Judgment :- 1. The second defendant in a suit for injunction is the petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition and the 3rd defendant in the same suit is the petitioner in the Original Petition under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. The suit O.S. No. 125 of 1980 was filed before the Moovattupuzha Munsiff Court on 16-4-1980 and an interim injunction was sought in that suit to restrain the defendants from tampering with, altering or destroying the road described as plaint schedule item 3 or from obstructing the use of the road by the plaintiff or his workmen or restraining the movement of vehicles at the instance of the plaintiff. On this application which was also moved on 16-4-1980 the court passed an interim order on the same day in the following terms: "Heard petitioner. Interim injunction and also order to maintain status quo by both parties, notice and counter by 17-6-1980." This order was passed exparte and before issue of notice to the defendants. Pursuant to the notice the second defendant appeared and filed a petition to vacate the interim order of injunction. This was filed on the 19th of April 1980 and it is urged at the hearing by Sri. Manual Paikaday, counsel for the petitioners in these cases, that he appeared and moved the court for disposal of the petition for injunction. The injunction petition was not disposed of and the court closed on the 19th April. Thereafter the vacation court was moved by a Revision Petition. CRP. 1081 of 1980, against the order passed by the learned Munsiff. The Revision was filed on 24-4-1980. Evidently for the same purpose a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution was moved on 12-5-1980. These matters came up before the vacation judge on 23rd May. The learned judge directed the posting of the cases before a Division Bench and accordingly the matter has come up before us. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners in these cases calls our attention to the provisions in 0.39 of the Code of Civil Procedure which call for a procedure different from that resorted to by the learned Munsiff in this case. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners in these cases calls our attention to the provisions in 0.39 of the Code of Civil Procedure which call for a procedure different from that resorted to by the learned Munsiff in this case. There has been a marked departure in regard to the provisions for grant of injunction in the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1976 from what it was prior to the amendment, and according to counsel the court below acted in violation of the provisions as in force now. It is for this reason that the learned counsel contends that the order is a nullity. If so, according to him, he is not obliged to file an appeal. That, according to learned counsel explains the filing of the Revision and also the filing of the petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. 3. Under the Code as it stood prior to the amendment in 1976 R.3 of 0.39 provided for grant of an injunction after notice of the application for injunction was given to the opposite party with the exception that in case it appears that the object of grant of injunction would be defeated by the delay, injunction could be ordered even before the issue of notice. That provision enabled the courts to issue exparte orders. Even under that rule the grant of such interim orders exparte should be taken to be the exception and not the rule, for, in cases where it would be practicable to give notice to the opposite party before grant of an order of injunction that should be done. It has been our experience that subordinate courts have not taken this requirement as seriously as they should in quite a good number of cases. We had occasion earlier to alert courts to the need of restraint of exercise under 0.39 in the matter of grant of interim injunction and particularly in avoiding the grant of exparte orders where without serious prejudice to parties that could be done after notice. 4. Evidently the practice of grant of exparte interim orders and sometimes the abuse of such power has received the attention of the Parliament which has amended 0 39 to meet the situation. That is by incorporating a proviso to 0 39 R.3 and incorporating a new Rule, 0.39 R.3A. The proviso to R.3 of 0.39 reads thus: "3. 4. Evidently the practice of grant of exparte interim orders and sometimes the abuse of such power has received the attention of the Parliament which has amended 0 39 to meet the situation. That is by incorporating a proviso to 0 39 R.3 and incorporating a new Rule, 0.39 R.3A. The proviso to R.3 of 0.39 reads thus: "3. Before granting injunction, court to direct notice to opposite party The court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent." Rule 3A reads thus: "3A. Court to dispose of application for injunction within thirty days: Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability." Whereas, prior to the amendment in 1976, a court would not be doing wrong in passing an exparte interim order without recording reason for dispensing with notice at that stage the proviso requires the recording of reasons for the opinion of the court that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay if notice was to be given. Further that rule requires the immediate delivery to the person against whom injunction is sought materials which would acquaint him of the case against him. To secure that this is done clause (b) of the proviso further makes provision that either on the day on which the injunction is granted or on the day immediately following the day an affidavit has to be filed stating that copies of documents mentioned in clause (a) of the proviso have been delivered or sent. R.3A is equally significant. Where an exparte order of injunction is granted the court is under a solemn duty to dispose of the matter within 30 days of the date of order of injunction. Where it is unable to do so it is called upon to record its reason therefor. Therefore though in terms it only requires a court to make an endeavour, if the court does not dispose of the matter within 30 days why its endeavour has not succeeded has to be indicated. 5. Despite these provisions in the Code some courts are still following the procedure as it stood prior to the amendment. The issue of interim orders exparte without recording reasons for passing such orders in that manner and cases of interim injunctions not disposed of within 30 days without recording reasons are of common occurrence. The Parliament made a conscious departure from the procedure that was in force earlier. The Parliament cannot oversee the functioning of the courts but it is up to the courts to respect the provisions in letter and spirit and conform to the requirements laid down by the Code as it stands amended. We are mentioning this to show that though we normally do not interfere with the procedure adopted by a court in any individual case in exercise of our power under Art.227 of the Constitution we consider that on the facts of this case it would be appropriate for us to notice the error in the procedure adopted by the court below so that we can use this occasion to alert the subordinate courts to the situation brought about by the amendment of the Code and the need for compliance with the provisions relating to grant of injunction as they stand amended in 1976. 6. 6. Though the revision before us cannot be entertained for the reason that a revision, when an appeal lies is prohibited, we may consider the grievance of the petitioner in the petition O.P. 1617 of 1980 Learned counsel Sri. Manual Paikaday submits that he has filed this revision on account of the fact that he is not to file an appeal against the order which is a nullity. We do not want to go into the question whether non-compliance with the requirement of recording reasons or posting the case to a date beyond 30 days without recording reasons would be sufficient to characterise the order under challenge as a nullity. Applying the same logic as that has been urged before us namely that the order is a nullity and no appeal is therefore necessary we would say that if it is a nullity and for that reason the right of appeal is not to be invoked the power of revision under S 115 is also not to be invoked. We need not be taken as having indicated any view on the question whether a party could set right an order which is contended by him to be erroneous and nullity by an appeal. Nor need we be taken to have spoken on the question whether the order is a nullity. For reasons stated we do not think that we should entertain the Revision Petition here. 7. But as we have said here if there is any serious error in the procedure adopted by the court below we would be justified in exercising our supervisory power in this case. The learned Munsiff passed the interim order on 16-4-1980, before issue of notice to the opposite party. But the learned Munsiff has not recorded reasons indicating that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay caused by the service of notice Again we find that the order directs interim injunction in terms applied for and added to that there is a further direction that status quo is to be maintained. It is not easy to digest this order. Where status quo is known the court may do well to maintain status quo if circumstances warrant such a course. But where a court directs injunction and thereby commands that certain acts shall not be performed, to club such direction with an order to maintain status quo makes very little sense. It is not easy to digest this order. Where status quo is known the court may do well to maintain status quo if circumstances warrant such a course. But where a court directs injunction and thereby commands that certain acts shall not be performed, to club such direction with an order to maintain status quo makes very little sense. At any rate that ought not to find a place in an order of court intended to be complied with. This court had occasion to point out that an order of injunction is a command by court and therefore it should be in such terms as is to be capable of compliance by the party to whom it is directed. It should not be ambiguous. It should not be vague or inconsistent. It should be sufficient to tell a party clearly what he is expected to do. The consequence of non-compliance being the risk of having to face the court on a charge of contempt a party should be apprised fully and clearly of what the court directs him to do or not to do by its order By an order in the nature passed by the learned Munsiff directing interim injunction in terms sought for coupled with a direction to maintain status quo the party would be non-plussed. 8. We notice that the learned Munsiff posted the case to 17-6-1980 by its order on 16-4-1980. Possibly the Munsiff thought that the case could not be disposed of within 30 days since the vacation intervened. But to discharge the legal obligation of disposing of the case as far as possible within 30 days the case should have been posted to a date immediately after reopening and not to a date two weeks after the reopening. 9. The grant of injunction is not a matter of course. Whether the court is satisfied of a prima facie case for the party seeking injunction, and of the urgent need for the injunction and also of the injury that would be caused to the party by the non-grant of interim order are matters which the court should consider when granting an order exparte. By casual grant of exparte orders the power of a court can be used to prejudice parties and that would amount to abuse of court's power. By casual grant of exparte orders the power of a court can be used to prejudice parties and that would amount to abuse of court's power. The civil court whose power under 0.39 is vast should exercise self-restraint in the grant of orders in exercise of its power. Evidently the legislature might have felt that there has generally been absence of such self-restraint to the extent desirable and therefore incorporated the amendment in R.3 of 0.39 and incorporated anew Rule R 3A. It would be desirable that courts do not give room for such legislative prescription of restrictions and that would be possible only if they exercise judicial mind in limiting their exercise of power so as to promote good and not to cause prejudice to parties. 10. In the circumstances of this case, as we have already indicated, the learned Munsiff was in error in passing an order in the nature she has chosen to pass and also in passing an order without conforming to the procedure prescribed in 0.39 as already indicated in this judgment. Though counsel Sri. Manual Paikaday urged that the injunction petition should be finally heard and disposed of by us, we do not think that it would be appropriate. In the exercise of supervisory power we have only to correct the error in the exercise of the court below and in this instant it would be by pointing out the mistake the court below has committed in passing the interim order. The final disposal must necessarily be by the court below. It is necessary that the injunction matter should be disposed of expeditiously, the requirement of the law being that it should be done within 30 days of the date of the injunction order. That period having expired and no reasons having been indicated for the delay it is necessary that there should be no further delay on any account. The matter has to be posted expeditiously. Though defendants I and 4 do not appear here, Sri. Manual T. Paikaday submits that he is taking notice on behalf of defendants I and 4 also and will accordingly enter appearance for them in the court below on the 11th June, to which date we post the case in the court below. The counsel on both sides take notice for the parties. Manual T. Paikaday submits that he is taking notice on behalf of defendants I and 4 also and will accordingly enter appearance for them in the court below on the 11th June, to which date we post the case in the court below. The counsel on both sides take notice for the parties. The learned Munsiff shall positively hear both parties on that day and dispose of the injunction petition immediately after the arguments are closed. Any papers necessary for the injunction petition must be filed by the parties if they want to rely upon them on or before 10th June. The Civil Revision Petition and the Original Petition are disposed of as above.