Judgment Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 1. These two criminal revision applications have been filed on behalf of the members of the first party and the third party to a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") for setting aside the final order passed in that proceeding in favour of the second party-opposite party. 2. It appears that on 19-3-1971 a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code was initiated as an apprehension of breach of the peace was reported to the magistrate. That proceeding was converted into a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code on 27-4-1971 because the dispute related to land. The disputed plots were 4678, 4715, 4840, 4882, 4817 and 5049 of village Khawaspur in the district bhagalpur. During the pendency of that proceeding a pleader commissioner was appointed who reported about the configuration of different plots. He further reported that plot no.4717 was amalgamated with some of the plots which were the subject-matter in dispute, On 9-7-1976 the members of the third party who are petitioners in Criminal Revision no.196 of 1978 urged before the learned Magistrate that a3 from the pleader commissioners report it appeared that plot nos.4715, 4716 and 4717 were amalgamated as such the proceeding should be amended and that plot shoud also be included. On 10-9-1976 an order was passed to amend the proceeding and to include plot no.4717 in the proceeding. He further directed that a fresh copy of the proceeding be issued to the parties. Thereafter all the parties were heard and ultimately by the impugned order the learned Magistrate declared second party-opposite party to be in possession of the land in dispute except plot no.4717 which was directed to be included on 10-9-76. About this plot he came to the conclusion that as neither the second party nor the third party have laid claim over this plot the first party, that is, the petitioner in Criminal Revision 161 of 1978 was being declared in possession thereof. 3. About this plot he came to the conclusion that as neither the second party nor the third party have laid claim over this plot the first party, that is, the petitioner in Criminal Revision 161 of 1978 was being declared in possession thereof. 3. Before the learned single Judge while challenging the validity of the final order passed under Sec.145 of Code it was urged that the whole proceeding has been vitiated because the amendment aforesaid was allowed on 10-9-1976 when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force and as such the proceeding should have been disposed of in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the new Code and not in terms of Sec.145 of the old Code. The learned single Judge has referred this case to the Division Bench for answering the question as to whether after inclusion of it new plot or a piece of land in a pending proceeding under Sec.145 of the old Code the procedure under the new Code has to be disposed of as if the new Code had not come into force treating it to be a pending proceeding, The main basis of this argument appears to be that no sooner any property is added by way of amendment a fresh preliminary order is issued which will be deemed to be initiation of a new proceeding. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged the same point in support of this application and submitted that whenever there is an amendment of the proceeding by addition of a new plot for all practical purposes it is a new proceeding which comes into existence and it has to be disposed of in accordance with law then prevailing. There cannct be any doubt that if it is held that by mere inclusion of some properties to the proceeding a new proceeding is initiated and the pending is terminated then it has to be held as a necessary corollary that this new proceeding is to be disposed of in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the new Code. So far as the general law is concerned it is well settled that any amendment in respect of the subject-matter of dspute allowed at a later stage does not amount to institution of a fresh proceeding since that date because after the amendment is allowed it relates back to the initiation of the earlier proceeding. So far as the general law is concerned it is well settled that any amendment in respect of the subject-matter of dspute allowed at a later stage does not amount to institution of a fresh proceeding since that date because after the amendment is allowed it relates back to the initiation of the earlier proceeding. According to learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that principle shall not apply so far as the proceedings under Sec.145 are concerned because there is no specific provision under the Code for allowing amendment of such proceedings and whenever any such amendment is allowed for all practical purposes it is a fresh proceeding. It is true that there is no specific provision under the Code enabling the Magistrate to amend the pending by adding or deleting parties or properties to the proceeding. But merely because there is no specific provision in may view it is difficult to hold that whenever a party is added to such a pending proceeding or a property is added or deleted a new proceeding ccmes into existence since that date. This power is implicit and inherent in the Magistrate and can be exercised by him for the purpose of deciding the dispute relating to land between the parties concerned,. The object of Sec.145 of the Code is to vest power in the Magistrate to decide the question of actual physical possession of the land in dispute between the parties concerned finally so far as the criminal court is concerned with the sole purpose to avoid the apprehension of breach of the peace. In a pending proceeding it is always open to the parties to bring to the notice of the Magistrate about the misdescription of the plots which are mentioned in the preliminary order. Can it be said that whenever the Magistrate corrects even such misdescription since that date he is drawing up a fresh proceeding Similarly on an application being made a party is added to the proceeding who claims the actual physical possession of the land. Can it be said that whenever the Magistrate corrects even such misdescription since that date he is drawing up a fresh proceeding Similarly on an application being made a party is added to the proceeding who claims the actual physical possession of the land. Can it be said that since the date of his addition it will be deemed that the old proceeding which was pending till that day has come to an end and a new proceeding has been brought into existence So far as the addition of a party is concerned a Bench of this Court has already considered the question in the case of Rajendra Prasad Singh V/s. Dr. A. K. Ghosh (1968 PLJR 208 ). It was held that there was nothing in Sec.145 of the Code to warrant the view that whenever a new party is added to a proceeding under that section it must be held as a matter of law that the proceeding starts or the preliminary order envisaged under sub-section (1) is made so far as that party is concerned on the day on which the party is added. Learned counsel urged that on addition or deletion of subject-matter in dispute the position will be different and in such case, according to him, since that date the old proceeding comes to an end and a fresh proceeding is initiated. In my view it is difficult to accept this contention. It is well settled that a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code once initiated can be disposed of only by three methods : (i) the preliminary order can be cancelled in view of sub-section (5) of Sec.145 if the Magistrate issatisfied that there was no dispute regarding the possession of the land, in question, (ii) by passing a final order under sub-section (6) of Sec.145 declaring one of the parties to the dispute to be in actual physical possession of the land in question, and (iii)by attaching the subject matter in dispute under Sec.145 of the Code as it stood prior to the amendment of the Code in 1955. It may be mentioned that under sec.146 of the new Code the Magistrate has been again vested with the power under certain contingency to attach the subject-matter in disputs till the matter is decided by the Civil Court. It may be mentioned that under sec.146 of the new Code the Magistrate has been again vested with the power under certain contingency to attach the subject-matter in disputs till the matter is decided by the Civil Court. If was pointed out as early as in the case of Sastu sahu V/s. Nathuni Thakur (6 PLT 258) by Kulwant Sahay, J. , that except three methodc mentioned above there is no other way to terminate a proceeding under sec.145 once it has been initiated. The same view was expressed in the case of jageshwar Mahto V/s. Uchit Mahto (1965 BLJR 231 ). If it is held that by addition of some new plots or deletion thereof the old proceeding is terminated then it will amount to prescribing a fourth mode of termination of a proceeding which has come into existence. This is not sanctioned by the Code. If the proceeding which has been initiated continues even after amendment then it has to be treated as a pending proceeding which has to be disposed of in accordance with the old code as provided by Sec.484 of the new Code. The fallacy of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners can be demonstrated by giving an example take a case where a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code is initiated and the subject-matter in dispute is attached and the property becomes custodia legis. After sometime some more lands are added to the proceeding by amendment. If it is held that since that date a new proceeding comes into existence then the date with reference to which the Magistrate has to find out the actual physical possession of one of the parties will be that date when amendment was allowed. Admittedly on that date the properties were under attachment and none of the parties were in actual physical possession. This will create anamolous position. Therefore, in my opinion, it has to be held that by mere addition of some more land to the proceeding a new proceeding does not come into existence and the old one continues and it has to be disposed of as a pending proceeding. 5. Faced with this situation the learned counsel appering for the petitioners submitted that the old proceeding may not terminate but after amendment there is a merger and it becomes a new proceeding. I have not been able to appreciate this argument. 5. Faced with this situation the learned counsel appering for the petitioners submitted that the old proceeding may not terminate but after amendment there is a merger and it becomes a new proceeding. I have not been able to appreciate this argument. For all practical purposes it is the same argument which has been put in another form. The real controversy which I have already indicated above is as to whether even after amendment the proceeding will be deemed to be a pending proceeding or a new proceeding. If it continues to be a pending proceeding then it has to be disposed of in accordance with the old code as has been done in the instant case. 6. Lastly, it was submitted that the learned Magistrate has not considered the pleader commissioners report on amalgamation of the plots property. From the order of the Magistrate it appears that he has fully discussed about the pleader commissioners report and then he has come to the conclusion that the second party opposite party were in possession of different plots other than plot number 4717 which was not claimed by them. There is no question of re-appraising the evidence on the record while exercising revisional jurisdiction of this Court. It was also submitted that the learnad Magistrate has considered the show cause filed in the 144 proceeding which preceded the proceeding under sec.145 and as such the final order has been vitiated. Sub-section (4) of sec.145 of the old Code enjoins the Magistrate concerned to peruse the statements, documents and affidavits so put in for the purpose of deciding the question of actual physical possession. If the show cause under Sec.144 of the Code had been put in by the parties concerned there was no bar in considering the the statements made therein. In that situation it cannot be held that the finding of actual physical possession is based on extraneous materials. In my opinion there is no merit in either of the applications and they are, accordingly, dismissed. Applications dismissed.