Judgment :- 1. The appellants are the defendants in a suit for recovery of amounts due under an anomalous mortgage (Vaide Illidarwar) dated 27-7-1919 by sale of the properties described in the A schedule to the plaint. 2. The properties originally belonged to one Narayana Kunikullaya, governed by the Hindu Mithakshara law. He died leaving his widow, Kaveri Amma, and two daughters, Seetharama and Gouramma, who are defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. The first defendant while yet a minor was married to one Sankaranarayana Analathaya (now deceased). The fourth defendant is the son of the first defendant and Sankaranarayana Analathya. The third defendant is the husband of the second defendant and the fifth defendant is their son. On 27-7-1919, Kaveri Amma for herself and as guardian of her minor daughter the second defendant and Sankaranarayana Analathya as the guardian of his wife, the first defendant, executed Ext. Al mortgage in favour of one Ramayya. As per the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagee was to pay amounts periodically at a stipulated rate to one Parvathi Ammal towards her maintenance. After her death the amount was to be paid to Kaveri Amma periodically. The mortgagee was to pay the surplus prof its at the rate mentioned in the document to Kaveri Amma towards her maintenance A term of 31 years is fixed in the mortgage. The mortgagors were to pay the principal mortgage amount and interest at the time of redemption or on demand by the mortgagee. The rights of Ramayya Alva, the mortgagee, were transferred to the plaintiff on 25-1-1932 as per Ext. A2. 3. Immediately after the mortgage, on 6-8-1919, a term lease was given to one Narayana Kunikullaya, a close relation of Kaveri Amma. Narayana Kunikullaya assigned his rights in favour of Sankaranarayana Analathaya and the third defendant. The lease was renewed on 19-7-1935 by the assignees in favour of the plaintiff as per Ext A4. Kaveri Amma and defendants 1 and 2 surrendered all their rights in favour of defendants 4 and 5, who were the reversionaries as per a release cum surrender deed dated 27-5-1953. On 5-2-1959, Sankaranarayana Analathaya and the third defendant assigned their leasehold right in the properties in favour of defendants 4 and 5. Defendants 4 and 5 thus got the entire equity of redemption and were in possession of the properties as lessees. On 5-2-1959, Sankaranarayana Analathaya and the third defendant assigned their leasehold right in the properties in favour of defendants 4 and 5. Defendants 4 and 5 thus got the entire equity of redemption and were in possession of the properties as lessees. The plaintiff filed O.S. No. 9 of 1962 against Kaveri Amma and defendants 1 to 3 for realisation of the mortgage money by sale of the properties without impleading defendants 4 and 5. The defendants therein contended that they had no right in the suit properties and that the properties had already come to vest with defendants 4 and 5. The plaintiff, however, did not choose to implead defendants 4 and 5 even afterwards. During the pendency of that suit Kaveri Amma and Sankaranarayana Analathya died. The fourth defendant was impleaded as the fifth respondent in the final decree proceedings, as the heir of Sankaranarayana Analathya. The fourth defendant contended that he was entitled to the properties in his individual capacity and that the preliminary decree was not binding on him in such capacity. The final decree was passed specifically reserving the individual rights of the fourth defendant. Thereafter, defendants 4 and 5 filed OS. No. 9 of 1962, contending that the decree in OS. No. 9 of 1962 had cast a cloud on their title, for a declaration that it was null and void and not binding on them. The suit was decreed on I2th March, 1971, holding that OS. No. 9 of 1962 for sale of the mortgage properties was null and void so far as it related to defendants 4 and 5 and their rights in the properties. It was thereafter that the plaintiff filed OS. No. 73 of 1973, from out of which the present appeal arises. 4. The plaintiff contended that since the mortgage deed fixed a term of 31 years and contained a recital that the money was payable only on demand by the mortgagee limitation commenced only from the date of demand. The demand, according to the plaintiff, was on 6111961 when the original of Ext. A6, registered notice, was sent on behalf of the plaintiff to Kaveri Amma. The suit having been filed within a period of 12 years was within time. Reference was also made to OS. The demand, according to the plaintiff, was on 6111961 when the original of Ext. A6, registered notice, was sent on behalf of the plaintiff to Kaveri Amma. The suit having been filed within a period of 12 years was within time. Reference was also made to OS. No 119 of 1968 filed by the plaintiff against defendants 3 to 5, wherein a decree was passed for arrears of rent against those defendants as lessees. The said decree was confirmed in appeal, AS. No. 28 of 1970. 5. The defendants, in their written statement, admitted the mortgage but denied that the cause of action arose only on 16111961 when a demand was made. According to them, Art.62 of the Limitation Act, which was relied on by the plaintiff, had no application. The suit, according to the defendants, was barred by 0 .11, R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The findings in OS No. 119 of 1968 and AS. No. 28 of 1970 were not res judicata or binding on the defendants as the Court which passed the decree in OS. No. 119 of 1968 was not competent to decide the issue regarding the lease. The suit, according to the defendants, was opposed to the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 and Act H of 1970. 6. The trial court held that the suit was maintainable, and there was no bar of res judicata. The court also held that limitation started only on a demand being made by the plaintiff for the mortgage money and since that demand was by virtue of the registered notice dated 6-11-1961 the suit was not barred by limitation. The court also held that the claims made in the suit were not opposed to the provisions of Act I of 1964 or Act 11 of 1970. A decree was accordingly passed for recovery of Rs. 9,924/-, including value of improvements. The plaintiff was also given a decree for her proportionate costs in the suit. It is this decree that is being challenged in the appeal. 7. Although several alternative contentions were raised in the appeal the main issue is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The trial court mainly relied on the provision in Ext. Al, the mortgage deed, relating to demand. It is this decree that is being challenged in the appeal. 7. Although several alternative contentions were raised in the appeal the main issue is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The trial court mainly relied on the provision in Ext. Al, the mortgage deed, relating to demand. The mortgage deed is in Kannada and a translation of the relevant portion has been extracted in the judgment of the trial court thus: "After the expiry of 31 years, when the principal mortgage amount and the value of improvements are ready in our hands or when you demand the amount from us, we will pay you the principal amount and the value of improvements effected by you as ascertained and fixed by some respectable persons and pay the entire amount on the charge of the undermentioned properties to you and redeem the mortgage and obtain a receipt from you evidencing repayment." The plaint proceeded on the footing that the transaction was an anomalous mortgage. As the defendants had no different case, the court also proceeded on the same footing. Under the mortgage there was a personal covenant to pay the amount secured and value of improvements and the mortgagee also is seen given a right to demand the amount, a charge being given for the said amounts. The trial court held that since the mortgage money was payable only on demand being made and this demand having been made only by the registered notice, Ext. A6, limitation started from the date of Ext. A6, viz., 6 11 1961 and the suit was not barred by limitation. The above reasoning is challenged. 8. The expression 'on demand' has been subjected to different treatment at the hands of the framers of the Limitation Act. Under Art.21 which deals with suits for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, and under Art.35, which deals with suits on a bill of exchange or promissory note, payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, limitation starts from the date of the loan or the document, as the case may be. On the other hand, under Art.22, in the case of a suit for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand limitation starts only when a demand is made. On the other hand, under Art.22, in the case of a suit for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand limitation starts only when a demand is made. There is distinction between a deposit and a loan. Unlike in the case of a loan a deposit is made for the benefit of the person who hands over the money and the principle that the debtor should seek the creditor has no application It would appear that under the scheme of the Limitation Act, wherever there is the element of a loan and the relationship of debtor and creditor limitation starts from the date of the transaction in spite of the use of the words 'on demand' unless of course a definite date is fixed for payment. Even in cases where a period is fixed for payment the amount becomes due or payable on the expiry of the term and not from the date of demand. In the case of a mortgage where there is an undertaking to pay there is the element of a loan and the relationship of debtor and creditor. In such cases, unless there are words to connote a different intention, mere use of the words 'on demand' is not sufficient to postpone the starting point of limitation. 9. Reference may in this connection be made to the decision in Venkataswami Chettiar v. Ramalingam, AIR. 1945 Madras 157. In that case the mortgage bond stipulated for payment of interest before 31st of March every year, and also that the principal amount and outstanding interest would be paid whenever required by the creditor. The question arose as to the interpretation of the words 'whenever required', and, it was argued, that the cause of action on the bond arose only when a demand was made. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, however, rejected the contention, after a review of the decisions on the point. The Full Bench observed as follows: "Without hesitation we accept as being correct the decisions of this Court which say that when a mortgage bond provides that the mortgage money shall be payable on demand it becomes repayable at once and limitation starts from the date of the bond. The question then is whether the position is altered when the words used are "when required by you" or "whenever demanded". In our judgment such expressions mean "on demand". The question then is whether the position is altered when the words used are "when required by you" or "whenever demanded". In our judgment such expressions mean "on demand". They are usually literal translations of words used in bonds written in the vernacular, the vernacular expression being intended to convey the same meaning as the English expression "on demand". We consider that there must be something more in a mortgage deed than this to justify the Court in holding that the cause of action on the bond only arises when a demand has in fact been made." 10. A similar question arose in the decision in Narayana Chettiar v. Rangaswamy Naidu, 1968(2) MLJ. 445. The mortgage in that case was a combination of a simple mortgage and an usufructuary mortgage, i, e., a possessory mortgage containing a personal covenant for payment. On the date of the mortgage itself the mortgaged properties were leased by the mortgagee to the mortgagor for a period of five years. The mortgagee demanded the mortgage money from the mortgagor 32 years after the execution of the mortgage deed. The question arose as to whether the suit was barred. The Court referred to the decision in Venkataswami Chettiar v. Ramalingam, AIR. 1945 Madras 157 and also the decision in Secretary of State for India v. Prasad Bapuli, (1923) ILR 46 Madras 259, and held that the words 'when you demand' were at the most mere words carrying no specific import. In the case of a usufructuary mortgage cum simple mortgage, the expression emphasises the personal covenant, and provides the right to demand the money. It was also held that the money became due from the standpoint of the mortgagee to sue for sale, on the expiry of the period of five years. 11. The same principle applies in the instant case. The terms of Ext. Al clearly indicate a debtor and auditor relationship and payment of amounts by way of plan.The mortgage deed, Ext. Al, fixed a period of 31 years. That period expired on 27-7-1950. It was upto the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage if he so required or to the mortgagee to sue for the sale of the mortgaged properties to recover the debt on any date subsequent to 27-7-1950. Al, fixed a period of 31 years. That period expired on 27-7-1950. It was upto the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage if he so required or to the mortgagee to sue for the sale of the mortgaged properties to recover the debt on any date subsequent to 27-7-1950. In other words, since a demand could be made as soon as money became payable limitation started from the date when the amount became due. The trial court was wrong in holding that money became due only on 6-11-1961 whin a registered notice demanding the amount was made. If the mortgagee could make a demand for the mortgage money at any time after 31 years it follows that the suit for, recovery of the amount would get barred after 12 years from the date of the expiry of the term of 31 years. The suit Cor sale of the mortgage property in the instant case having been filed long after the expiry of 12 years after the term of 31 years, is barred by limitation. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that the document sued for being an Illidarwar, the transaction came under the purview of S.10 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and that by virtue of S.111-A of that Act the mortgage money is not liable to be returned. But, in view of the fact that the suit for recovery of the mortgage money is barred by limitation we need not consider the above aspect. 13. A contention was raised that the respondent is entitled to exclusion of the period during which O. S. No. 9 of 1962 was pending, under S.14 of the Limitation Act. But the appellants were not parties to the previous suit. The fact that they were not impleaded even after the omission was pointed out by defendants 1 to 3 shows lack of good faith. S.14 has, therefore, no application. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the decree of the trial court decreeing the suit. The suit will stand dismissed. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in both the courts. Allowed. Counsel for the respondent in the appeal has made an oral application tor certificate for leave to appeal to Supreme Court under Art.134A of the Constitution. The suit will stand dismissed. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in both the courts. Allowed. Counsel for the respondent in the appeal has made an oral application tor certificate for leave to appeal to Supreme Court under Art.134A of the Constitution. No substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in this case. Hence leave refused. Leave refused.