JUDGMENT K. Kishore, Member - This is a revision under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act against the order of the Addl. Commissioner, Bareilly, dated August 13, 1979, confirming the order dated May 17, 1978 passed by the Naib Tahsildar, in a mutation case. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Kulvendra Singh and Sukhraj Singh applied for mutation over the land in dispute in place of Madan Lal on the basis of a sale deed executed in their favour. The Naib Tahsildar vide his order dated August 16, 1977 allowed mutation as prayed for. On April 13, 1978 Madan Lal vendor, moved an application for setting aside the ex parte order. On May 17, 1978, the Naib Tahsildar set aside the ex parte order and restored the case to its original number. The Collector, Pilibhit vide his order dated January 16, 1978 dismissed the appeal. Sukhraj Singh, being aggrieved by this order of the Collector went up in revision to the Additional Commissioner, Bareilly, who upheld the order dated May 17, 1978 passed by the Naib Tahsildar, giving rise to the present revision. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the order dated August 16, 1977 should not have been set aside without notice to the revisionist in whose favour the order dated August 16, 1977 was passed. He further submitted that the restoration application was moved after the expiry of the limitation period; therefore, without condoning delay the ex parte order should not have been set aside. According to him, the order suffers from illegality, warranting revisional interference. 4. The learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that Madan Lal had no knowledge about the proceedings and the order dated August 16, 1977 was passed, behind his back and that for the first time he came to know about the order only oh April 11, 1978; therefore, the restoration application was moved on April 13, 1978. According to him, there was no delay on his part needing condonation. The learned counsel argued that Madan Lal, the alleged vendor, was a necessary party and that a copy of the proclamation should have been served upon him, and this was net done. According to him, there was no delay on his part needing condonation. The learned counsel argued that Madan Lal, the alleged vendor, was a necessary party and that a copy of the proclamation should have been served upon him, and this was net done. The learned counsel also argued that the alleged sale deed was executed by an imposter and that Madan Lal did not execute the sale deed in question. According to him, the courts below had passed a correct order which did not need interference. 5. I have considered the matter carefully and gone through the record of the case. The whole mischief arises from Naib Tahsildar"s ex parte order dated August 16, 1977 granting mutation to the revisionist behind the back of the recorded tenure holder and the alleged vendor Madan Lal. In passing this order the Naib Tahsildar did not exercise proper care. It was imperative on his pan to comply with the requirements of Fara A-376 of the Revenue Court Manual and ensure that a copy of the proclamation was served on the recorded tenure holder and the alleged vendor Madan Lal. I find from the record that a copy of the proclamation was not served on Madan Lal. The order dated August 16, 1977 thus vitiates. The proceedings came to life again with Madan Lal's application dated April 13, 1978 wherein he asserted that he had no knowledge of the proceedings wherein the order had been passed in favour of the opposite parties. He stated that he had not executed the sale deed. He further submitted that he had no knowledge of the proceedings concerning him and his holding prior to April 11, 1978. The Naib Tahsildar, perhaps realised the latches in the order dated August 16, 1971, and restored the case. In rectifying the mistakes committed earlier, hie court unwittingly compounded them by not recounting the reasons for restoring the case which put the revisionist on the route to appeal and revision. It was argued on behalf of the revisionist that the order dated May 17, 1978 should not have been passed without notice to the revisionist. This is not a valid argument. In his order dated May 17, 1978, the Naib Tahsildar had categorically stated that both the parties were present. 6. It was argued on behalf of the revisionist that the order dated May 17, 1978 should not have been passed without notice to the revisionist. This is not a valid argument. In his order dated May 17, 1978, the Naib Tahsildar had categorically stated that both the parties were present. 6. Another argument which was vehemently pressed was that the application dated April 13, 1978 made by Madan Lal was in flagarant breach of the limitation period prescribed in Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act, that no application for condonation of delay as envisaged by Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act duly supported by an affidavit had been made, that court did not pass any specific order regarding limitation. In his application dated April 13, 1978, Madan Lal had merely asserted that he had no earlier knowledge of the proceedings. It has to be accepted that the limitation period prescribed in Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act was breached, that the requirements of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act were not fulfilled, that the Naib Tahsildar had not specifically condoned the delay in passing the order dated May 17, 1978. In my view the question of limitation in these proceedings is not vital in view of the inherent and incurable defect from which the Naib Tahsildar's order dated August 16, 1977 suffers. It was the duty of the court to specifically inform the recorded tenure holder and the vendor about the proceedings. Had this been done and had Madan Lal absented himself despite notice, the Naib Tahsildar's order dated August 17, 1977 would have prevailed. This order, hit by basic demerits, cannot be said to have conferred irrevocable rights on the revisionist. It also does not have the effect of banishing Madan Lal out of the court when he had ample interest in the land in suit and there was a palpable defect in the service of the proclamation. R.D. 1974 page 32 applies. On the question of limitation, Section 200 and 201 of the Land Revenue Act have to be carefully perused. Section 200 empowers the court to pass ex parte orders where the party to such proceedings "neglects to attend on the date specified in the summon". Although Madan Lal was a party to these proceedings, no summon was ever served upon him and, therefore, no neglect can possibly be attributed to him. Section 200 empowers the court to pass ex parte orders where the party to such proceedings "neglects to attend on the date specified in the summon". Although Madan Lal was a party to these proceedings, no summon was ever served upon him and, therefore, no neglect can possibly be attributed to him. Section 201 empowers the court making an order of re-hearing on proof of good cause for non-appearance. The party against whom the ex parte order was passed has to satisfy justice, within 15 days of such order communicated to him, or after any process for to the court that there had keen failure of enforcing the judgment has been executed. In these proceedings, there is nothing on record to show that order dated August 16, 1977 was ever conveyed to Madan Lal. The court was satisfied that there had been a failure of justice whereupon the proceedings were revived. Madan Lal in his application dated April 13, 1978 specifically stated that he had no knowledge of these proceedings prior to April 11, 1978. There is nothing on record to show that this assertion is invalid or incorrect. In these circumstances, the limitation period envisaged in Section 201 would accrue with effect from April 11, 1978, which is the date of knowledge on the part of Madan Lal. 7. I would also observe that where the case is revised, and on ex parte order set aside in exercise of powers vested in the court under Section 200 and 201 of the Act the court should take pains to record the manner in which the ingredients of these provisions of law have been fulfilled. Any order so passed shall be deemed to be an interlocutory order which would not warrant appellate or revisional interference. 8. In view of the foregoing analysis, the revision is without force and is dismissed. Naib Tahsildar's order dated May 17, 1978 will stand.