all religious trusts in the State in the Board and authorises the Board to do all things reasonable and necessary to ensure that such trusts are properly supervised and administered. When sub-section (2) of that section enumerates power of the Board, on face of it, it is illustrative in nature because sub-section (2) opens with the words, "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1)", which means that general power under sub-section (1) of Sec.28 has not been curtailed in any manner by sub-section (2). In view of this provision, in my opinion, it is difficult to hold that if the trustee of any trust in collusion with any person allows such person to take possession of any property of the trust, and refuses to file any suit for eviction, the Board will be a mere helpless spectator having no power to institute a suit against such trespasser. In my view, the power to institute a suit in such a situation will not only be covered by sub-section (1) but also by clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Sec.28 of the Act. 7. In my view, the power to institute a suit in such a situation will not only be covered by sub-section (1) but also by clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Sec.28 of the Act. 7. Learned counsel appearing for defendant No. 1 pointed out that clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Sec.28 of the Act does not vest power in the Board to institute the suit unless it has directed the trustee to institute any suit within a time fixed by it and such trustee has failed to do so. No doubt, on a plain reading cl. (c) of sub-section (2) of Sec.28 says that But, if the Board is satisfied that the trustee himself was in collusion with a trespasser or a transferee and has allowed him to come upon the land, in order to circumvent the provision regarding sanction by the Board for transfer of such property, it will be an empty formality on the part of the Board to request the trustee first to institute the suit within a time prescribed. The provision regarding directing the trustee to institute the suit first, in my view, cannot be held to be mandatory, or a condition precedent before a suit by the Board can be instituted. Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Sec.28 conceives any, type of suit in respect of the trust or any matter connected therewith, which will also include a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser. In my opinion, even in cases where no transfer has taken place within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, the Board is entitled to institute a suit under general power conferred on it by sub-section (1) of Sec.28 as well as under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Sec.28 of the Act. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside. Learned Subordinate Judge is directed to hear the suit afresh. It will be open to the parties concerned to adduce such evidence as they may deem fit and proper on the issues involved. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J. 9 I agree.