JUDGMENT : T.S. Misra, J. (for self and for Hari Swarup, J.) 1. I have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared by Hon'ble K.N. Goyal, J., but with greatest deference I find myself unable to concur with him in accepting the contention of the Petitioners that the power to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a Government employee sent on deputation to the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation as also the powers envisaged in the clauses (a) and (b) of the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution can be delegated to or conferred on officers of the said Corporation who are not Government servants and who are not on deputation with the Corporation. 2. It is common ground that formerly the State Government was running 'Roadways' for providing passenger transport service in Uttar Pradesh. The employees serving in the 'Roadways' were Government employees. Later on, in exercise of the powers conferred by the Road Transport Corporation Act the Government of Uttar Pradesh constituted U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (for short, the Corporation), with effect from 1-6-1972 vide notification issued on 31-5-1972. On the creation of the Corporation all those employees who were serving in the Roadways as Government employees were sent on deputation to the Corporation. Their services were thus lent to the Corporation. Though there is a provision whereunder the services of the Government employees sent on deputation to the Corporation could be merged with the services of the Corporation by following certain procedure, the same has not so far been done and it was stated in the course of arguments by the learned Chief Standing Counsel representing the State Government that all those employees who were formerly serving in the Roadways and who were sent on deputation are still on deputation with the Corporation. Sri R.N. Trivedi the learned Counsel for the Corporation, however, submitted that as everything which was being done by the State Government in the Roadways Department is being done and can be done by the Transport Corporation, the Corporation authorities can take disciplinary action against the erring Government employees who have come on deputation unless there was any restriction in the exercise of that power and as there was no restriction the Corporation authorities have jurisdiction and power to suspend the delinquent employees and inflict punishments on them whether they have been appointed by the Corporation after its creation or whether those employees have been sent to the Corporation on deputation. Sri Mannan and Sri V.C. Misra the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, however, submitted that the Petitioners were and are still servants of the Government of U.P., and they remain to be the servants of the Government of U.P., even when they have been sent on deputation to the Corporation, hence by virtue of Article 311(1) of the Constitution they cannot be dismissed or removed by the authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed or by any officer of the Corporation who is not a Government servant. This submission was sought to be met by Sri R.N. Trivedi by reference to notification of 7th June, 1972 Annexure A-l as also another notification Annexure A-3 whereby the Government has divested the Transport Commissioner of his powers and vested the same in the General Manager of the Transport Corporation. By this notification the Government delegated the administrative power to the General Manager and other corresponding authorities. Sri R.N. Trivedi submitted that if an authority is created under law and that authority has been empowered by the Government to take administrative action then that authority can take disciplinary action. He argued that there can be equivalent or coordinate authority to take action under Article 311(1) and such a co-ordinate authority need not be a Government Officer. In support of his contention he placed reliance on Mysore State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg and Another, AIR 1977 SC 747 . 3. No doubt, administrative power includes within its ambit the power to appoint and dismiss an employee which is the executive power, see Pradyat Kumar Bose Vs. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg and Another, AIR 1977 SC 747 . 3. No doubt, administrative power includes within its ambit the power to appoint and dismiss an employee which is the executive power, see Pradyat Kumar Bose Vs. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court. A Government employee, who has not ceased to be a Government employee when he is sent on deputation, cannot be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank, except in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. A Government servant continues to enjoy the status of a Government servant even when he is sent on deputation. Action for his suspension, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank can be taken only in accordance with law and rules and regulations relating thereto as also the provisions of the Constitution. Action” postulates two things (1) who has to take action and (2) in what manner action is to be taken. The question in the instant case is as to who can take disciplinary action against the Government employees who have been sent on deputation to serve in the Transport Corporation. 4. Article 311(1) of the Constitution gives protection to persons who come within the Article against dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed. It does not mean that the removal should be made by the very same authority which made the appointment or by his direct superior. It is enough that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade. There is nothing in the Constitution which debars the Government from conferring powers on an officer other than the appointing authority to dismiss a Government servant provided he is not inferior in rank to the appointing officer or authority. 5. When an employee is sent on deputation the parent employer does not lose control over him. The officer or the authority who has appointed him or any other officer or authority, not subordinate in rank to the appointing officer or authority, can in certain circumstances terminate his services or dismiss him from service or reduce him in rank by following the procedure prescribed by law and the relevant rules but a third person cannot terminate the services of the Government employee. In Manager, Pyarchand Kesarimal Ponwal Bidi Factory Vs. In Manager, Pyarchand Kesarimal Ponwal Bidi Factory Vs. Omkar Laxman Thange and Others, AIR 1970 SC 823 it was laid down by the Supreme Court : A contract of service being thus incapable of transfer unilaterally, such a transfer of service from one employer to another can only be affected by a tripartite agreement between the employer, the employee and the third party, the effect of which would be to terminate the original contract of service by mutual consent and to make a new contract between the employee and the third party. Therefore, so long as the contract of service is not terminated, a new contract is not made as aforesaid and the employee continues to be in the employment of the employer. Therefore, when an employer orders him to do a certain worth for another person, the employee still continues to be in his employment. The only thing that happens in such a case is that he carries out the orders of master. The employee has the right to claim his wages from the employer and not from the third party to whom his services are lent or hired. It may be that such third party may pay his wages during the time that he has hired his services, but that is because of his agreement with the employer. That does not preclude the employee from claiming his wages from the employer. The hirer may also exercise control and direction in the doing of the thing for which he is hired or even the manner in which it is to be done. But if the employee fails to carry out his directions he cannot dismiss him and can only complain to the employer. The right of dismissal vests in the employer. 6. The authority” mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution does not, in my view, bear the same meaning which the word authority” connotes in Article 12 of the Constitution. For the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution a statutory body created by or under an Act may in given circumstances be an instrumentality of the Government or an authority” and would, therefore, be State” and hence amenable to extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The word authority” in Article 311 means an officer of the Government. The word authority” in Article 311 means an officer of the Government. In the absence of a specific rule in that behalf framed under Article 309 of the Constitution or a definite provision in an Act of the appropriate legislature, a person who is not an officer of the Government and who is not actually in the employment of the Government cannot appoint any other person in the service of the Government. The appointing authority is, therefore, one which exercises the sovereign power of the Government and who has the requisite jurisdiction, power or authority to make order of appointment. The Government may hence delegate its authority to appoint and in consequence the authority to take disciplinary action. That delegation of authority cannot, in the absence of any definite rule framed under Article 309 or any provision in any enactment, be made in favour of any person who is not a Government Officer. An officer of the Transport Corporation appointed by the Corporation after its creation cannot, therefore, dismiss or remove from service any of those Government employees who have been sent on deputation to serve in the Corporation. It is open to the Corporation not to take work from any such employee who has been sent on deputation and may pass order asking him to suspend the work. It may also require the State Government to take back the delinquent employee by terminating the deputation because no foreign employer can be forced to keep in employment a worker on deputation who misconducts, but a Corporation officer, who is himself not a Government servant, cannot inflict any punishment against him either by way of dismissal or termination from service or reduction in rank. Such action can, however, be taken by those Deputy General Managers, Assistant General Managers, Regional and Assistant Regional Managers of the Corporation, as the case may be, who are Government servants and who have also been sent to the Corporation on deputation. The Government has in fact by the notification aforesaid delegated the authority to those Government officers who have been sent on deputation. The Government has in fact by the notification aforesaid delegated the authority to those Government officers who have been sent on deputation. Hence those Government officers, if they were the officers who had actually appointed the Petitioners or who are superior in rank or of the same rank or grade but who are not subordinate in rank or grade to the appointing officer, can take action against the delinquent Government employees who have been sent on deputation to the Corporation. This action can be taken by such an officer because he is a still a Government servant though he has been sent on deputation and in whose favour the Government has delegated its administrative authority. 7. To sum up, (1) it is open to the Transport Corporation not to take work from an employee who is a Government servant and has been sent on deputation to the Corporation and to pass orders asking that Government employee to suspend the work, (2) the Transport Corporation may require the State Government to take back a delinquent employee by terminating his deputation with the Corporation and (3) a Transport Corporation Officer who is himself not a Government servant and who has not been sent on deputation to the Corporation by the Government cannot inflict any punishment against any other Government servant sent on deputation to the Corporation either by way of dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank. Such action can be taken by those Deputy General Managers, Assistant General Managers, Regional and Assistant Regional Managers of the Corporation, as the case may be, who are Government servants and who have also been sent to the Corporation on deputation and who had either actually appointed the delinquent employee in question or who were superior in rank or of the same rank or grade but who are not subordinate in rank or grade to the appointing officer. 8. In each case in hand it has, therefore, to be seen whether the impugned order passed against the employee in question was made by an officer who was Government Officer and who was sent on deputation to the Corporation and who is either the appointing officer or who is of the same rank or grade or who is superior in rank or grade but who is not subordinate in rank to the appointing officer. A finding of fact in the light of the observations made hereinabove will have to be reached in each case which can appropriately be done by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. Since the Tribunal has allowed the claim petitions filed by the employees in question on a preliminary objection, the cases will have to be retried. 9. In the result Writ Petitions Nos. 168, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 742, 743, 746, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 880, 881, 883, 884, 885, 888, 889, 890, 892 and 893 of 1980, filed by the Corporation are hereby allowed and the orders of the U.P. Public Services Tribunals impugned in these writ petitions are hereby quashed. The Tribunals concerned will decide the claim petitions afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. In the circumstances of the cases the parties in these writ petitions shall bear their own costs. 10. Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980 shall be listed be are a Division Bench for disposal. K.N Goyal, J. : 11. The U.P. Government Roadways was originally departmental undertaking for providing passenger transport services in various parts of the State. The organisation was headed by the Transport Commissioner who was assisted by numerous officers under him. The Transport Commissioner and his officers performed dual duties. In the first place, they performed various administrative and statutory functions including those conferred on them by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. At the same time, they also administered the said departmental undertaking, namely, the Roadways. The Transport Commissioner was given the status of the Head of the Department and as such exercised various financial and administrative powers delegated to him from time to time. Financial powers of a Head of Department pertained to purchase of stores, inviting tenders and entering into contracts and also to certain matters in relation to subordinate employees of the department such as sanction of leave, advance increments etc. in relation to subordinate employees. The State Govt. acting under the proviso to Article 339 of the Constitution and in supersession of the earlier order, made certain provisions by notification dated 10th May, 1954. in relation to subordinate employees. The State Govt. acting under the proviso to Article 339 of the Constitution and in supersession of the earlier order, made certain provisions by notification dated 10th May, 1954. This notification is Annexure 2 to the supplementary counter affidavit of Sri Badshah Hasan filed in Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980. It laid down that the Transport Commissioner, the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration), the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Roadways), General Managers, Service Managers and the Assistant Regional Managers shall, subject to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, exercise the powers of appointing authority in respect of the non-gazetted staff of the Transport Organisation as specified in the schedule thereto. In this schedule there are five columns, entitled (1) Serial Number (2) Details of posts (3) Appointing Authority (4) Appellate Authority and (5) Remarks. Thus in column 3 the appointing authorities were designated for various categories of posts and in column 5 any conditions for the exercise of the powers of appointments were specified, for instance, in the case of some posts the procedure of selection was specified. The appellate authority could thus review the orders of the appointing authority in respect of any appointments made by the latter. By laying down that the conferment of power was subject to Article 311 of the Constitution, it was made clear that in the case of any employee who was earlier appointed by a higher authority, the conferment of powers of appointing authority on a lower authority would not have the effect of conferring on it the powers of dismissal or removal in violation of Article 311(1). Mention of this rider also made it clear by necessary implication that the power of appointing authority included, subject to the said rider, the powers of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement, termination, suspension and various disciplinary powers normally attaching to an appointing authority whether by virtue of Section 16, General Clauses Act, or under various rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. 12. It appears that subsequent to the issue of this notification, the designation of the Assistant Regional Manager mentioned in this notification was changed to Assistant General Manager. This has been mentioned in para 6 of the supplementary counter affidavit of Sri B.S. Malkani. When exactly this change took place, is not clear and the relevant notification was also reported to be not traceable. This has been mentioned in para 6 of the supplementary counter affidavit of Sri B.S. Malkani. When exactly this change took place, is not clear and the relevant notification was also reported to be not traceable. But the fact that such change did take place is clear from a subsequent order dated 29-5-1972 which is Annexure 3 to the aforesaid supplementary counter affidavit of Sri Badshah Hasan. This order says that with effect from establishment of a statutory Corporation, the designations of various officers of the Transport Department connected with the running of the Roadways would be changed as specified therein. Among the changes mentioned is one at serial No. 6 according to which Assistant General Managers would be redesignated as Assistant Regional Managers. Other were as follows J From Deputy Transport Commissioner to Deputy General Manager, Assistant Transport Commissioner to Assistant General Manager, General Manager to Regional Manager and so on. 13. This order of 29th May, 1972 was part of the preliminary steps taken by the State Government for constitution of a Statutory Corporation under the Road Transport Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This Act of Parliament had been passed in 1950, but it contained only an enabling provision. It did not by itself constitute any statutory Road Transport Corporation, but it conferred powers on the State Governments to constitute such Corporations if and when they so though fit. It was in 1972 that such a decision was taken by the State Government. The Corporation was to be constituted with effect from 1st June, 1972. The notification of constitution was issued on 31st May, 1972. It is annexure 1 to the said supplementary counter affidavit of Sri Badshah Hasan. It is, however, obvious that preparatory steps were taken in advance and the order dated 29-5-1972 was one of those steps. It was decided that the officers who were serving the Transport Commissioner's organisation in connection with the running of the Roadways would be seconded to the Corporation. The entire operational staff was also to be transferred en bloc to the new Corporation on deputation, Although the Corporation came into being as a legal entity on 1st June, 1972, the formal order relating to the staff was issued only on 30th June, 1972 and published in the Gazette dated 15th July, 1972. The entire operational staff was also to be transferred en bloc to the new Corporation on deputation, Although the Corporation came into being as a legal entity on 1st June, 1972, the formal order relating to the staff was issued only on 30th June, 1972 and published in the Gazette dated 15th July, 1972. This order is contained in annexure A-3 to the counter affidavit of Sri Gajendra Singh filed in the said Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980. This order purports to have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 34 of the Act. It says that the following arrangements and delegation of administrative and financial powers would be followed from 1st June, 1972 until 31st March, 1974 or until the Corporation framed its own procedures, regulations and delegation of the powers under the Act, whichever be earlier. The first paragraph refers to administrative arrangements in regard to operation of Roadways bus services, purchase of stores, maintenance and repair of vehicles etc. The second paragraph relates to suits and legal proceedings. The third paragraph deals with the arrangements relating to printing of stationery. The fourth paragraph, which is in the form of a residuary provision, lays down as follows : (V) Administrative and financial powers, duties, responsibilities and functions : The administrative and financial powers delegated by the Government of U.P. to the Transport Commissioner, U.P. and other officers, subordinate to him, immediately prior to June 1, 1972 shall be continued to be vested in and exercised by the General Manager and other officers of the Corporation to the same extent in each case as hitheretofore and similarly duties, responsibilities and functions, shall continue to be performed by them as they have been performing so far. 14. The period for which these orders were to be operative has been ex tended from time to time and the said order still continues to be in force. Another order was issued a few days earlier, on 7th June, 1972, vide Annexure A-1 to the counter affidavit of Gajendra Singh. It laid down that with effect from 1st June, 1972, the staff of the Roadways would be treated as on deputation with the Corporation. Another order was issued a few days earlier, on 7th June, 1972, vide Annexure A-1 to the counter affidavit of Gajendra Singh. It laid down that with effect from 1st June, 1972, the staff of the Roadways would be treated as on deputation with the Corporation. A detailed procedure with regard to the ultimate absorption of the staff was also mentioned in this order, but those procedural provisions were recalled by another order dated 5th July, 1972, Annexure A-2 to the same counter affidavit. It was instead mentioned in this new order that the said employees shall be deemed to be on deputation for an indefinite period and whenever the Corporation should frame its rules, they would be so framed that the rights of the employees who may be ultimately absorbed would not be ultimately affected. This formal status of deputation has continued till date and so far the process of absorption has not commenced. It was stated in arguments by Sri R.N. Trivedi for the Corporation that the process of absorption could not be started because the service regulations could not be finalised by the Corporation on account of conflicting views of trade unions of workmen. It is, however, not clear as to why it was considered necessary to finalise the service regulations before commencing the absorption process. Whatever regulations may be framed ultimately would be subject, to the aforesaid directive of the State Government that the conditions of service will not in any matter be less advantageous to the existing conditions of service. The process of absorption could, therefore, start in anticipation of finaliaation of the regulations, because even after their finalisation the regulations would be amenable to amendment from time to time, subject always to the aforesaid guarantee. However that may be, the fact, continued till date. The non-gazetted staff of the Roadways which is now working under the Corporation has been under the administrative control of Corporation officers. Some of the Corporation officers are themselves Government servants who have, like the said staff, came on deputation to the Corporation, while others have been recruited by the Corporation after its establishment. Thus at the officer level we have both deputationists and Corporation-appointees. . Both sets of officers, of course, get their salary etc. from the Corporation. 15. Some of the Corporation officers are themselves Government servants who have, like the said staff, came on deputation to the Corporation, while others have been recruited by the Corporation after its establishment. Thus at the officer level we have both deputationists and Corporation-appointees. . Both sets of officers, of course, get their salary etc. from the Corporation. 15. In connection with the exercise of the said control, various officers of the Corporation have passed from time to time orders affecting their subordinate staff. These are orders of suspension, termination, initiation of disciplinary proceedings, orders of punishment, compulsory retirement, orders determining seniority etc. The employees effected by these orders have challenged the orders on various grounds. One of the grounds of challenge is that the Corporation officers have no power to pass such orders as the employees affected are Government servants. Only officers serving under Government can pass such orders. Some of the employees approached the U.P. Public Services Tribunal complaining against these orders on the said ground. Some of the relevant provisions of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 may be noticed here. 16. Section 2(b) in substance, defines public servants” as Government servants and servants of local authorities and of statutory Corporations owned or controlled by the State Government. The U.P.S.R.T.C. is, no doubt, one of such Corporations. Section 6(1) lays down that no suit shall lie against the Government or any such Corporation for any relief in respect of any matter relating to employment at the instance of any person who is or has been a public servant, including a person specified in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 1(4). Sub-section (2) further lays down that all suits for the like relief, and all appeals, etc. pending in any Civil Court shall abate, and their records shall be transferred to the Tribunal which shall thereupon decide the cases in the same manner as if they were claims referred to it u/s 4. Section 1(4) lays down that while this section and Sections 2 and 6 shall apply to all public servants, the remaining Sections shall not apply to the classes of public servants described in clauses (a) to (e). Clause (e) refers to 'workmen' as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 1(4) lays down that while this section and Sections 2 and 6 shall apply to all public servants, the remaining Sections shall not apply to the classes of public servants described in clauses (a) to (e). Clause (e) refers to 'workmen' as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. All or most of the non-gazetted employees with whom we are concerned in these cases belong to the category of 'workmen'. 17. Section 4, after omitting the proviso and Explanation which are not relevant, runs as follows : If any person who is or has been a public servant claims that in any matter relating to employment as such public servant his employer or any officer or authority subordinate to the employer has dealt with him in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract, or (a) in the case of a government servant, with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or law having force under Article 309 or Article 313 of the Constitution ; (b) in the case of a servant of a local authority or a statutory corporation, with Article 16 of the Constitution or with any rules or regulations having force under any Act of Legislature constituting such authority or corporation, he shall refer such claim to the Tribunal, and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall, subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, be final. 18. In some cases the employees had filed civil suits the records of which were transferred to the Public Services Tribunals u/s 6(2). The Corporation raised, inter alia, the plea that any reference to a Tribunal was not maintainable as the Petitioners were workmen. The Tribunals decided some of the claims one way or another. 19. Various decisions of the Tribunals were subsequently assailed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The first of these cases brought to our notice in writ petition No. 4580 of 1976 (Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasiya v. The U.P. State Public Services Tribunal No. 1 and the U.P.S.R.T.C.) decided on 27th January, 1977 by a Division Bench consisting of H.N. Seth, J. and Mufti, J. (as then was), which is unreported. The first of these cases brought to our notice in writ petition No. 4580 of 1976 (Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasiya v. The U.P. State Public Services Tribunal No. 1 and the U.P.S.R.T.C.) decided on 27th January, 1977 by a Division Bench consisting of H.N. Seth, J. and Mufti, J. (as then was), which is unreported. In this case a civil suit had been ordered to abate and its record transferred to the Tribunal, and thereafter the Tribunal had taken the view that no relief could be granted by it because the Petitioner was a workman. The Petitioner challenged this decision of the Tribunal before this Court. Seth, J. held that the Petitioner was a workman and as such he could not make a claim u/s 4 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act. But he further held that so far as transferred cases were concerned, the Tribunal was bound to decide them on merits because Section 6(2) created a fiction that for the purposes of deciding such proceedings they had to be treated as claims referred to the Tribunal u/s 4. Accordingly, the Tribunal was directed to decide the case afresh on merits. Mufti, J, agreed with the order of Seth, J., but gave different reasons for coming to that conclusion. In his Lordship's opinion Section 1(4) did not bar the claim and the claim was maintainable u/s 4 because the Petitioner was not only a workman, but also a Government servant. According to him, the Petitioner could make a claim in the capacity as Government servant. The employee;, who were sent on deputation never became employees of the Corporation and continued to be Government servants. 20. In U.P.S.R.T.C. v. State of U.P., 1980 (6) ALR 146 a Labour Court had quashed an order of retirement passed by an Assistant Regional Manager. This was challenged through a writ petition by the Corporation and it was held by a Division Bench consisting of K.C. Agrawal, J. and K.M. Dayal, J. that the order of retirement passed by the Assistant Regional Manager was ultra vires and had been rightly set aside by the Labour Court. This was challenged through a writ petition by the Corporation and it was held by a Division Bench consisting of K.C. Agrawal, J. and K.M. Dayal, J. that the order of retirement passed by the Assistant Regional Manager was ultra vires and had been rightly set aside by the Labour Court. After referring to para (V) of the order dated 30th June, 1972 (notified on 15th July, 1972), which has already been quoted earlier, Agrawal, J. speaking for the Division Bench observed as follows : Placing reliance on the aforesaid clause, counsel contended that disciplinary power since was included within the administrative powers” conferred by the aforesaid Government order, the workmen could be retired in exercise of the said powers. The submission made is not correct. We have already noted above that the employees were on deputation. They had not been absorbed in the service of the Corporation and continued to be the servants of the State of U.P. By the aforesaid order, the State Government did not transfer the power of termination of services of the Government servants sent on deputation to the Corporation. The fact that the employee had been sent on deputation indicated that an action such as disciplinary action or termination of service by compulsorily retiring them could be taken only by the State Government. There is nothing in the aforesaid notification which could entitle the Corporation to terminate the services of these employees. The establishment of the Corporation did not mean that the services of the employees of U.P. Government Roadways were automatically transferred to the Corporation or that those employees of the Corporation as from 1st June, 1972. 21. The earlier notification dated 10th May, 1954 does not appear to have been brought to the notice of their Lordships although the notification relating to change of designations dated 29th May, 1972 was brought to their notice. In respect of the latter it was observed that there was nothing therein which entitles the Corporation to compulsorily retire the employees”. 22. This decision was dated 12th July, 1979. In respect of the latter it was observed that there was nothing therein which entitles the Corporation to compulsorily retire the employees”. 22. This decision was dated 12th July, 1979. Thereafter, on 9th October, 1979 another Division Bench consisting of K.N.Singh, J. and B.D. Agarwala, J. in J.P. Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1980 (6) ALR 81 also took the view that as the Petitioners had continued to be on deputation with the Corporation and the State Government had continued to be their employer, the Corporation was not competent to take any disciplinary action against the petitioner by terminating their services. Their Lordships agreed with the view taken by Mufti, J. and disagreed with the view taken by Seth, J. in Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasiya (Supra) and held that claim petition by the Petitioners was maintainable before the Public Services Tribunal. It was also held that as the Petitioners were Government servants, they were not workmen employed by the Corporation. In this case also only the Government order dated 30th June, 1972 was considered and not the order dated 10th May, 1954. 23. Then on 30th October, 1979 yet another Division Bench consisting of U.C. Srivastava, J. and one of us (Goyal, J.) was faced with a similar matter. This is A.K. Srivastava v. State of U.P. The leading judgment of Srivastava, J. was reported in 1980 (6) ALR 91, but by an inadvertence the concurring judgment of the other member of the Bench was not published at that time, but only subsequently at page 253 In this case the decision in Chaurasiya (Supra) was noticed, but the other two Division Bench decisions referred to above, which were till then unreported, were not brought to the notice of the Bench. This time, the notification of 10th May, 1954 was also considered. There were two connected petitions. In one, as A.K. Srivastava was found to have been removed from service by an officer who was lower in rank than the officer who had appointed him in terms of the said notification of 1954, the order of removal was quashed, but the disciplinary (inquiry was not) quashed and it was left open to the authorities to take further action, if any in accordance with law against A.K. Srivastava. In the connected Writ Petition No. 2295 of 1978 the termination order passed against opposite party No. 2 was quashed on the ground that the Tribunal had not considered the case in the light of the principles laid down in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bhoop Singh Verma, AIR 1979 SC 684 . The Tribunal was, therefore, directed to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law in the light of all the circumstances. It was thus treated as beyond controversy that the officers who were covered by the notification of 10th May, 1954 read with order dated 29th May, 1972 were competent to pass suitable orders in exercise of the powers of the appointing authority. 24. In view of this conflict, another Division Bench consisting of one of us (Misra, J.) and K.S. Verma, J. has referred Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980 to this Full Bench. Other cases in which similar questions have arisen either in writ petition filed by the employees challenging directly the orders of the Corporation officers or in writ petitions filed by the Corporation against the Tribunal's orders which had followed the Division Bench decisions J.P. Gupta (Supra) and in U.P.S.R.T.C. (Supra), have also been heard along with the said writ petition. 25. Sri R.N. Trivedi, learned Counsel for the Corporation, has assailed the correctness of the views taken in Mufti, J.'s judgment in Chaurasiya's case (supra) and in the two Division Beach decisions in J.P. Gupta and U.P. S.K.T.C. (supra) on a number of grounds. Heir as raised a number of contentions some of which are by way of alternative contentions and, according to one of the alternative contentions, the reasoning in A.K. Srivastava's case (supra) is also assailed while, according to another alternative contention, it is accepted by him as correct. His contentions are as follows: (1) The entire Roadways organisation having been already wound up by the State Government, there remained, in fact, no posts available with the Government on which these employees can be said to have continued under the State Government. The entire undertaking of the Roadways along with its employees was transferred to the Corporation with the result that all of them automatically became employees of the Corporation notwithstanding the use of the expression deputation” in various Government orders. The entire undertaking of the Roadways along with its employees was transferred to the Corporation with the result that all of them automatically became employees of the Corporation notwithstanding the use of the expression deputation” in various Government orders. (2) Prima facie the test for determining the relationship of employer and employee is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the servant is to do, but also the manner in which he shall do his work. Not only this test is satisfied for establishing the Corporation as the employer, but the further test of (sic). (3) A normal incident of deputation is that the department of foreign employer to whom an employee is sent on deputation has right to send back the employee to the parent department. In the present case, the Corporation cannot do so for two reasons Firstly, there remains for all practical purposes no parent department to which the employee can go back. Secondly, the direction issued to the Corporation u/s 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act is binding on the Corporation and it is, therefore, not open to the Corporation at all to send the employee back. Accordingly, there cannot be said to be in existence any deputation. (4) Although the Corporation has been set up under a statute as a separate legal entity,-it is open to the Court to pierce that the veil of this Corporation's entity. In actuality, the Corporation is only an instrumentality of the Government and should, therefore, be treated as a department of the Government and, accordingly the principle laid down in The State of U.P. and Others Vs. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1970 SC 1263 , should apply and the borrowing department has, even if we assume that there has been no express delegation of powers, the implied power to take all disciplinary action, including the power of dismissal, removal, termination etc. (5) The employees having been sent to the Corporation, the entire control over them should be taken to have vested in the Corporation. The expression control” in various contexts has been widely interpreted by the Supreme Court such as in the context of Article 235 of the Constitution and it should not be whittled down by excluding any of the normal disciplinary powers. The expression control” in various contexts has been widely interpreted by the Supreme Court such as in the context of Article 235 of the Constitution and it should not be whittled down by excluding any of the normal disciplinary powers. (6) If it be assumed that the Corporation is not an employer of these employees then the employees have no right to proceed by way of a claim petition before the Public Services Tribunal or by way of writ petition before this Court. If they consider the State Government as their employer, then they can just ignore any orders passed by the Corporation and ask for their wages etc. direct from the State Government, but they cannot proceed against a Corporation. (7) The provisions of the fundamental rules also referred to foreign employer and foreign services. These expressions show that the Corporation is the employer of these employees. (8) The employees are workmen. As workmen they have no right to maintain any claim petition before the Public Services Tribunal. They have also no right to file any writ petition in respect of their service conditions. Their only remedy is to get an industrial dispute referred to the labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act or under the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) as the case may be. (9) Assuming that the Government continues to be the employer, there is nothing in law to prevent there being more than one employer of the same employee. Thus the Corporation is also their employer and as such has full disciplinary powers over them. (10) In the alternative, as held in A.K. Srivastava (supra) the State Government has delegated its power of appointing authority to various officers of the Corporation who can exercise the same as those officers are not authorities subordinate to the authorities which had appointed these employees. Accordingly, in view of the notification dated 10th May, 1954 read with order dated 25th May, 1972 referred to earlier, these officers are competent to pass suitable orders. These orders are not hit by Article 311(1) of the Constitution and these officers are competent as appointing authorities to pass various orders under different service rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The orders have not been passed by the Corporation as such, but by these officers as designated authorities under Government orders. 26. These orders are not hit by Article 311(1) of the Constitution and these officers are competent as appointing authorities to pass various orders under different service rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The orders have not been passed by the Corporation as such, but by these officers as designated authorities under Government orders. 26. Sri Umesh Chandra, learned Chief Standing Counsel appeared for the State Government. He supported the Corporation in its stand that the officers of the Corporation designated under the notification dated 10th May, 1954 read with order dated 29th May, 1972, were competent to pass various orders as exercising the power of the appointing authorities. He, however, added that, according to the Government, the employees continued to be Government servants on deputation with the Corporation. 27. Sri Abdul Mannan, Sri V.C. Misra and Sri J.N. Srivastava, learned counsels for the employees, countered these contentions. Other learned counsels chose to adopt the arguments advanced mainly by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra. The contentions of these learned counsels are as follows : (a) The employees are Government servants on deputation with the Corporation. They are also workmen as the Roadways was an industry. (b) Even though the Corporation is for some purposes such as for liability for tortious acts of its employees committed during the course of their employment, the employer and as such does have power to direct not only that work the employees are to do, but also the manner in which they shall do their work, yet the Government being the principal employer has alone the power to take the disciplinary action. It is not denied that there can be more than one employer or one employee, but the borrowing employer has no disciplinary power which vests in the lending employer alone. (c) Even as workmen they can maintain claim petitions before the Public Services Tribunal because their grievance is not in respect of any right flowing under labour laws, but in respect of the violation of the service rules or Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Service rules give various powers only to the appointing authorities and Article 311(1) also gives power to the authority which appointed a servant or to a co-ordinate authority. A breach of these provisions can give rise to claim even by a workman before the Public Services Tribunal or to a writ petition before this Court. Service rules give various powers only to the appointing authorities and Article 311(1) also gives power to the authority which appointed a servant or to a co-ordinate authority. A breach of these provisions can give rise to claim even by a workman before the Public Services Tribunal or to a writ petition before this Court. (d) All that the Corporation can do in the case of any fault of any employee is to write to the Government and it will thereafter be for the Government to have the matter inquired into by its own officers of suitable grade and they alone can take action against the employees. If the Government agrees to take back the employees, it can do so and thereafter it will be for the Government and its officers to deal with the employees in accordance with the rules or to abolish their posts and to retrench them. The Corporation need not hold any inquiry even before writing to the Government in this behalf. (e) The Corporation can suspend any employee at fault only in the sense of not taking any work from him while continuing to pay him his full emoluments, but not in the sense of suspension as understood in the service rules under which the employee gets only subsistence allowance and not full salary. (f) The Corporation is not a department of the Government because it has an independent legal entity. Its officers cannot exercise any powers on behalf of the Government. They can exercise only powers on behalf of the Corporation. Any action taken by them cannot, therefore, be taken as action of the Government in pursuance of the notification dated 10th May, 1954 read with order dated 29-5-1972, but only as action on behalf of the Corporation. (g) Whether an officer was himselfient by the Government to the Corporation or was newly recruited by the Corporation is immaterial. All of them are acting as officers of the Corporation and cannot be treated as Government officers. In other words, even officers on deputation from Government are in the present context acting only as officers of the Corporation and not as officers of the Government. (h) The expression authority” in Article 311(1) and in various service rules can only mean an officer of the Government and not an officer of the Corporation. In other words, even officers on deputation from Government are in the present context acting only as officers of the Corporation and not as officers of the Government. (h) The expression authority” in Article 311(1) and in various service rules can only mean an officer of the Government and not an officer of the Corporation. There cannot be any question of inferiority or superiority in rank as between the officers of Government and the officers of the Corporation. (i) The employees even though officers on deputation from the Government can claim their wages from the Corporation in view of the fact that under statutory provisions, namely, fundamental rules and Section 34 of the Road Transport Corporations Act their services have been lent to the Corporation and the Corporation is bound to pay them and it is not necessary for them to ask for any relief from Government. (j) Even if there be any lacuna in the statutory provisions with regard to the exercise of the disciplinary powers over such employees, the employees are not to blame with this state of affairs which is of the own making of the Government and the Corporation. They alone shall be guilty of inaction, and as such no powers can be deemed conferred on the officers of the Corporation or on the Corporation by implication or by way of inherent powers. (k) Any action such as termination or retirement or dismissal by Corporation or its officers amounts to assuming that the employees have been absorbed in the service of the Corporation whereas, in fact, they are still to be so absorbed in view of the Government orders quoted earlier. (l) The Government order dated 29th May, 1972, could not bind the Corporation as it was not issued u/s 34 of the Act, but was issued even before the creation of the Corporation and, as such, was wholly unauthorised. (m) The delegation' of administrative powers contained in the notification dated 30th June, 1972, published on 15th July, 1972, does not include disciplinary powers of the employers. Firstly, there is no mention of such powers specifically. Secondly, disciplinary powers are quasi-judicial powers and cannot be treated as administrative powers. Only those powers could be treated as delegated which did require a quasi-judicial procedure being followed. 28. Contentions Nos. (1), (2), (3) and (7) raised by Sri R.N. Trivedi do not bear scrutiny. Firstly, there is no mention of such powers specifically. Secondly, disciplinary powers are quasi-judicial powers and cannot be treated as administrative powers. Only those powers could be treated as delegated which did require a quasi-judicial procedure being followed. 28. Contentions Nos. (1), (2), (3) and (7) raised by Sri R.N. Trivedi do not bear scrutiny. The closest case in which such contentions prevail may be said to be D.R. Gurushantappa Vs. Abdul Khuddus Anwar and Others, AIR 1969 SC 744 . In that case, even in the absence of any formal termination of service by Government it was held that the employees had become servants of the company to which the undertaking had been transferred. In para 3 it was held that at least so far as workmen were concerned, they would be deemed to be employees of the company in view of the provisions of Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In para 4 of the judgment it was, however, noted that the employees in question were not shown in the Government records as lent officers” who continued to be in Government service. In the instant case, however, the State Government's own stand is that all these employees have continued to be in Government service and are on deputation with the Corporation. It is true that the entire roadways undertaking having been transferred to the Corporation, the employees cannot in actual practice betaken back by the Government. However, the fact remains that the Government has not formally abolished their posts. The Government may, of course, abolish the posts at any time in their discretion. If any employee comes to be foisted on the Government, the Government will, no doubt, immediately abolish his post and terminate his services as is permissible under the rules in case of abortion of posts But so far it has not abolished the posts, these persons are, no doubt, servants of the Corporation in some respects, because the Corporation and its officers had a right to direct not only what work they will do, but also the manner in which they will do their work, and the Corporation is liable to pay their salaries and is also liable in tort for any of their wrongful acts committed in the course of their employment under the Corporation. There is, however, nothing in law to prevent an employee having two employers, for different purposes. There is, however, nothing in law to prevent an employee having two employers, for different purposes. As stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition Volume 2 para 871, A person may be the servant of another although a third party his the power of appointing or dismissing him or of requiring his dismissal, or has powers of direction and control in regard to his work, or pays him his wages ....A person may be a servant to different masters”. The contention that in view of the direction u/s 34 of the R.T.C. Act issued to the Corporation, it cannot send back any employee to the Government is not conclusive of the matter. An employee can be sent back by mutual agreement between the Government and the Corporation. Thus, the deputation does continue in the eye of law. Chapter XII of the U.P. Fundamental Rules speaks of Foreign service”. The rules comprised in this chapter also speak of a person continuing to be a Government servant while in foreign service”. Thus, while on deputation, Government servant has two employers, namely, the Government and the so-called foreign” employer. 29. In support of his contention No. (4) Sri Trivedi referred to certain observations in R.D. Shetty v. Inter national Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 particularly in paras 13 to 20 of the report. The observations were, however, made in the context of the requirement of fair dealing towards and non-discriminatory treatment of citizens by the Government as well as its instrumentalities. The observations cannot, however, be extended to a context like the present one, which is directly covered by the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation. In para 67 of the report the learned Chief Justice speaking for the majority observed as follow : The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. By way of abundant caution we state that these employees are not servants of the Union or the State. These statutory bodies are 'authorities' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. By way of abundant caution we state that these employees are not servants of the Union or the State. These statutory bodies are 'authorities' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus a statutory body, like the Corporation in the instant case, cannot be treated as department of the Government. 30. Sri Trivedi's contention No. 1(6) is equally untenable. The employees can ask for appropriate relief either against the Government or against the Corporation which is a statutory body and an authority, both being their employers. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the employees cannot maintain a writ petition or a claim petition against the Corporation merely because they are Government servants. 31. As regards his contention No. (8) and contentions No. (a) and (c) of Sri Mannan, it is to be noted that both parties agree that the employees in question are workmen and that the Roadways, like the Corporation, was also an industry. We are also of the same view and are unable to subscribe to the view expressed in J. P. Gupta (supra) that these employees were not workmen. The only reason given by the Division Bench in that case for this finding was that the employees were still in Government service. The fact that the erstwhile Roadways was also an industry was not alluded to at all. Even a Government servant can be a workman if the undertaking in which he is engaged constitutes an industry, as in the case of a railway servant. Thus, the view expressed by the Division Bench in J.P. Gupta (supra) that because the employees were Government servants, therefore, they were not workmen was with due respect, non sequitur. We have already noticed the relevant provisions of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976. It is true that the employees cannot ask for any relief arising out of their status as workmen, namely, any relief admissible to them on the basis of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or of any other labour law, either in view of the provisions of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act noted earlier, from the Tribunal or as held in Union of India v. Kalicharan (1978) 37 FLR 232 by a Division Bench of this Court following The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Others, AIR 1975 SC 2238 direct from this Court. But if they claim any relief arising out of their status and rights as Government servants simpliciter, they can maintain a claim u/s 4(a) of that Act. If they contend that they are being dealt with otherwise than in conformity with Article 311(1) or (2) of the Constitution, or with statutory services rules made under Article 309, such a relief can certainly be granted only by a Tribunal under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act or directly by this Court. In the instant cases they are not claiming any relief under any labour law conferring any rights on them as workman. We are, accordingly inclined to accept the contention No. (c) of Sri Abdul mannan noted above. 32. During the course of arguments, a question was raised as to whether at least those officers of the Government whose services had been lent to the 'Corporation could exercise disciplinary powers, if not officers of the same rank recruited by the Corporation after its establishment. It was in the context of this question that a supplementary affidavit was filed by the Corporation indicating the cases in which action had been taken by lent officers and cases in which action had been taken by officers of the Corporation directly recruited by itself. Contention (g) of Sri Mannan is that such a distinction is not possible, because even officers lent by the Govt. to the Corporation would be acting under the control of the Corporation while exercising disciplinary powers. On principle it appears correct that no distinction can be made between two sets of officers. It would be anomalous if an Assistant Regional Manager who was a lent officer could exercise disciplinary powers and other powers of appointing authority in respect of workman serving under him, but another Assistant Regional Manager could not do so in respect of workman serving under him while exercising disciplinary powers, they would no doubt be acting as officers of the Corporation though they would be exercising powers delegated by the Government. It appears thus that both sets of officers should sail on the same boat so far as their powers with regard to workman respectively serving under them are concerned. 33. As regards contentions nos. It appears thus that both sets of officers should sail on the same boat so far as their powers with regard to workman respectively serving under them are concerned. 33. As regards contentions nos. (5) and (9) of Sri R.N. Trivedi, it is true that the foreign employer must have atleast some control over the lent employee, but as pointed out in Manager, Pyarchand Kesarimal Ponwal Bidi Factory Vs. Omkar Laxman Thange and Others, the foreign employer cannot merely by reason of the lending of services to him, dismiss the employee but only complain to the lending employer, i.e. the primary employer. The extent of disciplinary control exercisable by the foreign employer will, however depend on statutory provisions or mutual contract between the three parties, as the case may be. Pyarchand Kesarimal Porwal (supra) was a case of private employment where the matter depended solely on contract. The case before us is of employees whose employment partakes more of the character of status than of contract. These Corporations being mere instrumentalities of Government it has been provided in the statutory rules relating to Govt. servants that the latter's services can be transferred on deputation to any such Corporation even without the consent of the employees and without entitling him to any deputation allowance, vide proviso to Fundamental Rule 110(a). Such being the case, no tripartite contract was required for transfer of even disciplinary control to officers of the foreign employer. The smooth working of the Corporation clearly required transfer of disciplinary control as well to officers of the Corporation. The state of U.P. and Others Vs. Ram Naresh Lal, was a case of inter departmental deputation, and their Lordships held that transfer of “control” included transfer of disciplinary jurisdiction and power to dismiss. The instant case is different in form though not in substance. Here the transfer is from a Govt. departmental undertaking which has been wound up, though the formality of abolition of posts has been delayed due to bureaucratic inefficiency, to a Corporation which has taken over that undertaking. In a, case like this, transfer of full control has been effected by various orders noted above. No exception can in the case of status employment be taken to such unilateral transfer, but such transfer of control can only be subject to the provisions of the statutory service rules and Article 311 of the Constitution. In a, case like this, transfer of full control has been effected by various orders noted above. No exception can in the case of status employment be taken to such unilateral transfer, but such transfer of control can only be subject to the provisions of the statutory service rules and Article 311 of the Constitution. Unless in the peculiar factual situation of this case officers of the so called foreign employer are permitted to exercise disciplinary control, they cannot in the very nature of things, effectively supervise and control the work done by the servant either in the manner of directing what work the servant is to do or in the manner in which he should do his work. The observations in J.P. Gupta v. State of U.P. 1980 (6) ALR 81 that the Corporation was not authorised to exercise any disciplinary control over the erstwhile employees of the Roadways were rather too wide, in the sense that the fact of conferment of powers by Govt. on officers of the Corporation was not taken into account. Of course, as observed earlier the limit; of disciplinary control exercisable by officers of the Corporation are defined by the provisions in the service rules and in Article 311 of the Constitution. 34. Under various service rules and an Act of the State Legislature the powers of suspensions, termination of services, compulsory retirement and initiation of disciplinary proceedings are vested in the appointing authority, i.e. the authority for the time being competent to make an appointment to the post at that time held by the employee. So far as dismissal and removal are concerned, those powers can be exercised only by an authority not lower in rank than the authority which actually appointed an employee. We have therefore, to see whether the Corporation or its officers fall within the definition of the appointing authority or within the definition of an authority not subordinate in rank to that by which an employee was appointed within the meaning of these provisions. 35. We, therefore, come back to the notification dated 10th May, 1954 and the orders dated 29th May, 1972 and 30th June, 1972 (published in the Gazette dated 15th July, 1972) referred to earlier, in particular, we have to consider the implications of the order contained in paragraph (V) of the last mentioned order which has been quoted earlier. 36. 35. We, therefore, come back to the notification dated 10th May, 1954 and the orders dated 29th May, 1972 and 30th June, 1972 (published in the Gazette dated 15th July, 1972) referred to earlier, in particular, we have to consider the implications of the order contained in paragraph (V) of the last mentioned order which has been quoted earlier. 36. The first question that arises in this connection is whether the words administrative powers” in the said paragraph (V) include disciplinary power or powers of compulsory retirement or powers of dismissal, removal etc. over employees. Sri Mannan and V.C. Misra have argued that disciplinary powers are quasi judicial powers and cannot therefore, be treated as administrative powers. It is true that a reasonable opportunity has to be given to the Government servant before he can be dismissed or removed from service. Even before a minor penalty is imposed, an opportune by is required to be given. No such opportunity is, however, required to be given before an order of suspension pending inquiry is passed or before an order instituting an inquiry is mad; or before compulsory retirement or termination of services is, ordered. In Union of India (UOI) Vs. Col. J.N. Sinha and Another, AIR 1971 SC 40 it was, for instance, laid down that the rules of natural justice are not applicable to the passing of an order of compulsory retirement. Thus, so far as these powers are concerned which do not involve the giving of an opportunity of hearing, there can be no doubt that they are administrative powers. Now so far as dismissal, removal, reduction and other penal orders are concerned, the giving of opportunity to the employee is certainly necessary, but the mere fact that before an administrative order is passed, an opportunity of hearing has to be given or a procedure which is often called quasi judicial is required to be followed, cannot by itself detract from the administrative nature of the power. In recent years there is a gradual enlargement of area of administrative powers in which the courts have insisted on compliance with requirements of fairness. If such an argument were to be accepted, then even a selection for purposes of promotion, which were dealt within A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. In recent years there is a gradual enlargement of area of administrative powers in which the courts have insisted on compliance with requirements of fairness. If such an argument were to be accepted, then even a selection for purposes of promotion, which were dealt within A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1970 SC 150 , would have to be treated as a judicial and not an administrative function. In Kraipak's case their Lordships quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Parker, C. J., in re H.K. (An infant) (1967) 2 QB 617: Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem but acting fairly ; and to the limited extent do the so called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. 37. In Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, AIR 1978 SC 851 Krishna Iyer, J. has discussed in depth the application of the principles of natural justice to administrative actions because of the requirements of fair play. In para 45 his Lordship observed : Kraipak marks the watershed, if we may say so, in the application of natural justice to administrative proceedings. Again in R.R. Verma and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1980 SC 1461 the same learned Judge observed in para 5 of the report : If they (the Government) are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. 38. In Pradyat Kumar Bose Vs. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 , a Constitution Bench expressly held as follows : But the exercise of the power to appoint or dismiss an officer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power. It is nonetheless so, by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise thereof. 39. It is nonetheless so, by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise thereof. 39. This has been recently followed by a Full Bench of this Court in Hindu National School v. Deputy Director of Education 1980 AWC 407 at 413. 40. The contention of Sri Mannan and Sri Misra that disciplinary powers are not administrative powers must, therefore, be rejected. 41. It has next been contended that the said paragraph (V) relates only to the working of the Roadways, but not to the employees, as nothing has been said in this paragraph about employees. An organisation or an undertaking can work only through its employees. To say that administrative power have been conferred in relation to its employees is a contradiction in terms. The undertaking cannot be administered at all without exercise of powers of control over the employees. There is, therefore, no reason to exclude control over employees from the wide expression administrative powers” in this paragraph. 42. It has next been contended that Government can confer powers of appointing authority only on officers of the Government working for the time being under the Government. Before we consider the powers of dismissal, removal and reduction, let us consider the power of appointment. It is not disputed that after the transfer of the Roadways undertaking to the Corporation, thousands of new employees have been recruited by the Corporation or its officers, either in place of those who have retired or died or whose services have otherwise become unavailable or to meet the demands of the expanding services of the undertaking. The Transport Commissioner or officers working under him had no longer any say in the working of the Corporation. They could not, therefore, continue to exercise the powers of appointment which were originally conferred on them in 1954. These powers had, therefore, necessarily to be conferred on officers of the Corporation. This is what the Government has done by its orders dated 29th May, 1972 and 30th June, 1972. 43. One criticism made by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra in regard to these orders is that their orders were totally unauthorised as they could not have been issued u/s 34 of the Road Transport Corporations Act inasmuch as the Corporation had not even come into being when these orders were issued. 43. One criticism made by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra in regard to these orders is that their orders were totally unauthorised as they could not have been issued u/s 34 of the Road Transport Corporations Act inasmuch as the Corporation had not even come into being when these orders were issued. Section 34 lays down that the directions issued by the State Government have to be given after consultation with the Corporation established by the Government. It is true that these orders were issued even before the establishment of the Corporation, but they were issued by way of advance action almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Corporation. It is well settled that on a matter which is not directly covered by a rule made under Article 309 of the Constitution, the Government can pass executive orders. These orders are thus valid executive orders which are in no way incoasistent with any service rule or with the provisions of Article 311(1). The mere fact that they were issued prior to the actual constitution of the Corporation does not detract from their continued validity after the constitution of the Corporation. In the very nature of things, advance action had to be taken by the Government which is the promoter, planner and the creator of the Corporation. It cannot be stipulated that nothing can be done until after the Corporation is constituted and the Government has consulted the Corporation. The law does not contemplate a vacuum. The Corporation, after it is constituted, will have to finalise its rules of functioning and to transact business in accordance with these rules. If the Government were to send its proposed direction to the Corporation and thereafter the Corporation were to deliberate on the same and the Government were to issue directions only after receiving views from the Corporation, then there is bound to be a time-lag. It cannot be contemplated that during that interregnum no work is to be done by the Corporation. The activities of the organisation cannot be at a standstill during this interregnum. By way of illustration of advance action, reference may be made to Section 22 of the General Clauses Act. This provision contemplates that the Government may take advance action in relation to an Act even before the enforcement of the Act. The activities of the organisation cannot be at a standstill during this interregnum. By way of illustration of advance action, reference may be made to Section 22 of the General Clauses Act. This provision contemplates that the Government may take advance action in relation to an Act even before the enforcement of the Act. The principle underlying this provision can be called in aid of the validity of the orders dated 29th May, 1972 and 30th June, 1972 and, at any rate, the orders can be justified under Article 162 of the Constitution inasmuch as they are not inconsistent with any provision of law or statutory rule. It is not necessary for us in the instant case to consider the validity of these orders in relation to employees subsequently recruited by the Corporation. So far as the category of employees with whom we are dealing in these writ petitions is concerned, it is not strictly necessary to take the help of Section 34. We have only to see whether the orders are valid under Article 162 and the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. 44. The employees dealt with in these cases were not appointed by the Governor, but by subordinate authorities, namely, either the Transport Commissioner or officers subordinate to the Transport Commissioner. It is true that in the case of an employee appointed by the Governor the power of dismissal and removal cannot be delegated to any officer of the Corporation. The Governor has to act personally or through officers subordinate to him as laid down in Articles 154(1) and 166(3) of the Constitution. It was held in AIR 1945 156 (Privy Council) that even a Minister is an officer of the Government. Thus the Governor's powers can only be exercised in his name by a Minister, Secretary or other officer subordinate to the Governor mentioned in this behalf in the Rules of Business made under Article 166(3). But so far as Government servants appointed by authorities subordinate to the Governor are concerned, the only restriction in regard to the conferment of powers of dismissal or removal laid down in Article 311(1) is that the authority empowered should not be an authority subordinate to that by which the Government servant was appointed. Article 311(1) uses the word “authority”' but not, unlike Article 154(1), the words officers subordinate to him (the Governor)”. Article 311(1) uses the word “authority”' but not, unlike Article 154(1), the words officers subordinate to him (the Governor)”. The only qualification mentioned in Article 311(1) is that there should be an 'authority' and further that the authority should not be subordinate to the authority by which the Government servant was appointed to the post held by him. 45. It is common ground that the Corporation is an authority. In Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, AIR 1975 SC 1331 the majority judgment delivered by Chief Justice Ray discussed the status of statutory Corporations and their servants in depth. In para 39 of the report, reliance was placed on Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edition Vol. 30 paragraph 1317 for the view that : A public authority is a body which has public or statutory duties to perform and which performs those duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit of the public and not for private profit. Such an authority is not precluded from making a profit for the public benefit. The same definition has been repeated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition, Vol.1, para 6. Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 42 of the Road Transport Corporations Act and Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act confer various powers and duties on the Corporation as a State Transport undertaking. Section 33 of the Road Transport Corporation Act (read with Section 16 of the General Clauses Act) authorises the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India to audit the accounts of the Corporation. Sections 5(1), 14(1) and 8 empower the State Government to appoint the Chairman, members. General Manager and the Chief Accounts Officer of the Corporation and to remove or suspend them. Section 33 provides that all members of a Corporation, and all its officers and servants, whether appointed by the State Government or the Corporation, shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act or any other law to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 34(1) empowers the Government to issue directions of a general nature to the Corporation, including directions relating to the recruitment, conditions of service and training of its employees, wages to be paid to the employees and so on. Sub-section (2) provides that the Corporation is bound by such directions. Section 45 confers on the Corporation the power to make regulations for specified purposes, including regulations providing for the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and servants of the Corporation other than the General Manager and the Chief Accounts Officer. After referring to similar provisions found in the Oil and Natural Gas Commissions Act, the learned Chief Justice observed in para 44 that the Commission was an authority and agency of the Central Government. In para 63 it was observed that the various statutory Corporation mentioned therein were authorities envisaged in Article 12 of the Constitution. This was repeated in para 67. In the concurring judgment of Mathew, J. (which has been approved in R. D. Shetty (supra) in para 1.09 of the report) it was observed that : These corporations are instrumentalities or agencies of the State for carrying on business which otherwise would have been run by the State departmentally. If the State had chosen to carry on these businesses through the medium of government departments, there would have been no question that actions of these departments would be 'State actions'. Why then should actions of these corporations be not State action ? After referring to the contention that the Corporation had a separate legal personality, the learned Judge observed, in para 111 of the report that an agent has a legal personality different from that of the principal. Accordingly, merely because a corporation has legal personality of its own, it does not follow that the Corporation cannot be an agent or instrumentality of the State, if it is subject to control of government in all important matters of policy. No doubt, there might be some distinction between the nature of control exercised by government over public corporations. That I think is only a distinction in degree. The crux of the matter is that public corporation is a new type of institution which has sprung from the new social and economic functions of government and that it therefore does not neatly fit into old legal categories. That I think is only a distinction in degree. The crux of the matter is that public corporation is a new type of institution which has sprung from the new social and economic functions of government and that it therefore does not neatly fit into old legal categories. Instead of forcing it into them, the latter should be adopted to the needs of changing times and conditions.” This judgment of Mathew, J. was referred to with approval also in Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation and Another Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840 in which all such Corporations were described as a third arm of the government”. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention that the Corporation or its officers cannot be delegated powers under Article 311(1) cannot be accepted. II principle of jurisprudence has been cited in support of the contention that administrative and disciplinary powers under Article 311(1) cannot be conferred or delegated by the Government, in respect of the employees appointed by authorities subordinate to the Government, on or to the Corporation which is, undoubtedly, an authority, or on or to its officers who are public servants and are also, undoubtedly, authorities and are as such being arraigned before the Services Tribunal or before this Court. When even legislative powers can be conferred on a Corporation, such as by Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, there is no reason why administrative powers cannot be conferred by the Government on the Corporation or its officers. 46. There are numerous instances of exercise of disciplinary powers over per sons holding civil posts by authorities which are not authorities subordinate to the Governor. Many administrative and financial powers are delegated by the Governor to the High Court and its Chief Justice who in official jargon are described as Heads of Department,” although constitutionally speaking, this would not be a correct appellation as the High Court is not a department of Government nor are the Chief Justice and the High Court subordinate to the Government. Not only financial powers, but even disciplinary powers over persons holding civil posts and were working under the High Court or in the subordinate courts are exercised by the Chief Justice and by the High Court. Not only financial powers, but even disciplinary powers over persons holding civil posts and were working under the High Court or in the subordinate courts are exercised by the Chief Justice and by the High Court. They are authorities independent of Government, and yet powers are conferred on them either by rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution read with Article 311(1), or under Article 162 read with Article 266(3) of the Constitution in relation to various matters comprised in the Financial Handbook. The Public Services Commission and its Chairman are another instance of authorities independent of Government exercising similar powers. Again, the Advocate General is not a Government servant, but is holder of constitutional office, and he also exercises various disciplinary and other administrative and financial powers in relation to the State Law Officers' establishment. The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and Chairman of the Legislative Council are also authorities independent of Government, and they too exercise various administrative and financial powers conferred by Government. The Corporation and its officers cannot, despite the separate legal personality of the Corporation, claim even a part of the independence or freedom from the control of the Government as is enjoyed by the authorities hereinbefore mentioned. Thus, the mere fact that the Corporation is an independent corporate personality cannot stand in the way of the Government conferring on it or on its officers certain powers in relation to Government employees by a rule under the proviso to Article 309 by an order under Article 162 and Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Of course, the Corporation or its officers cannot exercise powers under clause (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution even in relation to these employees. That power can be exercised only by Governor or his officers in accordance with Article 154 read with Article 166(3). But the other powers can certainly be delegated to or conferred on officers of the Corporation in relation to Government servants whose services have been lent to the Corporation. 47. It was argued by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra that the Government cannot entrust the fate of its employees to any man on the street. This argument has no application to the facts of the case. The power has not been conferred on any man on the street. 47. It was argued by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra that the Government cannot entrust the fate of its employees to any man on the street. This argument has no application to the facts of the case. The power has not been conferred on any man on the street. Under Article 311(1) it can be conferred only on an authority, and that authority must be an authority which is not subordinate in rank to the authority which appointed the Government servant. The power in the instant case has been conferred on officers who (or whose predecessors) under their old designations were already making appointments to identical posts in the Roadways organisation, and under their present designations are making appointments to identical posts in the Corporation organisation. They are the officers who are supervising the work of these employees. To argue therefore, that the Govt. cannot be permitted to confer such powers on every Tom, Dic and Harry is thus unwarranted of the facts of the case. 48. It has also been argued by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra. that unless the authority on which the power is conferred forms part of the Government organisation and belongs to the same hierarchy, there can be no determination of subordination” mentioned in Article 311(1). It is, however, well settled that the word subordinate” occurring in Article 311(1) does not imply direct actual subordination in functioning, but inferiority in rank, vide Mahesh Prasad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 70 . Problems of correspondence of rank and grade have been satisfactorily tackled within numerous situations arising out of integration and reorganisation of States and of railway administrations respectively. In the instant case, no such problem arise because the officers on whom the powers have been conferred or their predecessors in offices did exercise those powers under their old designations, and the new designations have been conferred on them by order dated 29th May, 1972 which itself is conclusive of the fact that their rank has remained unchanged. Para (V) of the order dated 30th June, 1972 itself says that the relevant powers shall be continued to be vested in and exercised by the officers of the Corporation to the same extent in each case as hithertofore”. Para (V) of the order dated 30th June, 1972 itself says that the relevant powers shall be continued to be vested in and exercised by the officers of the Corporation to the same extent in each case as hithertofore”. It cannot, therefore, be said by any stretch of imagination that the power has been conferred on any officer inferior in rank to the officer who actually appointed these employees. 49. It was also argued by Sri Mannan that there was no precedent in which the authority of an officer outside the Government organisation may have been upheld for purposes of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Several instances of such authorities exercising similar powers have already been noted above and the fact that there is no reported case directly on the subject may only indicate that no one so far has ever thought fit to question the legality of the exercise of such powers. Moreover, the absence of any prior authority is not a valid argument in support of the extreme contentions advanced by Sri Mannan and Sri Misra. In this connection, an extract from Vice Chancellor Megarry's judgment in Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1979) 2 WLR 700 at 711 would be found interesting : This year, ...................... is ........................ the centenary of a celebrated dictum of Doe, C. J. of New Hampshire which I mentioned during the argument. As slightly varied, it is : As there was a time when there were no precedents, anything that could be done with them can be done without them”; Metcalf v. Gilmore (1879) 59 NH 417, 433. If authority on a point is lacking neither equity nor common law is incapable of filling the gap in a proper case. Such an approach may be traced back atleast to the 16th century, in Anon, (1588) Goulds. 96, it was said in argument that there were no cases in the books on the point in issue. But Anderson, C. J., said : What of that shall not we give judgment because it is not adjudged in the books before ? We will give judgment according to reason, and if there be no reason in the books, I will not regard them. 50. We have, therefore, to consider the matter on the basis of principles without being deterred by the absence of direct precedent on the problem involved. We will give judgment according to reason, and if there be no reason in the books, I will not regard them. 50. We have, therefore, to consider the matter on the basis of principles without being deterred by the absence of direct precedent on the problem involved. It is clear that on the basis of the principles mentioned earlier, the Corporation and its officers are authorities. They are authorities subordinate to the authorities which appointed these employees. They are instrumentalities of the Government, though they may not be directly subordinate to the Government. Unlike Article 154(1), Article 311(1) does not require the authorities to be directly subordinate to the Governor. The Corporation is, however, controlled by and is an instrumentality, an agent and an arm of the Government. The Chairman, the other members, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Accounts Officer of the Corporation are direct appointees of the Government and officers on whom these powers have been conferred are subordinate to them. The Corporation itself is substantially controlled by and owned by the Government. In these circumstances, there seems no good reason for denying the validity of the power conferred on them by the notification of 1954 read with orders of 29th May, 1972 and 30th June, 1972, respectively. 51. While interpreting any statutory provision, the Court cannot shut its eyes to the practical implications of the proposed interpretation. The working of the Roadways organisation will be seriously impaired if its officers were to be denied disciplinary powers over the bulk of its employees. It is said that the Corporation can always write to the Government to take back any employee. This is an impractical suggestion from the point of view of Corporation and its employees and also from the point of view of the Government. The Corporation cannot send such requests in respect of hundreds of its employees to the Government and await Government orders for months and in the meantime to allow the employees to remain on its rolls with impunity. If the Corporation is not to make even an inquiry or to order suspension pending inquiry, the result would be that the Corporation merely on receiving any complaint, which in many cases may be uufounded, will have to write to the Government to take back the employee. If the Corporation is not to make even an inquiry or to order suspension pending inquiry, the result would be that the Corporation merely on receiving any complaint, which in many cases may be uufounded, will have to write to the Government to take back the employee. The employee will also have thus no chance of explaining his conduct because the principles of natural justice will not apply to an action by the borrowing employer in writing to the lending employer to take back the employee whose services have been lent to it. Such an action would not be a penal action. If the Government were thereafter to institute inquiries, it will have to set up a separate machinery for the purpose. The original machinery is no longer available with it. The Transport Commissioner and his subordinate officers are no longer concerned with the working of the undertaking. New officers will have to be appointed by the Government for this purpose. They will be acting virtually as super bosses over the heads of the officers of the Corporation. This will be not only most expensive and dilatory, but also subversive of discipline. If the Government were to choose the easier course of instantly abolishing the posts of all such employees as are required by the Corporation to be taken back by the Government, without holding any inquiry whatsoever, it will be harmful from the point of view of the employees they will have no right to complain of the non penal act of the abolition of their posts and consequential termination of their services. As there is no one in the Government organisation at present empowered to take action against these employees, the powers of the Transport Commissioner and his officers having already been taken away, every case will have to be dealt with at the level of the Governments itself, i.e., by the Minister or the Secretary to the Government, although the status of these employees does not warrant their cases being dealt with at such a high level. All this will be productive of endless mischief, such a situation cannot be countenanced by any Court of law. In this connection the following observation of Krishna Iyer, J., in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board Vs. All this will be productive of endless mischief, such a situation cannot be countenanced by any Court of law. In this connection the following observation of Krishna Iyer, J., in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board Vs. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi and Others, AIR 1981 SC 1708 may be usefully referred to : We are reinforced in this view by the pragmatics of the situation. The Electricity Board is an enormous undertaking which employees several thousand of employees. We are told that over a lakh of employees serve under the Board currently. It would be virtually impossible for the Board to carry on its functions if every time every million under it were to be subjected to disciplinary action only by the Board which is the top body acting as a corporate entity. We do not think that the provisions of the Act can be interpreted into an impossible position for the Board. On the other hand a more viable construction is what we have indicated above. 52. Thus, contention No. (10) of Sri R.N. Trivedi and the stand of the Chief Standing Counsel for the State Government in this regard deserve to be accepted and the contentions of the learned Counsel for the employees to the contrary deserve to be rejected. 53. At this stage, we are dealing only with the question of the authority of the Corporation and its officers over the employees concerned. The merits of the various impugned orders are not being investigated. The Services Tribunals have in various orders challenged by the Corporation in various writ petitions not gone into the merits of the claim petitions at all. Those merits will have to be reinvestigated by the Services Tribunals. The merits of the individual impugned order in the writ petition directly filed in this Court will also have to be gone into by Division Bench in the light of the legal position expounded above. 54. In the result, Writ Petitions Nos. 168, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 742, 743, 746, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 880, 881, 883, 884, 885, 888, 889, 890, 892 and 893 of 1980 filed by the Corporation are hereby allowed and the orders of the Services Tribunes impugned in these writ petitions are hereby quashed. The Tribunals concerned will decide the claim petitions afresh in accordance with law in the light of the legal position declared in this judgment. No order is made as to costs. 55. Writ petition No. 150 of 1980 shall be listed before a Division Bench for disposal in the light of the opinion expressed herein. Order of the Court : (The same as in Paras 54 and 55 directing tribunals to decide these claim petitions in the light of the observations made in the majority decision consisting of Hari Swarup and T. S. Misra, JJ. Editor).