JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order of the Assistant Engineer, (Phones), Allahabad, dated Aug. 23, 1978, terminating the petitioner's services under R. 19 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and also against the order of the appellate authority dated 6-12-1978, dismissing the petitioner's appeal against the order of termination. 2. Dost Mohammad, the petitioner, was employed as neon in the Posts and Telegraphs Department and posted in the office of the Assistant Engineer, Phones, at Allahabad. The petitioner's real brother, Mukhtar Ahmed, was also employed as Extra-Department Agent under the Posts and Telegraphs Department. On 18-4-1974 an incident of marpit took place in the petitioner's village as a result of which the petitioner along with his brother Mukhtar Ahmed and his father Badruddin was convicted for on offence under S. 323, IPC. An appeal against trial court's order was partly allowed and the petitioner's conviction was upheld but the sentence was modified by the District and Sessions Judge. The petitioner, his brother Mukhtar Ahmed and Badruddin petitioner's father, all were directed to undergo imprisonment for one month, further each of them was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 100. Thereafter, the Assistant Engineer, Phones, removed the petitioner from service under R. 19 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, by his order dated Aug. 23, 1978. The petitioner preferred an appeal against that order but that was rejected by the Divisional Engineer, Telephones, by his order dated 6-12-1978. Aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid two orders. 2-A. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner's conduct which led to his conviction was not related to his service and he could not be departmentally punished for that conduct and as such he could not be removed from service on account of his conviction. The competent authority did not afford any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before removing him from service in a mechanical manner without considering the relevant matters. The impugned order of removal has been passed arbitrarily and unreasonally for a very trivial matter which is unconnected with the petitioner's duties. The respondent-authorities discriminated the petitioner in removing him from service while on the same facts and circumstances they reinstated the petitioner's brother and allowed him to continue in service. The impugned order of removal has been passed arbitrarily and unreasonally for a very trivial matter which is unconnected with the petitioner's duties. The respondent-authorities discriminated the petitioner in removing him from service while on the same facts and circumstances they reinstated the petitioner's brother and allowed him to continue in service. Learned counsel for the respondent-authorities urged that R. 19 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, does not contemplate any enquiry or giving of an opportunity to the delinquent employee. Once a Governments servants convicted for an offence thy a criminal court it is open to the competent authority to remove him from service without giving him any opportunity. The principles of natural justice are not attracted and the petitioner was not entitled to any opportunity of hearing before the issue of impugned order. He further urged that R. 19 of the Rules was applicable to the petitioner as he was a Government servant while the said rule was not applicable to his brother as he was an extra-Department Agent. 3. The petition:- was a Government servant and he was entitled to the constitutional protection of Article 311. Rr. 14 to 18 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, prescribe procedure for imposing penalties on a Government servant which provide for the issue of a charge-sheet and giving of an opportunity to the delinquent employee to submit his explanation and to cross-examine witnesses and to produce witnesses in his defence. These Rules are designed to afford reasonable opportunity of defence to the Government servant as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. Rule 19, however, incorporates the principle contained in proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, which lays down that Article 311 (2) shall not apply where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to the conviction on a criminal charge. Proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution does not contemplate holding of an enquiry and giving of opportunity as contemplated by Clause (2) of the Article before imposition of a major penalty. Rule 19 enunciates the same principle and the same considerations would be applicable to R. 19 also. Proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution does not contemplate holding of an enquiry and giving of opportunity as contemplated by Clause (2) of the Article before imposition of a major penalty. Rule 19 enunciates the same principle and the same considerations would be applicable to R. 19 also. It is thus clear that if a delinquent Government servant is convicted of a criminal offence the competent authority is entitled to impose any of the penalties contemplated under the rules without holding any departmental enquiry as required by Rs. 14 to 18. 4. The question then arises as to whether it is open to the competent authority under R. 19 to impose the penalty on a Government servant even if he is convicted for an offence which has no connection with his duties. Rules 19 (1) in substance lays down that where any penalty is imposable on the Government servant for a conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, the competent authority may take action against him. The rule empowers the disciplinary authority to impose penalty on the basis of conviction and sentence passed against the delinquent employee by a competent court, but the conviction must be in respect of which a departmental trial could be taken against the Government servant and a penalty could be imposed on him for the conduct which was the subject-matter of his prosecution and conviction. A Government servant may have been convicted for a very trifling offence and in that situation it would be fair for the competent authority to consider the question as to whether the conduct which led to his conviction could be the subject-matter of departmental enquiry and whether any penalty could he imposed on the Government servant. 5. In Krishna Kutty v. Sr. Supdt. of Post Offices, Ernakulam, 1975 Serv LJ 749, almost in similar circumstances the Kerala High Court held that R. 19 (1) cannot he invoked to dispense with the services of it Government servant if the conduct which led to his conviction was not in the course of employment and could not he a misconduct as per the Conduct Rules and further if the same could not be the subject matter of disciplinary action. A domestic quarrel which is wholly unrelated with the employment of the Government servant cannot be a misconduct for the purpose of R. 19 (1). A domestic quarrel which is wholly unrelated with the employment of the Government servant cannot be a misconduct for the purpose of R. 19 (1). In the instant case, the petitioner was convicted of an offence under S. 323, I. P. C. on a complaint trade by a private individual which alleged that some alteration took place between the petitioner, his brother and his father on one side and the complainant on the other, with regard to possession over a plot of land in his village far away from his place of posting. The incident of marpit which took place in the petitioner's village could not he the subject-matter of any departmental trial under the rules and no penalty could be imposed on him even if such departmental trial was held as the petitioner had not committed and misconduct as contemplated by the service Rules. Before awarding any penalty to a Government it servant under R. 19 (1) the competent authority must apply his mind to the conduct of the Government servant which has led to his conviction to a certain as to whether there was any reasonable nexus in the conduct and his official duties or the conviction involving moral turpitude which would bring the public service into disrepute. The competent authority is required to apply his mind to these considerations before exercising his power under R. 19 (1). 6. Rule 19 does not require the competent authority to give any opportunity of hearing to the delinquent Government Servant. There is no necessiiy for holding a detailed departmental enquiry, nonetheless the principles of natural justice require that before awarding any penalty the competent `authority should give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent Government Servant. This would meet the requirement of natural justice. The respondent's contention that even the principles of natural justice are not applicable cannot be accepted. It is necessary to bear in mind that R. 19 contemplates three exigencies under which the services of a Government servant can be dispensed with. Firstly, on the ground of conviction of a criminal charge, secondly, where the disciplinary authority if satisfied that it is not reasonable and practicable to hold an enquiry and, thirdly, where the President satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not necessary to hold the enquiry provided under the rules. Firstly, on the ground of conviction of a criminal charge, secondly, where the disciplinary authority if satisfied that it is not reasonable and practicable to hold an enquiry and, thirdly, where the President satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not necessary to hold the enquiry provided under the rules. The rule, however further lays down that "the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit." The Rule therefore itself contemplates that the disciplinary authority shall consider the circumstances of the case and apply his mind to the relevant factors and only thereafter it may pass orders which it may consider necessary. The expression "may consider the circumstances of the case" postulates giving of opportunity to the delinquent Government servant and consideration of his reply by the disciplinary authority. If an opportunity of hearing is given to the delinquent Government servant, he may place facts and circumstances before the disciplinary authority to persuade him not to award any penalty against him or to award a minor penalty. Any order imposing penalty to the Government servant under R. 19(1) without giving any opportunity of hearing to hill would be in violation of the principles of natural justice and the same would be void. In Union of India v. Rajendra Prasad Srivastava, 1977 (2) Serv. L. R. 81, a Division Bench of our Court held that the disciplinary authority, while exercising his power under R. 11(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, must give an opportunity of hearing and representation to the Government servant, as without giving that opportunity the disciplinary authority cannot consider the matter objectively. The principles laid down in Rajendra Prasad's case are fully applicable to the instant case as the provisions of R. 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, are almost identical to R. 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 7. In Divisional Personnel Officer v. T.R. Chellappan, AIR 1975 SC 2216 , the Supreme Court while considering R. 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules held that the concluding part of R. 14 imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking a final decision in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard, the circumstances must be objectively considered. The rule further requires that there should he active application of mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the conduct and the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. The rule further confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether on the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should he imposed on the delinquent employee. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Chellappan's case squarely apply to the instant case. There is no dispute that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing and explanation before the disciplinary authority issued the impugned order removing him from service. A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that the disciplinary authority did not apply his mind objectively to the question as to whether the conduct which led to the petitioner's conviction was sufficient to impose the penaty against him and if at all what penalty should be imposed on him. It appears that the disciplinary authority mechanically exercised its power under R. 19 to remove the petitioner from service merely because the petitioner had been convicted of a criminal offence under S. 323 IPC. In our opinion the disciplinary authority acted in violation of the principles of natural justice as well as in excess of his jurisdiction. The appellate authority also acted in the same manner and it failed to apply its mind to the questions raised by the petitioner in appeal. 8. The petitioner's grievance that he has been discriminated also appears to be well founded. The respondent's contention that his brother. Mukhtar Ahmad, being Extra-departmental Agent was not a Government servant and as such the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were not applicable to him is untenable. In Superintendent of Post Offices v. P.K. Rajamma, AIR 1977 SC 1677 , it was held that extra-Departmental Agent was a Government servant and he holds a civil post under the Union of India as provided under Article 311 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter Mukhtar Ahmed was a Government Servant like the petitioner and both constituted the same class. In this view of the matter Mukhtar Ahmed was a Government Servant like the petitioner and both constituted the same class. Since both of them were convicted for the same offence arising out of the same incident, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to deal with the petitioner in a different manner so as to allow Mukhtar Ahmed to join his duties and to remove the petitioner from service. The plea of hostile discrimination is therefore well founded. 9. In the result, we allow the petition and quash the impugned order of the Assistant Engineer dated Aug. 23, 1978, as well as the order of the Divisional Engineer dated 6-12-1978. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.