ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows :- 2. The property in dispute is a part of the premises No. 106/247, Gandhi Nagar, Kanpur. Rudra Narain Shukla, was originally the tenant. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 9 are his heirs and legal representatives. Opposite party No. 1, Smt. Sundari Devi is the owner of the property. On 29th May, 1967 the opposite party No. 1 filed an application under Section 7-B of U.P. Act 3 of 1947, against Rudra Narain Shukla. This was Misc. Case No. 503 of 1967. Rudra Narain Shukla deposited the entire rent demanded in those proceedings amounting to Rs. 110/25 np. After the deposit of the amount the application under Sec. 7-B of the Act was dismissed in default. Rudra Narain Shukla thereafter made an application under Section 7-C of the Act which was allowed on 9th August, 1968 and he continued to deposit the amount up to 28th November, 1969 towards the rent. On 20th November, 1969 another application was made under Section 7-B of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 which was numbered as 1151 of 1979. This application was served on Rudra Narain Shukla on 28th November, 1969. Rudra Narain Shukla died on 13th December, 1969 and thereafter the petitioners were made parties on 17th July, 1970, being the legal heirs and representatives of Rudra Narain Shukla. The petitioners filed objections before the trial Court. Rudra Narain Shukla did not deposit the amount as required under Section 7-B of the Act. The petitioners after they were impleaded as parties filed objections to the effect that the application under Section 7-B of the Act was not maintainable; that the amount claimed under Section 7-B of the Act had already been deposited by them. Objections were rejected and the Munsif City, Kanpur by order dated 31st October, 1972, allowed the application under Sec. 7-B of the Act and directed the eviction of the petitioners from the property in dispute. Against the said order a civil revision No. 299 of 1972, was filed by the petitioner before the District Judge; Kanpur. The revision came up for hearing before the III Additional District Judge, Kanpur who by judgment dated September 13, 1975, dismissed the revision. Against the said order a civil revision No. 299 of 1972, was filed by the petitioner before the District Judge; Kanpur. The revision came up for hearing before the III Additional District Judge, Kanpur who by judgment dated September 13, 1975, dismissed the revision. Thereafter the order dated 13th September, 1975, was challenged in a revision filed in this Court which was dismissed as not maintainable in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court. After the dismissal of the revision the present petition has been filed challenging the orders dated 31st October, 1972 and 13th September, 1975, mentioned above. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that a sum of Rs. 110/25 which had been deposited in the earlier proceedings under Section 7-B of the Act should have been considered as a deposit in this proceeding and as such the order under Sec. 7-B of the Act could not have been passed by the Courts below. 4. The second submission of the learned counsel is that Rudra Narain Shukla having died on 13th December 1969, the application could not have been proceeded thereafter as the tenancy in favour of Rudra Narain Shukla was a statutory tenancy and it was not heritable and as such the petitioners could not be directed to be evicted under this proceeding. 5. In so far as the first contention is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the amount deposited in the earlier proceedings under Section 7-B of the Act could have been withdrawn by the landlord and as such it could be deemed to have been paid to the landlord. 6. As I have already stated above, Rs. 110/25 had been deposited by Rudra Narain Shukla in the earlier proceedings under S. 7-B of the Act. The application under Section 7-B was thereafter dismissed in default. The effect was that the deposits which have been made Dy Rudra Narain Shukla could not have been withdrawn by the landlord. It was Rudra Narain Shukla who alone could have withdrawn the sum of Rs. 110/25 from the Court. In the circumstances, it cannot be deemed to be a payment to the landlord even on the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners. It was Rudra Narain Shukla who alone could have withdrawn the sum of Rs. 110/25 from the Court. In the circumstances, it cannot be deemed to be a payment to the landlord even on the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners. In my view, therefore, the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner lacks substance and the view taken by the Courts below is in accordance with law. I do not find any manifest error of law in this finding recorded by the Court below. 7. In regard to the second submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in Lala Prem Prakash v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1967 All WR (HC) 762 : (1967 All LJ 985) a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that an allottee leaves behind a heritable interest on his death when there is a subsisting contract of tenancy between him and the landlord at the time of his death. Such contract may be express or implied. Its formation and subsistence at the death are questions of fact to be decided on the facts of each case. An implied contract may be spelt out from the conduct of the landlord and the allottee and other circumstances. For instance, where the landlord accepts rent from the allottee without any protest, or where the District Magistrate allots the accommodation to his nominee u/R 4 or the person suggested by him under Rules 7 and 8, there should arise a contract of tenancy. 8. The principle laid down in the case of Lala Prem Prakash (supra) fully applies in the present case. In the instant case, after the allotment rent was being accepted by the landlord from Rudra Narain Shukla. Therefore, the contract of tenancy came into existence. Once the contract of tenancy came into existence, the tenancy would be heritable. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied on Bakshi Chaman Lal v. Smt. Amrit Kaur, 1975 Rent C.J. 646. In this case the learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court has taken the view that when a statutory tenant dies, landlord's right to obtain possession of the demised premises survives to him. The legal representatives of a deceased statutory tenant have the right to urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except such as were personal to the latter. The legal representatives of a deceased statutory tenant have the right to urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except such as were personal to the latter. In the case of Bakshi Chaman Lal (supra) the Punjab High Court has taken the view that the case can be proceeded against the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant. In the instant case the petitioners are not claiming any independent right and they have disclaimed their heritable right in the property. Admittedly they are the legal representatives and heirs of the deceased tenant and as such the claim against the deceased tenant can be proceeded against the present petitioners. Support can be had for this proposition also from Rameshwar Dayal v. Smt. Mohania, 1963 All LJ 198, where a Division Bench of our Court has taken the view that a suit can be filed for eviction of a tenant who is an heir of the original tenant, after the death of the original tenant on the basis of a permission obtained against the original tenant during the lifetime of the original tenant. In my view once the tenant died, under the general law the landlord can get substituted his legal heirs and representatives in the proceedings against the original tenant and therefore proceed against the legal heirs and representatives of the tenant and they are bound by the decree passed against the original tenant. In the circumstances it cannot be said that mere death of Rudra Narain Shukla brought about an end of the proceedings under Section 7-B of the Act. The proceeding under Section 7-B of the Act was, therefore, validly continued and the order passed in Section 7-B cannot therefore be said to be invalid on this ground. The view taken by the revisional Court is therefore, in accordance with law. 10. In the result, I do not find any force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs.