Sachar ( 1 ) [united India General Finance Co. was ordered to be wound up on 12. 8. 68. Appellant on 12. 6. 67 had asked Chowkidar of the Company to give a truck of the Company to respondent 2. Latter did not give any receipt and there was no record. O. L. on 9. 9. 69. asked respondent 2 about the position of the truck who did not care to reply until 13. 9. 72 when he took the stand that truck was never delievered to him. The date of denial about liability by appellant was 31. 5. 72. O. L. filed the claim application on 17. 10. 73. Appellant raised the contention that the claim was barred by time and claim could not be made against him U/s 446 of the Act. Single Judge held again him and he filed appeal]. After giving above facts, Judgment is : ( 2 ) MR Jain the learned counsel for the appellant challenges the finding of the learned Judge as to the applicablity of Section 10 of the Limitation Act, the contention being that the property of the Company that is the vehicle cannot be said to be vested in the Director. He has referred to the Bank of Multan Ltd. v. Hukam Chand (AIR 1923 Lahore 58 (2) ) which has held that the property is not vested in the company director and Section 10 of Limitation Act is not applicable. He also seeks aid from Mis. Brahmayya and Co. Official Liquidators Hanuman Bank Ltd. v. V. S. Ramaswami Aiyar AIR 1966 Madras 247 that the directors are not the trustees. We do not deem it necessary to decide this aspect of the case because as we shall presently show the claim was within time under Section 446 of the Act, as falling within Article 137 of Limitation Act and it is not necessary to invoke any other provision of the Limitation Act. For similar reasons also that we do not intend to decide about the applicability of Article 70 of the Limitation Act which finding was also challenged by Mr. Jain. ( 3 ) WE shall first deal with the question of limitation on the assumption that an application under Section 446 of the Act was maintainable. We are saying this because Mr. Jain. ( 3 ) WE shall first deal with the question of limitation on the assumption that an application under Section 446 of the Act was maintainable. We are saying this because Mr. Jain has contended and which contention we shall deal a little later that an application under Section 446 of the Act is not maintainable against the appellant. ( 4 ) NOW there is no specific article for an application to be moved before the Company Judge under Section 446 of the Act. Such a claim would therefore be under residuary Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act 1963, which provides for a period of three years for an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere. The time from which the period begins to run is "when the right to apply accrues". As mentioned already the date of winding up order is 12. 8. 1968. The claim application was filed on 17. 10. 1973. The learned Judge casually observed that even by applying Section 428a of the Companies Act the limitation would have expired apparently on the assumption that the starting period for limitation is at the latest the date of the winding up order i. e. 12. 8. 1968. The learned Judge obviously did not give any firm finding on this aspect because he was finding that the claims were within time either under Section 10 or Article 70 of the Schedule to Limitation Act. It seems to us however, that the claim was within time, as the right to apply laid down in Article 137 of Schedule to Limitation Act (which article is applicable) would only arise on 30. 9. 1972 so far as the respondent No. 2 is concerned and 31. 5. 1972 so far as the appellant is concerned, as there was no refusal by them to return the truck earlier to these dates. The claim application filed in 1973 would thus be well within time. If for example the right to apply had accured even prior to 1967 the result of winding up order would have been to exclude the period from the date of commencement of the winding up of the company to the date on which winding up order is passed and one year thereafter. But if as in the present case the right to apply accrued in 1972 the resort to Section 458a was not necessary. But if as in the present case the right to apply accrued in 1972 the resort to Section 458a was not necessary. Of course Mr. Jain contended that it was not correct to say that the right to apply accrued only in 1972. We cannot agree. In Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others ( AIR 1960 SC 335 ) it was held that "there can be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or" at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. " Applying the ratio of that case when can we say that the right to apply accrued. According to the facts found the vehicle was repossessed by the company on 25 4. 1965. The vehicle remained with the company till 12. 6. 1967. According to the appellant he directed the chowkidar to give this vehicle to respondent No. 2 for the purposes of selling it. There is nothing on record to show that at any time between 1967 and 12. 8. 1968 when the order of winding up was passed there was any denial by respondent No. 2 to return the vehicle or by the appellant dis-owning that the vehicle had been repossessed by the company or that the same had been given to respondent No. 2. The official liquidator who came on the scene wrote on 9. 9. 1969 to respondent No. 2 seeking information as to the position of the truck. No. reply was received from respondent No. 2 till 13. 9. 1972 Ex. R. 3 in which it took the stand that the sruck was not delivered to them, rather the stand taken was that the company had itself sold the truck. This letter no doubt indicated that respondent No. 2 was not accepting the liability for the truck and if the official liquidator wanted to proceed against them definitely a right to apply accrued from that date. There is nothing on record to show that earlier to this there is any thing in writing from respondent No. 2. As a matter of fact there was a total silence. The right to apply accrued on 13. 9. 72 and the claim filed was well within time qua them. ( 5 ) AS regards the appellant as per letter Ex. As a matter of fact there was a total silence. The right to apply accrued on 13. 9. 72 and the claim filed was well within time qua them. ( 5 ) AS regards the appellant as per letter Ex. P-4 dated 31. 5. 1972 the Official Liquidator wrote to the appellant pointing out that the truck was seized by the company and making a reference to letter dated 22. 5. 1971 written by the appellant to the effect that the vehicle was given to respondent No. 2 against the dues, but pointing out that the amount outstanding against the original hirer is still being shown as due and asking for clarifying the position. In Ex. P-5 to P-7 (June-August 1972) the letters written by the appellant to the Official Liquidator, the appellant kept on maintaing that the vehicle was given to respondent No. 2 but that he would make enquiries and give further details. Even if we exclude the subsequent letter Ex. P-5 to P-7 and hold that the right to apply accrued on 22. 5. 1971, (the date referred to in the letter dated 31. 51972) wherein the appellant had informed the official liquidator that the vehicle has been given to respondent No,. 2 against their dues, the present claim filed in October 1973 would be within time. There is no disavowal of liability by the appellant prior to 1971. Official Liquidator is making enquiries since 1969 and right to apply could only arise when disavowal is made and the earliest could be 22. 5. 1971. The question therefore of applying against the appellant could not arise earlier than May 1971. Calculating a period of three years from that date, the present claim would be within time against the appellant also. ( 6 ) THE next contention of Mr. Jain is that no proceedings can be held against the appellant under Section 446 of the Act. The learned Judge has accepted that the truck was handed over under the orders of appellant to respondent No. 2, this finding has not been disputed before us. Mr Jain however, would have it that once it was proved that the truck was handed over even by the appellant s order to respondent No. 2 the liability of the appellant was exhausted. We find that unacceptable. Mr Jain however, would have it that once it was proved that the truck was handed over even by the appellant s order to respondent No. 2 the liability of the appellant was exhausted. We find that unacceptable. Before the liability of the appellant could be discharged, he has to established - that the truck was given rightly to respondent No 2, and in pursuance of some right of respondent No. 2 to receive the truck. Now even (he appellant in his evidence explained that thetruck was given to respondent No. 2 as certain money was owed by the company and respondent No 2 was in a better position to sell the truck. He admitted that he was never told what had been done by respondent No. 2 about the proceeds of the truck. He also admitted that the legal owner of the truck was the company because the document of the truck had not been given to respondent No. 2. No doubt the respondent No. 2 denied having received the truck. But that finding is against them and Mr. Jain does not dispute that finding. The position is that the truck belonging to the company was given to respondent No. 2 under the orders of the appellant (no doubt order was countersigned by another Director ). The appellant was the Managing Director, under his orders the property of the company is given to respondent No. 2 who has not returned it or in lieu the proceeds of the truck that had been sold. In such circumstances we do not see how the appellant can escape the liability for the return of the truck or its equivalent. The truck was given away under the orders of the appellant. Even if no bad motive is attributed to the appellant as indeed it should not in view of the refusal by the learned Judge, to proceed against the appellant under Section 543 of the Act vide his order of 17. 5. 1974 the fact remains that the assets of the company namely the truck was in possession of the appellant. The mere fact that under orders of the appellant the truck was handed over to respondent No. 2 would not mean that the possession of the appellant in law would not continue. 5. 1974 the fact remains that the assets of the company namely the truck was in possession of the appellant. The mere fact that under orders of the appellant the truck was handed over to respondent No. 2 would not mean that the possession of the appellant in law would not continue. The authority of respondent No. 2 was derived from appellant and the latter cannot clear himself of this liability by fixing it solely on respondent No 2 Here the claim is straight forward one by the liquidator asking the appellant and respondent No. 2 to return the property of the company i e. the truck or its equivalent. The present is a claim like any other claim on a person who is possessed of the assets of a company but has no right to hold it. The explanation given by the appellant that the truck had been given to the respondent No. 2, if accepted has relevance only to prove that the appellant had not committed any fraudulent conduct so as to fall within Section 543 of the Act, But it cannot absolve the appellant of the liability to return the truck or its equivalent to the company. The liability on respondent No. 2 has also been correctly placed because respondent No. 2 did take the truck though under orders of the appellant and having no authority \to hold it is bound to return it. Therefore the claim against the appellant and respondent No. 2 has been rightly ordered by the learned single Judge. ( 7 ) MR. Jain s argument that once the truck had gone out of the hands of the appellant his liability ceases. We cannot agree. To take an illustration if it was found. that the truck was still in possession of the appellant can it be doubted that he would be liable to return it. If in that case the claim can be orderd against the appellant, we see no difference in the present case, where the truck is with respondent No. 2 under authority of the appellant. Passing it on to respondent No. 2 is still an act of the appellant and his liability to account for it would cotinue. ( 8 ) MR. Jain had also sought to contend that proceedings under section 446 cannot be maintained against a director. Passing it on to respondent No. 2 is still an act of the appellant and his liability to account for it would cotinue. ( 8 ) MR. Jain had also sought to contend that proceedings under section 446 cannot be maintained against a director. No precedent was cited for such a position nor is it supported on any principle of law. No doubt sections 477,542 and 543 of the companies Act empowers the court to proceed against the director and assess his liability for fraudulent conduct of the business, and no doubt benefit of section 543 for extended limitation is also available for proceeding against a director if he has misapplied any property of the company, it does not mean that if there is a claim for which limitation is still available by applying under section 446, this remedy is prohibited. Section 545 of the Act does not exclude moving against the Director under Section 446 of the Act. Both of them are not mutually exclusive. As to what provision would apply would depend on the facts of each case. To take an illustration, if an amount had been taken on loan from the company or some funds had been openly drawn by the ex-director before the passing of an order of winding up not for wrongful purposes but for legitimate purposes of the business of the company, but had not been returned out of sheer for getfulness or inadvertance and with no intention to misapply it or retain it wrongfully, there is no logic or rationality which prohibits the official liquidator, in the event of the refusal by the ex-director to return the amount to proceed against him under section 446 of the Companies Act. He does not have to nor indeed it may be possible to proceed against the ex-director under Section 543 of the Act, if no fraudulent conduct was alleged. Section 446 in terms applies to claims against every one. It is impossible to cut down the width of Section by excluding the directors from its ambit. This would be adding to the language of the statute, which is not permissible, unless the result was to lead to absurdity or anomaly, for which we find no basis. Section 446 in terms applies to claims against every one. It is impossible to cut down the width of Section by excluding the directors from its ambit. This would be adding to the language of the statute, which is not permissible, unless the result was to lead to absurdity or anomaly, for which we find no basis. We, therefore, would hold that the learned judge was right in directing the payment of amount against the appellant and respondent No. 2, though we have arrived at this conclusion by a different process of reasoning.