ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is against the judgment of Sri Devi Shanker Shukla, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi dated 25-7-1973. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details the petitioner filed an application on 3-1-73 before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, which had been decided by the Consolidation Officer through his order dated 5-7-1973, and the application has been dismissed as barred by time and the delay has not been condoned. Against the order of the Consolidation Officer the petitioner preferred a revision petition which has been dismissed through the impugned judgment dated 25-7-1973. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that in the circumstances of the present case the objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 was within time and it should have been proceeded with by the Consolidation authorities on merits. Secondly he has contended that the different tenure holders in the village were served with C.H. Form No. 5 in the second week of November, 1971 and the objection filed by them even after the objection filed by the petitioner have been entertained and have been decided on merits and the claim of the petitioner is not being investigated on merits due to bar of limitation. In the circumstances of the present case a liberal view should have been taken by the consolidation authorities and the delay in filing the objection by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 should have been condoned. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also emphasised before me that the Consolidation Officer had rejected the objections on the ground of limitation taking into account the fact that, the objection has been filed by the petitioner on 3-1-1973. If the Consolidation Officer had addressed himself to the objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 he might have condoned the delay but the revisional Court has refused to condone the delay on the ground that no affidavit or application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been filed. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner oral prayer and attending circumstances can also afford a ground for condonation of delay. Since the consolidation authorities have not afforded a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to explain the delay and that according to the decision of this Court the consolidation authorities should not adhere to technicalities, a great prejudice would occur to the petitioner, if her claim is not investigated on merits. Since the consolidation authorities have not afforded a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to explain the delay and that according to the decision of this Court the consolidation authorities should not adhere to technicalities, a great prejudice would occur to the petitioner, if her claim is not investigated on merits. 5. In reply the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted that in the circumstances of the present case it is difficult to accept that the objection filed by the petitioner was within time. He has also emphasised that no affidavit and application under Section 5 had been attached with the alleged objection dated 25-11-1971. hence the petitioner is not entitled to condonation of delay in preferring the objection on 25-11-1971. He has also emphasised that the revisional Court was fully justified in the circumstances of the present case in not condoning the delay as the alleged objection dated 25-11-1971 was filed much beyond time and it was rightly rejected by the revisional Court. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has also emphasised that the condonation of delay cannot be done by the consolidation authorities in the absence of any written application or affidavit. 6. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 7. This much is apparent that the tenure holders in the village had filed objection in the month of November 1971 and that has been dealt with on merits. Even if the objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 is not within time, a relevant consideration may arise whether the petitioner may be entitled to condonation of delay in view of the circumstances that the tenure holders in the village had filed objection in November 1971 which had been dealt with on merits. The Consolidation Officer in his judgment dated 5-7-1973 has mainly confined himself to the objection filed by the petitioner on 3-1-1973 arid did not condone the delay but rejected the objection. In revision it appears that the revisional Court has accepted the fact that the petitioner had filed an objection on 25-11-1971 but confirmed the judgment of the Consolidation Officer and did not condone the delay on the ground that the objection dated 25-11-1971 was also much beyond time. 8. In the circumstances of the present case it does not appear that the petitioner was called upon to explain the delay in filing the objection on 25-11-1971. 8. In the circumstances of the present case it does not appear that the petitioner was called upon to explain the delay in filing the objection on 25-11-1971. The Court has held several times that the consolidation authorities should not adhere to technicalities and decide the claims of the parties on merits. 9. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the circumstances of the present case his objection dated 25-11-1971 is within time but he has not been able to satisfy me prima facie that this objection may be within time. However, in the ends of justice it is necessary to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to satisfy the last Court of fact about his contention whether his objection dated 25-11-1971 is within time or whether the petitioner is entitled to condonation of delay in the circumstances of the present case. 10. A suggestion has been made to me that on the basis of oral prayer and the attending circumstances the claim of condonation of delay regarding objection dated 25-11-1971 can be demonstrated, but the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted that in view of a recent ruling of their Lordships of the Supreme Court the oral prayer cannot be entertained. 11. In my opinion the Consolidation officer had not exercised his discretion about condonation of delay, regarding objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 and the revisional Court has dealt with the question without affording an opportunity to the petitioner as to why his objection filed on 25-11-1971, should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation and on the materials on record the revisional Court has dismissed the objection as barred by time. It is in the ends of justice that the revisional Courts being last Court of fact, should afford a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to satisfy itself about the question whether the objection filed by the petitioner may be treated as within time or the petitioner may be entitled to condonation of delay in the case. All the legal pleas raised by the learned counsel tor the contesting opposite party are left open to be canvassed before the revisional Court, so that the claim of the contesting opposite party about the merits of his claims as well as the valuable right accruing to him due to bar of limitation may not be jeopardised in any manner. All the legal pleas raised by the learned counsel tor the contesting opposite party are left open to be canvassed before the revisional Court, so that the claim of the contesting opposite party about the merits of his claims as well as the valuable right accruing to him due to bar of limitation may not be jeopardised in any manner. 12. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in (1973) 2 SCC 52 : ( AIR 1972 SC 2125 ) Chander Bhan v. Bal Mukand in support of his contention that the revisional Court, was fully justified in dismissing the petitioners objection dated 25-11-1971 in the absence of any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay. To my mind their Lordships all the Supreme Court in the aforesaid ruling have not declared the law to the effect that oral prayer regarding condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained by a Court in the absence of a written application. 13. It is noteworthy that the learned Judges in AIR 1936 All 666 : (1936 All LJ 1281) Mst. Kulsommum Nissa v. Noor Mohammed, AIR 1959 Punj 646 Firm Kaura Mal Bishan Dass v. Firm Mathra Dass Atma Ram, AIR 1975 Mad 137 , Meghraj v. Jesraj Kasturjee and 1977 All WC 624 :( AIR 1978 All 21 ) Mohd. Ajmal v. Firm Indian Chemical Co. have indicated that oral prayer for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be entertained by a Court. 14. In AIR 1975 Mad 137 Meghraj v. Jesraj Kasturjee a learned single Judge of that Court has observed in para 4, all the ruling as below :- "The consensus, therefore, appears to be this. If under explainable circumstance an appeal or an application is filed in Court, but without a formal application or a written application for excusing the delay in the presentation of the same, then the Court should circumvent, technicality and afford a reasonable opportunity in the aggrieved party to mend matters. Otherwise it would lead to miscarriage of justice. (Underlining is mine) 15. Otherwise it would lead to miscarriage of justice. (Underlining is mine) 15. In the present case the tenure of the impugned judgment indicates that the revisional Court has dismissed the objection filed by the petitioner on the ground of limitation due to the circumstance that the petitioner had not indicated any reason for filing the belated objection. The trial Court had dismissed the second objection filed by the petitioner in the year 1973 through its order dated 5-7-1973. In the revision petition the question under consideration was about the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer on 5-7-1973. When the revisional Court accepted the contention of the petitioner that he had filed an objection on 25-11-1971 it was proper for the revisional Court to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to indicate how his objection was within time or the petitioner was entitled to condonation of delay. Without affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner the revisional Court has held even the objection dated 25-11-1971 filed by the petitioner as barred by time, I think a great prejudice has occurred to the petition and the petitioner should get reasonable opportunity to explain the delay, if any, in the circumstances of the present case as it has been contended before me that various tenure holders in the village had filed objections even after 25-11-1971 and their objections had been entertained and decided on merits. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1965 SC 111 , T. Prem Sagar v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Madras, and the ruling reported in (1969) 3 SCC 489 , Thakur Birendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, and has contended that this Court should not make any direction to the revisional Court to consider the oral prayer on behalf of the petitioner for condonation of delay under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. In the present case, however, I only propose to quash the impugned judgment of the revisional Court without making any direction to the revisional Court. It would be open to the petitioner to convince the revisional Court about the merits of his contention. 17. In the present case, however, I only propose to quash the impugned judgment of the revisional Court without making any direction to the revisional Court. It would be open to the petitioner to convince the revisional Court about the merits of his contention. Since I have accepted the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party in this regard I do not express any concluded opinion on the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that this Court cannot make any direction to the revisional Court for considering the oral prayer of the petitioner for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing the objection before the Consolidation Officer. 18. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has also suggested in view of the ruling of this Court reported in 1967 Rev Dec 340 Chhotey Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation when the revisional Court has refused to condone the delay in preferring the objection by the petitioner, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned judgment. The aforesaid ruling is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case the revisional Court did not call upon the petitioner to explain the delay in preferring the objection on 25-11-1971. 19. In view of the ruling of the Madras High Court mentioned above, I am of the view that the revisional Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to put forward his claim for condonation of delay or to indicate as to whether the objection was within time. To my mind the petitioner deserves an opportunity to put forward his claim before the consolidation authorities on the question of delay. 20. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has also placed reliance upon the ruling reported in 1971 Rev Dec 162 (All) Bachan Singh v. Gauri Shankar Agarwal and has contended that this Court should not consider the question of oral prayer as it had not been urged before the revisional Court. I have already indicated above that I have agreed to the suggestion of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that I will not make any direction to the revisional Court to consider the oral prayer of the petitioner. I think that I should not express any concluded opinion regarding the oral prayer made by the petitioner before me. 21. I think that I should not express any concluded opinion regarding the oral prayer made by the petitioner before me. 21. In my opinion the revisional Court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record in dismissing the objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 as barred by time without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to put forward his claim on the question involved in view of the ruling of the Madras High Court mentioned (supra). Moreover, in the revision petition before the revisional Court the order of the Consolidation Officer dismissing the second objection filed by the petitioner in the year 1973 was under consideration and when the revisional Court accepted the fact that the petitioner had filed an objection even in the year 1971 it was only necessary for the revisional Court to have considered the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer on 5-7-1973 (Annexure 3 attached with the writ petition) and it should not have dismissed the objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 as barred by time without affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to put forward his claim on the question of delay regarding objection dated 25-11-1971 to my mind the revisional court has exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the objection of the petitioner dated 25-11-1971 on the ground of limitation and it has acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in dismissing the petitioner's objection dated 25-11-1971 without a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner for putting forward his claim on the question of delay. 22. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has vehemently argued that the claim of the petitioner is not fair and honest, hence no interference should be made with the impugned judgment of the revisional Court. At this stage it would be premature to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party especially when the petitioner has not got any opportunity to substantiate his claim. The ends of justice require that the petitioner should get a fair opportunity to put forward his, claim on the question of delay in preferring the objection and if the objection filed by the petitioner on 25-11-1971 is either found within time or the petitioner is found entitled to condonation of delay, he should get an opportunity to establish his claim on merits. 23. 23. In the result the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional Court dated 25-7-1973 in revision 721 under Section 48 of the U.P. C.H. Act, Smt. Indrasani v. Satya Narain and others, is hereby quashed. When the judgment of the revisional Court has been quashed, it would be open to the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of the revisional Court in the light of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.