JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This is a second appeal by the defendants. 2. Plaintiffs suit for perpetual injunction and in the alternative for possession and recovery of Rs. 4.50 ps. as arrears of rent was dismissed by the trial court in respect of the first two reliefs but was decreed for the to recovery of the amount of money claimed. The trial court held that the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant and since the tenancy of the defendants had not been terminated by giving a notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the suit for ejectment or for recovery of possession could not be decreed. Since the rent at the rate of 2 Annas per month was in arrears, the recovery of arrears of rent was decreed. On appeal by the plaintiffs the lower appellate court held that the defendants were licensees and not tenants. The plea that the license had become irrevocable by virtue of the fact that the defendants father had raised a construction over the land was also rejected. The appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed as prayed. Cross-objections by the defendants in regard to the recovery of arrears of rent was also dismissed. 3. In this appeal learned counsel for the appellants contended that the lower appellate court had not specifically set aside the finding of the trial court that the defendants were tenants of the land in suit, the finding hat the defendants were licensees was erroneous and was based on misinterpretation of Exhibit 4. In the alternative, it was contended that even if the defendants were held to be licensees their eviction was protected by virtue of S. 60 (b) of the Easements Act for acting upon the license they had raised a construction of a permanent character incurring expenses. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am unable to accept any of these contentions. The reasons are as follows: 4. There were mainly two questions before the court below. The first was what was the relationship between the parties ? The trial court had of course held that the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant. This conclusion was based on an interpretation of Exhibit 4. Exhibit 4 was a deed written by the defendants' father Ballaiyan. There were mainly two questions before the court below. The first was what was the relationship between the parties ? The trial court had of course held that the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant. This conclusion was based on an interpretation of Exhibit 4. Exhibit 4 was a deed written by the defendants' father Ballaiyan. Even if there was a reference to Kiraya or kirayanama it did not make the document, a rent note. A plain reading of the document leaves no room that this was a document which purported to lay down the conditions under which the defendants father was taking a piece of land from the erstwhile owner of the land. This document was of the year 1929 and it clearly stipulated that a piece of land was being taken for raising a house and for keeping a malba, laththa, baans and kiwara etc. on the conditions mentioned in the document. The executor of the document Ballaiyan bound himself to pay two Annas per month as rent and also undertook to vacate the land whenever it was needed by the owner of the land and to remove the malba. It also stipulated that the executor will have no right to sell or mortgage the house nor let out the house to any one else and if there was a breach of the term it would be competent for the owner to get him evicted through a Court. Lastly, it stated that he would remain in possession subject to these terms. This document has all the ingredients of a licence, but not of a lease. The lower appellate court has court erectly recorded that this document had been executed by the father of defendant No. 1 and not by Sheikh Masuduzzaman, the erstwhile owner of the land. The lower appellate court has also correctly stated that there is nothing in the deed to show that any interest was given in the land. It is clear from the above that the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court that the status of the defendants father was that of a licensee was correct. Consequently the plea that he was a lessee could not be sustained. It may be mentioned here that both the courts below have proceeded to decide the question on the basis of the document, Exhibit 4. Consequently the plea that he was a lessee could not be sustained. It may be mentioned here that both the courts below have proceeded to decide the question on the basis of the document, Exhibit 4. In my opinion, the view taken by the court below that the document created only a licence and not a lease is correct. 5. Learned counsel had raised a contention that the plot which was claimed by the plaintiffs was No. 2550 whereas Exhibit 4 pertained to plot No. 2169 and, therefore, it would not be relevant. This contention has also to be rejected for the reasons given by the court below. The finding is that the plaint map gives not only the boundaries but also the measurements and it has been found that Exhibit 4 pertained to the same piece of land although in the Exhibit 4 the plot number mentioned is 2169. The court below has recorded that this deed. Exhibit 4 related to the land in suit. This finding must be accepted as correct. 6. The second main contention by the learned counsel was that since Ballaiyan had, acting upon the licence, raised a construction of a permanent character incurring expenses, the construction was protected by virtue of Section 60 (b) of the Easements Act. In support of his contention he relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mathuri v. Bholanath (AIR 1934 All 517). In that case it was held that when an owner of a land gives permission to another person to put up a building of a permanent character and he incurs expenses in the execution of such work, the licenser is by necessary implication estopped from revoking his licence. It is also held that even a mud house or a kachha house may be a work of a permanent character. On a perusal of this decision it is apparent that the learned Munsif recorded that there is no evidence whatsoever on record to show what the terms of the original grant were. The Court proceeded on the basis that there were no specific terms under which the licence was granted. The position, in my opinion, would be different where there are certain terms laid down or agreed upon between the parties. What would be position if there are terms which restrict the rights of the licence ? The Court proceeded on the basis that there were no specific terms under which the licence was granted. The position, in my opinion, would be different where there are certain terms laid down or agreed upon between the parties. What would be position if there are terms which restrict the rights of the licence ? The question has been considered in the case of Chotey Lal Durga Bai ( AIR 1950 All 661 ). It was held by the learned single Judge that "where a licensee executes a work of a permanent character under a clear understanding that he or his heirs may be called upon after certain time to leave the land, it is not open to him to plead such work as a bar against his eviction on a suit brought by the plaintiff in pursuance of the solemn understanding given by him." In coming to this conclusion the learned single Judge had referred to two cases of the Court, namely, Ganga Sahai v. Badrul Islam (AIR 1942 All 330) and to the case of Maqbool Ahmad v. Debi ( AIR 1949 All 455 ). In the former case Bajpai, J. referred to a Division Bench case of the Court in Nabi Mahomed v. Bhagwat Prasad (1931 All LJ 649) of which he was a member and then held as follows : "It was clearly recognised in this case that a contract to the contrary would disentitle the licensee from deriving advantage confers red by S. 60, Easements Act and in the present case the defendant, has, in terms expressed and in unambiguous language, given out that the landlord would have the right to get the site vacated whenever he so chose. I have not been able to appreciate the argument of learned counsel for the appellant based on S. 23, Contract Act. There is nothing illegal in the contract such as I have been considering and I cannot see why the contract cannot be given effect." 7. In the case of Maqbool Ahmad v. Debi (supra) it was held that a mere rent note or a qabuliat does not amount to a lease but the person executing the rent note is bound by the terms as a matter of his undertaking although the other party who had not signed the document would not be bound by it. 8. 8. It is, therefore, clear from the above that where there are certain terms whether in a rent note or a fabulist or in any other such paper and it limits the right of a licensee while making a construction on a piece of land owned by the other party, he is bound by the terms thereof. If he has undertaken to vacate the land on the happening of some event, then he is precluded from raising the plea that his constructions are protected by virtue of S. 60 (b) of the Easements Act. The undertaking given by the licensee is a solemn undertaking and I see no reason why should a court lean in favour of such a person to flout the undertaking. In my opinion, that would not be an action guided by justice, good conscience or even equity. The undertaking given by such a person would be binding on him and he would be estopped from pleading to the contrary. 9. Applying the above principles in the present case I find that Exhibit 4 was executed by Ballaiyan, father of defendant No.l. Ballaiyan and his successors would be bound by the terms thereof. They had undertaken to vacate the land whenever asked for by the owner. The plaintiffs stepped into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and, therefore, were entitled to ask for the vacation of the land. In such a case the provisions of the licence having become irrevocable cannot be pleaded. In this view of the matter I find no ground for interference in the second appeal. 10. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be order as to costs.