ORDER S. D. Aggarwala, J. - These are two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The property in dispute is bungalow No. 40, Cariappa Road, Cantonment, Kanpur. The original landlord and owner of the said premises was Gaja Nand Sootwala, who had filed writ petition No. 1978 of 1977. He died during the pendency of this writ petition and his heirs, namely, Snit. Maddi Devi and Hemant Kumar, have been substituted in his place. Kamal Ahmad is the person in whose favour the premises in dispute have been allotted. 2. The property in dispute was purchased by Gajanand Sootwala in the year 1942. He moved an application before the Cantonment Station Commander, Cantonment, Kanpur for getting the premises released for his own use and occupation. The application was allowed and the property was released in favour of the owner on 10th September, 1966. Since then the owner used the bungalow for the occupation by himself and the members of his family. On 21st March, 1974 a report was submitted by the Rent Control Inspector that at the time of inspection of the premises in question the premises were found locked and, therefore, a notice was issued to the owner as to why the premises be not deemed vacant. The owner filed objections on 10th May, 1974 stating categorically that the premises in question were being used by him and the members of his family. Thereafter on 26th May, 1975 an additional report was submitted by the Rent Control Inspector. On 19th January, 1976 Kamal Ahmad made an application for allotment of the premises in question. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by an order dated 30th March, 1976 declared the property as deemed to be vacant under section 12(1)(a) of the Act and directed that proceedings for allotment may take place. Consequent upon the order dated 30th March, 1976 the premises in question were allotted to Group Commander, N.C.C., Kanpur, vide order dated 28/29th April, 1976. 3. Consequent upon the order dated 30th March, 1976 the premises in question were allotted to Group Commander, N.C.C., Kanpur, vide order dated 28/29th April, 1976. 3. Consequent upon the property being declared vacant and having been allotted to Group Commander, N.C.C., three appeals were filed before the District Judge, Kanpur Rent Control appeal No. 246 of 1976 was filed by Kamal Ahmad on the ground that his application for allotment was not granted. Gajanand Sootwala filed an appeal Rent Control Appeal No. 197 of 1976 both against the order declaring the property to be vacant as well as challenging the allotment order and Rent Control Appeal No. 21 of 1977 was filed by Lt. Col. A.K. Siddiqui, who was also an applicant for allotment of the premises in question and was aggrieved by the fact that the property was not allotted to him. These appeals were converted into revisions in view of the amendment of section 18 of the Act. All the three appeals converted into revisions were heard by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Kanpur. During the pendency of the appeal the Group Commander N.C.C., had intimated to the court that he did not require the premises in question. In spite of the said statement the revisional authority went into the merits of the matter and held that the premises can be deemed to be vacant under section 12(l)(a) of the Act and further issued a direction that it will be open for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot the premises deeming the premises vacant. The result was that Rent Control Appeal No. 197 of 1976 filed by Gajanand Sootwala was dismissed, Rent Control Appeal No. 27 of 1977 was also dismissed as no direction could begiven by the revisional authority for allotment in favour of the appellant Lt. Col. A.K. Siddiqui. Rent Control Appeal No. 246 of 1976 was also dismissed on the same ground as the revisional authority could not pass any allotment order in favour of the appellant. All the three appeals which were converted into revisions were decided by a common judgment on 14th July, 1977. The orders dated 30th March, 1976 and 14th July, 1977 have been impugned in writ petition No. 1978 of 1977. 4. All the three appeals which were converted into revisions were decided by a common judgment on 14th July, 1977. The orders dated 30th March, 1976 and 14th July, 1977 have been impugned in writ petition No. 1978 of 1977. 4. After the decision of the revisions on 14th July, 1977 an allotment order was passed in favour of Kamal Ahmad, respondent No. 3 on 23rd August 1977. Against the order dated 23rd August, 1977 Gajanand Sootwala, the owner and landlord, filed a revision before the revisional authority, which was dismissed on 12th May, 1979. This revision was primarily filed on the ground firstly that no notice was given to the landlord before allotting the premises and secondly on the ground that the allotment order was invalid as by virtue of the allotment order a new appartment known as Annexe, consisting of two spacious rooms, 2 bath rooms, covered verandah and equipped with all modern amenities was also allotted to Kamal Ahmad, which could not have been the subject matter of allotment. After the revision was dismissed Kamal Ahmad took possession of the premises in question 24th August, 1977. This possession was alleged to have been taken by respondent No. 3 by force by wrongfully confirming the gardner of the landlord, forcibly and illegally removing the name plate of the landlord. It was further alleged that the entire goods of the landlord have been taken possession of by Kamal Ahmad and the landlord was threatened with dire consequences in case any attempt was made to enter the premises in question. Hemant Kumar, the son of Gajanand Sootwala, therefore, has filed the present petition No. 6413 of 1979 challenging the orders dated 23rd August, 1977 allotting the premises in question in favour of Kamal Ahmad and the order in revision dated 12th May, 1979. 5. The two petitions being in respect of the same premises in question and common questions of fact and law arise, consequently they are being decided by a common judgment. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties in both the petitions. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner landlord has urged in the first petition that Section 12(l)(a) of the Act does not apply to the present case and as such the property could not be deemed to be vacant and as such the entire proceedings for allotment were void ab initio. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner landlord has urged in the first petition that Section 12(l)(a) of the Act does not apply to the present case and as such the property could not be deemed to be vacant and as such the entire proceedings for allotment were void ab initio. In regard to the second petition the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the allotment order in favour of respondent No. 3 is wholly without jurisdiction as he was not given any notice after the matter was decided by the revisional court on 14th July, 1977. Since no notice was given the entire proceedings for allotment and possession are void in law. 8. It is not necessary for me to go into the merits of the contention raised in regard to the second petition as I am of the view that the property could not have been deemed vacant under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Since the property cannot be deemed vacant the entire proceedings for allotment and the possession in consequence thereof would be clearly without jurisdiction and illegal. 9. Section 12(l) of the Act reads as follows: (1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if- (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere." Rule 10, sub-clause (9) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, framed under the provisions of the Act provides that in case of a building which was never let out before, the District Magistrate shall serve on the landlord a notice asking him within a month of the service thereof whether he is willing to throw the building open for allotment and if so to nominate a person in whose favour the allotment may be made and thereupon if the landlord intimates the District Magistrate within the said period that he does not want to let out the building it shall not be allotted. If, however, the landlord gives his consent to letting them he is entitled to nominate a person and the allotment has to be made in favour of his nominee. If, however, the landlord fails to send any intimation then alone it is open to the District Magistrate to allot the building to any person other than the nominee. From a reading of section 12 with rule 10, sub-clause (9) of the rules it is clear that the intention of the legislature is that if it property has never been let out before it is left to the discretion of the landlord to throw the building open for letting or not. If once the landlord does not give his consent to throw the building for letting, the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to allot the premises to any body else. Therefore, in the case of a building which was never been let out before and the landlord does not give his consent to throw the building open for allotment the provisions of Section 12 of the Act would not apply to enable the District Magistrate to allot the premises to any body else after holding it deemed vacant. Section 12 of the Act would, however, apply to a building which had been let out before. 10. By Section 12 a legal fiction has been created that the property would be deemed vacant in certain circumstances. This provision has to be very strictly construed. The property cannot be deemed to be vacant unless it has been specifically established by evidence on record that the circumstances stated in one of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 12 of the Act have come into existence. In the instant case the property has been deemed vacant under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. I have already quoted Section 12(1)(a). The property can, therefore, only be deemed to be vacant if the landlord has 'substantially removed his effects therefrom.' In the absence of a specific finding that the landlord has specifically removed his effects therefrom the property cannot be deemed to be vacant under the provisions of this section. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decisions given by me in earlier cases as well as a decisions of K. C. Agarwal, J. and K.N. Singh, J. In Karanpir Co-operative Society v. The District Judge 1979 (U . Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decisions given by me in earlier cases as well as a decisions of K. C. Agarwal, J. and K.N. Singh, J. In Karanpir Co-operative Society v. The District Judge 1979 (U . P.) R.C.C. 525., I had taken the view that if a tenant of a shop does not carry on business for some time it does not entitle the authorities to declare the property as vacant. The property can be deemed vacant if the tenant had substantially removed his effects therefrom. Similarly in Surendra Kumar Vishappi v. IInd Addl. District Judge, 1979 (U.P) R.C.C. 634., I had taken the view that by the mere fact that the shop is locked it cannot be taken to be deemed vacant. In Suresh Chandra Agarwal v. 1st Addl. District Judges, 1979 (U.P.) R.C.C. 315., K.C. Agarwal, J. took the view that if furniture was lying in the house the authorities could not hold that the effects have been removed and that merely because some of the members of the family of the landlord were living in Bombay it could not justify the finding that Section 12(l)(a) of the Act would apply. In Dr. S.N. Ghosh v. B.C. & F. Officer, 1976 A.L.J. 266. K. N. Singh, J. had occasion to consider the expression 'substantially removed his effects.' He has interpreted it as follows : "It does not contemplate removal of some house-hold effects, on the contrary it envisages that for all [practical purposes the landlord or tenant as the case may be should be found to have practically removed all his house-hold effects from the accommodation in question." He further held that the expression 'substantially' means that the tenant has removed almost all his belongings which may indicate his intention of not coming back to occupy the house in question. The deeming provision can, however, not be made applicable if it is found that only part of the belongings of the tenant have been removed and his furniture, luggage and other belongings are still kept in the house under the charge of a caretaker. The view which K.N. Singh, J. took in Dr. S.N. Ghosh (supra) was subsequently reiterated by him in Harmukh Rai v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Agra, 1978 All. R.C. 472. I respectfully agree both with K.N. Singh J. as well as K.C. Agarwal. The view which K.N. Singh, J. took in Dr. S.N. Ghosh (supra) was subsequently reiterated by him in Harmukh Rai v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Agra, 1978 All. R.C. 472. I respectfully agree both with K.N. Singh J. as well as K.C. Agarwal. J, In order that a property can be deemed vacant there has to be a specific finding that the landlord or a tenant has substantially removed his effects. The mere fact that the property is locked or the mere fact that the landlord has temporarily gone to another place in the same city or another city to live with another person, for example old parents may temporarily go to live with their children or in similar other circumstances it could not by itself be taken that the property is vacant. The Legislature, therefore, used specifically the word 'effects'. 'Effects' is generally expressed to denote 'movables' of a person in the case of a residential building. In the circumstances a finding has to be recorded that from the examination of the facts all the necessary effects have already been removed. In sub-clause (c) the Legislature specifically provided that a property can be deemed vacant if a landlord or a tenant has taken up residence elsewhere not being temporary residence. In sub-clause (c) the words' as well as members of his family' are significant. It has to be found that the landlord or tenant as the case may be along with members of his family have taken permanent residence elsewhere. 11. In the instant case from the order dated 30th March, 1976 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer it is clear that the goods of the land- lord were found in the premises in question, a telephone of the landlord was in existence and the premises were locked. This is also clear from both the reports dated 21.3.1974 and 26.5.1975. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer simply has considered the entire matter in the last para of his judgment and has observed as follows : "Parantu Yahan jo tathya samney aa rahe hain unsey yahi pratit hota hai ke ukt bungalow No. 40 makandar ke proyog me nahin hain. Evem woh Khali hai. Majendar kewal usme tala band kiye hai',. 12. The portion of the judgment translated would mean that bungalow No. 40 is not in use of the landlord, hence it is vacant. Evem woh Khali hai. Majendar kewal usme tala band kiye hai',. 12. The portion of the judgment translated would mean that bungalow No. 40 is not in use of the landlord, hence it is vacant. The landlord has only put a lock. Merely on this finding the property was deemed vacant. As observed above from both the reports of the Rent Control Inspector it is clear that the landlord's goods were found in the premises. There is no finding that the landlord has substantially removed his effects. On the other hand, there is evidence on record to show that the landlord has kept a telephone, has paid electricity bills as well as water tax bills in respect of the premises in question and has employed a gardener to look after the garden. The revisional authority has simply disposed of the matter by observing as follows : "No direct evidence was required to show that the landlord had substantially removed his effects therefrom. The owner was not found to be using the premises except that water and electric installation continued along with a telephone connection for which bills in nominal sums were paid..... Since the premises had ceased to be in occupation of the landlord inasmuch as no practical use of the premises was made, I find that the learned R.C. & E.O. was justified in declaring the premises vacant under section 12(l)(a)." 13. The revisional authority also merely on the finding that the premises were not in occupation of the landlord declared the property vacant under section 12(l)(a) of the Act. There is, therefore, no finding either by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or by the revisional authority that the landlord has substantially removed his effects from the house in dispute. In the absence of any evidence or finding to that effect the impugned orders are manifestly erroneous in law. The property could not be deemed to be vacant under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, Kamal Ahmad has sought to justify the orders on the ground that the orders would come under section 12(c) of the Act. There was no case set up by the authorities for deemed vacancy under section 12(c) of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, Kamal Ahmad has sought to justify the orders on the ground that the orders would come under section 12(c) of the Act. There was no case set up by the authorities for deemed vacancy under section 12(c) of the Act. The authorities cannot be permitted to set up a fresh case when no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner land- lord to establish that clause kc) would not apply. Even if sub-clause (c) is taken into consideration then too there is no finding that the landlord as well as members of his family have taken up residence elsewhere. In the circumstances the order cannot be justified under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. 15. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the submission made on behalf of the landlord petitioner in the first petition is well founded. The property could not be deemed vacant and as such the allotment order dated 23rd Aug., 1977 passed in favour of respondent No. 3 is also liable to be quashed as being without jurisdiction. 16. I am constrained to observe that the authorities in the instant case have acted in a very high handed manner in disregard of the statutory provisions. After passing the allotment order in spite of an objection raised by the landlord forcible possession was directed to be given to respondent No. 3. This is not the purpose of the enactment of section 12 of the Act. 17. In the result I allow both the petitions and quashed the orders dated 30th March, 1976 and 14th July, 1977, as well as the allotment order dated 23rd August, 1977 in favour of respondent No. 3 and the revisional order dated 12th May, 1979. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are directed to deliver back possession of the premises in dispute to the petitioner forthwith. Parties will bear their own costs in both the petitions.