JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is landlady's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The property in dispute is the ground floor of house No. 122/181 Sarojini Nagar, Kanpur. Opposite party No. 3 is the tenant in the said premises. The petitioner, as I have already stated, is the landlady. An application under Section 21 of the Act was moved on the ground that for reason of old age, illness of the heart and consequently original pain she require the accommodation bonafide for her personal use. Other circumstances were also set up to establish her bonafide need in regard to the grandson of the petitioner as she has only daughter and no other children. This application was contested by opposite party No. 3. Ultimately the Prescribed Authority allowed the application on 19th August, 1978. The Prescribed Authority recorded a categorical finding of fact that the petitioner is suffering from ill health, she has heart trouble and as such her case for living on the ground floor and further her want to keep her grandson with her appeared to be bonafide and genuine. The Prescribed Authority further recorded a finding that comparing the hardship the petitioner will be put to greater hardship in case the accommodation is not released to her. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority dated 19th August, 1978 an appeal was filed by opposite party No. 3 before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the VIIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur by judgment dated 25th May, 1979. The appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Prescribed Authority. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 25th May, 1979, by means of the present petition in this Court. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged firstly that the finding in regard to bonafide need is vitiated in law as the appellate authority has wrongly held that the documents filed in support of the illness of the petitioner had not been proved by the petitioner. He also urged that material evidence has not been considered by the appellate authority in respect of this finding before reversing the order of the Prescribed Authority. He also urged that material evidence has not been considered by the appellate authority in respect of this finding before reversing the order of the Prescribed Authority. The second submission of the learned counsel is that in regard to the question of hardship the appellate authority has wrongly proceeded on the footing that the petitioner seeks benefit of Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act. Further the appellate authority has misread the statement of P.W. 1 Sri Jai Shanker Tewari, the clerk of the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, who had come to prove the veracity of the sanctioned plan in favour of opposite party No. 3 for constructing a building on premises No. 133/134, Transport Nagar, Kanpur. He has also urged in this connection that an affidavit had been filed in the Court below specifically to the effect that Devendra Singh, the son of opposite party No. 3, who is also alleged to be occupying the premises in dispute, has already shifted to a spacious accommodation in premises No. 115/820, Ranjit Nagar, Kanpur, and this was a relevant consideration for examining the question of hardship. 3. In my opinion the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are well founded. 4. The petitioner in support of her ailment had filed X-ray plate, X-ray report and medical certificate. She had also filed a report in the nature of an electro cardiogram to establish that she was suffering from heart ailment. So far as the electro-cardiogram is concerned the appellate authority has not considered it at all. So far as the X-ray plates and medical certificates are concerned the appellate authority has just not relied upon them considering them as not genuine. At this point it may be noted that in none of the affidavits filed before this Court and as appears from the record there appears to be no denial about the genuineness of these documents. The only challenge was that the petitioner did not suffer from the ailments alleged in the application for release and, therefore opposite party No. 3 moved an application asking the Court to have the petitioner medically examined confirming whether she was ill or not. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 4th May, 1978. The Prescribed Authority permitted the opposite party No. 3 to examine the petitioner by the Chief Medical Officer at his expense. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 4th May, 1978. The Prescribed Authority permitted the opposite party No. 3 to examine the petitioner by the Chief Medical Officer at his expense. In spite of opportunities as stated by the Prescribed Authority opposite party No. 3 did not get the petitioner examined by the Chief Medical Officer and ultimately the order had to be recalled by the Prescribed Authority on 23rd May, 1978 on an application moved on behalf of the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority, in these circumstances, drew an adverse inference against the petitioner. The appellate authority did not consider this aspect at all. The documents filed on behalf of the petitioner, had been rejected by the appellate authority on the ground that oral evidence had not been led to prove these documents. This view of the appellate authority is clearly erroneous in law. From the order of the Prescribed Authority, it is clear that an affidavit of illness had been filed. In these proceedings it is not necessary that every document should be proved by oral evidence like a regular trial. Section 34(b) of the Act clearly provides that evidence can be received on affidavits. When affidavits were filed it was for the Court to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of affidavits as to which version was correct or not. In the instant case as I have already observed above there was no denial of the genuineness of these documents and, therefore, merely on the basis that oral evidence had not been produced the appellate Court clearly acted with material irregularity and illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act in ignoring these documents and recording a finding against the petitioner. The finding, therefore, in regard to the bonafide need is clearly vitiated in law. 5. In regard to the second submission, Annexure 12 is the statement of PW Jai Shanker Tewari. In this statement it has been categorically stated by him that the property 133/134, Transport nagar, Kanpur was sought to be constructed both for commercial-cum-residential purposes. The appellate authority it appears has not read the statement at all and has erred in stating that the property was meant only for commercial purposes. This misreading by the appellate authority has led the appellate authority to err in recording a finding on that basis. The appellate authority it appears has not read the statement at all and has erred in stating that the property was meant only for commercial purposes. This misreading by the appellate authority has led the appellate authority to err in recording a finding on that basis. The other circumstance also, namely about the fact that the son of opposite party No. 3 has also shifted to a spacious accommodation in premises No. 185/820. Rajni Nagar, Kanpur, has also not been considered, which is a very relevant circumstance while examining the question of hardship. The petitioner's case was not that the objections of opposite party No. 3 be dismissed on the ground that he has built or otherwise acquired in vacant state a residential building in the same city. The appellate authority has wrongly considered this an the petitioner's case. The petitioner has placed these circumstances of the accommodations available to opposite party No. 3 for the purposes of showing that no hardship would be caused to opposite party No. 3 in case the property is released. The finding, therefore, of the appellate authority is vitiated. 6. In the result the petition is allowed, the order of the appellate authority dated 25th May, 1979 is quashed and the VIIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur, is directed to decide the appeal of opposite party No. 3 afresh in the light of the observations made by me above and in accordance with law. Since the petitioner's case is that she is a very old lady suffering from heart disease it is necessary that the appeal be decided very expeditiously. The Additional District Judge is directed to decide the appeal as far as possible within a period of two months from today. Learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to move the appellate authority after obtaining a certified copy of this judgment from this Court. In the circumstances parties shall bear their own costs.