Judgment This revision is directed against the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Narsapur, in M.C.No. 1 of 1978. The brief facts leading to the impugned order are as follows: The Inspector of Police, Bhimavaram, laid information on 11th May, 1978 in Crime No. 115 of 1978 under section 145 , Criminal Procedure Code, before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Narsapur requesting him. for passing an order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, restraining the A and B parties as there is apprehension of breach of peace that might be caused at the Ramakrishna Prakruti Ashramam premises, Bhimavaram. Taking into consideration the information laid by the Inspector of Police, and also the circumstances, that the likelihood of breach of peace that might break out in view of the dispute in respect of the said building, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed orders on 4th May, 1978 in M.C. No. 1 of 1978 and restrained both the parties from interfering into the double storeyed building bearing Nos. 10, 12, 61 and 27 of Gunupudi Revenue Village of Bhimavaram Municipal area corresponding to the part of Ramakrishna Prakruthi Ashramam, Bhimavaram under dispute pending disposal of the petition. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate also felt it desirable in the interests of justice to attach the Schedule property under section 146(1) of Criminal Procedure Code pending disposal of the petition, and so holding he appointed Sri M. Rambabu, M.A., LL.B., Tahsildar, Bhimavaram, as Official Receiver, under section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, to safeguard the interests of the property under dispute and directed him (the Receiver appointed to take possession of the Schedule property) at once for looking after it pending receipt of further orders. On 11th day of May, 1978, Sri P. V. Bhaskararao, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Narsapur, was succeeded by Sri A. K. Goel, I. A. S. Before him the Counsel for A and B parties filed counters claiming their respective rights. Then the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, heard the arguments of both sides and held that when once that property which is the subject-matter of the proceedings, was attached by the Court that Court is precluded from deciding the rights of the property as per the decision reported in Ramndran v. Rugmini Amma and others1 and that it is the civil Court that has to decide the rights of the parties, and directed both the parties to get their respective rights (as) adjudicated in the civil Court. He also directed that the receiver appointed by that Court to continue in possession of the said property till another receiver is appointed by a competent civil Court. 2. Aggrieved with this order, the present revision is filed by A party. 3. Sri Adinarayana Raju, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that there is an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in Mathurlal v. Bhanwarlal2 which laid down, that in case of emergency, a Magistrate can attach the property, at any time, after making preliminary order, and there is no express stipulation in section 145 (1) , Criminal Procedure Code, and that jurisdiction of the Magistrate for proceeding into enquiry under section 145 (4) ends with the attachment, and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is, therefore, empowered to proceed with the enquiry under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, and pass necessary orders after due enquiry into the respective claims of both hearing the parties, and the impugned order, therefore, is not correct, and in view of the above said Supreme Court decision, the decision relied upon by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is no more good law. As against this contention Sri Venkateswara Rao, learned Counsel for the B party respondent contends that the Supreme Court decision in Mathurlal v. Bhanwarlal2 is not applicable to the facts of this rase. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is justified in directing the parties to get their respective claims adjudicated by a competent civil Court. 4. From the facts) narrated above, it is clear that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Narsapur, after being satisfied with the circumstances that there is likelihood of breach of peace being caused by the interested parties on account of the dispute in respect of the property in question and hence felt it desirable to appoint the Tahsildar, Bbimavararn, as Receiver under section 146 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, and restrained both the parties from entering into the property in question. It is further clear that both A and B parties submitted their respective claims before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Then the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate took up the matter for enquiry and heard the arguments on both sides. It is further clear that both A and B parties submitted their respective claims before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Then the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate took up the matter for enquiry and heard the arguments on both sides. After hearing the arguments on both sides, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate felt that after the order of attachment was made and a receiver was appointed, he need not proceed with the enquiry into the question as to which party was in possession of the land in dispute, except referring both the parties to a civil Court to get their respective claims adjudicated by a competent civil Court. 5. This order of the Magistrate is undoubtedly vitiated with illegality. A careful reading of the provisions of sections 145 and 146 makes it abundantly clear that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction, on being, satisfied that the dispute in respect of the actual possession of the land is likely to cause breach of peace and on passing the preliminary order under sub- section (1) of section 145, to proceed with the enquiry for giving the decision as to which of the parties was in actual possession by the date of the preliminary order. Sub- section (4) of section 145 enjoins the Magistrate to peruse written statements of the party and to receive the evidence adduced by them and decide as to which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. After passing the preliminary order under section 145(1) and before proceeding with the enquiry under section 145 (4) , if the Magistrate considers that it is a case of emergency, he is given the power under section 146 to attach the property and pass an order of attachment. This is one stage when an order of attachment can be passed under section 146. After attaching the property, the Magistrate proceeds with the enquiry under section 145(4). As a result of his enquiry, if the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that a particular party was in actual physical possession of the land by the date of the preliminary order, the Magistrate gives declaration under section 145(6) to that effect. When such a declaration was made in favour of the particular party, the attachment need not be continued, as there would be no longer any likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of the dispute. When such a declaration was made in favour of the particular party, the attachment need not be continued, as there would be no longer any likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of the dispute. The Magistrate, therefore, raises the attachment, so that the party in whose favour the declaration under section 145(6) was made should be restored to possession. If, from the enquiry, the Magistrate is unable to decide which of the parties was in possession of the property or is of the opinion that neither party was in possession, the Magistrate can continue the attachment. There is yet another stage when the Magistrate can pass an order of, attachment under section 146. If the Magistrate, after passing preliminary order, considers that there is no emergency, though the dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists, the Magistrate shall not pass order of attachment under section 146, but proceeds with the enquiry to determine as to which party was in possession by the date of the preliminary order. If he is unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession or if he is of the view that neither party was in possession, then the Magistrate can pass an order of attachment under section 146. It is, therefore, clear that the attachment can also be ordered in the circumstances stated above even after enquiry. The two stages at which the order of attachment can be passed should be understood by a combined reading of the provisions of sections 145 and146. These provisions should not, therefore, be considered disjunctively. There is no express stipulation under section 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed with the enquiry under section 145(4) ends with the attachment nor is it implied. Thus it is clear that the Magistrate's jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry does not cease at all, even though the attachment has been ordered on the ground of emergency immediately after the preliminary order has been passed. 6. There has been divergence of views on this question amongst various High Courts. But the Supreme Court finally set at rest the controversy in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik1. Before I deal with this decision of the Supreme Court, I would like to deal with the views expressed by the several High Courts and also earlier decision of the Supreme Court. 7. But the Supreme Court finally set at rest the controversy in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik1. Before I deal with this decision of the Supreme Court, I would like to deal with the views expressed by the several High Courts and also earlier decision of the Supreme Court. 7. In Ravindran v.Rugmini Amma2the learned single Judge of Kerala High Court held that by virtue of the changes introduced by the new Code, the Magistrate has no power to attach the property in dispute pending decision by himself as to who was in possession on the date of the preliminary order and if he considers the case to be one of emergency, he may attach the property and once he attaches the property, it is only a competent civil Court which can determine the rights of the parties and the person entitled to the possession of the property. 8. This decision is followed by the learned Magistrate in the impugned order. 9. A Division Bench of Gauhati High Court took a different view in Thokchom Khoyon Singh v. M. Bira Singh3on this point. In that case the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145 (1) of the Code after he had asked the parties to appear before him and put in their respective written statements. On 18th May, 1974, the learned Magistrate passed orders attaching the disputed land. Both the parties led evidence after filing the written statements. The Magistrate on the material placed before him passed final order under section 145 (6) declaring the second party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction. Aggrieved with the said order, the first party filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, Manipur and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Manipur, to whom the case transferred accepted the revision taking the view that the Magistrate, has no jurisdiction to continue and finally decided the proceeding under section 145(6) of the Code after attachment of the disputed land under section 146 (1) of the Code. He did not consider the case on merits. The second party therefore came upon in revision before the High Court. He did not consider the case on merits. The second party therefore came upon in revision before the High Court. The learned Judges held that in substance and in effect a proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is primarily concerned with the prevention of breach of peace by declaring party in possession and found to be entitled to remain in possession until eviction therefrom in due course of law. The provisions of sections 145 and146 of the Code are intended to achieve the object which is paramount in such a proceeding. Because of this, the Magistrate is invested with jurisdiction to withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject-matter of the dispute. Even after attachment, the Magistrate therefore, in the first instance is to try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the provisions of section 145 of the Code. In case he is able to declare possession on the material before him, he would do so, and in that event he is to pass final order under section 145(6) of the Code. The Magistrate then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with the proviso to sub- section (1) of section 146 of the Code. The learned Judges finally held that the Magistrate does not become functus officio, and he has jurisdiction to continue and finally decide the proceeding under section 145(6) of the Code even after attachment of the disputed land under section 146 (1) of the Code, considering the case to be one of emergency. 10. The Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Appeal No. 54 of 1977 dated 25th March, 1977 has also occasion to consider the same question. In that case the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145 (1) of the Code on 29th July, 1975 asking the parties to appear before him and put in their written statements. On the same date, however, he attached the disputed property under section 146 (1) of the Code. The Appellants put in their written statements on the 2nd August, 1975. Thereafter the case was heard by the Magistrate from time to time. In the meantime the Maharashtra Vacant Land (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975, came into force. On the same date, however, he attached the disputed property under section 146 (1) of the Code. The Appellants put in their written statements on the 2nd August, 1975. Thereafter the case was heard by the Magistrate from time to time. In the meantime the Maharashtra Vacant Land (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975, came into force. The Act was passed to prohibit unauthorised occupation of vacant lands in the urban area of the State of Maharashtra and to provide for summary eviction of persons from such lands. The competent authority under the Act was empowered under section 4 to evict persons from unauthorised occupation of vacant lands. The Magistrate in his order dated 21st January, 1977 passed in the proceeding aforementioned took the view that in view of section 8 of the Act, he ceased to have jurisdiction to proceed with the case inasmuch as he-will have to order eviction of the appellants from the disputed property if the case of the respondent was found to be true. The appellant filed a revision in the Bombay High Court from the said order of the Magistrate but failed. The High Court agreed with the view taken by the Magistrate and dismissed the revision. Then an appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. This is the subject-matter of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandu v. Sitaram1the Supreme Court held that in substance and in effect a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is not for the purpose of evicting any person from any land but is primarily concerned with the prevention of the breach of the peace by declaring the party found in possession to be entitled to remain in possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law. Their Lordships examined the proviso to sub- section (4) of section 145 and also sub- section (6). Their Lordships examined the proviso to sub- section (4) of section 145 and also sub- section (6). Their Lordships observed that the restoration of possession to the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed attracting the proviso to sub- section (4) is, in substance and in effect, putting back the party to possession for deciding his possession on the date of the preliminary order made under sub- section (1), and that although the party who forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed the other party attracting the application of the proviso to sub- section (4) of section 145 of the Code has to be factually and physically evicted from the property, by a legal fiction it is only for the purpose of treating him in possession on the date of the preliminary order, and hence the Courts below were wrong in their view that the proceeding abated and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to dispose it of. As the proceeding did not abate it has to be disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of law contained in sections 145 and146 of the Code. Their Lordships felt it expedient in the interests of justice for the guidance of the Magistrate to indicate briefly as to how the Magistrate is to proceed for disposing of the proceeding. The Magistrate, in the first instance will try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the various provisions of section 145 of the Code. If he is able to declare the possession of either party on consideration of the evidence adduced or to be adduced before him he would do so. In that event the other party will be forbidden from creating any disturbance of the possession (including the deemed possession in case the application of the proviso to sub- section (4) is found necessary) of the party declared in possession. The Magistrate, then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with the proviso to sub- section (1) of section 146, because, as per his order declaring a party in possession there would be no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The party not found in possession by the Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if, any, elsewhere. The party not found in possession by the Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if, any, elsewhere. If, however, the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the order made under sub- section (1) of section 145 or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in possession of the subject of dispute he need not lift the attachment until a competent Court had determined the rights of the parties as provided for in section 146(1). In such a situation recourse, if necessary, may be taken to sub- section (2) of section 146 of the Code either by the Magistrate or a civil Court, as the case may be. 11. In Mathurlal v. Bhanwarlal1 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have exained the same question with reference to the divergent decisions of the various High Courts on this aspect, and also the above cited ruling of the Supreme Court and clarified the legal position on this question whether the Magistrate becomes functus officio after passing an order of attachment on the ground of emergency, and whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction to proceed with enquiry inspite of the orders of attachment. In that case also there was a dispute between Mathurlal and Bhanwarlal concerning a house, and the dispute was likely to cause breach of peace and hence the Station House Officer, laid information before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ratlam. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Code on 1st March, 1978. On 2nd March, 1978, Magistrate attached the property subject of dispute under section 146(1) considering the case to be one of emergency. Thereafter the learned Magistrate wanted to proceed with the enquiry under section 145 , Criminal Procedure Code, then an objection was raised by Mathurlal that such an enquiry was incompetent once the subject of the dispute had been attached under section 146, Criminal Procedure Code. The objection was overruled by the learned Magistrate. Successive Revisions taken before the Sessions Judge and the High Court having borne no fruit, Mathurlal has filed the present appeal by special leave of the Supreme Court. The High Court thought that the matter was concluded against the appellant by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik2. Successive Revisions taken before the Sessions Judge and the High Court having borne no fruit, Mathurlal has filed the present appeal by special leave of the Supreme Court. The High Court thought that the matter was concluded against the appellant by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik2. Before their Lordships, Sri Mukherji the learned Counsel for the appellant, urged that under section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, an attachment of the subject of dispute could be affected in three situations; ( i) if the Magistrate at any time after making the order under section 145 (1) considered the case to be one of emergency, or ( ii) if he decided that none of the parties was then in such possession as was referred to in section 145, or (iii) if the was unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute. The attachment to be effected, regardless of the situation consequent upon which it was effected, was to subsist until a competent Court determined the rights of the parties with regard to the person entitled to possession. According to him, that when once the attachment was effected it was the civil Court and not Magistrate that has further jurisdiction in the matter. Speaking for the Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J., observed: “Though at first flush there appeared to be force in the submissions of Shri Mukherji, a closer scrutiny of the provisions of sections 145 and 146 exposes their unsoundness. It may perhaps be desirable; at this stage to extract the provisions of sections 145 and146, to the extent that they are relevant”. The learned Judge extracted the relevant provisions, and then he observed: “Quite obviously, sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code, together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If. section 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of section 145 it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. If. section 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of section 145 it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But section 146 cannot be so separated from section 145. It can only be read in the context of section 145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise it may mislead. That is one of the first principles of construction. Let us therefore look at section 145 and consider section 146 in that context. section 145 contemplates, first, the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or their boundaries, and, next, the issuance of an order, known to lawyers practising in the criminal Courts as a Preliminary Order, stating the grounds of his satisfaction and requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. A preliminary order is considered so basic to a proceeding under section 145 that a failure to draw up a preliminary order has been held by several High Courts to vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. It is by making a preliminary order that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to proceed under sections 145 and146. In fact, the first of the situations in which an attachment may be effected under section 146 of the 1973 Code has to be “at any time after making the order under sub- section (1) of section 145 “. While the other two situations have, necessarily, to be at the final stage of the proceeding initiated by the preliminary order. Now, the preliminary order is required to enjoin the parties not only to appear before the Magistrate on a specified date but also to put in their written statements. Sub- section (3) of section 145 prescribes the mode of service of the preliminary order on the parties. Now, the preliminary order is required to enjoin the parties not only to appear before the Magistrate on a specified date but also to put in their written statements. Sub- section (3) of section 145 prescribes the mode of service of the preliminary order on the parties. Sub section (4) casts a duty on the Magistrate to peruse the written statements of the parties, to receive the evidence adduced by them, to take further evidence if necessary and, if possible, to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the prehminary order. If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was in possession he is to make a final order in the manner provided by sub- section (6). Provision for the two situations where the Magistrate is unable to decide which of the parties was in possession or where he is of the view that neither of them was in possession is made in section 146 under which he may attach the subject of dispute until the determination of the rights of parties by a competent Court. The scheme of sections 145 and146 is that the Magistrate, on being satisfied about the existence of the dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, issues a preliminary order stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements. Then he proceeds to peruse the statements, to receive and to take evidence and to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. On the other hand if he is unable to decide who was in such possession or if he is of the view that none of the parties was in such possession he may say so. If he decides that one of the parties was in possession, he declares the possession of such party. In the other two situations he attaches the property. Thus a proceeding begun with a preliminary order must be followed up by an enquiry and end with the Magistrate deciding in one of three ways and making consequential orders. There is no half-way house, there is no question of stopping in the middle and leaving the parties to go to the civil Court. Thus a proceeding begun with a preliminary order must be followed up by an enquiry and end with the Magistrate deciding in one of three ways and making consequential orders. There is no half-way house, there is no question of stopping in the middle and leaving the parties to go to the civil Court. Proceeding may however be stopped at any time if one or other of the parties satisfies the Magistrate that there has never been or there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, if there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the foundation for jurisdiction of the Magistrate disappears. The Magistrate then cancels the preliminary order. This is provided by section 145, sub- section (5). Except for the reason that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and as provided by section 145 (5) , a proceeding initiated by a preliminary order under section 145 (1) must run its full course. Now, in a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order. This is the first of the situations provided in section 145(1) in which an attachment may be effected. There is no express stipulation in section 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it, the obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by section 145, sub- section (4) is against any such implication. Suppose a Magistrate draws up a preliminary order under section 145 (1) and immediately follows it up with an attachment under section 145(1) the whole exercise of stating the grounds of his satisfication and calling: upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements becomes futile if he is to have no further jurisdiction in the matter. And yet he cannot make an order of attachment under section 145(1) on the ground of emergency without first making a preliminary order in the manner prescribed by section 145(1). There is no reason why we should adopt a construction which will lead to such inevitable constructions. And yet he cannot make an order of attachment under section 145(1) on the ground of emergency without first making a preliminary order in the manner prescribed by section 145(1). There is no reason why we should adopt a construction which will lead to such inevitable constructions. We mentioned a little earlier that the only provision for stopping the only proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in section 145(5) and it can only be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of section 145(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace …… In our view, it is wrong to hold that the Magistrate's jurisdiction ends as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency”. 12. This ruling of the Supreme Court dispels all doubts on this aspect, as it authoritatively lays down that it is wrong to hold that the Magistrate's Jurisdiction ends as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. The very fact that the emergency involved in the case requires attachment under section 145(1) makes it abundantly clear that the dispute is likely to cause breach of peace and hence the Magistrate should proceed with enquiry and give a decision as to which of the parties has been in possession of the property in dispute. The Magistrate does not become functus officio merely because the attachment was ordered in view of the emergency. Since this decision of the Supreme Court set at rest all the controversy on this aspect, the decision on which the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate relied upon for holding that the Magistrate has become functus officio and cannot proceed with the enquiry is no longer a good law as it can be deemed to have been impliedly overruled. 13. Haying regard to the aforesaid discussion. I find myself unable to agree with the contentions raised by Sri Venkateswara Rao, the learned Counsel for the B party respondent. Hence the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Narsapur, is set aside and he is directed to proceed with the enquiry in the light of the above cited ruling of the Supreme Court on the material placed before him. 14. Hence the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Narsapur, is set aside and he is directed to proceed with the enquiry in the light of the above cited ruling of the Supreme Court on the material placed before him. 14. In the result, the revision is allowed. Revision allowed.