JUDGMENT Murlidhar 1. This bail application dated 25-7-80 was pressed only on the legal ground that the Magistrate had no power to remand the applicant to judicial custody for a period of 90 days (from 12-5-80 to 10-8-80) by the order dated 12-5-80. It was urged on this ground that the detention of the applicant in custody was illegal and he was entitled to be released on bail. The hearing of the application was protracted and during the pendency of the application on 5-8-80 the Magistrate committed the case for trial under Section 393/302 IPC to the court of Sessions simultaneously passing an order for the accused's remand to custody in these words:"......All the three accused are committed to the court of session to face their trial. They being in jail custody are remanded to jail custody..............." The learned counsel then challenged this order also on the grounds (1) If as contended in the main argument, the custody was illegal the remand to custody order under Section 209 pending the bail application could not cure it. (2) Even in itself the detention order dated 5-8-80 is illegal as it specifies no term of detention. As the question raised about the order dated 12-5-80 is of general importance, the learned counsel gave valuable assistance to the court by arguing the case at length on a number of dates covering various aspects of the matter. 2. Before taking up the points raised, it would be proper to very briefly indicate the facts. The occurrence is of 6-5-80. Three miscreants were said to have way-laid a rickshaw at about 11 p.m. in Moradabad town and in the course of the attempt to rob the passenger murdered him by a stab wound and a Tamancha shot. The FIR did not name any accused but mentioned that they had been identified. The evidence against the applicant was of identification. He had been produced by the police before the Magistrate apparently in a Bapurdah condition on 12th May and the aforesaid impugned remand order was passed. Identification proceedings were held on 23-5-80. In order to appreciate and appraise the points raised, it is necessary to refer to the relevant portions of Sections 167, 209 and 309 of the CrPC 1973 which cover the subject of remand to custody of an accused person pending investigation committal inquiry, or trial. "167. (1)................... Identification proceedings were held on 23-5-80. In order to appreciate and appraise the points raised, it is necessary to refer to the relevant portions of Sections 167, 209 and 309 of the CrPC 1973 which cover the subject of remand to custody of an accused person pending investigation committal inquiry, or trial. "167. (1)................... (2) The Magistrate to whom ain accused is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole ; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction : Provided that-(a) the Magistrate may authories detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this section for a total period exceeding sixty days, and on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail; and every person released on bail under this section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; The corresponding provision in the 1898 Code was as follows : 167 (2)- "The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has. no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the; accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that no Magistrate of the third class, and no Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government shall authorise detention in the custody of the police." The provision dealing with commitment of cases in Section 209 : "209. Commitment of case to court of Sessions when offence is triable exclusively by it: When in a case instituted on a polity report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the court of Sessions, he shall.........(a) commit the case to the court of Sessions; or (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial; (c)...............(d)............... 3. Under the old Code commitment far trial by a court of session was under Section 213 CrPC but that section made no mention of remanding the accused to custody. Section 220 occurring as the last section in the Chapter of XVIII inquiring into cases triable by the court of Sessions or High Court however provided that until and during the trial the Magistrate shall subject to the provisions of this Code regarding the taking of bail commit the accused by warrant to custody. Thus pending the inquiry the Magistrate exercised the power of remand to custody under old Section 344 and at commitment under Section 220 whereafter the Sessions Court in cases of adjournment exercised the power under Section 344. Section 309. This general section provides for postponement and adjournment of the proceedings. Sub-section (2) relates to remand. The section runs as follows: "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. 0)............... (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement or trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody : Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time : Provided further that............... Explanation 1............... Explanation 2..............." The corresponding provision under the 1898 Code was Section 344 : "344. Power to postpone or adjourn proceeding : (1)............... Explanation 1............... Explanation 2..............." The corresponding provision under the 1898 Code was Section 344 : "344. Power to postpone or adjourn proceeding : (1)............... (1-A) If from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the court may, if it thinks, fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody : Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time : Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reason to be recorded in writing. (2)..............." 4. It would seem from a perusal of the relevant provisions under the old and new Codes that the old Section 167 (2) conferred a power of remand to custody of an accused person pending investigation for a maximum period of 15 days. Any further remand pending investigation) was not possible under Section 167 CrPC cases. Cases however occurred where investigation could not be completed within 15 days and it was necessary to detain the accused. In such cases further remands were granted under Section 344. This is clearly brought out by Natwar Farida v. State of Orissa, 1975 ACC 299. It was observed that under the old Code after 15 days, the investigating agency could seek remand of the accused to custody under Section 344 provided it satisfied the court that sufficient evidence had been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and that there will be hindrance in obtaining of further evidence unless an order of remand was made. This was the reason for the change in the new Code. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill it was stated in respect of the change in 167 (2); "At present Sec. 167 CrPC (empowers) Magistrate to authorise detention of the accused in custody for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. This was the reason for the change in the new Code. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill it was stated in respect of the change in 167 (2); "At present Sec. 167 CrPC (empowers) Magistrate to authorise detention of the accused in custody for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. There is a complaint that the provision Is honoured more in breach than in observance and that the police investigation takes a much longer period in practice of doubtful illegality had grown whereby the police file a preliminary or incomplete charge sheet and move the court for remand under Section 344 which is not Intended to apply to stage of investigation. While in some cases, the delay in investigation may be due to fault of the police, in cannot be denied that there may be genuine cases where it may not be practical to complete the investigation in 15 days. The commission recommended that the period should be extended to 60 days but if this is done, 60 days would become the rule and there is no guarantee that the illegal practice referred to above will not continue. It is considered the most satisfactory solution of the problem would be to confer on the Magistrate the power to extend the period of detention beyond 15 days whenever he is satisfied that adequate ground exists for granting such extension. Clause 117 gives effect to this." 5. It was in this background that new Section 167 (2) was enacted. Thus whereas formerly remand to custody during investigation was possible initially upto 15 days under Section 167 (2) and thereafter subject to the condition elucidated In Natwar Farida's case in 15 day packets under Section 344 CrPC under the new Code the remand during investigation can be only under Section 167 (2). Usually the maximum period for such remand is 15 days. But in cases covered by the proviso a longer period of 60 or 90 days (90 days in cases specified by the Amendment Act 18 of 1977) are permissible. 6. It is on the mode of exercise of the power of remand for 60/90 days under the new Section 167 (2) that the argument in this case is built. But in cases covered by the proviso a longer period of 60 or 90 days (90 days in cases specified by the Amendment Act 18 of 1977) are permissible. 6. It is on the mode of exercise of the power of remand for 60/90 days under the new Section 167 (2) that the argument in this case is built. At one stage, the learned counsel for the applicant probably on account of the habit of familiarity with tie provisions of old Code tried to urge that remand to custody for 60/90 days pending investigation can only be in smaller packets-no packets exceeding a maximum of 15 days at one stretch but this is an obviously untenable contention. There is nothing whatever in the new Section 167 (2) to base an argument that the extra remand period of 45/75 days authorised by the proviso beyond the usual limit of 15 days has to be granted in not larger than 15 days pieces or packets. Probably as a result of this realisation the main thrust of the argument was that in any case the first remand has to be for a maximum period of 15 days as provided by the main clause of Section 167 (2) and that the remand for the remaining period permissible under the proviso can only be granted after the initial remand period (at one stretch or from time to time) of 15 days. It is, therefore, argued that an initial one shot remand for any period exceeding 15 days whether it is for the minimum 60/90 days or for a lesser period is illegal. 7. The matter turns on interpretation of the proviso, the relevant words being "provided that the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused persons .............beyond the period of 15 days...............but no Magistrate shall authorise detention...............under this section for a total period exceeding 60 days." Is this proviso to be interpreted as empowering the Magistrate only to grant a further remand for a period upto 45/75 days after the expiry of the 15 days permitted by the main clause of sub-section (2) or does it in cases covered by the proviso substitute the limit of 15 days by 60/90 days. The learned counsel for the applicant pressed for the first interpretation. The learned counsel for the applicant pressed for the first interpretation. According to him, the true import of the proviso is shown more clearly if it is read after a little re-arrangement in this way : "The Magistrate may beyond the period of 15 days authorise detention of the accused persons................but no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused persons in custody under the Section for a total period exceeding 60/90 days................" 8. I am unable to accept the contention. The proviso has to be read in its natural sense. We cannot rearrange the: language so as to make it more amenable for the interpretation urged. To begin with if the Legislature wanted the initial remand or remands to be for 15 days only and the subsequent remands beyond 15 days to require separate subsequent order or orders it could have achieved this by the simple use of the word 'further' between the words 'authorise' and 'detention'. The proviso would then read 'Provided that the Magistrate may authorise further detention of the accused persons beyond the period of 15 days ...............but no Magistrate...............shall authorise the detention............... under this section for a total period exceeding 60/90 days................" Since the language of the proviso is not in this form, tit is proper to read it as it is and not in the rearranged form suggested by the learned counsel. Reading the proviso in the way suggested would do violence to the language and distort the sense altogether, lit would result in 'beyond the period of 15 days' referring to the point of time at: which the Magistrate is to authorise the detention whereas on the words as they stand that point is left unspecified and the phrase relates to the duration for which the detention may be authorised. It is important to note that even in the main clause there is no specification of the point of time at which the second or subsequent orders of remand may be passed. Even the practice that there may be more than one detention orders each one of a smaller duration so as not to exceed .15 days in the whole is implied in the phrase 'from time to time'. Even the practice that there may be more than one detention orders each one of a smaller duration so as not to exceed .15 days in the whole is implied in the phrase 'from time to time'. The learned counsel conceded that form time to time covered either all at once stretch or by more than one detention orders and hence under the main clause a single 15 days remand to detention order was in order and the power to time as thought fit was only an enabling one. Therefore the point of time at which in case of bit orders the subsequent order is to be passed is left indeterminate. This means that on expiry of the authorised detention by the earlier order further detention may be ordered subject of course to the prescribed out-side limit of 15 days. The position under the proviso is no- different. The proviso only states that the remand may be beyond 15 days upto 60/90 days in cases covered by it without specifying when this may be done. This means that under the proviso the limit of 15 days in whole' for remand is abro gated and the limit of 60/90 days is substituted. Authorisation for detention beyond the period of 15 days upto 60/90 da;ys may be made initially at the very, start, at an intermediate stage within 15 days or on the expiry of 15 days provided of course the conditions laid down by the proviso are satisfied. The drafting of the proviso is not of the best kind but there is no way of reasonably reading the same except in the sense that in cases covered by it limit of 15 days is substituted to 60/90 days. 9. The learned counsel tried to build an argument based on the rights of personal liberty and equality covered by Articles 21, 19 and 14 of the Constitution. I find no force in any of these contentions. As regards Article 14 it was contended that if the proviso was treated as authorising even one shot 60/90 days remand, it would be a case of excessive and arbitrary delegation of the power of detention to the Magistrate. The argument is mis-conceived. The conditions and guide-lines are laid down in the proviso itself. As regards Article 14 it was contended that if the proviso was treated as authorising even one shot 60/90 days remand, it would be a case of excessive and arbitrary delegation of the power of detention to the Magistrate. The argument is mis-conceived. The conditions and guide-lines are laid down in the proviso itself. The justification for the extended power is in the indisputable fact that in a large number of cases investigation cannot be completed in 15 days and has to take 60/90 days or even longer. There is no distinction from the point of view of laying down of guidelines between the 15 days term of the main clause and the extended term in the proviso. Nor is there any merit in the contention that while an initial 15 days remand followed by a remand for further period or periods upto the total of 60/90 days would satisfy the test of being a reasonable just and fair restriction on the right of personal liberty a one shot remand of 60/90 days would not satisfy such a test and, therefore, be violative of Article 21 read with Article 19. 10. There was considerable argument as to the effect of the circumstance that the extended period is permitted by a proviso. I am afraid this cannot in any way help the view canvassed on behalf of the applicant. A proviso can and in this case does make specific provision for a category of cases that would but for the proviso fall within the main clause. Here the proviso confines the extended detention to cases of non-police detention and where the Magistrate is satisfied that there are adequate grounds for detaining the accused pending investigation beyond 15 days. But for the proviso these cases would have been covered by the main clause. There is no attempt here to influence the interpretation of the main clause by the language of the proviso. Nor is there any force in the contention that the fields covered by the main clause and the proviso are different and, therefore, the powers under the proviso cannot be exercised within the 15 days period by the main clause. The confusion in this argument is that the field of the main clause is taken to be the duration limit allowed by it whereas duration is only an incident to the field or the cases covered by the clause. The confusion in this argument is that the field of the main clause is taken to be the duration limit allowed by it whereas duration is only an incident to the field or the cases covered by the clause. The field of the proviso is an exception to the field of the main clause and there the limit of 60/90 days applies. Where the conditions prescribed by the proviso avail the extended duration applies and the; duration limit of the main clause ceases to apply. An attempt was made to build an argument on the difference in phraseology between the main clause and the proviso. The corresponding relevant words are "from time to time authorise detention for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole" in the main clause and 'authorise detention beyond the period of 15 days for a total period not exceeding 60/90 days' in the proviso. I am unable to see any difference necessitating a fresh order after 15 days for the extended period. The word 'total' in the proviso does not signify anything in particular and may have been used in preference to the phrase 'in the whole' so as to cover cases where there are one or more remands under the main clause and only the others under the proviso. 11. Lastly leaving aside quibbling over words we may consider the basics. The comparative advantages of the two interpretations are a relevant consideration when choosing between the same where the legislative mandate is not clear. There is no advantage in insisting on an initial remand period of 15 days under the proviso. The legislature has already imposed the check that the extended period remand beyond 15 days can be granted only to non-police custody and only if the Magistrate is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so. If these conditions are satisfied at the initial stage there is no reason why one shot remand for the whole period about the need for which the Magistrate is satisfied should not be granted avoiding the needless production of the accused and an intermediate order of remand at the end of 15 days. Any one familiar with the working of the Magistrate's courts knows that in quite a few cases investigation has to take much longer than 15 days. Any one familiar with the working of the Magistrate's courts knows that in quite a few cases investigation has to take much longer than 15 days. It is to avoid intermediate remand orders in such cases that the proviso has been added in the new Code. Considering the large number of such cases all over the State by avoiding needless production of the accused for such intermediate remand orders there is appreciable saving in courts' time as well as the effort involved in producing the accused in court including office work in jail and police offices and pressure on transport, escort man power and lock up etc. Even for the under trials the trips to courts for remand orders quite often are a strain rather than a respite from jail routine. On the other hand there is no appreciable gain even in the way of a safe guard of the right of personal liberty in having avoidable intermediate remand orders even in cases covered by the proviso. In fact the main protection of the accused against improper detention when a non-bailable case is under investigation against him are the provisions regarding bail which are applicable even during the period of remand. 12. It may be properly said that the interest of liberty would be served not by denial of the power of over 15 days remand even at the start but by its proper exercise. Therefore, while holding that a one shot 15 days remand under the main clause or 60/90 days remand under the proviso is valid it must be emphasised that it is important that the Magistrate fix the period of remand in each case carefully after application of mind to all the relevant circumstances. It would be wrong to mechanically grant remands for the period desired by the investigating agency. The Magistrate should be conscious that remand to custody during investigation involves deprivation of personal liberty only in the social interest of the requirements of proper investigation. Also that it is only through the power of remand that he can watch the progress of investigation and curb any tendency to laxity or to use the pendency of investigation as an excuse for detention. Also that it is only through the power of remand that he can watch the progress of investigation and curb any tendency to laxity or to use the pendency of investigation as an excuse for detention. In view of the main argument failing, it is not necessary to go into the attack on the remand order under Section 209 CrPC on the ground that illegal custody under the order dated 12-5-80 could not be cured by such an order. On merits the main ground on which this order is attacked is that the period for which the accused has been remanded to jail custody has not been specified. Section 209 quoted earlier permits remand of the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. This would clearly [include an initial remand not till the conclusion of trial but for a shorter duration of either a fixed period or till the commencement of the trial. In the present order the Magistrate merely said "All the accused are committed to the court of session to face their trial they being in jail custody are remanded to jail custody." I am of the opinion that in the light of the preceding sentence about committal for trial the remand to jail custody must of necessity be interpreted as remand; for the duration of the trial and at any rate till the commencement of the trial. In case the latter interpretation is adopted of course the court may have to take action under Section 309 CrPC if it decides to keep the accused in custody on the; first date of trial. 13. The application is, therefore, dismissed. Application dismissed.