JUDGMENT Murlidhar, J. - This is a plaintiff second appeal arising out of a suit for declaring order dated 13-12-1955 of his dismissal from service to be illegal and void and for Rs. 5,820-03 as arrears of pay and allowance. 2. The trial court decreed the suit but the lower appellate court has dismissed it. 3. The brief relevant facts are that the plaintiff-appellant was an instrument mechanic (electrical) in the 509 Army Workshop. He had initially been appointed as a clerk in the workshop on 5th July, 1945, but became instrument mechanic in December, 1948. He was a trade union worker and on 5th Apr. 1955, was alleged to have pushed a sentry at the gate and addressed the workers after mounting his stool. With regard to this incident a court of inquiry was held and orders for his removal from service were passed on 9-6-1955. On a departmental appeal, however, the appellate authority remanded the enquiry with a direction that the three defence witnesses not examined earlier should be examined. After remand, these three witnesses were examined and the appellant again was dismissed from service as per order dated 13-12-1955. An appeal against the order was also dismissed by the appellate authority. Thereafter the suit in question was filed, challenging the order of the dismissal on a number of grounds. It is not necessary to detail these grounds for after adverse decision of the lower appellate court, the learned counsel for the appellant has pressed only three grounds of attack on the order of the dismissal. Two of these pertain to the alleged lack of proper opportunity to defend himself during the inquiry and one to the competence of the authority that passed the order of dismissal. I proceed to examine each one of these points. 4. It may be noted that the applicant is governed by Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and although the appellants appointment is of an earlier period, the parties argued their cases on the basis of the Rules without pointing out the rules existing at the time of the appellants appointment to the post. 5. So far as the first point is concerned, it may be mentioned that Rule 15 of the above Rules provides for the procedure to be followed during the inquiry. 5. So far as the first point is concerned, it may be mentioned that Rule 15 of the above Rules provides for the procedure to be followed during the inquiry. Inter alia, it states that the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person, and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. A discretion, however, is given to the Inquiry Officer about the defence witnesses in these words: "Provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness". Now in the present case, some witnesses in the inquiry were examined on 5th Apr. 1955, but another court of enquiry was constituted on 12th Apr. 1955 and after some proceedings the appellant requested for permission to have a lawyer and examine witnesses from outside the workshop but vide letter dated 12-5-1955, these requests were refused and it was stated that the incident had taken place inside the premises of the workshop and, hence it was not possible for any outsider to be a witness of the same and, hence, no outside witness would be permitted to appear before the Enquiry Officer. The appellant questioned this order and reiterated his request for outside witness. But this was again rejected as per letter dated 19-5-1955. 6. Learned, counsel has urged that the discretion permitted by R. 15 could be exercised for any individual witness but a blanket shutting out of the outside witnesses was improper and illegal. The argument is correct in the sense that the reasoning of the Inquiry Officer is not very correct. But this was again rejected as per letter dated 19-5-1955. 6. Learned, counsel has urged that the discretion permitted by R. 15 could be exercised for any individual witness but a blanket shutting out of the outside witnesses was improper and illegal. The argument is correct in the sense that the reasoning of the Inquiry Officer is not very correct. But then we consider the position in the background of the facts that the appellant had named as many as 15 workshop witnesses who were, in fact, examined, that at no stage he named a particular outside witness or witnesses proposed to be examined to enable an assessment of their importance to the inquiry, that the matter pertains to a heavily guarded defence establishment and except in special cases, introduction of any outsider in disciplinary inquiries of this kind relating to such establishment would on ground of policy be undesirable; I think no fault can be found in the decision to exclude outsider witness even if we accept the position that the gate being a barbed-wire one it was physically possible for persons outside the gate to see the occurrence. Even in the suit, the appellant has not indicated how he was prejudiced by this decision nor has indicated the witness whose evidence might have made a difference to his case so far as the inquiry was concerned and would have worked where fifteen workshop witnesses proved to be of no avail. Therefore, no prejudice by the alleged irregularity has been shown. In this situation, I find that the decision of the learned appellate court that the inquiry cannot be held vitiated for improper shutting out of the outsider defence witnesses to be correct. 7. The second objection is that the appellant was prejudiced in his defence because although on 18-10-1955 the inquiry was adjourned to 19-10-1955, it was subsequently completed on the 18th itself. The facts are found recited in the two judgments. On 18th, the appellant was called and said that the inquiry was being held in continuation of the previous inquiry and to examine the three remaining defence witnesses named by him. The appellant stated that he was not prepared for the inquiry and may be informed in writing whatever was to be conveyed to him. A written order was then passed by the Major Middha the Officer Commanding. The appellant stated that he was not prepared for the inquiry and may be informed in writing whatever was to be conveyed to him. A written order was then passed by the Major Middha the Officer Commanding. Thereafter the names of the defence witnesses were also given out but the appellant stated that he was going home. Major Middha warned him but he said that he may be allowed to leave and whatever was to be intimated to him, may be given in writing. The Court of Inquiry again explained the situation to him and reassembled after five minutes but the appellant insisted on going away and walked away. At this development, Major Middha proposed to postpone the inquiry to 19th and prepared an intimation in this regard for the appellant but the appellant refused to take even this intimation and the endorsement on the letter was that he had refused to receive the same or sign it after reading it. Thereafter Major Middha continued the inquiry on the same day, recalled the three defence witnesses and recorded their statements, as directed by the appellate authority. In view of the conduct of the appellant described above, it seems clear that the appellant was totally non-cooperative. He cannot be allowed to make any grievance of the fact that the inquiry was completed on 18th after being postponed to 19th. In the circumstances, the postponement to next day should be regarded as a proposal to accommodate the appellant which was dropped because of the appellants attitude. The completion of inquiry on 19th does not appear to have prejudiced the appellant in any way. No further material came on record on that day. The learned lower appellate courts judgment shows that the three witnesses examined on that day did not state anything against him. It is, thus, clear that no prejudice, whatever, was caused to the appellant by finalising the inquiry on 18th itself. This point also, therefore, fails. 8. The main argument is that the appellant was removed from the service on the order of the Officer Commanding although the appointing authority was the Director of Military Engineering or who is a high authority or D.M.E. Now, in this regard, according to the R. 14 of the Rules, the penalty of removal is imposable by "the Government or by the appointing authority". An explanation states that "in this rule the expression the appointing authority includes an officer empowered under R. 10 to make first appointments to class III and class IV services". Rule 10 states that the first appointment to class III and class IV are to be made by the authority specified in col. 3 of Sch. IV or by officers empowered in this behalf by the such authorities. The authority specified in col. 3 of Sch. IV, so far as the appellants post is concerned, is the D. M. E. who is a higher authority than the Officer Commanding of the workshop. It is also undisputed that in 1952, the D. M. E. passed an order empowering Officer Commanding to make appointments under R. 10. The respondents contention is that in view of the explanation to Rule 14, the officer commanding was an appointing authority empowered under R. 10 and had power to dismiss while the contention of the appellant is that since he was appointed prior to 1952, his appointment must be taken to have been made by the D. M. E. and he could not be dismissed by an officer commanding who is undisputedly an authority lower than D. M. E. 9. There are two answers to this argument. In the first place, as the lower appellate court has observed, the appellant cannot be presumed to have been appointed by the D. M. E. on the basis that he is the appointing authority under the 1952 Rules and the notification empowering officer commanding to make appointments under R. 10 is of 1952. The appellant has not shown the appointment letter or adduced any evidence to show who was his actual appointing authority and, therefore, the argument that officer commanding is an authority lower than appointing authority, is not available to him. For all that we know, the applicant may have been appointed by the officer commanding. The plaint allegation shows that the appellant initially was appointed as a clerk and later on he shifted to the post of instrument mechanic. He should have strictly proved who was the appointing authority before he could attack his dismissal on this ground. I agree to the finding of the lower appellate court that this not having been done, the argument cannot help the appellant. 10. He should have strictly proved who was the appointing authority before he could attack his dismissal on this ground. I agree to the finding of the lower appellate court that this not having been done, the argument cannot help the appellant. 10. But apart from this, I am inclined to think that even if the D. M. E. be assumed to have been appointing authority, the removal by the officer commanding who on the date of the disciplinary proceedings was empowered under R. 10 would be in order. Admittedly, the appellant being in a defence establishment is not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution under which no person can be dismissed or removed "by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed". Nor is this a case where the Rules applicable themselves provide that no authority lower than the one which appointed the employee shall dismiss him. Therefore, the various rulings with regard to dismissals of persons to whom Article 311 or such Rules are applicable are of no help in the present case. This is a matter that has to be governed solely by the interpretation of 1952 Rules. What do the words, "appointing authority" read with explanation in R. 14 mean. In my opinion, in the light of the explanation the words "appointing authority" must be interpreted to mean the appointing authority competent to make the appointment on the date of the dismissal order and not the appointing authority which had the power of appointment on the date of actual appointment. Thus, where an officer was not empowered under R. 10 to make an appointment on the date of the appointment but became so empowered subsequently he would become an appointing authority for the purpose of R. 14 even though he may not have been an appointing authority on the date of the appointment because till then he had not been empowered or designated the appointing authority. This would be the reasonable interpretation for if an empowered officer as a matter of routine deals with these affairs, it will be-highly inconvenient without any advantage to require the actual appointing authority to handle cases of dismissal of persons appointed before the authority was delegated to the empowered officer. The dismissal by officer commanding must therefore, be held to be in order. 11. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The dismissal by officer commanding must therefore, be held to be in order. 11. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this court.