Judgment :- 1. Janaki Amma, a landlord, filed an application in 1965 for resumption of land from her tenant Gopalan Nair, under S.16 of Act I of 1964 as it then stood. The Section permitted resumption for cultivation by the landlord or a member of his family, from tenants in possession of excess land, subject to the condition that the extent of land in the landlord's possession should not exceed the ceiling area and that in the tenant's possession should not be reduced below his ceiling area. The Land Tribunal allowed the application on 15-5 -67. The tenant appealed, and by order dated 23-11-70 the Appellate Authority remanded the matter for fresh disposal by taking note of the revised ceiling provisions introduced by the amending Act 35/69. The Land Tribunal reconsidered the matter, found that the applicant-landlord was not in possession of any land and that the tenant was having 9.44 standard acres as excess. Accordingly 9.44 acres were ordered to be surrendered by order dated 17-3-75. The tenant again appealed, but this time without success. Hence this revision by him. 2. Janaki Amma passed away while the appeal of 1975 was pending, and her legal representatives were brought on record by the Appellate Authority. Gopalan Nair also is no more, and his legal representatives are additional petitioners 2 to 6 herein. 3. The following points are raised on behalf of the tenant: (i) Since resumption under S.16 is for personal cultivation, no surrender for that purpose could have been ordered after the death of Janaki Amma; (ii) In any event, her legal representative should have established that they too required the land for their own cultivation; but this has not been done; (iii) The finding that the tenant is holding excess land is unsustainable; and (iv) All other members of Janaki Amma's family had attained majority before 1-1-70 and under S.82(1)(a), after its amendment by Act 35/69, her ceiling area was 5 standard acres. The direction for surrender of 9.44 acres is illegal. 4. In support of points (i) and (ii) above, learned counsel referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in J. C. Chatterjee v. S. K. Tandon (AIR 1972 SC 2526), Phool Rani v. Navbat Rai (AIR 1973 SC. 2110) and Shantilal v Chimanlal (AIR 1976 SC 2358). The direction for surrender of 9.44 acres is illegal. 4. In support of points (i) and (ii) above, learned counsel referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in J. C. Chatterjee v. S. K. Tandon (AIR 1972 SC 2526), Phool Rani v. Navbat Rai (AIR 1973 SC. 2110) and Shantilal v Chimanlal (AIR 1976 SC 2358). The first of these had arisen from a suit by a landlord of certain premises for ejecting a tenant from its first floor. Though the trial court held in favour of the landlord, the District Judge differed; and when the matter was pending in Second Appeal before the High Court, the tenant passed away. The High Court took the view that S.13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act provided protection only personally to a statutory tenant, and that his legal representatives could not object to eviction after the tenancy had been duly terminated. The Supreme Court confirmed this view holding that after termination of the contractual tenancy, the tenant could continue to occupy the premises as a statutory tenant only, liable to be evicted in accordance with the special law (i. e. the Rajasthan Act), and that such right was personal to him. This personal right vanished with his death and his legal heirs could not urge it, as they were not tenants in their own right. The second case (Phool Rani) arose under the Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958) where the landlord filed an ejectment application under S.14(1)(e), seeking possession from the tenant on the ground that the premises were required for the bona fide occupation of himself and his family members. The Rent Controller dismissed the application on the preliminary ground that the notice to quit was not valid. An appeal was taken, and during its pendency, the landlord passed away. The Supreme Court held that the ground for "own occupation" was personal to the applicant, in spite of the circumstance that the requirement of the members of his family had also been pleaded, and that therefore the "right to sue" did not survive the deceased. This broad statement of the law was not approved by a larger bench of the Court in the third case cited (Shantilal's), where it was held that the requirement of the family members, as distinct from that of the deceased, was not personal to the latter. This broad statement of the law was not approved by a larger bench of the Court in the third case cited (Shantilal's), where it was held that the requirement of the family members, as distinct from that of the deceased, was not personal to the latter. This case had arisen under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1949. 5. Mr. Balasubramonian's argument is that under S.16 of Act I of 1964, resumption is permitted only for bona fide requirement of cultivation by the landlord or by members of his family, and that such a right could not survive the landlord, in the light of Chatterjee"s case (AIR. 1972 SC. 2526). It is also contended that Janaki Amma's application was for her own cultivation and that the need of the members of the family had not been pleaded, to attract the dicta in Shantilal's case (AIR 1976 SC. 2358). If attention is confined to the three decisions, the contention is attractive; but it appears to me that they are only instances where the Court had to consider in the context of certain Rent Control legislations, whether the "right to sue" survived the death of a party. Chandrachood J. (as he then was) had cautiously and briefly touched upon this question in Phool Rani's case (AIR. 1973 SC. 2110) by observing that: "The survival of the right to sue on the death of a plaintiff is a problem that has often to be solved on a permutation of several facts and circumstances. But it would be out of place in this judgment to embark upon an abstract disquisition of the question as to in what classes of cases, the right to sue survives in favour of the legal representatives. In some cases under the Rent Acts, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum person a has been attempted to be applied on the death of a necessary party to a suit or proceeding but that oft-quoted maxim is oft misunderstood. The plain meaning of that common law maxim is that a personal action dies with the parties to the cause of action. Its purport, until sweeping changes were made in the previous law by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 was that no executor or administrator could, subject to certain exceptions, sue or be sued for any tort committed against or by the deceased in his lifetime. Its purport, until sweeping changes were made in the previous law by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 was that no executor or administrator could, subject to certain exceptions, sue or be sued for any tort committed against or by the deceased in his lifetime. The action for a tort had to be begun in the joint lifetime of the wrongdoer and the person injured." "Nor do we find relevance in the provisions of S.306 of the Indian Succession Act, under which all demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation and assault, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party and except also cases "where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed" or granting it would be nugatory. We can only press into service and that too indirectly, the analogy of the first part of the last exception in an effort to find whether after the death of the plaintiff in the instant case the relief sought could not be enjoyed by his legal representatives." 'Cautiously', because, the doctrine actio personalis moritur cum persona has been criticised by many as a rule "strangely at variance with the reasonableness underlying most principles of common law liability", a principle "founded on slender authority", "an irrational doctrine" supported only by "vicious antiquity", and "a serious anomaly" in the law of civil wrongs See Allen, Law in the Making. 7th Edn pp 327 to 329. As to the impact of subsequent happenings including death of parties on pending proceedings in general, and that too with special reference to land reform legislations, there is however an illuminating discussion in the Supreme Court's decision in Rameswar v. Jot Bam (AIR. 1976 SC. 49), and it will be useful to advert to the same also. 6. The case arose under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953). S.18 of the Act provided that a tenant, holding under a large landowner, could purchase the landlord's rights. The purchase price could be paid in instalments, and on payment of the first instalment itself, the tenant was to be deemed to have become owner. 6. The case arose under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953). S.18 of the Act provided that a tenant, holding under a large landowner, could purchase the landlord's rights. The purchase price could be paid in instalments, and on payment of the first instalment itself, the tenant was to be deemed to have become owner. Three tenants of a large landowner, Teja by name, had applied for purchase. The application was allowed and they deposited the first instalment. An appeal had been filed and when it was pending, Teja died. His legal representatives contended that after his death, the land had devolved on them as small owners and that the purchase applications had ceased to be maintainable In the course of rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court laid down the following propositions: (i) the normal rule is that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date action is instituted. In an ideal legal system, the litigant who asks for justice should get forthwith, and should not be left to the vicissitudes of subsequent happenings, simply because courts or tribunals function slowly, and appeals, revisions and reviews are provided for, in quest of perfection; (ii) there may be exceptional cases or circumstances where subsequent events may have their impact on the right of action or on the nature of the relief; but they are a narrow category, and are mostly in the nature of a discretion in courts to exercise their jurisdiction to avoid injustice; (iii) where the nature of the relief originally sought has become obsolete and a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of subsequent developments, courts can mould, vary or reshape the relief; (iv) where rights have already vested in a party, they are altogether immune from subsequent events except in the shape of retrospective legislation; and (v) the primary concern of the courts is to implement the justice of the legislation, and except in those rare cases where the right to relief itself depends on the continued existence of certain facts, a subsequent event can have no "fundamental impact" on statutory rights. And turning to the need for extraordinary caution when questions of the above nature arise under laws relating to agrarian reforms, the court said: "Agrarian reform law affects a considerable number of people and to keep rights uncertain over a long stretch of time till appeals and reviews and revisions are exhausted, is to inject unpredictability of results, for it is quite on the cards that a landlord may die in the long course of litigation, or other events may happen at later stages beyond the trial court. Can rights of parties fluctuate with such uncertain contingencies? If so, stabilisation of land ownerships, so vital to the new pattern of agrarian relations, will be postponed for a long time. Is not the judicial task simplified by adopting the golden rule that the rights of parties must be determined when they seek justice and not when the last court has had its last say, long years after the litigation was initiated? A system of orderliness about rights in land will result from this approach. More than all, the sounder rule of law as between rival claims to consideration of, or indifference to, subsequent events is surely that which excludes later event factually or legally". 7. What then is the 'justice of the legislation' here? Taken in isolation, no doubt, S.16 provides for resumption of land from a tenant only when the landlord requires the holding bona fide for cultivation by himself or any member of his family. But the provision is only a small part of a comprehensive scheme for agrarian reform, taking in its stride the conferment of fixty of tenure on tenants, scaling down of arrears of rents, fixation of fair rent, vesting of landlord's rights in the State, purchase of such rights by the tenants, and fixation of ceiling, including take-over of excess land by the State and distribution of the same among the landless and the small holders. Under S.13, every tenant is entitled to fixty of tenure is respect of his holding and no land shall be resumed from him except as provided in S.14 to 22; and under S.72 the rights of the owners of all tenanted lands vest in Government, to be purchased by the tenants under S.72B. But the tenant cannot purchase the landlord's rights if he or his family is holding land in excess of the ceiling area. But the tenant cannot purchase the landlord's rights if he or his family is holding land in excess of the ceiling area. If the extent of land held by him is less than the ceiling area, he can purchase only so much as to make up the deficiency. S.83 treats landlords and tenants alike in the sense that even a tenant who holds excess land is bound to surrender such excess to the State. The right to purchase as also the right to hold are thus circumscribed by the ceiling provisions of Chapter III, and so are the provisions of S.16 which permit resumption consistent only with the ceiling area applicable to the landlord as also the tenant. The Act does not stop with conferment of fixity on tenants; it goes further and insists that no person (or family), whether as landlord or tenant, can own or hold land in excess of the ceiling area with effect from the notified date and even subsequent thereto. Creation of tenancies after 1-4-64 is prohibited. The justice of the legislation consists of an equitable distribution of lands, including the rights therein, so that no one, whether landlord or tenant, occupies a dominant position in agrarian economy. The legislature was aware that just as there were large owners of lands, there were also tenants holding extensive lands; and both are being cut down to size. It was also aware that in certain areas of the State, fixity had been conferred on tenants much earlier with no right for the landlords to resume; still it provided for limited resumptions, albeit under stringent conditions, because the equitable distribution conceived of required weaker links to be strengthened, even if they were technically landlords. It is true that the Act discloses an anxiety to protect tenants from eviction; but in its broad sweep directed against concentration of lands in the hands of a few, it has not carved out a sanctuary for any one class. It has declined to freeze the status quo by allowing the tenant to hold on to every cent of land in his possession. It has consigned landlordism to the lumber room, but not everyone with the label of a landlord on him. The semantic content of one Section cannot be segregated from the general philosophy underlying the whole enactment. It has declined to freeze the status quo by allowing the tenant to hold on to every cent of land in his possession. It has consigned landlordism to the lumber room, but not everyone with the label of a landlord on him. The semantic content of one Section cannot be segregated from the general philosophy underlying the whole enactment. Viewed in this background, the resumption under S.16, though primarily designed to meet the landlord's requirement of personal cultivation, is something more than a right personal to him or a right for personal enjoyment only; it is property which he is permitted to acquire on payment of the compensation fixed under S.20. S.23 enabling tenants to ask for restoration of lands resumed from them is also relevant. If a landlord resumes land for personal cultivation and fails to cultivate it "without reasonable excuse" within three years, the Section allows the tenant to get it back. Suppose the landlord becomes physically disabled. That is a reasonable excuse, and restoration is ruled out in such a case. The landlord can then pass on the land resumed to others by gift or sale, or if he dies, it devolves on his heirs. Again, a tenant possessing land equal to or in excess of the ceiling area cannot seek restoration at all, in view of the proviso. Under S.24, an application for restoration has to be filed within four years of the date of resumption; that is, if the landlord parts with the land after personally cultivating it for three years, the tenant again has no remedy. The provisions of S.23 and 24 thus indicate that it is not the intention of the legislature that any land resumed under S 16 should revert to the tenant the moment personal cultivation by the landlord comes to an end. Examining the legislative scheme as a whole, and the specific provisions noticed, it is not possible to hold that the right conferred on the landlords under S.16 are entirely personal and are of a nature which do not survive them. 8. Janaki Amma filed her application in 1965, and she was alive at least for a decade thereafter. The tribunals below have found, more than once, that she was entitled to resume. Should the delay of years flowing from the infirmities of the judicial system be permitted to defeat that right? 8. Janaki Amma filed her application in 1965, and she was alive at least for a decade thereafter. The tribunals below have found, more than once, that she was entitled to resume. Should the delay of years flowing from the infirmities of the judicial system be permitted to defeat that right? Should unpredictability be injected into a sphere where speedy stabilisation of rights is the essence of the legislative policy? Should the legal representatives of Gopalan Nair be given an undue advantage over those of his adversary, because he was a tenant and she, a landlord? I think not. 9. In the above view, the question whether the legal representatives of the deceased landlord require the land for their own cultivations does not arise, and the decision in Madhoji v. Abdul Kunhi (1979 KLT 11), cited by counsel, requires no separate consideration. 10. The finding that the tenant is holding land in excess of the ceiling area is a finding of fact, and little has been said to suggest that it calls for interference under S.103. 11. The last contention is that Janaki Amma was the sole surviving member of her family as on 1-1-70, and that she could at the most have resumed only five standard acres, subject to a minimum of six and a maximum of seven and a half ordinary acres. If the factual foundation is true, resumption of 9,44 standard acres could not have been ordered. But I do not find from the orders of the two authorities below that such a specific contention had been taken before them. All the same, the question is important and it is only proper that the tenant gets an opportunity to show that all other members of Janaki Amma's family had become adults by 1-1-70. I therefore set aside the finding as regards the actual extent to be surrendered (and that only) and remit the matter to the Appellate Authority for a fresh consideration of the same, but on condition that the petitioners pay to counsel appearing in this Court for respondent No. 5 an amount of Rs. 150/- within one month from today. Needless to say that the petitioners will be entitled to exercise option under S.22(4). All other points are held against the petitioners, and the CRP. is disposed of as above. No costs.