JUDGMENT-The only point that is involved in this revision application is, whether the Land Acquisition Officer, while exercising the powers of the Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has jurisdiction to entertain and decide an application under Order 33, rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The proceedings, out of which this matter arises relate to the determination of compensation for acquisition of the land S. No. 16/1 situate at Mouza Waghapur, taluq and district Yeotmal and belonging to the revision applicant. In the said proceedings, bearing Land Acquisition Case No. 7/1965-66, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an Award on 28-2-1970 and fixed the compensation for the aforesaid land at Rs. 62,975. Respondent Ranganath who claimed to be the tenant of the said land demanded Rs. 61,123,74 as the portion of the compensation payable to him. His claim was negatived by the Land Acquisition Officer and hence Ranganath applied "to the said Officer for making a reference under section 18 of the Act to the Civil Court. He also made an application under Order 33, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code for permission to file the reference in forma pauperis. The revision applicant opposed both these applications and inter alia contended that the Land Acquisition Officer has no jurisdiction to decide the question of pauperism and the provisions of Order 33, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code do not apply to an application for reference under section 18 of the Act. The Land Acquisition Officer, vide his order dated 15-9-1970, held that he was competent to decide the question of pauperism. He, therefore, enquired into the matter, allowed the application by his order dated 14-10-1971 and held that the provisions of Order 33, Civil Procedure Code are applicable to an application under section 18 of the Act and that the respondent was entitled to make a reference on payment of minimum court fee of Rs. 15. Being aggrieved by this order, the revision applicant-the land lady has preferred this revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Dharmadhikari J. who heard the revision application, felt that the controversy involved in this revision application is of general importance and involves a substantial question of law, which should be authoritatively decided by a Division Bench of this Court. 3. Dharmadhikari J. who heard the revision application, felt that the controversy involved in this revision application is of general importance and involves a substantial question of law, which should be authoritatively decided by a Division Bench of this Court. Accordingly the matter was placed before the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Masodkar and Kambli JJ. The learned Judges, after referring to a number of decisions for and against the view, that the Collector, while considering an application 'under section I ~ of the Act, is a Civil Court, also felt that the matter requires decision by a larger Bench of this Court. Consequently, reference was made to the Full Bench of this Court consisting of Deshmukh, C. J., Gadgil J. and myself. The reference involved the following question: "Whether the Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Maharashtra Act 38/1964, which makes every order made by the Collector revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court, while dealing with an application for making a reference for the determination of the Civil Court performs the functions of the Court: such; and whether to the proceedings before him the provisions of Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable ?" 4. The Full Bench did not appreciate the manner in which the reference was made and observed that the fact that the point involved is of general importance cannot be a ground on which a reference should be made to a larger Bench. It was, therefore, directed that the Single Judge before whom the revision application properly lies should hear and dispose of the application. The matter thus came before me. It was argued at great length and several decisions, including the decisions referred to by the learned Single Judge and the learned Judges of the Division Bench, were cited. 5. It was, therefore, directed that the Single Judge before whom the revision application properly lies should hear and dispose of the application. The matter thus came before me. It was argued at great length and several decisions, including the decisions referred to by the learned Single Judge and the learned Judges of the Division Bench, were cited. 5. An award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 11 of the Act determining the true area of land acquired; compensation payable for the land and the apportionment of the said compensation amongst pea-sons interested in the land can be challenged by any person interested; by an application to the Collector under section 18 (1) of the Act, requiring that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court. The objection of the person interested may be to the measurement of the land or to the amount of compensation or to the persons to whom it is payable or to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested. Sub-section (2) of section 18, however, lays down that the grounds on which objection to the award is taken, shall be stated in the application. The proviso to sub-section (2) further provides that every such application shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award, if the person making the application was present or represented before the Collector at the time when the award was made and in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector that he had made the award, whichever period shall first expire. The expressions "Collector" and "Court" are denied by clauses (c) and (d) of section 3 of the Act. The expressions "Collector" and "Court" are denied by clauses (c) and (d) of section 3 of the Act. The definition of "Court" given in clause (d) has been amended by the Land Acquisition (Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act (38 of 1964) which came into force on 7-12-1964, Clause (d) as it originally stood read as follows: "The expression "Court" means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limit to perform the functions of the Court under Act." The amended clause (d) reads as follows: "The expression 'Court' (except in sub-section (3) of section 18) means a principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government bas appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial Officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act;" By the amendment in place of the clause "the expression Court means", the clause "the expression Court (except in sub-section (3) of section 18) means" was substituted. This amendment was effected, because of addition of a new sub-clause (3) in section 18, which provides that any order made by the Collector on an application under section 18 shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Emphasis supplied.). The amended definition of "Court" read with sub-section (3) makes it clear that so far as any order passed by the Collector under section 18 is concerned, the Collector is a Court subordinate to High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 6. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act lays down that "save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained, in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act." 7. In support of the proposition that the Collector is not a 'Court' reliance was sought to be placed on the decisions Balkrishna v. Collector1, Kashi Prasad v. Notified Area2, Khetshidas v. Land Acquisition Officer3, Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh4, Alihusain v. Collector Panch Mahals5 and Union of India v. Deben Adhicary6. In support of the proposition that the Collector is not a 'Court' reliance was sought to be placed on the decisions Balkrishna v. Collector1, Kashi Prasad v. Notified Area2, Khetshidas v. Land Acquisition Officer3, Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh4, Alihusain v. Collector Panch Mahals5 and Union of India v. Deben Adhicary6. In Balkrishna Gupte's case, it was held that the High Court bas not been given power to interfere with the proceedings of the Collector so that if he refuses to do what seems incumbent upon his under the provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, High Court cannot direct him to make a reference and the proper remedy is either for the Legislature to give the High Court powers of superintendence over the Collector's proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act or for the Government to draw the attention of their Officers to the provisions of the Act and lay down rules for their guidance, if they have not already done so." 7-A. In Kashiprasad's case it was also held that "the Collector was not a 'Court' subordinate to the High Court. The High Court bas no jurisdiction to correct the Collector, if he improperly fails to make a reference or having made a reference, withdraws the reference before the reference has reached the District Judge". It was also held that "section 29 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that section 53 of the said Act applies only to the Court of the District Judge. The Collector has no power to review an order awarding compensation, passed by himself, as the Civil Procedure Code does not in terms apply to the proceedings before the Collector." 8. However, in view of the above referred amendment of the Land Acquisition Act by addition of new sub-clause (3) in section 18, the ratio of these decisions is no longer good law on the point that a Collector acting under section 18 is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. 9. In Khetshidas's case the Full Bench of Calcutta High Court held that the proceedings before the Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act are not a part of judicial proceedings before the Court. 9. In Khetshidas's case the Full Bench of Calcutta High Court held that the proceedings before the Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act are not a part of judicial proceedings before the Court. It was also held that even assuming that in dealing with an application under section 18 of the Collector acts as a Court, he does not do so as a Court subordinate to the High Court, so as to make his order revisable under section 115 of the Code. In coming to the conclusion that the proceedings before the Collector are not a part of judicial proceedings before the Court, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows :- "Where proceedings before a Court depend for their initiation on leave granted on reference made by another authority, the proceedings before that authority as to such leave or reference form no part of the subsequent proceedings before the Court. The sanctioning authority or referring authority cannot, therefore be held to be a Court on the ground that he deals with a part of the judicial proceedings nor to be a component part of some notional Court, composed of himself and the Judge." the learned Judges gave the following reasons for holding that the Collector acting under section 18 does not act as a 'Court'. "The Collector is otherwise a purely administrative Officer and when such an officer acting under section 18 in deciding the question whether the applicant is a person interested or whether the application is made within time, is given power to consider whether he will or will not refer to the Court a matter decided by him in his administrative capacity and when he can make his decision without hearing anyone and without following the procedure which Courts usually follow, it is impol6ible to hold that he acts as a Court. Constitution, subject matter for decision and procedure are all against such a view being taken." In Abdul Karim's case it was held that a 'suit' must be taken as one 'meaning' a suit instituted by the presentation of a plaint and Order 22 cannot be applied to proceedings under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act taking these proceedings as suit proceedings in reality or fictionally under the Code. In Alihussain's case the Gujrath High Court took contrary view about applicability of Order 22 to proceeding under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was held that reference proceeding under section 18 is not different from an ordinary civil proceeding and it can be dismissed for default in appearance, by force of Order 9, Rule 8 and that on the-death of the party, Order 22, Rule 3 is applicable. It was also held that a reference proceeding is not 'a suit' within the meaning of Article 176 of the Limitation Act of 1908 and as section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act does not make the provisions of Limitation Act applicable, Article 176 is not applicable to a reference under section 18. It was further held that though by a statutory fiction an award made on a reference becomes a 'decree' within the meaning of section 2 (2) of Civil Procedure Code there is no statutory fiction either in the Land Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act to make a reference a suit. 10. In Deben Adhicary's case, the question was whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 1963 was applicable to an application to the Collector under section 19(1) of the Defence of India Act; for making a reference to the Arbitrator for compensation. It was held that the Collector, before whom the application for reference has to be filed, not being a Court, Article 137 is not applicable. It was observed, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A I R 1977 S C 282, that Article 137 will apply only when an application is under any statute and is filed in a Civil Court. 11. As observed above, in view of the amendment made by the Maharashtra Extension and Amendment Act, 1964 the Collector while acting under section 18 is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and the question whether the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code are applicable to the proceedings under section 18 will have to be examined in the light of the said amendment along with the amended definition of 'Court'. 12. 12. Non-applicant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case Mohanlal v. State of Maharashtra7 in support of the proposition that Collector while dealing with an application under section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is a Court. In that case it was held that "decision of Collector on sufficiency of stamps is final and Court bas no jurisdiction to decide the question once the reference has been made by the Collector". Reliance was also placed by the non-applicant on the decision of this Court in the case Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra8 in which the effect of the amendment was considered. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether the Land Acquisition Officer while dealing with an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act has power to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application for reference in that case was barred by limitation by nine days and the Land Acquisition Officer rejected the application on the ground that the time for filing the application could not be extended for any reason whatsoever. In the revision application filed by the applicant, Padhye J., held that section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for making reference. According to the learned Judge the amendment which has been made to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by Maharashtra Act No, XXXVIII of 1964 by incorporating therein sub-section (3), made a considerable difference in the position in this behalf. The relevant observations made by the learned Judge about the material change effected by sub-section (3) of section 18 in para 3 of the judgment are as under: "From this provision it would appear that even though the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer, while dealing with the matter of the compensation may not be a Court governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet by virtue of this provision when he is dealing with the application for reference under section 18, he deals with that application as a Court governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and that is why an application for revision to the High Court has been provided against the order made by the Collector on such an application. When dealing with an application for reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Officer is considered to be a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If he is considered a Court under subsection (3) of section 18 then in that case the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the application for reference. On this view the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were applicable to the application made by the applicant for reference and the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer had to consider the application under section 5 for condonation of delay in filing the application." 13. Relying on this decision, Masodkar J. took the same view of the matter in two unreported decisions in Murlidhar v. Deputy Collector9 and Ramchandra Swami Deosthan v. South Eastern Railway10. 14. I am in agreement with this view which is consistent with the legal fiction created by the deeming provision in section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (3) of section 18 which was added by the Amendment Act No. XXXVIII of 1964, provides that ·'any order by the Collector on application under section 18 shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." This deeming provision must be given its full legal effect and should be carried to its logical conclusion as observed by the Supreme Court in the case State of Bombay v. Pandurang12. The logical conclusion that can be drawn by giving full effect to the aforesaid statutory provision is that for the purposes of deciding the questions whether the application for reference is sufficiently stamped, whether it is filed within limitation and whether the person filing the application is interested in the land acquired, the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer will be a Court subordinate to the High Court for purposes of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to the limited questions that arise for determination of the Collector while considering an application for reference under section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 15. 15. In a recent decision reported in State of Haryana v. Darshanadevi13 the Supreme Court has taken the view that Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court. In that case the question for consideration of their Lordships was whether the provisions in Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Punjab and Haryana High Court took the view that the claims Tribunal performing the functions under the Motor Vehicles Act has more or less the same status as that of the Court performing similar functions and, therefore, the petitioners before it are entitled to the benefit of Order XXXIII. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision and made the above mentioned observation that Order XXXIII will apply to tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court. 16. The Collector or the special Land Acquisition Officer, exercising the powers of Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, while dealing with an application for making reference has to consider the questions whether the application for reference is properly stamped, whether the application is within time and whether the person applying is interested in the compensation payable. The Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer is empowered to reject an application which is insufficiently stamped or which is not filed within time. He is also empowered to refuse to make a reference on the ground that the person applying has no interest in the land acquired. As held in Mohanlal's case (supra) the decision of Collector on sufficiency of stamps is final and the Court bas no jurisdiction to decide the question once the reference bas been made by the Collector. The power to decide the question whether the person filing an application for reference is capable of paying the court fee or not, is implicit in the power to decide whether the application is properly stamped or not. Further as has been consistently held by this Court, after the aforesaid amendment, the Collector or Land Acquisition Officer while acting under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act bas power to condone the delay in filing an application for making a reference. Further as has been consistently held by this Court, after the aforesaid amendment, the Collector or Land Acquisition Officer while acting under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act bas power to condone the delay in filing an application for making a reference. Moreover before making the reference, the Collector has to decide the question whether the person making the application has interest in the land acquired. In view of this position the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer while dealing with an application under section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has the trappings of a Civil Court and hence Order XXXIII of Civil Procedure Code will apply to an application under section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 17. In view of the position discussed above, the Land Acquisition Officer was perfectly justified in applying the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Civil Procedure Code to the application filed by the non-applicant under section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for making a reference. As the conclusion drawn by him that the non-applicant is a pauper is not challenged on merits, the revision application must fail. 18. The revision application is dismissed. In view of the fact that the revision application raised purely questions of law, there shall be no order as to costs. In view of the delay already. committed, it is directed that the reference be disposed of as early as possible. Revision application dismissed.