R. S. PATHAK, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by special leave arises out of a suit for a declaration and injunction and raises questions concerning the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 ( 2 ) PEERBHOY Mansion is a building situated at Vithalbhai Patel Road in the City of Bombay. It was let to a partnership firm Gold Field Leather Works. Gold Field sublet a portion of a shop on the ground floor to Manekchand Bhikhabhai. The sub-tenant Manekchand sublet it further to Sardar Tota Singh in 1952. ( 3 ) GOLD Field filed a suit in 1962 against Manekchand for possession of the premises on the ground of unlawful subletting and carrying out un-authorised structural alterations. Manekchand resisted the suit and filed a written statement. During the pendency of the suit Tota Singh applied to the Court for being added as a defendant but the application was opposed by Gold Field and was rejected. Gold Fields suit was ultimately decreed for possession in accordance with a compromise between the parties. ( 4 ) TOTA Singh then filed Suit No. 2454 of 1966 for a declaration that he was a lawful tenant in possession of the premises and for an injunction restraining Gold Field from executing the decree which that firm had obtained against Manekchand. It was pleaded that he was in occupation and exclusive possession as a lawful sub-tenant for more than fifteen years to the knowledge of Gold Field that the decree in Gold Fields suit was a collusive decree that as the decree had been passed against Manekchand he Tota Singh had become a direct tenant of Gold Field under Section 14 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (the Bombay Rent Act) and that therefore he was entitled to the declaration and injunction sought in the suit. ( 5 ) GOLD Field filed a written statement in the suit and pleaded that they were tenants of the entire building and had sublet the premises to Manekchand that Manekchand as sub-tenant could not sublet the premises further to Tota Singh and there-fore Tota Singhs sub-tenancy was in-valid. ( 6 ) THE Court of Small Causes tried the suit and decreed it on April 17 1973 Gold Field appealed. ( 6 ) THE Court of Small Causes tried the suit and decreed it on April 17 1973 Gold Field appealed. The Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes dismissed the appeal on April 30 1975 The Appellate Bench affirmed the trial Judges finding that the premises had been sublet by Manekchand to Tota Singh in 1952 and that on May 21 1959 when the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 was promulgated and sub-section (2) of Section 15 was introduced into the Bombay Rent Act Manekchand was not in possession. In the attempt to prove that he was a lawful sub-tenant Tota Singh urged before the Appellate Bench that Gold Field had permitted Manekchand to sublet the premises to him but this contention was not entertained by the Appellate Bench as there was neither any plea nor any evidence to support it. The Appellate Bench also rejected the submissions of Tota Singh that he had paid rent directly to Gold Field and therefore had been accepted as a tenant by them. It found that no rent had been paid by Tota Singh to Gold Field after Manekchands statutory tenancy which followed the termination of his contractual tenancy by service of notice had itself been terminated by the decree for possession in Gold Fields suit. One road seemed still open to Tota Singh to establish the validity of his tenancy. Before the Appellate Bench a concession had been made by counsel for Gold Field. It was conceded on behalf of Gold Field that Manekchand was their lawful sub-tenant. On that Tota Singh urged that if Manekchand although a sub-tenant was regarded as a tenant by reason of sub-section (11) of Section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act then the benefit of sub-section (2) of Section 15 should be extended to him. He was in possession on May 21 1959 as the sub-tenant of lawful tenant and therefore the submission proceeded his sub-tenancy would be deemed to be valid. This contention found favour with the Appellate Bench. It held that as Tota Singh was undisputedly in possession on May 21 1959 the sub-tenancy in his favour by Manekchand must be deemed to be a valid sub-tenancy. This contention found favour with the Appellate Bench. It held that as Tota Singh was undisputedly in possession on May 21 1959 the sub-tenancy in his favour by Manekchand must be deemed to be a valid sub-tenancy. At this point a debate was raised whether the benefit of sub section (2) of Section 15 had to be confined to a sub-tenancy created by a tenant or could be extended to a sub-tenancy created by sub-tenant. Following the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Josephy Santa Vincent v. Ambico Industries 70 Bom. LR 224 the Appellate Bench answered that question in favour of Tota Singh and dismissed Gold Fields appeal. ( 7 ) GOLD Field filed a Special Civil Application in the High Court against the order of the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes and on June 21 1980 the High Court set aside the decree passed by the Appellate Bench and dismissed Tota Singhs suit. The High Court took the view that having regard to certain observations made by this Court in Jai Singh Morarji v. Sovani Pvt. Ltd. (1973)2 SCR 603 an extended construction of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act so as to include a sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant was not justified. ( 8 ) TOTA Singh died during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court and accordingly this appeal has been preferred by his legal representatives. ( 9 ) THE material question before us is whether Tota Singh could rightly claim tenancy rights in the premises and therefore nullify the enforcement as against him of the decree in Gold Fields suit. ( 10 ) IT appears that sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act as originally enacted prohibited the subletting by a tenant of premises let to him except in the particular cases notified by the State Government under the proviso to that sub-section. A subletting by the tenant constituted a ground for his eviction under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. A subletting by the tenant constituted a ground for his eviction under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. The rigour of the provision was relaxed by the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 which was brought into force on May 21 1959 The Ordinance was replaced by the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act 1959 In consequence sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act stood amended from the inception of the Bombay Rent Act so that the prohibition against subletting incorporated in it operated subject to any contract to the contrary. Simultaneously sub-section (2) was inserted in Section 15. That provision was subsequently substituted by Maharashtra Act 38 of 1962 by the following provision with effect from May 21 1959"15 (2 ). The prohibition against the subletting of the whole or any part of the premises which have been let to any tenant and against the assignment or transfer in any other manner of the interest of the tenant therein contained in sub-section (1) shall subject to the provisions of this sub-section he deemed to have had no effect before the commencement of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 in any area in which this Act was in operation before such commencement; and accordingly notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or in the judgment decree or order of a Court any such sublease assignment or transfer or any such purported sub-lease assignment or transfer in favour of any person who has entered into possession despite the prohibition in sub-section (1) as a purported sub-lessee assignee or transferee and has continued in possession at the commencement of the said Ordinance shall be deemed to be valid and effectual for all purposes and any tenant who has sublet any premises or part thereof assigned or transferred any interest therein shall not be liable to eviction under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. ( 11 ) IT is contended for the appellant that as the respondent conceded before the Court of Small Causes that Manekchand was a lawful sub-tenant the High Court should have held that a sub-tenancy created by such sub-tenant must be deemed valid by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 11 ) IT is contended for the appellant that as the respondent conceded before the Court of Small Causes that Manekchand was a lawful sub-tenant the High Court should have held that a sub-tenancy created by such sub-tenant must be deemed valid by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act. It is urged that the High Court erred in construing Jai Singh Morarji (Supra) as laying down the contrary. The case for the respondent is that sub-section (2) of Section 15 benefits a sub-tenancy created by the original tenant only and does not extend to a sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant. ( 12 ) THERE can be no doubt that upon the amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 15 by the Ordinance and by its related Act the prohibition against subletting did not operate in those cases where the subletting was permitted by contract between the landlord and tenant. In all such cases if the landlord had permitted the tenant under a contract between them to sublet the premises no question would arise of a need to validate those sub-tenancies. The relevant amendment in sub-section (1) of Section 15 was deemed to have always been part of the sub-sections. It is in this light that we must determine the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 15. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 raises the ban from all subletting effected before May 21 1959 the date of commencement of the Ordinance provided the provisions of that sub-section are fulfilled. Any such sub-lease shall be deemed to be valid provided the sub-lessee has entered into possession on such date. This is an especial provision and marks a departure from the general law. It does not refer to sub-tenancies which are permitted by contract between the landlord and the tenant but relates to sub-tenancies which are not so protected. Any such sub-lease shall be deemed to be valid provided the sub-lessee has entered into possession on such date. This is an especial provision and marks a departure from the general law. It does not refer to sub-tenancies which are permitted by contract between the landlord and the tenant but relates to sub-tenancies which are not so protected. It will be noted that the removal by sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the prohibition is limited only to those sub-tenancies which were created before May 21 1959 Such a limitation would be inappropriate to sub-tenancies permitted by contract which could be created regardless of whether they were brought into existence before May 21 1959 or after that date Also the sub-tenancies covered by sub-section (2) of Section 15 would be regarded as valid only if the sub-tenant had-entered into possession before May 21 1959 and was continued in possession on that date. Such a requirement would be wholly inconsistent in the case of sub-tenancies permitted by contract. Inasmuch as sub-section (2) of Section 15 specifically attaches the condition that the sub-tenant should have been in possession before the commencement of the Ordinance and should have continued in possession on that date it is apparent that such a provision could be related only to illegal sub-tenants that is to say sub-tenants who were let in and given possession without any contractual right conferred by the landlord on the tenant to do so. The protection conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 15 is necessary for such sub-tenancies only and not for a sub-tenancy which is permitted by the terms of the contract and which therefore falls altogether outside the prohibition embodied in sub-section (1) of Section 15 The result therefore is that sub-section (2) of Section 15 relates to sub-tenancies not permitted by contract between the landlord and tenant and which would but for the said sub-section (2) fall within the prohibition enacted in the amended sub-section (1) of Section 15 ( 13 ) IN the present case it was conceded on behalf of Gold Field before the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes that Manekchand was a lawful sub-tenant. He could not have been a lawful sub-tenant by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 15 because on May 21 1959 he was not in possession of the premises which in fact had already passed as early as 1952 into the possession of Tota Singh. Manekchand could have been a lawful sub-tenant only on the assumption that the sub-tenancy was permitted under the contract between Gold Field and their landlord. As the existence of such a term in the contract would be a question of fact the concession by counsel for Gold Field must be regarded as binding in this case on Gold Field. It is urged for the respondent that the concession made by counsel for Gold Field can be of no avail because any agreement by a tenant creating a sub-tenancy being directly opposed to sub-section (1) of Section 15 as originally enacted would be void. The submission it seems to us is without force. It must be remembered that sub-section (1) of Section 15 was amended by inserting the words but subject to any contract to the contrary in 1959 retrospectively the words being deemed always to have been inserted in that sub-section. We must take it by reason of the legal fiction employed that those words were already part of the sub-section when Gold Field agreed to sublet the premises to Manekchand. The cases P. D. Aswani v. Kavashah Dinshah Mulla (1954) 56 Bom R 467 and Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 217 on which learned counsel for the respondent relies were decided before sub-section (1) of Section 15 was amended and therefore did not take into account the effect of such amendment. ( 14 ) THEREFORE the present case is one where Gold Field is a tenant Manekchand is a lawful sub-tenant and the latter has created a further sub-tenancy in favour of Tota Singh. The question is whether the further subtenancy can fall within the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 15. Now if regard be had to clause (a) of sub-section (11) of Section 5 it is apparent that in respect of the subsequent sub-tenancy Manekchand could be described as a tenant and Tota Singh as his sub-tenant. The question is whether the further subtenancy can fall within the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 15. Now if regard be had to clause (a) of sub-section (11) of Section 5 it is apparent that in respect of the subsequent sub-tenancy Manekchand could be described as a tenant and Tota Singh as his sub-tenant. And if that be so there is no reason why Tota Singhs sub-tenancy should not be regarded as a valid sub-tenancy inasmuch as it was created before May 21 1959 and he had entered into possession of the premises before that date and was continuing in possession on that date. ( 15 ) BUT it is urged on behalf of Gold Field that this Court has held in Jai Singh Morarji (supra) that sub-section (2) of Section 15 does not validate a sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant. That was a case where the original landlord filed a suit against the tenant Ochhavlal for possession on the ground inter alia of illegal subletting by Ochhavlal. The suit was decreed and the plaintiff obtained possession. Ochhavlal had sublet the premises to Sovani and had sublet them to a private limited company. On application by the Company against dispossession in the execution proceedings the trial court up-held the Companys claim to possession but this Court ultimately rejected the Companys claim and up-held the right of the original land lord to possession. The facts of that case disclose that there were two prohibited sub-tenancies the first was created by Ochhavlal in favour of Sovani and the subsequent was created by Sovani in favour of the Company. The benefit of sub-section (2) of Section 15 could have been extended to Sovani only if the conditions of the sub-section were satisfied. If they were satisfied in the case of Sovani the benefit could not be extended again in favour of the Company. That would obviously be so because the condition as to possession on May 21 1959 could not possibly be satisfied by the subsequent sub-tenant if the original sub-tenant was in possession on that date. If however the subsequent sub-tenant was in possession on May 21 1959 then clearly neither sub-tenancy can be regarded as valid. To be valid the first sub-tenancy had to satisfy the condition of possession by that sub-tenant on May 21 1959 which ex-hypothesi was not possible. If however the subsequent sub-tenant was in possession on May 21 1959 then clearly neither sub-tenancy can be regarded as valid. To be valid the first sub-tenancy had to satisfy the condition of possession by that sub-tenant on May 21 1959 which ex-hypothesi was not possible. And if the original sub-tenancy was invalid the subsequent sub-tenancy would also be invalid. The subsequent sub-tenancy could be valid only if the original sub-tenant had legal interest to transfer to the subsequent sub-tenant. It is in the light of this analysis that the decision of this Court in Jai Singh Morarji 1973 (2) SCR 603 (supra) needs to be appreciated in particular the passage on page 607 of the Report which reads:"the answer to the question is whether the respondent Private Company was a sub-tenant prior to 1959 and continued in possession at the commencement of the Ordinance in 1959. Ochhavlal in the present case gave the sub-lease to Sovani before the Ordinance. It is an indisputable feature in the present case that Sovani did not continue in possession at the commencement of the Ordinance of 1959. Sovani became a Director of the Private Company. It is the Private Company which claims to be a sub-lessee. The Private Company was in the first place not a sub-lessee of the tenant but a subsequent assignee from the sub-lessee. Secondly Sovani who was the sub-lessee was not in possession on the date of the Ordinance on 21 May 1959 It was the Private Company which was in possession. Therefore the Private Company is not within the protection of Section 15 (2) of the Act". THE learned Judges were not un-aware of the terms of sub-section (11) of Section 5 as is evident from the passage on page 608 of the Report". ( 16 ) IT is then urged by learned counsel for the respondent that clause (a) of sub-section (11) of Section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be called in aid by the appellant as sub-section (1) of Section 15 applies to contractual tenants only. We are referred to Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji (1964) 4 SCR 892 where this Court laid down that the expression tenant in sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act means a contractual tenant and not a statutory tenant. The submission can be of no assistance to the respondent. We are referred to Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji (1964) 4 SCR 892 where this Court laid down that the expression tenant in sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act means a contractual tenant and not a statutory tenant. The submission can be of no assistance to the respondent. Having regard to the concession made by counsel for Gold Field in the Court below that Manekchand was a lawful tenant which position as we have discussed earlier necessarily implies a valid contract of tenancy between Gold Field and Manekchand the latter must be regarded a contractual tenant when he sublet the premises to Tota Singh. No question arises of a statutory tenant purporting to sublet his interest to a sub-tenant. ( 17 ) UPON the aforesaid considerations in our judgment the appeal must succeed. ( 18 ) THE appeal is allowed with costs. Appeal allowed. .