JUDGMENT Per Ojha, J. - This petitioner was under an obligation to make an ad hoc increase to the wages of its workmen at the rate of Rs. 6 per month with effect from 1 January 1960, and to a further additional increase of Rs. 2 per month with effect from 1 January 1962, in pursuance of two notifications issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on 20 September 1960 and 19 January 1962, respectively. The case of the petitioner is that a settlement was arrived at between it on the one hand and its workmen represented by the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat on the other on 20 December 1962, whereby the petitioner was exonerated from paying to its workmen the wages at the enhanced rate for the period prior to 1 January 1963, provided it paid in a lump sum Rs. 40 to each workman in the manner prescribed in the agreement. Their further case is that the said agreement was registered under S. 6B of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. Copies of the agreement and the certificate of registration Referred to above have been attached as anrexures 4 and 5 respectively to the writ petition. The workmen of the petitioner mills subsequently made a demand for the payment of the enhanced wages for the period prior to 1 January 1963. Their demand was, however, not met by the petitioner. Consequently the State Government referred the following dispute under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to the First Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, for adjudication : " Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably deprived the workmen mentioned in the annexure of the payment of ad hoc increase of Rs. 6 per month with effect from I January 1960, and further additional increase of Rs. 2 per month with effect from 1 January 1962 ? If so, to what relief are they entitled ? " After hearing the parties the Industrial Tribunal, respondent 1, gave an award in favour of the workmen on 31 July 1972. It held that the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat, the union of workmen, which is said to have arrived at the settlement referred to above did not represent all the workmen of the petitioner-mills. " After hearing the parties the Industrial Tribunal, respondent 1, gave an award in favour of the workmen on 31 July 1972. It held that the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat, the union of workmen, which is said to have arrived at the settlement referred to above did not represent all the workmen of the petitioner-mills. It also held : " There is also no evidence that the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat represented a substantial majority of the workmen. There is evidence on record to show that there were other trade unions at Hathras which also represented the workmen of this concern. Those unions, however, for reasons best known to the concern, were not taken into confidence and the settlement, dated 20 December 1962, was evidently made behind their back." Respondent 1 also held that since by the settlement relied on by the petitioner the workmen purported to forego a part of their wages which was payable to them without any deduction as contemplated by S. 7 of the Payment of Wages Act other than the deductions enumerated therein, the said settlement was null and void in view of S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act. It is this award of the Industrial Tribunal which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. Having heard counsel for the parties we are of opinion that there is no substance in this writ petition. The finding recorded by the Industrial Tribunal that the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat did not represent the substantial majority of the workmen and that there were other unions also which represented the workmen is a finding of fact based on appraisal of evidence and cannot be challenged under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Tata Chemicals, Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1978-I L. L. N. 547), it was held that even if a settlement regarding certain demand is arrived at otherwise than during the conciliation proceeding between the employer and the union representing majority workmen, the same is not binding on the other union who represents minority workmen and who was not a party to that settlement. 3. 3. Indeed from the tenor of the award it appears that the Tribunal appears to have accepted the case of the workmen that the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat was definitely not representing the majority workmen and illegally deprived them of their right to get the increased wages for the years 1960 to 1962 in full. The Tribunal has also held that it was difficult to believe that the workmen would have consented to such a heavy deduction unless things had been misrepresented to them. presumably by the Sooti Mill Mazdoor Panchayat which had signed the agreement on their behalf and this explains why they had reagitated the matter in 1966, after having come to know of the fraud which had been played on them. In our opinion, these findings should be enough to sustain the award. However, we proceed to consider the other submissions also made by the counsel for the petitioner, viz., that S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act, was not applicable in view of S. 117 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. To appreciate this, argument it would be useful to quote here S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act, as well as S. 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. Section 23 of the Payment of Wages Act reads : "23. Contracting out.-Any contract or agreement, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, whereby an employed person relinquishes any right conferred by this Act shall be null and void in so far as it purports to deprive hits of such right. " Section 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, on the other hand, reads : "17. Effect of provision inconsistent with other enactments. - Any rule or order made or deemed to be made under this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any other enactment or in any Instrument having effect by virtue of any other enactment." It has not been disputed that but for the settlement relied on by it, the petitioner would have been under an obligation to pay the additional wages referred to above to its workmen in view of S. 7 of the Payment of Wages Act, without making any deduction other than the deductions specified therein. What has been urged is that since the settlement referred to above had been registered under S. 6B of the Act, the act of registration amounted to an "order made or deemed to be made under this Act " within the meaning of S. 17 of the Act and consequently the said order would override the provisions of S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act. 4. Having gives, our anxious consideration we find it difficult to accept this submission. Section 17 of the Act refers to " any rule or order made or deemed to be made under this Act." The question is what is meant by the "rule or order made or deemed to be made under this Act." Section 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, deals with the rule making power of the State Government in pursuance whereof the State Government can make rules in the manner prescribed therein. A rule can be said to have been made under the Act within the meaning of S. 17 thereof only if such rule has been framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it under S. 23. Now we come to the term "order" referred to in S. 17. It would be seen that the Act not only confers powers on the State Government to frame rules but also confers powers on it to pass orders. For the sake of illustration reference may be made to S. 3 of the Act which, inter alia, provides that: " If, in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order, make provision................... " (Emphasis supplied.) We are of opinion that the term "order" referred to in S. 17 refers to an order such as one issued under S. 3 of the Act. " (Emphasis supplied.) We are of opinion that the term "order" referred to in S. 17 refers to an order such as one issued under S. 3 of the Act. It is only if a rule as contemplated by 'S. 23 has been framed or an order as contemplated, inter alts, by S. 3 has been issued that such rule or order will in view of S. 17 of the Act, have effect over the provision contained in any other enactment or any instrument which may be inconsistent which such rule or order. It does not prima facie refer to an act of registration of a settlement under S. 6B of the Act. On a perusal of S. 6B it is apparent that it just gives the power to the Conciliation Officer or any authority notified in this behalf by the State Government to registers a settlement arrived at between the employer and its workmen or to refuse registration in the contingencies provided therein. Even after registration of a settlement, what is binding on the parties is the settlement itself and not the act of registration. Of course if its registration is refused under S. 6B the settlement shall not be binding under the Act in view of Sub-sec. (4) of S. 6B, but it cannot be said that when the Conciliation Officer registers the settlement he passes any order within the meaning of S. 17 of the Act. Apparently, therefore, S. 17 of the Act was not attracted to the facts of the instant case. 5. Lastly it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the act of registration will come within the term " deemed to be made under this Act " used in S. 17 of the Act. We find it difficult to accept this submission also. In our opinion the words " deemed to be made under this Act" have been used for a different purpose. In N. B Sanjana v. E. S. & W. Mills, [A. I. R. 1971 S. C 2039]', it was held : " Dr. We find it difficult to accept this submission also. In our opinion the words " deemed to be made under this Act" have been used for a different purpose. In N. B Sanjana v. E. S. & W. Mills, [A. I. R. 1971 S. C 2039]', it was held : " Dr. Syed Mohammad Is, no doubt, well founded in his contention that if the appellants have power to issue notice either under rule 10A or rule 9 (2), the fact that the notice refers specifically to a particular rule, which may not be applicable, will not make the notice invalid on that ground as has been held by this Court in J. K. Seel, Ltd. v. Union of India, (A .I R. 1970 S. C. 1173). If the exercise of a power can be traced to a legitimate source, the fact that the same was purported to have been exercised under a different power does not vitiate the exercise of the power in question. This is a well settled proposition of law. In this connexion reference may(usefully be made to the decisions of this Court in B. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, [A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 232] and Afzal Ullah v. State of Uttar Pradesh ,(A. I. R.1964 S. C. 264). Suppose a rule has been made by the State Government which does not travel beyond the powers conferred on it by S. 23 of the Act but does not purport to have been framed under S. 23 of the Act but purports to have been framed under some other provision. In such a situation the rule will not be invalid simply on that score. On the other hand it will be deemed to have been made by the State Government in the exercise of its power conferred by S. 23. Likewise, suppose an order has been passed which comes within the frame work of an order contemplated by S. 3 of the Act but does not disclose the source of the power under which it has been issued or quotes a wrong source, the order will not be invalid and will be deemed to have been passed under S. 3 of the Act. When the words " deemed to be made under this Act " were used in S. 17 of the Act the Legislature had, in our opinion, in mind such cases, and not a case as contended by counsel for the petitioner. 6. No other point has been pressed. 7. In the result, we do not find either any error of jurisdiction or any manifest error of law in the impugned award. 8. For the foregoing reasons the writ petition falls and is dismissed with costs and the interim order, dated 27 February 1978, is vacated.