ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation Basti, camp at Mirazpur, dated 5-9-73, whereby the revision petitions filed by the petitioner were dismissed. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that in the basic year Mst. Manraji was recorded over the disputed plots constituting Khata No. 34 as Bhumidhar and one Smt. Bhagirathi was recorded as Mukarrardar on rent of Rs. 9/-. The contesting opposite parties Ram Gopal and others had claimed right in the disputed plots being heirs of Smt. Bhagirathi whereas the present petitioner had claimed Bhumidhari right in the disputed plots on the basis of a sale deed executed by Mst. Manraji in her favour. The consolidation officer through his judgment dated 25-10-71 (annexure 3 attached to the writ petition) held that the petitioner was Bhumidhar of the disputed plots and that the contesting opposite parties Ram Gopal, Gauri Snankar and Dina Nath were entitled to Asami right in the disputed plots. Aggrieved by the lodgment of the consolidation officer the parties preferred appeals and me appellate authority through its judgment dated 21-2-72 allowed the appeals filed by the contesting opposite parties Ram Gopal and others and dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioner as is evident from annexure 4 attached to the writ petition. Thereafter the petitioner preferred revision petitions which were dismissed by the revisional court through its judgment dated 5-9-73. Now, the petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the appellate authority and the revisional court have patently erred in negativing the claim of the petitioner in the disputed plots in the circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also emphasised before me that the appellate authority and the revisional court have failed to consider oral evidence led by the petitioner with regard to nature of possession enjoyed by the contesting opposite parties in the disputed plots, hence their judgments suffer from patent error and deserve to be quashed. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also emphasised before me that the appellate authority and the revisional court have failed to consider oral evidence led by the petitioner with regard to nature of possession enjoyed by the contesting opposite parties in the disputed plots, hence their judgments suffer from patent error and deserve to be quashed. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner,and has submitted that on the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority and the revisional court to the effect that the contesting opposite parties have been in possession over the disputed plots since long, and thereby they have succeeded in establishing their claim of Sirdari right in the disputed land; hence the judgment should be maintained. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted that the contesting opposite parties were recorded as Mukarrardars of the disputed land; hence their position in the eye of law was that of sub-proprietors in this State and by virtue of their possession on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting (i.e. 1-7-1952), the contesting opposite parties became Bhumidhars of the disputed land and in this view of the matter the petitioner is not entitled to maintain the writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in 1973 R. D. 280, Gocharan Singh v. Regional Deputy Director of Consolidation and has contended that the status of a Mukarrardar is that of a sub-proprietor, hence the contesting opposite parties have become Bhumidhars of the disputed plots and their claim cannot be negatived in the present writ petition. 6. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties in support of his contention. To my mind the aforesaid ruling is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In the reported ruling the entry of Mukararidar was made in Khewat which is the record of proprietors of the Mahal and in the present case the entry relied upon by the contesting opposite parties is the entry in Khatauni wherein the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was recorded as Mafidar and the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting opposite parties was recorded as Mukarraridar. In this context it is to be examined as to whether the entry of Mukarraridar in favour of the contesting opposite parties denotes their status as sub-proprietors. The consolidation officer had recognised the claim of the present petitioner being transferee of Smt. Manraji who was Mafidar of the disputed plots and had become Bhumidhar thereof after the enforcement of U. P. Act I of 1951. The appellate authority and the revisional court have recognised the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the footing that they were sub-tenants of the disputed plots and they had acquired Sirdari right therein and the sale deed in favour of the petitioner executed by Mst. Manraji did not confer valid title as her right, if any, had become extinguished before the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. 7. The revisional court has expressed-itself in para. 8 of its impugned judgment as below:- "Mukarrardar shabd ke vishay men adhik tark ki avashyakta nahin hai kyonki jo paristhitiyan aur tathya samane hain unse yah nishkarsh nikalta hai ki vipakshi ganon ke purvaj vivadit bhoomi ka 9.00 lagan salana ki shart par kabiz dakhil rahe hain our use Mst. Manraji athawa unke purvajon ki oar se jota boy a jata raha hai. Aise kashtakaron ko zamindari vinash ke pashchat sirdari Adhikar prapt huye atah adhinasth Nya-yalayon ke yah nirnaya sahi hain ki vivadit bhoomi men jo bhi swatwa Mst. Manraji ya unke purvajon ke the wey samapt ho chuke hain." 7-A. Similarly in para. 10 of the impugned judgment the revisional court has observed as below:- "............Nigranikarat ki oar se ek bahas yah bhi ki gai ki chunki Mst. Manraji piehwan thi aur unhe vivadit bhoomi men seemit adhikar prapt the atah vivadit bhoomi ko sub-let kame ka adhikar unhe nahin tha. Yah bahas bhi bhramak hai kyonki bhoomi Mst. Manraji ne sub-let nahin ki balki unke bahut pahle unke purvajon ke jamane se aur unki oar se vivadit bhoomi par vipakshi gano ke purvaj mukarrardar ankit hain" 8. The above extracts of the impugned judgment indicate that at least the revisional court has accepted the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the ground of sub-letting by the Mafidars in. the present case. 'Mafidar (rent free grantee) is not a 'tenant as is evident from the provision of S. 4 (5) of the North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901. 9. the present case. 'Mafidar (rent free grantee) is not a 'tenant as is evident from the provision of S. 4 (5) of the North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901. 9. S. 4 (7) of the above Act defines "sub-tenant" as a tenant who holds land from a person possessing therein only the interest of a tenant other than a permanent tenure-holder or a Thekedar. 10. S. 4 (3) defines 'rent free grantee as a person who holds land on service tenure. 10-A. The term 'tenant and 'sub-tenant have been similarly defined in Section 3 (6) and (7) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The provisions of S. 3 (22) and (23) of the U. P. Tenancy Act 1939 also indicate that a rent free grantee is not included within the term 'tenant and a person holding land from a rent free grantee is also not a sub-tenant, hence I think that the appellate authority and the revisional court have failed to examine the relevant provisions of Tenancy Laws and they have erred in holding the opposite parties as Sirdars of the disputed land on the basis of subletting in the present case. 11. As regards the petitioners contention that oral evidence has not been examined by the last court while determining the status of the contesting opposite parties. I find that the revisional court has failed to refer to the oral evidence led by the petitioner to indicate the nature of possession enjoyed by the contesting opposite parties. Unless the nature of possession by the contesting opposite parties is determined in relation to the evidence on record, the opposite parties cannot be held as Sirdars of the .disputed plots. 12. I have a feeling that the revisional court and the appellate authority have not examined the claim of the contesting opposite parties in relation to relevant law and evidence led by the petitioner with regard to the nature of possession enjoyed by the contesting opposite parties. I think it proper to quash the impugned judgment given by the revisional court and direct the revisional court to re-examine the claim of the parties in the light of the relevant pro-sions of Tenancy Laws and the oral evidence with regard to the nature of possession of the opposite parties. 13. I think it proper to quash the impugned judgment given by the revisional court and direct the revisional court to re-examine the claim of the parties in the light of the relevant pro-sions of Tenancy Laws and the oral evidence with regard to the nature of possession of the opposite parties. 13. In the present case I am not inclined to agree with the suggestion of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties that they have acquired Bhumidhari right in the disputed land on the ground that they were Mukarrardars and the ruling relied upon by the contesting opposite parties appears to me as inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 14. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, dated 5-9-73, is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claim of the parties in the light of the observations made above. Parties directed to bear their own costs.