ORDER S.D. Agrawal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directed against the order of the District Judge, Fatehpur dated 4th May, 1976. 2. The dispute in the present writ petition relates to a shop situate in the town of Khaga. The opposite party No. 3 is the landlord and the petitioner is the tenant. On 12th Aug., 1972 a suit for ejectment was filed against the petitioner. On 20th of Feb., 1973 the suit was decreed ex parte. The decree was got executed on 12th Oct., 1973 and the possession of the shop was delivered to the decree-holder. On 18th Oct., 1973 the petitioner filed an application for restoration under O. IX, R. 13, C.P.C. This application was allowed by the Munsif, Fatehpur on 19th Feb., 1976; the opposite party No. 3 filed a revision in the Court of the District Judge, Fatehpur. The revision was allowed on 4th of May, 1976 and the application for restoration was dismissed. It is this order which has been impugned in the present petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the revisional Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and as such the revisional Court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the decree passed by the trial Court was a void decree and as such his application for restoration is liable to be allowed. 4. Admittedly in the instant case the decree was passed on 20th Feb., 1973. The trial Court held the application for restoration maintainable on the ground that the application had been moved within 30 days from the knowledge of passing of the decree against the petitioner. The trial Court further held that the summonses on the petitioner were not duly served as the process server did not affix the copy of the plaint as required by O.V, R. 17, C.P.C. Having held that the summonses were not duly served the trial Court further recorded a finding that the petitioner did not have knowledge of the ex parte decree before 18th Oct., 1973. 5. 5. The revisional Court, however, held that the summonses were duly served and as such the application for restoration was beyond time and not maintainable in law. 6. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as follows: 128. To set aside a decree passed ex parte or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard exparte Thirty days The date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served when the applicant had know ledge of decree. 7. The period for limitation for filing an application for setting aside the ex parte decree commences from the date of decree if the summons had been duly served. If, however, the summons have not been duly served, then the period of limitation commences from the date the applicant has knowledge of the decree. The question whether the summons were duly served or not was, therefore, a jurisdictional fact on which depended the maintainability of the application for restoration. The revisional Court in the instant case has held that the summons were duly served and thereafter held that the application was not maintainable. Since the revisional Court has decided the jurisdictional fact it cannot be said that the revisional Court had acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. 8. The trial Court had held that the summons were nut duly served merely because a copy of the plaint had not been affixed on the outer door of the house of the petitioner, though, in fact, he had refused to accept the summons. In Raghubir Sahai Bhatnagar v. Bhakt Sajjan, AIR 1978 All 139 a Division Bench of this Court has already taken a view that mere non affixing of the copy of the plaint on the door of the house under O.V, R. 17, C.P.C. is a mere irregularity. The view, therefore, on merits taken by the revisional Court is correct. The summons were, therefore, duly served on the petitioner and the revisional Court has rightly held that the application for restoration was beyond time. 9. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel, this question cannot be urged by the petitioner in an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The course open to the petitioner was to challenge the ex parte decree by filing an appeal. This the petitioner did not do. 9. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel, this question cannot be urged by the petitioner in an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The course open to the petitioner was to challenge the ex parte decree by filing an appeal. This the petitioner did not do. In the circumstances, the second submission of the learned counsel does not in any manner affect, the decision of the application for restoration. 10. In the result, there is no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.