JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. -This is a plaintiffs Second Appeal in a suit for declaration, demolition, possession and permanent injunction. The plaintiff-appellants case was that the building of their shop abutted on the Kalpi-Lucknow Highway as it passes through the town of Pukhraiyan in the District of Kanpur. They enjoyed elementary rights of passage, light and air to their shop from the Patri of the road. In April, 1965 the defendant-respondents constructed the disputed shops on the road Patri which obstructed the enjoyment of the said rights of easements by the plaintiff-appellants. The plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the land covered by the shops in suit were their sehan land and also that the plaintiffs had acquired elementary rights of passage, air and light to their shop from that land. They further claimed demolition of the disputed shops and prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from obstructing the plaintiffs use of the sehan and the enjoyment of their elementary rights. 2. The defendants denied that the disputed shops constructed by them were on the road Patri and asserted that they had been constructed on the land obtained by them from the then Zamindar before the abolition of the Zamindari that the land had never been used by the plaintiffs as their sehan and the plaintiffs had never acquired any elementary rights thereon. It was further alleged that the disputed shops did not interfere with the plaintiffs right of passage from the road inasmuch as a strip of land about 8-6" wide had been left between the two shops constructed by the defendants which provided sufficient space to the plaintiffs to pass from the road to their building, and with regard to the elementary rights of light and air, it was alleged that there was no material interference with the same by the constructions raised by the defendants. 3. Several points were raised in the suit. The trial court held on the merits that the land in suit was situate within the limits of the town area Pukhraiyan and since the plaintiffs were not agriculturists they could acquire no sehan rights on the land in suit. With regard to the elementary rights, the trial court held that the disputed constructions did not substantially interfere with the physical comfort of the plaintiffs and accordingly the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. With regard to the elementary rights, the trial court held that the disputed constructions did not substantially interfere with the physical comfort of the plaintiffs and accordingly the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. Before the lower appellate Court it was urged by the plaintiff-appellants that it may be that they could not claim the land in suit to be their sehan land; however, inasmuch as the land in suit was part of a public highway and inasmuch as it lay in front of their shops which the plaintiffs had been using for the purposes of their trade and were continuously using it as such, the defendants could not obstruct their user by constructing the disputed shops. The lower appellate court negatived the contention on the ground that it was admitted by P. W. 1 Bhurelal in the course of his cross examination that there were Khantis on both sides of the road, and P. W. 3 Salik Ram had stated that the Khantis were about 5 feet in width and about 1 feet in depth, which according to the lower appellate court made it highly improbable that the land occupied by the disputed constructions could have been used by the plaintiffs for the purpose of their trade. With regard to the plaintiffs right of passage through the land in suit, the lower appellate court relied on a decision of this Court in Municipal Board, Banaras v. Behari Lal & Brothers ( AIR 1926 All 538 ) and held that the right of passage over a public road is not in the nature of easement, and they could not, therefore, claim any elementary right of passage throughout the land in suit which was alleged by them to be a part of the public road. The lower appellate court also observed that the 8-6" wide strip of land left by the defendant in between the two shops was sufficient for the plaintiffs for the purpose of access from the road to their building and that being so it could not be said that their right of passage was materially interfered with. With regard to elementary rights of light and air claimed by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court that those rights had also not been materially interfered with and plaintiffs could not therefore, claim any of the reliefs claimed by them. 4. With regard to elementary rights of light and air claimed by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court that those rights had also not been materially interfered with and plaintiffs could not therefore, claim any of the reliefs claimed by them. 4. It could not be disputed that the land where the constructions in suit were raised by the defendants was part of the public highway inasmuch as they were found to lie on the patri, the boundary of the public highway being in this case the Khantis which had been dug on both sides of the road. That being so, the land could not be part of the Sehan of the plaintiffs and they could not exercise any such rights as are exercised by a person on his sehan land and on this point the finding of the lower appellate court appears to be quite correct. Nevertheless, the land being part of the public highway, it must be deemed to have been dedicated by the Government for the unrestricted use of passing and repassing over that land by the members of the public. See Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj (1965 All LJ 335). The plaintiffs were certainly members of the public and had unrestricted rights of free passage over the land. The constructions in suit did restrict this right. The plaintiffs were more aggrieved than any other members of the public inasmuch as their house abutted on the public highway at the very place where the constructions in suit were erected by the defendants. The public works department could undoubtedly get the constructions in suit removed as an encroachment on the public highway, for the benefit of the public at large. The Advocate General could have the same removed by a suit under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any two or more persons, even though no special damage was caused to them, could also have them removed by a suit filed with the leave of the court, but that does not limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which the plaintiffs had independently of the provisions of Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question is whether the plaintiffs had any such right of suit on account of the fact that their house abutted on the public highway at the very place where the constructions in suit were erected think they clearly had that right, for the situation of their house at that place gave them a special reason for a grievance against the construction in suit, such as to come with in the meaning of special damages. If that be so, the fact that the plaintiffs could still pass out from their house to the public highway through the opening left by the defendants between the two shops erected by them on the road patri, is not sufficient to disentitle the plaintiffs to relief, for the land of the land of the public highway being dedicated to the public for unrestricted use as a passage by any member of the public, any interference with the same was actionable. 5. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree under appeal is set aside and the plaintiff's suit for demolition of the constructions in suit is decree with costs throughout.