DEOKI NANDAN, J. This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for in junction restraining the defendant-respondent from evicting the appellants by force or from demolishing the building on the land in suit. The trial Court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate Court has dismissed it, hence the second appeal. The land in suit was obtained on a lease dated 3-8-1906 from the Munici pal Board of Varanasi as the Manager of the Nazul on behalf of the Govern ment. The lease was for a period of 30 years and a Dharamshala having been constructed thereon by the lessee Ayodhya Prasad hag created a trust for mana ging it under a deed dated 13-6-1921. The trust named Sri Krishna Dharam shala Trust Englishia Line, Varanasi City, is the first plaintiff-appellant and Gopi Krishna, the Managing Trustee, is the second plaintiff- appellant. The plaintiffs case was that the lease was a permanent one. They also pleaded that after the expiry of the 30 years term, they had been allowed to remain in possession of the land and had by way of precaution applied for renewal of the lease which was sanctioned and they had also paid rent at the enhanced rate on 4-1-1954, but a renewed lease was not executed in spite of demand. The plaintiffs complaint was that instead of doing so the defendant-respondent passes a resolution No. 9 dated 10-1-1966 for evicting the plaintiff-appellants and settling the land with others. The plaintiffs came to know of it on 1-2-1967. The defendants case was that the description of the property given at the foot of the plaint was not correct, that the plaintiffs alone had no right to sue, and that the term of the lease having expired, the defendant had every right to eject the plaintiffs or the successors of the original lessee Ayodhya Prasad, as the case may be, and to settle the land with anybody or to deal with or use it in any manner it likes. However, the existence of any such resolution No. 9 dated 10-1-1966, as alleged by the plaintiffs, was denied. The following were the issues on which the parties went to trial :- 1. Whether the plaintiff No- 1 is permanent lessee of the land in suit ? 2. Whether defendant has no right to eject the plaintiff from the land in suit ? 3. The following were the issues on which the parties went to trial :- 1. Whether the plaintiff No- 1 is permanent lessee of the land in suit ? 2. Whether defendant has no right to eject the plaintiff from the land in suit ? 3. Whether Ayodhya Prasad had any right to create any trust in res pect of the land in suit ? 4. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? 5. Is the suit bad for want of a notice under Sec. 571 of U. P. Act 2 of 1959 ? 6. Whether plaintiff has served valid notice u/s 571 of U. P. Act 2 of 1959 on the defendant ? 7. Whether the Corporation No. and boundary of the land in suit, as given at the foot of the plaint are correct ? 8. Is the suit under-valued and the Court-fee paid is insufficient ? 9. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 10. Is the suit not maintainable for the reasons mentioned in para 4 of A/87 ? Issues No. 4,5,6,7,8 and 10, which were more or less of a technical nature, were decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were taken up to gether for consideration by the trial Court. It held that although a period of 30 years was provided in the lease-deed Ext. 9, its terms suggested that a per manent lease was executed with the right of eviction only on breach of the same : and that it was thus a permanent lease and the defendant had no right to eject the plaintiffs from the land in suit except when there is a breach of the terms from the plaintiffs side. On Issue No. 3 it held that Ayodhya Prasad had a right to create a trust in respect of the land in suit and in view of the aforesaid findings it held on Issue No. 9 that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief claimed and decreed the suit for an injunction "restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiffs or from taking forcible possession after demol ishing the constructions standing [thereon, except as possible under the lease deed". On appeal the lower appellate Court held that the lease was not a perma nent one, but was for a fixed period of 30 years; that Gopi Krishna alone, namely, the managing trustee, could file the suit; and lastly that the plaintiffs could not rely on the sanction for renewal of the lease communicated to them by letter dated 24-12-1953 by the Revenue Superintendent of the Municipal Board, Varanasi (Paper No. 124-C) as no renewed lease had been executed or registered and further that the plaintiffs could, at best, be said to be holding over as lessees from year to year on account of payment of rent and acceptance of the same by the defendant but "there is nothing to entitle the plaintiffs to continue in possession over the expiry of the period for which rent was paid. " In this view of the matter the lower appellat Court allowed the appeal and reversing the trial Courts decree, dismissed the suit with costs. Mr. H. S. Joshi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants, has not very seriously urged before me that the lease granted to Ayodhya Prasad in the year 1906 was a permanent lease, but he urged that even so the renewal of the lease having been sanctioned and the case being covered by the Governments Grant Act, the communication-of the sanction was itself sufficient to protect the plain tiffs from eviction, and further that in. any view of the matter the plaintiffs having been found to be holding over as lessees from year to year, they could not be evicted from the land in suit except after determination of the lease, and even then except by due process of Court. Learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection. He said that the plaintiffs had no right to sue inasmuch as all the trustees had not joined as plaintiffs and the suit was barred under Sec. 46 of the Indian Trusts Act. He further raised an objection that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action inasmuch as it was not proved that the defendant-respondent had ever threatened the plaintiffs with any action or done anything to give the plaintiffs any cause of apprehension that they would be evicted from the land in suit by use of force or otherwise than by due process of law. Since the decree under appeal is of dismissal of the suit, it shall be more convenient to take up first the plaintiff-appellants contentions and to take up the contentions raised for the defendant-respondent only if it is found that the contentions raised for the plaintiff-appellants have any force. As observed above the deed of lease does create a lease only for 30 years with transferable and heritable rights. There could thus be no objection to the transfer of the land in suit by Ayodhya Prasad to and for the purpose of Dha ramshala on trust. The lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs were holding over as lessees from year to year. That finding is, in my opinion, sufficient for the purposes of decision of the appeal before me and I do not, therefore, propose to go into the questions whether the lease was a permanent one or that the letter dated 24-12-1953 (Paper No. 124-C), communicating the decision sanctioning the renewal of the lease, could be used in the present case for holding that the lease was or could be deemed to have been renewed for a further period of 30 years. All these questions are left open for determination if any dispute arises about them in future between the parties. Suffice it to say that so long as the plaintiff-appellants are holding over the land as lessees from year to year they cannot be evicted except by suit after the lease in their favour is determined in accordance with law and in case they refuse to vacate even after a valid determination of the lease. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate Court was, in my opinion, not right in setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissing the suit on the view that the plaintiffs were not entitled to continue in possession over the land in suit after expiry of the period for which rent was paid. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate Court was, in my opinion, not right in setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissing the suit on the view that the plaintiffs were not entitled to continue in possession over the land in suit after expiry of the period for which rent was paid. Once a lease is renewed by holding over under Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act by payment and acceptance of rent, it continues as a lease from year to year until determined in accordance with law by notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, If rent for the subsequent period has not been paid, that can be recovered from the lessee but the lease continues as a lease from year to year. As to the preliminary objection, it is sufficient to say that notwithstanding the reference to the provisions of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, for filling in the vacancies in the office of the trustees, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, could not apply to the trust in question for it was a charitable endowment. Sec. 1 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is express on this point. It says that "nothing herein contained affects the rules of Muhammadan law as to waqf, or the mu tual relations of the members of an undivided family or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments". As to the second preliminary objection, raised by the learned counsel, although there is a denial of the existence of resolution No. 9 dated 10-l-1966 and in the face of that deniai and any acceptable evidence on the point, it cannot be said whether such a resolution existed or not, nevertheless, the fact remains that the plaintiffs would not have taken the trouble to go to Court unless there had been some real threat of dispossession from the side of the defendant-respondent. Moreover, in spite of the denial of the fact of the resol ution, the defendant-respondent has clearly asserted in its written statement that it had a right to evict the plaintiff-appellants after the expiry of the origi nal period of the lease. It is noticeable in this connection that the original 30 years period of the lease expired in the year 1936 and the written statement is verified on the 2nd February 1968, some 32 years after the said event. It is noticeable in this connection that the original 30 years period of the lease expired in the year 1936 and the written statement is verified on the 2nd February 1968, some 32 years after the said event. Again with regard to the plaintiffs, allegation that they had served a notice under Sec. 571 of the U. P. Act 2 of 1959, all that is stated in the written statement is that the defendant-respondent could not trace out that notice in its office. The service of the notice has been found to be proved. If the defendant- respondent had in reply to that notice averred that they did not intend to evict the plain tiffs from the land in suit, except by due process of law, something might have been said for the contention now raised on its behalf by the learned counsel, but even today the learned counsel for defendant- respondent is not prepared to give an undertaking to that effect. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the alleged threat of dispossession by force was not real and the suit can not be dismissed. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judg ment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree of trial Court is restored, with costs throughout. .