JUDGMENT - The dispute relates to survey No. 5/1 admeasuring 8 acres 31 gunthas situated at village Chatwan in Wani Tahsil of Yeotmal District. The land originally belonged to one Panibai widow of Dhulchand Chopda. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1258/74, Dharmanna was a tenant of the entire land since before coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Tenancy Act). Panibai died some time in 1966, although the exact date of her death is not on record. The present respondent No.3 Mishrilal succeeded to this widow in respect of the disputed property. The petitioner Dharmanna claimed that on 1 4-1961 and on 1-4-1963, be was in possession of the disputed land. 2. Suo-motu proceedings were started in 1963-64 by Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Wani for transferring the ownership of the disputed land in favour of petitioner-tenant Dharmanna under section 46 read with section 49-A of the Tenancy Act. On 20-11-1964, an order was passed by the said Agricultural Lands Tribunal dropping the proceedings in view of the fact that the land owner was a widow. 3. After the death of Panibai respondent No.3, who succeeded her did not apply to the competent authority within one year from the date of death of Panibai for personal cultivation of this land. The petitioner Dharmanna therefore, claims that be became statutory owner of this land in 1967 i. e. after one year after the death of Panibai in 1966 in view of the provisions of section 49-A, sub-section 3 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. 4. On 25-11-1970, the respondent No.3 Mishrilal sold 4 16 acres i. e. half of the disputed land to the petitioner Dharmanna at the value of 4 times the payment of rent according to the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. On the same day, the respondent No.3 Mishrilal sold the remaining half i. e. 4.15 acres to respondent No.2 by a registered sale-deed for an amount of Rs. 8,500. The petitioner Dharmanna contended that he was dispossessed from half portion sold by respondent No.3 to respondent No.2 without the order of the Tahsildar and, therefore, petitioner Dharmanna started proceedings under section 120 (c) of the Tenancy Act for obtaining possession of the half land which was put in possession of the respondent No.2. 8,500. The petitioner Dharmanna contended that he was dispossessed from half portion sold by respondent No.3 to respondent No.2 without the order of the Tahsildar and, therefore, petitioner Dharmanna started proceedings under section 120 (c) of the Tenancy Act for obtaining possession of the half land which was put in possession of the respondent No.2. The petitioner claimed that he succeeded in that proceedings and he obtained possession of that land under that proceedings and is still in possession of that portion of the land. 5. Thereafter, proceedings under section 122 of the Tenancy Act were initiated by the Additional Tahsildar for illegal transfers made by the respondent No.3 Mishrilal in favour of the petitioner, Dharmanna and in favour of respondent No.2. Notices were served in respect of both the sale-deeds and by virtue of his order dated 11-5-1973, Additional Tahsildar, Wani held that both the sales were hit by section 91 of Tenancy Act but so far as sale in favour of the petitioner Dharmanna is concerned, he imposed a nominal fine of Re. 1 and validated that sale-deed in favour of petitioner, Dharmanna. So far as the other sale-deed by respondent No.3 in favour .of respondent No.2 was concerned, the learned Additional Tahsildar held that the sale was invalid by virtue of section 91 of the Tenancy Act and he passed an order that that portion of the land be vested in the Government and consequently he passed further order that an amount of Rs. 8,300 which was the consideration in that sale deed is forfeited to the State Government and he further directed that the forfeited amount should be recovered from respondent No.3, as arrears of land revenue. 6. Being aggrieved by the order of the Additional Tahsildar, respondent No.2 alone preferred an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Wani. It is significant to note that these two petitioners did not prefer appeals. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1258/74 was impleaded as respondent No.3 in this appeal and the petitioner in other Special Civil Application was impleaded as respondent No 2 in this appeal. After considering the entire matter, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent No.2. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, it was respondent No.2 alone, who preferred a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur. After considering the entire matter, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent No.2. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, it was respondent No.2 alone, who preferred a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur. Here also, none of these two petitioners preferred any revision petition before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. After considering entire material, the learned member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal rejected the revision application as it was without any force. Thereafter, it is significant to note that the respondent No.2 did not prefer any writ petition but the present petitioner filed Special Civil Application No. 1258/74 against that part of the order, which directed vesting of half land in the Government and the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1734/74 filed a writ petition against the order forfeiting the amount of purchase in State Government; and that is how both these writ petitions are disposed of by a common order. 7. It was contended by Mr. Patil and Mr. Bapat that all the orders passed in this case are without jurisdiction. According to both of them, section 91 of the Tenancy Act was not applicable to the transactions in question. Section 91, sub-section 1 of the Tenancy Act runs as follows:- "When a landlord intends to sell any land, leased to tenant, he shall apply to the Tribunal for determining the reasonable price thereof….. " My attention therefore, is invited by both of them to the very commencement of this section, which says that where a landlord intends to sell any land leased to the tenant, he shall apply to the Tribunal for determining a reasonable price thereof. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that in the instant case, there was absolutely no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner Dharmanna and Mishrilal the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1734. Both of them, relied upon section 49-A subsection (3) of the Tenancy Act in order to point out that ownership of the land vested in the tenant Dharmanna some time in 1967. 8. It is an undisputed fact that the last owner prior to Mishrilal petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 1734 was one Panibai, who was a widow and she died some time in 1966. Mr. Bapat and Mr. 8. It is an undisputed fact that the last owner prior to Mishrilal petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 1734 was one Panibai, who was a widow and she died some time in 1966. Mr. Bapat and Mr. Patil, therefore, placed reliance upon section 49-A sub-section (3) of the Tenancy Act and it runs as follows :- "Where the landlord, belonging to any of the categories specified in sub-section (2) of section 38, has not given notice of termination of tenancy in accordance with the said sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 39-A or has given such notice but has not made an application thereafter under section 36 for possession, such tenant shall be deemed to be the full owner of land held by him on the expiry of the period specified in sub-section (3) of section 39-A." Now it is an admitted fact that Panibai was a widow and was belonging to the category specified in sub-section (2) of section 38 of the Tenancy Act. It is an undisputed fact that during the life time of Panibai, she did not serve the tenant with any notice in accordance with section 38 (2) or In accordance with section 39-A sub· section (3) of the Tenancy Act. It is further an undisputed fact that Mishrilal succeeded to the widow after her death and that Mishrilal also did not serve the tenant with notice within the period mentioned in either section 38 (2) or section 39-A (3). Under section 38 sub-section (2) (b), in the case of a widow notice is to be given by successor-in-title within one year from the date on which the widow's interest in the land ceases to exist. Similarly, under section 39-A subsection 3, where a landlord belongs to any of the following categories i.e., a minor, a widow or a person subject to any physical or mental disability etc. if the notice is not given or the application is not made as required by sub-section (2), then such notice may be given and such application made in case of landlord who is a widow by the successor-in-interest within one year from the date on which widow's interest in the land ceases to exist. if the notice is not given or the application is not made as required by sub-section (2), then such notice may be given and such application made in case of landlord who is a widow by the successor-in-interest within one year from the date on which widow's interest in the land ceases to exist. It is an undisputed fact that on account of death of Panibai in 1966, the widow's interest in the land ceased in 1966 and if we compute a period of one year from this year, this takes us to the year 1967. Hence at the end of this period is year 1967 and in the absence of any notice having been given either by widow or her successor-in-interest by virtue of section 49-A subsection 3 of the Tenancy Act such tenant shall be deemed to be full owner of the land held by him on the expiry of period specified in sub-section 3 of section 39-A. Hence by virtue of this provision after expiry of period of one year from the date of death of widow, the tenant became the statutory owner of the disputed land. 9. It is true that by virtue of sub-section 4 of section 49-A, the purchase is subject to the provision contained in sub section 4. It is also true that the provisions of sub-sections 4 to 14 of section 43 of the Tenancy Act apply in this case also. Now sub- section 4 of section 43 states about the deposit of the amount by the tenant on the determination of purchase price under sub-section 3 of section 43. Then we are not much concerned with sub-sections 5 to 10 of section 43 and what is material for our purpose is sub-section 11 of section 43, which runs as under:- "Until the deposit of the entire amount is made in lump sum or until the year in which the first instalment becomes payable the liability of the tenant to pay the rent due in respect of the land shall continue and shall not be affected. The tenant holding land in a scheduled area shall be liable to pay the land revenue canal revenue, and other cesses referred to in section 17 due in respect of the land on deposit of the entire amount or from the year in which the first instalment thereof becomes payable. The tenant holding land in a scheduled area shall be liable to pay the land revenue canal revenue, and other cesses referred to in section 17 due in respect of the land on deposit of the entire amount or from the year in which the first instalment thereof becomes payable. " We are not concerned with the later part of this sub-section, we are concerned only with the first part of this sub· sect ion, which says that until amount is paid, the liability of the tenant to pay rent due in respect of land shall continue. The crucial question for my consideration is what is the status of the so called tenant after the date on which such tenant shall be deemed to be full owner of the land held by him and the period required for fixation of price, for depositing the amount etc. The point is directly covered 'by an authority of Division Bench of this Court in Sitaram v. Hawadya,1. In this ruling, the Division Bench observed as follows:- "The question, is however, is whether by the provisions of this nature which ultimately fix the price and make it payable either in lumpsum or by instalments and with the best of intention the tenant is unable to pay and the sale becomes infructuous, is the relationship of landlord and tenant still kept alive by the legislature during this period? The answer seems to be clearly 'no'. The vesting is complete as on 1st of April, 1961 or 1st of April, 1963 (in the instant case one year after the death of Panibai i. e. 1967). It is a full title which the tenant gets, but that title is defeasible if he is unable to fulful the conditions of retaining that title. Even where the sale becomes ineffective, the landlord does not as of right get the entire land. Provisions of section 21 are attracted and the Tribunal has to dispose of the land in that manner after deciding the rights and liabilities of the landlord himself. In this scheme of Vidarbha Tenancy Act, we see no scope to infer that former tenant who now becomes owner can still be described as a tenant for certain purposes. True, the procedural sections leading to the fixation of price etc. In this scheme of Vidarbha Tenancy Act, we see no scope to infer that former tenant who now becomes owner can still be described as a tenant for certain purposes. True, the procedural sections leading to the fixation of price etc. to refer to the erstwhile tenant as tenant and makes provision for the payment of price by the tenant to the landlord. The legislature seems to have resorted to that nomenclature for easy reference and it does not mean that until last pie is paid the erstwhile tenant still continues to be a tenant and has to face the liabilities of a tenant or to enjoy rights of a tenant." Again further, the Division Bench observed as follows :- "This being the total scheme of the Act we are of the view that there is no scope to imagine that an ex-tenant who became full owner under the provisions of section 49-A and has been dispossessed from possession after 1-4-63 (in this case we are not concerned with the question of dispossession) can still call himself a tenant for the purpose of taking advantage of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act." Again after further discussion, the Division Bench observed as follows:- "The title was thus transferred from the landlord and vested in the tenant making him an owner on the 1st of April, 1963 at the latest (in the year 1967 at the latest in the instant case). The obligations were yet to be discharged and there was a right to decline to purchase. But short of that, the title being defeasible on the happening of those events, the vesting was complete and the ex-tenant was to be deemed to be an owner for all practical purposes as the very language of section 94-A itself points out unmistakably." Again after further discussion, and after reproducing some observations of the Supreme Court in Madhaorao v. Shankarsingh2, the Division Bench further observed as follows :- "Having pointed out that the land shall stand transferred to and vest in the tenant on the dates mentioned in those sections, the legislature further adds a clause that the tenant 'shall be deemed to be the full owner of such land'. This deeming provision obviously means an introduction of legal fiction. This deeming provision obviously means an introduction of legal fiction. Even if some formalities had remained and were to be performed later and even if due to the inability to comply with those provisions, in some cases, the sale was to be declared ineffective later, until that stage is reached the earlier tenant is to be deemed to be the full owner for all purposes. That is the intention of the legislature and we find that no other view is possible on the reading of these two sections". The Division Bench reproduced the following' observations of the Supreme Court :- "We concur in the view of the tribunal that the respondent No.1 became statutory owner of the land in his tenancy by virtue of section 46 (1) of the Act with effect from 1, April 1961, even though he did not take steps to purchase that land from the appellant under section 13". 10. Thus, this is an authority which has direct bearing on the facts of this case and I have so far pointed out that after a period of one year from the death of Panibai, the tenant became owner of this land and to use the word used in section 49-A, the tenant shall be deemed to be full owner of the land held by him. Once it is held that he is full owner of the land, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, between the ex-landlord and ex-tenant and in this view of the matter, the contention of the petitioners that section 91 of the Tenancy Act does not apply to the facts of this case has to be upheld. It is clear from the wording of section 91 itself that it applies in a case where the landlord intends to sell any land leased to the tenant, he shall apply to the Tribunal for determining the reasonable price thereof. This narration itself is sufficient to show that the relationship of landlord and tenant must exist on the date on which the landlord intends to sell land as contemplated by section 91. If the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases, there is no question of operation of section 91 of the Tenancy Act in this case. 11. Mr. Paonikar appearing for the State relied upon Gajanan v. State of Maharmhtra3. If the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases, there is no question of operation of section 91 of the Tenancy Act in this case. 11. Mr. Paonikar appearing for the State relied upon Gajanan v. State of Maharmhtra3. In that ruling although the tenant left the land at the end of April 1963, the tenant's right to the lands subsisted and hence there was a relationship of landlord and tenant in existence although the tenant was not in actual possession of the land and, therefore, it was held in that case that by virtue of section 91, the sale was invalid. In the instant case, I have pointed out so far that with reference to the observations made by the Division Bench that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist and the tenant became statutory owner of the land after a period of one year from the date of death of widow Panibai and hence the ruling on which Mr. Paonikar placed reliance is not applicable to the facts of this case. 12. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the orders passed by the Courts below deserve to be set aside and both these petitions deserve to be allowed; and accordingly they are allowed. The orders passed by .all the Courts below are hereby set aside and it is hereby directed that suo-motu proceedings started are directed to be dropped. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.