Judgment M. P. Varma, J. 1. This writ application is directed against the order of suspension passed by the Commissioner, Patna Division, on 5th Septem ber, 1979, by which this petitioner has been put under suspension with effect from 9th January, 1979. The order was communicated to the petitioner by the office of the Collector, Aurangabad after 23rd September 1979. The impugned order of suspension is contained in Annexure 1 and the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the same. 2. The short point which arises for consideration is whether the order of suspension can be passed with retrospactive effect. 3. It appears that the petitioner was suspended on a charge of receiv ing illegal gratification which is an offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act and also under the Indian Penal Code. He was arrested on the said charge on 10th November 1978 but was released on bail on 9th January, 1979. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that on being released, when he went to join his office, he was served with the suspension order, vide Annexure 1, after 23rd September, 1979. 4. The petitioner holds the post of Circle Inspector in Deo Block in aurangabad and his service condition is regulated by the Bihar Service Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to rule 100 of the Code and has submitted that according to this rule the otder of suspension can be made effective, at best on and from the date it has been passed or on the date it has been communicated to the petitioner but not with retrospective effect. Reliance has been placed on the case of Satya Narain Prasad Srivastava V/s. The State of Bihar and others (1978 B. B. C. J.208 ). It has been held therein that rule 100 of the Code has vested power in the authorities concerned to pass order of suspension of a Government servant. It does not in express term speak that such an order can be passed retrospectively as well. In the instant case, as pointed out above, the order of suspension was passed on 5th September, 1979, which was made effective from a retrospective date i. e. from 9th January, 1979. It does not in express term speak that such an order can be passed retrospectively as well. In the instant case, as pointed out above, the order of suspension was passed on 5th September, 1979, which was made effective from a retrospective date i. e. from 9th January, 1979. In the aforesaid view, the order of suspension taking effect with a retrospective date is certainly violative of the rule 100 of the Code and, as such, must be set aside. 5. In view of what has been stated above, 1 hold that the order of suspension of the petitioner, as envisaged in Annexure 1, will not be deemed to be effective from 9th January, 1979, but of course, the suspension order will come into effect on and from 5th September, 1979. when the order was passed. I will like to mention here that 1 am not inclined to accept the contention raised at the Bar that suspension order will be effective from the date it is communicated to the petitioner. In my opinion, as per rule 106 of the Code, the order takes effect on the date it has been passed. In the circumstances, the order will be deemed to be in effect on aad from the date it has been passed i. e. from 5th September, 1979, and not from 9th January, 1979, as has been stated in Annexure 1. 6. In the result, the application succeeds in part and the petitioner will be deemed to be in service in between the period of 9th January, 1979 and 4th September, 1979, and be will be entitled to his full pay and emoluments for the said period. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.