ORDER S.D. Agrawal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under S. 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioner is the tenant while respondent No. 3 is the landlord. The property in dispute is a shop, which is used as a show room by the petitioner. The petitioner is carrying on the business of wood carving. 2. Respondent No. 3 had moved an application for release on the ground that he has three grown-up sons, who have learnt tailoring and are of marriageable age and as such they need the shop in dispute for starting their business of tailoring. The application was initially rejected by the prescribed authority on 9th January, 1974. Against the said judgment an appeal was filed by opposite party No. 3 before the District Judge, Saharanpur. The appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded against by the appellate authority for decision afresh. Two particular aspects were stressed by the District Judge in the remand order, firstly it should be ascertained as to how much accommodation was available to respondent No. 3 in the rented shop and whether his sons also can work in that shop. The second aspect was that the petitioner has a small room in his factory and it had to be ascertained whether that small room can be used as a show room by the petitioner. The District Judge had further observed that adjacent to the shop in dispute was another shop belonging to respondent No. 3, half portion of which was found vacant. The order of the District Judge is dated 7th November, 1976. 3. After remand the Prescribed Authority again dismissed the release application on 30th November, 1977. Against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 30th November, 1977 respondent No. 3 again filed an appeal before the District Judge, Saharanpur. The appeal was allowed and the property was directed to be released by judgment dated 12th March, 1980. Against the said judgment the present petition has been filed in this Court. 4. Against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 30th November, 1977 respondent No. 3 again filed an appeal before the District Judge, Saharanpur. The appeal was allowed and the property was directed to be released by judgment dated 12th March, 1980. Against the said judgment the present petition has been filed in this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the findings recorded by the lower appellate authority are vitiated in law firstly because the finding of bona fide need is vitiated on the ground that the lower appellate authority considered the question of bona fide need on the assumption that in case the landlord desired to get the shop adjacent to the shop in dispute released he will have to move an application for release in respect of the entire shop. Secondly the submission of the learned counsel is that so far as the finding in regard to the hardship is concerned the lower appellate court has erred in holding that no show room is required in case a person is an exporter. This irrelevant consideration, according to the learned counsel, has vitiated the finding recorded by the lower appellate authority. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. In my opinion the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are well founded. 6. From the inspection note of the District Judge, Saharanpur, dated 12th November, 1976, which is Annexure 3 to the petition, it is clear that the District Judge had found that the adjacent shop is also owned by respondent No. 3, landlord. This shop has got two doors and four 'khans'. One portion of the said shop is being used for running parchooni business by another tenant. The other portion of the said shop was found vacant. The District Judge in his remand order dated 17th November, 1976 had, therefore, directed that this question be also considered by the Prescribed Authority when the question of the need of the landlord is being considered. By the impugned order the District Judge has accepted the bona fide need of respondent No. 3 brushing aside this important circumstance on the ground that if a portion of the adjacent shop was vacant respondent No. 3 would have to file an application for release of the entire shop. This view expressed in the impugned order is manifestly erroneous in law. 7. This view expressed in the impugned order is manifestly erroneous in law. 7. S. 21 of the Act clearly provides that the Prescribed Authority may on an application of a landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any 'specified part thereof (emphasis (hereinto) added. The Act has now given a right to the landlord to apply for even a part of the accommodation under the tenancy of a tenant. In the circumstances it was open to respondent No. 3 to apply for the release of a portion of the shop adjacent to the shop in dispute which was lying vacant. The finding in regard to the bona fide need recorded in the impugned order is, therefore, clearly vitiated and the findings recorded by the lower appellate authority require re-consideration in a proper perspective. 8. It is settled law that if a landlord has more than one accommodation the landlord cannot be compelled to choose one particular accommodation and to apply for the release of the same and it is always open to the landlord to select any of the accommodations for his own use. This is not an absolute proposition. The choice which has to be exercised by the landlord cannot be an arbitrary choice. The choice has to be based on reasonable grounds. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, as I have already observed above, the portion of the adjacent shop, which is as large as the shop in dispute itself, is lying vacant. In such a situation respondent No. 3 could have reasonably applied for release of the portion of the adjacent shop, which was lying vacant and not apply for the release of the shop in dispute by dislodging a tenant, who is already carrying on business in the said shop. The observations made, to the contrary, in the impugned order are therefore, not sound in law. 9. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, by the impugned order the District Judge has rejected the case of the petitioner on the ground that since the petitioner is an exporter he does not require any show room. This also is a wholly irrelevant consideration. 9. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, by the impugned order the District Judge has rejected the case of the petitioner on the ground that since the petitioner is an exporter he does not require any show room. This also is a wholly irrelevant consideration. Any person may be doing export business but that does not mean that he does not require a show room at all. The business which the petitioner is carrying on is wood carving business. Wood carving is a small scale industry of repute in the district of Saharanpur. Small wooden carved articles are prepared in such an industry and in order that a person may be able to properly carry on business a show room may be required to exhibit the article prepared by a particular business house. This also will depend upon the nature of the articles manufactured by the petitioner. The absolute proposition laid down in the impugned order that merely because a person is an exporter he does not require a show room is manifestly a wrong assumption. It may be that in the instant case the petitioner may have sufficient accommodation for his show room in the accommodation already in his occupation but that is a matter which requires consideration by the court on the evidence on record and I am not expressing any opinion on this question. The finding in regard to hardship is, therefore, vitiated as the lower appellate authority proceeded on the absolute assumption that an exporter does not require a show room. 10. In view of the above the entire case requires re-consideration. 11. In the result the petition is allowed, the order dated 12th March, 1980 is quashed and the IVth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur is directed to decide the appeal of the petitioner afresh in the light of the observations made by me above. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.