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1980 DIGILAW 1186 (ALL)

Suresh Kumar Sharma v. 2nd Additional District Judge, Etawah

1980-12-05

S.D.AGARWALA

body1980
ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition directed against the order dated 31-5-1976 passed in revision by the II Additional District Judge, Etawah. Smt. Brajesh Kumari, respondent No. 3 is the landlord. She filed a suit against one Shanti Swarup who was the tenant of the shop in dispute for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profits. The suit was decreed against Shanti Swarup who filed a revision. The revision came up for hearing before the II Additional District Judge, Etawah. The revision was also dismissed on 31st May, 1976. Thereafter Shri Shanti Swarup filed a revision in this Court. During the pendency of the revision Shanti Swarup died. Petitioners moved an application for substitution. The said application was not disposed of but meanwhile in view of Full Bench decision of this Court the revision was dismissed as not maintainable. Thereafter the present petition has been filed by the petitioners treating themselves to be heirs of Shanti Swarup by virtue of a will having been executed in their favour on 26th March, 1979. 2. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Brajesh Kumari has raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners who claim themselves to be the heirs by virtue of a will cannot be treated as heirs as the building in respect of which the suit was filed was governed by the provision of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, U.P. Act XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act and as such the petition is not maintainable on their behalf. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the petition if has met this preliminary objection on two grounds. It is contended by him, firstly that there is a distinction between a residential building and non-residential building. In the case of non-residential building the testamentary 'heirs' would also be included within the word 'heirs' as used in S. 3 of the Act. His second contention is that the proceedings out of which the present petition arises were not brought under the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 but were proceedings arising out of a suit and as such the interpretation of the word 'heirs' as used in S. 3 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 would not apply but the definition of the word 'legal representative' as used in S. 2 (11) C.P.C. would apply. 5. 5. U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is the special Act regulating the letting and eviction of tenants from certain class of buildings. Section 3 defines certain expressions. Section 3 (a) defines the word 'tenant as follows: "(a) "tenant" in relation to a building, means, a person, by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death- (1) in the case of residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death; (2) in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs." 6. Sub-cl. (a) clearly provides that the word 'tenant' in relation to a building means a person by whom its rent is payable and on the tenant's death in case of residential building only his heirs who normally resided with him in the building at the time of death and in the case of non-residential building his heirs. On a reading of S. 3 (a) it is, therefore, clear that so far as non-residential building is concerned, the heirs would include all the heirs of the tenant but in the case of residential building only those heirs would be treated as heirs who normally resided with the tenant at the time of his death in the building. There is no distinction, in my opinion, between the word 'heirs' as used in S. 3 (a) (i) and 3 (a) (ii). The meaning to be given to the word 'heirs' both in sub-cls. (i) and (ii) therefore has to be the same. 7. In Ratan Lal v. Addl. District Judge 1979 All LJ 849 and in Devendra Kumar v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge Meerut, 1980 All LJ 755 the two learned Judges of this Court have taken the view that the word 'heirs' as used in Section 3 (a) would not include testamentary heirs. In my opinion, the principle laid down in two cases mentioned above fully applies to the present case. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be treated to be the heirs as defined, in S. 3 of the Act. Learned counsel in this connection cited a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Angur Bala v. Debabrata, AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951 All LJ 132). Reliance has been placed on the following observations made in the above case (at p. 140 of All LJ): "The word "heirs" cannot normally be limited to issue only. Learned counsel in this connection cited a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Angur Bala v. Debabrata, AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951 All LJ 132). Reliance has been placed on the following observations made in the above case (at p. 140 of All LJ): "The word "heirs" cannot normally be limited to issue only. It must mean all persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance. So far as the main provision is concerned, there is nothing in the language or in the context to suggest that the word 'heirs' has not been used in its ordinary or natural sense." 8. In the case of Angur Bala (1951 All LJ 132) (supra) the Supreme Court had taken the view that the expression 'heirs' used in the Act which was up for interpretation before the Court was not used in any restricted or limited sense and as such an opinion was expressed that all persons who are entitled to succession under law would be heirs. This Court has, however, taken the view in both the cases mentioned above that the word 'heirs' in the context of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 has been used in a restricted and limited sense, and therefore, the principle laid down in the case of Angur Bala would not apply. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is therefore, without substance. 9. In regard to the second contention S. 2 (11) of C.P.C. is as follows:- " "Legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued." 10. This provision is a general provision applicable in respect of suits pending in the civil Court. Section 3 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is, however, a special provision governing suits which are filed in respect of buildings governed by U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The word 'building' used in Section 3 (a) of the Act is significant. This provision is a general provision applicable in respect of suits pending in the civil Court. Section 3 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is, however, a special provision governing suits which are filed in respect of buildings governed by U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The word 'building' used in Section 3 (a) of the Act is significant. Whenever the subject matter of dispute is a building which is governed by U.P. Act XIII of 1972, the dispute in relation to the said building, would be governed by the provisions of this Act and as such the heirs of the deceased would be those as mentioned in this Act. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 169 it has been observed as follows :- "In the absence of these conditions, the general statute is read as silently excluding from its operation the cases which have been provided for by the special 11. The principle would fully apply in the instant case. Since U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is special Act applicable to buildings to which the Act applies, it necessarily excludes the application of the general provisions contained in S. 2 (11) of the Civil P.C. In the circumstances, I do not find any force in the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 12. I am, therefore, of the opinion, that the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is well founded. The petitioners have no locus standi to file the present petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own Costs.