( 1 ) IN this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), the petitioner who is accused No. 1 has moved this Court for clashing the criminal proceedings instituted by respondent No. 1 ] complainant (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) in. private complaint No- 61 of 1979 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate First class; Ranibennur. ( 2 ) ON 13-9-1979 at 5-30 p. m. , the respondent presented a private complaint before the learned Magistrate, complaining that the petitioner and another person by name R. Balaraman, accused no. 2 respondent No. 2 have committed offences punishable under Sections 420, 427, 405 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 3 ) AMONG others the respondent has alleged that he was the registered owner, permit holder of a motor vehicle bearing No. MYW 3531, popularly called as a truck or a lorry used for carrying goods for hire or reward and the accused along with two persons of Ranebennur, approached him for sale of the vehicle. In his complaint, the respondent, does not specify the date, time and place where the persons met him for the said purpose. But, at the hearing, learned counsel for the contesting parties viz. . the pe'itioner and the respondent, agreed that the same took place on or about 19th or 20th August, 1979. At that meeting, the respondent stated that the vehicle was not available at Ranebennur and had been sent to a nearby place called Tumminakatti and was stationed at Halageri and that he was ready and willing to sell the same fora fair price. In answer to the. same, the accused having shown interest to purchase the vehicle and inspect the same at Halageri, proceeded to Halageri along with the respondent, where they found the truck in the bus stand of that place. The accused and others inspected the vehicle, agreed to purchase the same, if the same was certified to. be fit by their mechanic at Bangalore, to which the respondent agreed and delivered the same to the accused and sent it to Bangalore along with his son Dyamappa,. At or from Bangalore the accused caused the disappearance of the vehicle and have removed the same to Tiruvannamalai of Tamilnadu state. be fit by their mechanic at Bangalore, to which the respondent agreed and delivered the same to the accused and sent it to Bangalore along with his son Dyamappa,. At or from Bangalore the accused caused the disappearance of the vehicle and have removed the same to Tiruvannamalai of Tamilnadu state. On these main and other allegations, the respondent claims that the accused have committed acts of mischief and have dishonestly induced him to deliver the vehicle and are liable to be punished for offences punishable under Sections 420, 425 and 427 I. P. C. He has also alleged that the police who were approached with a complaint on the previous day did not receive the same on the ground that he may approach the Court itself. Lastly, he has alleged that the offences were committed by the accused within the jurisdiction of the Ranebennur Court. ( 4 ) ON the said complaint petition itself, the learned Magistrate made an order in these terms:"presented at 5-30 p. m. The complaint is referred to P. S. I. Halageri under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. for investigation and report by 12-11-79. The P. S. I. is directed to seize the truck involved and produce. Sd|- S. B. Chanal, prl. Munsiff and J. M. F. C. Ranebennur. "in pursuance of the aforesaid direction, the P. S. I. Halageri proceeded to Tiruvannamalai and seized the vehicle from the petitioner on 25-9-1979 at that place and produced the same on 28-9-1979 before the learned Magistrate. ( 5 ) A few days thereafter, the petitioner and the respondent filed applications before the learned Magistrate for release of the vehicle pending determination of the case. On a consideration of the rival claims made by them, the learned Magistrate by his order dated 18-10-1979 directed the release of the vehicle to the respondent on the terms and conditions stipulated in his order which was challenged by the petitioner before this court in Criminal revision Petition No. 560 of 1979. In the said case, the peiitioner made an application viz. , I. A. No. I for stay of the operation of the order of the learned Magistrate and for a direction to release the vehicle in his favour pending disposal of his revision petition by this Court. In the said case, the peiitioner made an application viz. , I. A. No. I for stay of the operation of the order of the learned Magistrate and for a direction to release the vehicle in his favour pending disposal of his revision petition by this Court. On 30-10-1979 nagappa, J, admitted the said revision petition and ex-parte allowed I. A. No. I as a result of which, the vehicle was delivered to the petitioner on 3-11-79 and thereafter the petitioner removed the same to his place viz. , Tiruvannaamalai. On 14-11-1979 the petitioner instituted a suit in O. S. No. 2632 of 1979 in the Court of the District Munsiff, Tiruvannamalai, for a permanent injunction against the respondent from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the vehicle. An application made in that suit for temporary injunction in similar terms was granted by the learned District Munsiff on 15-11-1979. On 11-3-80 Nagappa, J. dismissed the said criminal revision petition and directed the petitioner to produce the vehicle before the learned Magistrate within 3 weeks from that day. A submission made for the petitioner to quash the proceedings in the case, was not examined by Nagappa, J. and was left open to be agitated in a separate petition for the said purpose. Emboldened by the said observation, the petitioner has presented this petition on 13-3-1980 again with a prayer for stay of the operation of the proceedings and permit him to retain the vehicle in his custody on the terms and conditions imposed in the stay order issued in criminal Revision Petiton No. 560 of 1979. On 26-3-1980 Patil, J. before whom this petition was posted with i. A. No. I. admitted the same and granted the prayer made in I. A. No: 1 an application made by the respondent for vacating stay was rejected by me on 5-5-1980. As a result of the above proceedings, the petitioner who had taken possession of the vehicle on 3-11-1979 continues to be in possession of the same ever since then and as on this day also. ( 6 ) IN obedience to the order of the learned Magistrate, the Police of Halageri have investigated the complaint and have sub mitted their final report on 22-1-1980 stating that the dispute was of a civil nature and the same may therefore be closed on that basis. ( 6 ) IN obedience to the order of the learned Magistrate, the Police of Halageri have investigated the complaint and have sub mitted their final report on 22-1-1980 stating that the dispute was of a civil nature and the same may therefore be closed on that basis. But, in view of the order of stay issued by this court, the learned Magistrate has neither considered the same nor has he recorded evidence and completed the trial of the case. ( 7 ) SRI N. S. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even if all the allegations made by the respondent are accepted as true, (i) they do not establish offences punishable under any of the provisions; (ii) that in any event the J. M. F. C. Ranebennur had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint; (iii) that the case put forward by the respondent on the face of it was improbable; and (iv) that the controversy between the parties was essentially a civil dispute and, therefore, it is a fit case to quash the proceedings exercising the inherent powers of this Court under S. 482 of the Code, in support of his contention, Sri Srinivesan relied on the ruling of the supreme Court in Trilok Singh v. Sctya Deo Tripalhi, AIR 1979 SC. 850 . and the ruling of the Patna High Court in R. K. Poddar v. Dr. M. P. Sinha, 1973 Cri. L. J. 1065. ( 8 ) SRI R. H. Chandan Gowdar, learned counsel for the respondent while refuting the contentions urged by Sri Srinivasan, urged that even before the process is issued to the accused, this petition for quashing the proceedings under S. 482 of the Code was not maintainable. In support of his latter contention Sri Chandan Gowdar strongly relied on the ruling of the supreme Court in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC. 1430 = 1964 (1) SCR 639 . As the preliminary contention urged by Sri chandan Gowdar goes to the root of the matter, I propose to examine the same first. ( 9 ) ON a written complaint filed by the respondent the learned Magistrate passed an interim order adverse to the interests of the petitioner which is not also denied by him. As the preliminary contention urged by Sri chandan Gowdar goes to the root of the matter, I propose to examine the same first. ( 9 ) ON a written complaint filed by the respondent the learned Magistrate passed an interim order adverse to the interests of the petitioner which is not also denied by him. But, what is seriously pressed before me is that on the said complaint the Magistrate, has not decided to initiate proceedings or has not issued summons to the accused to appear before him and as such no process has been issued and till the same is not done, a petition under S. 482 of the Code is not maintainable. ( 10 ) THE word 'process' is neither defined in the Code nor is it a term of art and, therefore, its meaning has to be ascertained from the context in which it occurs. ( 11 ) AMONG various other meanings the word 'process' has been defined thus in the Oxford. English Dictionary vol. VIII page 1408: a. The whole of the proceedings in any action at law; the course or method of carrying on an action; an action, suit. b. The formal commencement of any action at law; the mandate, summons, or writ by which a person or thing is brought into court for litigation. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of words and phrases Vol. III defines the same thus: 'process' is the doing of something in, a proceeding in a civil or criminal Court and that which may be done without the aid of a Court is not a 'process'. From the above meanings that are apposite, the word 'process' comprehends a proceeding commenced in a criminal Court. A Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in the matter of Llewelyn Evans (4) interpreted the term 'process' as a general word meaning in effect anything done by the Court. On this analysis it is difficult to uphold the contention of sri Chandangowdar that no 'process' has been issued against the petitioner. ( 12 ) IN Chandra Deo Singh's (3) case on which strong reliance is placed by sri Chandan Gowdar, the Supreme court had no occasion to examine the true scope and ambit of the word 'process'. On this analysis it is difficult to uphold the contention of sri Chandangowdar that no 'process' has been issued against the petitioner. ( 12 ) IN Chandra Deo Singh's (3) case on which strong reliance is placed by sri Chandan Gowdar, the Supreme court had no occasion to examine the true scope and ambit of the word 'process'. In that case, among other questions, the Court was examining whether the accused even before he was summoned to appear had locus standi to appear and contest the criminal case against him before a magistrate to whom a complaint had been referred for enquiry. In my opinion, the ratio, in Chandra Deo singh's (3) case does not really bear on the question. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Trilok Singh's (1) case has expressly rejected a similar contention urged by Sri Chandan gowdar in these words:"on behalf of the respondent it was argued that the appellants' filing a petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was premature and the High Court could not have quashed it. In our opinion the point is so wholly without substance that it has to be stated merely to be rejected. "for all these reasons, I reject the preliminary objection urged for the respondent and proceed to examine the merits of the case. ( 13 ) S. 482 of the Code which corresponds to S. 561 (A) of the earlier code empowers this Court to quash proceedings pending before a subordinate criminal court to prevent the abuse of the process of that Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The scope end ambit of Section 482 has been examined in a large number of rulings and it is not necessary to notice all those cases. Abusing the process of the Court is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive (See R. Narappa Reddy v. Jagarlamudi Chandramouli and others, AIR 1967 AP 219 . Continuance of a criminal proceeding that has become unnecessary by reason of filing of a civil suit can be interfered under Section 482 (vide a. I. R. 1935 Orissa 285 ). A dispute of a civil nature should not be permitted to be proceeded in a criminal Court (vide Trilok Singh's (1) case ). Continuance of a criminal proceeding that has become unnecessary by reason of filing of a civil suit can be interfered under Section 482 (vide a. I. R. 1935 Orissa 285 ). A dispute of a civil nature should not be permitted to be proceeded in a criminal Court (vide Trilok Singh's (1) case ). Bearing these principles, it is useful to examine the facts of the case. ( 14 ) IN his complaint the respondent admits the delivery of the vehicle to the petitioner and its transportation to Bangalore to enable him to have it tested by his mechanic at that place. Even according to respondent, the offences, if any were committed principally within the territorial limits of bangalore City. Section 177 of the Code, requires a complaint to be instituted where the offence is normally committed. Why the respondent has no|t filed his complaint in Bangalore Courts is difficult to understand. In my opinion, the criticism of Sri Srinivasan that the, respondent has deliberately filed the complaint against the petitioner in Ranebennur Court though it has prima facie no jurisdiction only with a view to harass the accused who are residents of a far off place cannot be characterised as fanciful. ( 15 ) AN examination of the allegations made by the respondent, taking them at their face value, indicates that the dispute between the parties is essentially of a civil nature. Even the police to whom the case had been referred for investigation though the same may not be binding on the Court, have also taken a similar stand. Apart from this, the petitioner has already instituted a suit against the respondent in Tiruvannamalai civil Court which is pending disposal before the said Court. What is essentially a Civil dispute is sought to be agitated in a criminal proceeding. For all these reasons. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case for interference under Section 482 of the Code and relegate the parties to work out their remedies in civil Courts. ( 16 ) BEFORE parting with this case, i am distressed to notice that the learned Magistrate has made an extraprdinary interim order in a very casual way. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case for interference under Section 482 of the Code and relegate the parties to work out their remedies in civil Courts. ( 16 ) BEFORE parting with this case, i am distressed to notice that the learned Magistrate has made an extraprdinary interim order in a very casual way. When the respondent approached the Court, taking his own time, the learned Magistrate made the interim order to seize the vehicle without even an application and without bestowing any thought as if heavens would fall if that order was not made by him then and there. I have no doubt, if the learned Magistrate had bestowed some thought, he would not have passed the extraordinary interim order, which has led to a series of proceedings between the parties. I do hope that the learned Magistrate will avqid passing such casual and hasty orders at least in future. ( 17 ) IN the result. I allow this criminal petition and quash the proceeding in P. C. No. 61 of 1979 on the file of the Principal Munsiff and J. M. F. C. Ranebennur. ( 18 ) CRIMINAL Petition allowed. --- *** --- .