Judgment :- 1. By the decree under appeal the plaintiffs in a suit for compensation have been awarded a sum of Rs 8640/-with interest thereon against defendants I and 2 in the suit who are respectively the driver and owner of a motor vehicle and the State Insurance Department which is the 5th defendant in the suit has been called upon to satisfy the decree since the vehicle involved in the accident which has given rise to the claim had been insured with the 5th defendant against third party risks. The appeal is by the 5th defendant, the State Insurance Officer, Trivandrum. There is a memorandum of cross-objection by the plaintiffs seeking enhancement of the quantum of compensation. Though in the plaint the claim was for an amount of Rs 20000/-and only Rs. 8640/-had been awarded by the court below the cross-objection limits the further claim to Rs. 7000/-. 2. One M G. John, a Police Constable, met with his death when a motor vehicle KLK. 5742 driven by the first defendant knocked him down and ran over him. This was on 5th April 1968 at about 9 P. M. The scene of accident was near the Y.M.C.A. junction in the Kottayam town. According to the plaintiffs who are the widow and the three children of the deceased the accident was caused by the rash and negligent manner in which the vehicle was being driven at the time of accident by the first defendant. The plaintiffs claim to be dependants of deceased John. Besides them the other legal representatives of the deceased are said to be his parents who have been impleaded as defendants 3 and 4 in the suit. The plaintiffs plead that on the death of the breadwinner of the family plaintiffs are left without any means of livelihood. The 5th defendant was not originally a party to the suit. He was impleaded on motion being made for the purpose by the second defendant. 3. At the time or his death John was 33 years of age. He was an Armed Reserve Police Constable posted at the Armed Reserve Camp at Kottayam. His salary with allowances is said to have amounted to Rs. 200/-per mensem on the date of his death. 3. At the time or his death John was 33 years of age. He was an Armed Reserve Police Constable posted at the Armed Reserve Camp at Kottayam. His salary with allowances is said to have amounted to Rs. 200/-per mensem on the date of his death. In the normal course he would have been in service till the age of 55 and according to the incremental scale which he was drawing and the promotions which he would normally get he was one who was eligible for salary of Rs. 500/-in due course. Besides this he would receive his pension on his retirement. He was said to be in sound state of health on the date of the accident 4. Defendants 1 and 2 refute the claim of the plaintiffs averring that there was no negligence on the part of the first defendant. It is said that the deceased and another person were walking along the middle of the road and when the vehicle approached them the deceased is said to have moved north while the other person is said to have moved south. Despite the sudden application of the brake and driving the vehicle to the left as far as possible the vehicle is said to have hit the deceased and ran over him. This, it is said, was due to the negligence of the deceased. Plaintiffs were put to proof of the plea that they are the wife and children of the deceased. The quantum of compensation was also disputed. The 5th defendant adopted more or less the case of defendants 1 and 2. It was contended in Para.6 of the written statement of the 5th defendant thus: "The bus was driven with maximum care. While the bus came, the deceased and another man was walking and though the driver blew the horn, they did not give side to the bus. Then the driver drove the bus keeping the same to the maximum left side of the (road. Then immediately the deceased crossed to the north and the other to the south. As the further north area was a ditch, the driver applied the brake and by the time the bus was to be stopped, the deceased dashed against the bus and fell beneath it and sustained injuries which resulted in his death." It was said that on compassionate grounds the 5th defendant offered a sum of Rs. As the further north area was a ditch, the driver applied the brake and by the time the bus was to be stopped, the deceased dashed against the bus and fell beneath it and sustained injuries which resulted in his death." It was said that on compassionate grounds the 5th defendant offered a sum of Rs. 3000/-to the dependants but since this offer was not accepted this was withdrawn. It was contended that the deceased was not entitled to claim any damages and therefore the plaintiffs also were not entitled to compensation. The court below in the judgment under appeal held that the plaintiffs were the dependants of the deceased when the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by the first defendant and that the compensation due to the plaintiffs was to be fixed as Rs. 8640/-. Though a plea of limitation was raised that was found against. In the decretal portion the court allowed the amount decreed not only to plaintiffs but to defendants 3 and 4 as well. In arriving at the quantum of compensation as Rs. 8640/- the court noticed that the salary of the deceased was Rs. 192/-, that he would have been in service up to the age of 55, that the deceased was a normally healthy individual, that even at a modest estimate atleast 25 percent of the emoluments that he was drawing would have been utilised for his dependants and therefore the annual value of the dependency must be fixed at Rs. 576/-. On the date of suit in 1970 the first plaintiff was 31 years old and the court was of the view that the possibility of her remarriage could not be ruled out and plaintiffs 3 and 4 being boys could be expected to eke their own livelihood within a few years. In view of this the court fixed the multiplier at 15. It was thus that Rs. 8640/- was determined as compensation. 5. In the appeal only two points are raised. The finding that the accident was due to the rash and negligent handling of the vehicle by the first defendant is challenged. It is also contended that the quantum of compensation determined by the court below is high. 6. The court below believed the evidence of pw.2 who is the only independent witness. The finding that the accident was due to the rash and negligent handling of the vehicle by the first defendant is challenged. It is also contended that the quantum of compensation determined by the court below is high. 6. The court below believed the evidence of pw.2 who is the only independent witness. pw.1 is the first plaintiff, who, of course, is not in a position to speak from her own knowledge as to the manner in which the accident took place. dw.1 is the first defendant who is necessarily interested in sustaining his plea that the accident was caused due to the act of the deceased. Naturally the court below gave weight to the evidence of pw. 2 who, it is agreed, was at the scene of occurrence. That he was walking along the road with the deceased is the case of both parties. According to pw. 2 he was walking along with the deceased and the latter was within a distance of 4 feet from the footpath. The bus was coming at terrific speed along the wrong side. If the story of pws. 2 is true evidently the accident could have been only as a result of rash handling of the vehicle by the first defendant. But according to the first defendant the deceased was walking along the middle of the road along with pw. 2 under an umbrella. On seeing them he sounded the horn. He was plying the bus along the left side of the road. The court below has rightly noticed that if pw. 2 and deceased were moving along the middle of the road, there would have been more than 30 feet on the left and it would have been very unlikely that the bus which was said to be moving along the left would have caused alarm to pw. 2 and the deceased so as to cause them run to both sides. There was no other vehicle or other pedestrians near the scene of occurrence. dw.1 admits that despite applying the brake he could not stop the vehicle immediately and that it travelled a further distance of 5 feet. A question in cross examination of pw. 2 by counsel for the 5th defendant suggests that at the time of the accident pw. 2 and the deceased John had taken liquor. The case of pw. dw.1 admits that despite applying the brake he could not stop the vehicle immediately and that it travelled a further distance of 5 feet. A question in cross examination of pw. 2 by counsel for the 5th defendant suggests that at the time of the accident pw. 2 and the deceased John had taken liquor. The case of pw. 2 was that he stopped near the footpath at the time of the accident while the deceased proceeded a few feet further and that he so stopped near the footpath to pass urine. On this the cross-examination of the 5th defendant's counsel (translated into English) runs thus: "Had you and John consumed liquor? (Q). No. (A). Was it not because you had consumed liquor that you passed urine standing on the roadside? (Q) No. (An)." 7. The accident took place in a wide road of about 70 feet and at the time of the accident there were no vehicles or pedestrians. There is evidence that earlier there was some rain. But there is no case for dw.1 that he could not see the deceased from a distance. In fact according to him he saw him from a distance. The story that the deceased and pw. 2 were walking along the middle of the road at that time and they ran in different directions and thereby the deceased came up against the vehicle running on the left side is not substantiated by the evidence in the case. We agree with the court below that pw. 2's evidence is, in the circumstances, to be accepted. Evidently the driver of the vehicle did not have sufficient control of the vehicle to avert the accident because of the manner in which it was being driven. We agree with the court below that it was the negligence and rash driving of the vehicle that caused the accident. 8. Counsel for the applicant urged before us that it is mainly the quantum of compensation found by the court below that is challenged before us and it is said that it is because the principle adopted by the court below in awarding such compensation is wrong. 8. Counsel for the applicant urged before us that it is mainly the quantum of compensation found by the court below that is challenged before us and it is said that it is because the principle adopted by the court below in awarding such compensation is wrong. We think it is necessary to consider this question here as it would serve as a guideline to the Claims Tribunals in the State which have commenced functioning and before which a good number of cases of claims for compensation are pending, and enable them to make a scientific or systematic approach to the question of compensation. 9. By the substitution of Ss, 110 to 110F for the former S.110 by Act 100 of 1956 the Motor Vehicles Act now provides for a speedier process of settling questions as to compensation. Whether in practice the object has been achieved is a different matter. We say this because so far as this State is concerned in the absence of proper facilities for the normal functioning of the Claims Tribunals there has not been proper disposal of cases before the Tribunals so much so cases have been mounting. Even when they begin to function effectively hereafter there would be such a big backlog of cases that unless some drastic measures are adopted to meet the situation it is likely that for years to come compensation cases may spend before the Claims Tribunals for unduly long periods despite the efforts of the Tribunals to dispose of cases. We have already drawn the attention of the Government to this matter on the administrative side. 10. The provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act provide only the procedure for settling the question as to compensation in claims for compensation arising from accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of use of motor vehicles. The substantive law as to the basis for determination of such compensation has not been altered by these provisions: (Vide Swarnalata v. N. T. I. Pvt. Ltd. AIR. 1974 Gauhati 31). The claim by the plaintiffs are as dependants of the deceased. The compensation claimed is really by way of provision of the equivalent of dependency on the deceased. The substantive law as to the basis for determination of such compensation has not been altered by these provisions: (Vide Swarnalata v. N. T. I. Pvt. Ltd. AIR. 1974 Gauhati 31). The claim by the plaintiffs are as dependants of the deceased. The compensation claimed is really by way of provision of the equivalent of dependency on the deceased. Had the deceased lived his normal life span the benefit that would have accrued to his dependants in the normal course would be the quantum of compensation due to the claimants on this account. This has to be understood as a concept different from the benefit due to his estate, had he lived his normal life earning his normal income. That would in fact be the surplus left over after meeting his expenses. That he would have left on his death as his estate and would have been inherited by his legal representatives or would have been administered by an executor in case he had appointed one by a will. That need not necessarily be due to the dependants, for, the dependants may not be identical with the legal representatives though in some or in many cases they may be the same There may be children who may not be dependants but who would inherit the estate of the deceased. There may be similar other legal representatives who may not be dependants. What would have been available as his estate on his death is different from what is due to the dependants by way of provision for their future dependency. The Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides for claims on both these counts. Under S.1 of that Act damages are recoverable for the benefit of persons mentioned therein while under S.2 compensation goes to the benefit of the estate. S.2 provides for damages inter alia for loss of expectation of life. The claims are recoverable under different heads. As held by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami, AIR. 1962 SC.1 in awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim. The Supreme Court further said thus: "if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under S.1, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation under S.2 and vice versa." 11. 1962 SC.1 in awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim. The Supreme Court further said thus: "if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under S.1, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation under S.2 and vice versa." 11. The determination of compensation payable to dependants is by no means an easy task. That is because it is not possible to define the rule as to determination of such compensation in terms of any rigid formula. Such determination must depend upon several imponderable factors. The exercise of judicial discretion is called for with reference to facts and circumstances of each case to determine the relevancy of the facts applicable to the case before the court or the Tribunal, Yet it is possible to indicate guidelines and we feel that it may be useful to state the broad outlines within which it will be advisable to apply the law to the facts. 12. In the case of a person who is earning a meagre income barely sufficient to meet his needs or making an income which in the normal course he will utilise for his needs without being in a position to reserve any substantial part of it as savings his entire income would be consumed himself and his dependants. Generally that would be the case with people of the lower and middle classes particularly in these days when there would be very little for them to save. The court has to determine in every case the normal expectancy of life of the deceased. Though at one time the age of 60 was taken to be the average span of life of a man in this country, we do not think it holds good any longer. In the case of a person of normal health with no history of serious ailment that may impair the expectation of a normal life span the age of 65 to 70 would be quite reasonable. In the case of a person of normal health with no history of serious ailment that may impair the expectation of a normal life span the age of 65 to 70 would be quite reasonable. Of course if facts in evidence indicate a family history of early death or the affliction with a disease likely to shorten the life span or any other fact such as is likely to endanger the life span the court will be right in determining the life span in the case of such person at a lesser number of years. Having determined the life span the court necessarily has to consider the income of the deceased not only as at the time of the death but the income that he may earn in future in the normal course which may vary for reasons such as the benefit of the incremental scale of pay, likelihood of promotions in the usual course and even the likelihood of revisions of pay scales. This may give the court or the Tribunal the idea of the income structure of the person concerned during the period he could work. That a man who is employed in service has to retire at a particular age need not be taken as limiting his earning capacity to that age. May be that he is entitled to draw pension thereafter and his dependants at that time may expect to depend upon such pension for their maintenance. Again the benefit such as gratuity and provident fund that a person may receive at the end of his service would go to the maintenance of himself and dependants in an after retirement life if a person is of meagre means and has necessarily to depend upon these for such sustenance. The court must take an overall view of these and determine how far the dependants may be benefited by the income of the deceased that he would have earned in the normal course. It is true that children who may complete their education and seek their own living may cease to be dependants at a particular point of time. The wife is likely to continue to be dependant on her husband even thereafter It may also be that a wife is by here self an earning member on the date of death of the deceased. The wife is likely to continue to be dependant on her husband even thereafter It may also be that a wife is by here self an earning member on the date of death of the deceased. This does not by itself mean that she is not a dependant on the deceased. If a part of the income of the husband also goes to the maintenance of the household of which the wife is one she may be a dependant to some extent on the husband's income. 13. The further question that may arise is as to how much of the income of the deceased is to be taken as being spent for the dependants. Different courts in India have taken different approaches on this question and it is difficult to find an undercurrent of sustained logic in these. We feel that in the normal course the income of a husband which is spent for the household must be taken to be expended for the benefit of the breadwinner and his dependants equally. Even in the case of a person who is able to save out of his income what he spends for the family must be taken to be enjoyed equally by himself and his dependants. That is because normally in an ordinary family with normal means of sustenance there is no special treatment to any member. The children cannot be expected to cost less, for, though they may possibly consume less food than the others, their needs such as for education are to be met. Therefore it would be reasonable to assume that the deceased would be expending as much for himself as for each one of the dependants out of the income expended by him for the family. There may be cases which are not normal such as where a husband is compelled for the purpose of his avocation to take up separate residence and has therefore to meet expenses in that connection. There may be cases which are not normal such as where a husband is compelled for the purpose of his avocation to take up separate residence and has therefore to meet expenses in that connection. Barring such cases in the general run of cases the income expended for the dependants may be taken as their share of expenses treating the breadwinner as one among the family for which the expenses are met Thus, where, as in this case, there is a family of father, mother and 3 children the share of expenses of the mother and the children would be 4/5th of the total expenses unless something more is shown indicating special expenses of the father. Where, as in this case, the income is barely sufficient for expenses the whole income may be taken as expended. The judgment of the court below does not indicate the basis for the assumption that 1/4th of the income alone would have been expended by the deceased John for his dependants. That appears to us to be unreasonable. A wife and three children having no other means of sustenance cannot live with a meagre monthly income of Rs. 50/-. 14. Summing up; The court or Tribunal determining the amount due to dependants on account of the loss to them caused by the death of the breadwinner would do well to pose and answer the following questions: 1. What would have been the age up to which the deceased would have lived in the normal course, considering all relevant factors such as state of health, family history and habit? 2. What was the income of the deceased on the date of death and what would have been his income structure during the rest of his life had he lived? 3. Had he a surplus left over or would he have expended the whole of his income for himself and dependants? 4. What would the deceased have expended on his dependants? Are there any special circumstances to hold that he would have expended more en himself? If so what would he have so expended? 5. What is the multiple to be applied for determining compensation, taking into account relevant facts such as the number of years the deceased would have earned, the extent and nature of dependency and the normal life-span of the deceased? 15. If so what would he have so expended? 5. What is the multiple to be applied for determining compensation, taking into account relevant facts such as the number of years the deceased would have earned, the extent and nature of dependency and the normal life-span of the deceased? 15. The normal expectation of life of the deceased in this case would be anywhere near 65 to 70 years. There is no case that he was not in sound state of health. He was 33 years of age on the date of his death. He would have been in service for 22 years more. His salary would not have remained static at Rs. 200/-As a matter of fact the salary scales have undergone drastic revisions and even without promotions he would have been entitled to more than double the income in due course. Therefore it cannot be said that the expectation of the plaintiffs that he would have retired with an income of Rs. 500/- is unreasonable. He would have been entitled to retirement benefits, however small they might be, on his retirement and would have continued to receive his pension. The children would have continued to enjoy the dependency until they were able to make their living There is no basis for the assumption that the first plaintiff, the widow, would have remarried. She was 31 on the date of suit. There is no suggestion when she was examined in 1974 that she had remarried. She had three children. In these circumstances to apply the multiple of 15 to determine what the dependants would be entitled to obtain as compensation seems to be very much on the low side. We have also to remember that when the children make a living of their own and for that reason the father has a more viable income would be shared between him and his wife as even then there would be no question of substantial saving but only a better living. The court below has not taken into account the tact that the deceased could have been in service for 22 years more and could have continued to earn normally for more than 10 years thereafter. 16. No doubt the multiple to be adopted is not the number of years for which the deceased may be earning income. The court below has not taken into account the tact that the deceased could have been in service for 22 years more and could have continued to earn normally for more than 10 years thereafter. 16. No doubt the multiple to be adopted is not the number of years for which the deceased may be earning income. That is because when compensation is to be awarded as a lump sum the payment is accelerated and necessarily allowance has to be made on account of such acceleration. What exactly is the allowance to be made for such acceleration is a matter to be decided in each case. We are not called upon to decide it here, for, if we take 4/5th of the income of the deceased even as on the date of his death and apply the multiple of 15 there will be very much more than the amount claimed even by the cross-objection. In fact even if we take half alone of the salary received by the deceased on the date of his death as expended for the dependants and again adopt the multiple of 15 only the resultant compensation would be more than what is now claimed even in the cross objection. We need not be taken to have said that these are the factors to be adopted. In fact we have indicated that this cannot be. But we are not going into this question further in this case only because the compensation awarded in this case in any view of the matter is inadequate and the additional amount of Rs. 7000/- prayed for in the cross-objection could be decreed without determining the other matters. If the deceased was receiving only Rs. 192/- at the time of his death half of his income would be Rs. 96/- and for 15 years it would be more than what is now claimed by the plaintiffs. 17. We may observe here that the claim by the plaintiffs was as dependants of the deceased and there was no case for the parties that defendants 3 and 4 are such dependants so much so that whatever was granted should have been granted to the plaintiffs. But since the memorandum of cross-objection is silent on this point we do not think that we should alter the decree granted to the plaintiffs as if it is for defendants 3 and 4 also. But since the memorandum of cross-objection is silent on this point we do not think that we should alter the decree granted to the plaintiffs as if it is for defendants 3 and 4 also. We also notice that we are not called upon in this case to consider the head of the claim for damages on account of loss of expectation of the life, a claim which is in the nature of one that may fall within S.2 of the Fatal Accidents Act since that has not been urged. The compensation awarded by the court below is found to be quite inadequate and consequently the appeal fails and the cross-objection succeeds. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs and the cross-objection is allowed with costs. On the total amount decreed interest will be due as found by the court below on the amount decreed by it.