Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1980 DIGILAW 1283 (ALL)

Ram Kewal Sharma v. Deputy Director of Education, VII Region, Gorakhpur

1980-12-24

A.N.VARMA, SATISH CHANDRA

body1980
JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is lirected againsu two orders one passed by the Deputy Director of Education, respondent no. 1 herein, dated 2/3-4-1974 and the other passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Basti, respondent no. 2 dated 13-:-1973. 2. The petition was filed on the allegation that the petitioner was appointed as a lecturer in a clear vacancy in English in^e respondent no. 3 College, having been selected for the post in July, 1966. His appointment was duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 10th October, 1966. Ever since then the petitioner had been taking intermediate classes in English in the said college. Since the session 1971-72, however, the work of teaching intermediate classes was taken away from the petitioner and was assigned to Sri Chand Bhan Singh, the respondent no. 4, an Assistant Teacher in the same college in the L. T. grade. On 31st August, 1972, the Managing Committee of the institution passed a resolution whereby it was decided to promote respondent no. 4 to the post of a Lecturer in English and a recommendation to that effect was sent to the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner submitted a representation to the District Inspector of Schools against this resolution on the assertion that as the petitioner was already working as a lecturer on that post the respondent no. 4 could not legally be promoted. The District Inspector of Schools, however, by his order dated 13th February, 1973 accorded approval to the promotion of respondent no. 4. The petitioner again made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools against the said approval but to no avail. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a. writ petition in this Court challenging the order dated 13th February, 1973 but the same was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner could challenge that order by way of an appeal. The petitioner thereupon, filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education which was dismissed by the impugned order. 3. On these facts the petitioner filed the present petition, the main ground upon which it is founded being that as the petitioner had already been appointed as a lecturer in English, the respondent no. 4 could not be promoted or appointed to that post. 4. The respondents contested the above petition. 3. On these facts the petitioner filed the present petition, the main ground upon which it is founded being that as the petitioner had already been appointed as a lecturer in English, the respondent no. 4 could not be promoted or appointed to that post. 4. The respondents contested the above petition. Two counter-affidavits were filed, one on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools, and the other of the college. In both the counter-affidavits, it has been categorically asserted that in point of fact the petitioner was never appointed a lecturer. He was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in L. T. grade. However, in the order of approval passed by the District Inspector of Schools in the year 1956, by an obvious over right, it was stated that the approval was being given to the "promotion" of the petitioner as a lecturer. The mistake was promptly rectified in October, 1966 itself to the knowledge of the petitioner himself. Indeed, he worked throughout only as an Assistant Teacher in the L. T. grade and he drew salary in that grade without any protest. The petitioner was given full opportunity by the Deputy Director of Education and the allegation to the contrary was wrong and baseless. The impugned orders were perfectly legal and proper. 5. Two points were urged in support of the petition : 1. Regulation 90 of the Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, which enjoins the appellate authority to fix a date of the hearing of the appeal, was violated. 2. Inasmuch as, the petitioner already been duly appointed as a lecturer in English in the year 1966 the promotion of respondent no. 4 to the same post amounted, in effect, to reduction on rank of the petitioner within the meaning of Section 16-G (3) of the said Act. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find no merits in either of the two points. 7. Taking the first point first, we find that Regulation 90 or the provisions relating to hearing of appeals under Chapter III have absolutely no application to the facts of the present case. The impugned order has been passed upon a representation and not in any appeal submitted by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Education. Against the approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools to the promotion of the respondent no. The impugned order has been passed upon a representation and not in any appeal submitted by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Education. Against the approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools to the promotion of the respondent no. 4 to the post of lecturer in English, no appeal is provided. Regulation nos. 83-90 deal with the procedure for hearing and disposal of appeals filed under Clause (c) of subsection (3) of Section 16-G. The regulations do not apply to the disposal of the representations such as was filed by the petitioner. 8. The contention, therefore, that Regulation No. 90 aforesaid applied to the present case or that the same was not complied with is thus obviously misconceived. The petitioner filed a written representation which has been disposed of by a reasoned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any provision which may have entitled the petitioner to personal hearing. We are satisfied that the petitioner was given full opportunity to make representation and that his representation has been properly disposed of. The first point, therefore, fails. 9. Coming to the second point, in the counter-affidavits filed both on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools as well as the College, it has been categorically stated that the petitioner was appointed only as Assistant Teacher in the L. T. Grade. The petitioner was appointed on that post in a vacancy which had occurred in that grade. The approval of the District Inspector of Schools for the appointment of the petitioner was also sought for the post of an Assistant Teacher in the L. T. grade. In the order of approval dated 10th October, 1966, however, by oversight it was mentioned that the promotion of the petitioner to the post of lecturer was being approved. The error was promptly pointed out by the Management and was, thereupon, corrected by the District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 31st October, 1966. In the agreement which was executed by the petitioner under Paragraphs 143 (.f) and 239 (2) of the U. P. Education Code also the petitioner was shown as having been appointed as an Assistant Teacher in L. T. grade. In his service book also the petitioner was throughout shown as an Assistant Teacher in L. T. grade. In the agreement which was executed by the petitioner under Paragraphs 143 (.f) and 239 (2) of the U. P. Education Code also the petitioner was shown as having been appointed as an Assistant Teacher in L. T. grade. In his service book also the petitioner was throughout shown as an Assistant Teacher in L. T. grade. The petitioner also drew salary for the post of an Assistant Teacher in the L. T. grade without any protest, right from 1968 up to this date- When the L. T. grades were revised twice, in the year 1969 and again in 1974, the Assistant Teachers working in L. T. grade were asked to give their option for the revised grade. The petitioner exercised his option in favour of the revised grades on 1st of July, 1969 and 23rd of March, 1974. 10. It is on these incontrovertible facts that the respondent no. 1 has found that the petitioner's contention that he was appointed as a lecturer was completely wrong. We have periled the impugned order and we have no hesitation in holding that the aforesaid conclusion reached by the Deputy Director of Education is fully supported by indisputable facts. The conclusion is not vitiated by any error of law. The very premise of the second argument being wrong, the submission cannot be sustained. We, therefore, find no merits in the second point urged in support of the petition. 11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.